Changing intelligence dynamics in Africa

Which school of thought is the most valid: intelligence as the power behind the throne, the mediocre bureaucracy that delivers unhelpful intelligence reports, or the entity that must adapt to the times and constantly reinvent itself to stay relevant and to ensure its survival? Though there has been little critical analysis of the role of African intelligence services – not least because they have tended to operate in the political shadows - there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that talk of their pervasive powers is reasonably well founded. And yet a more introspective study reveals a more nuanced picture - their power is wielded at varying times and in differing circumstances, to differing and not always spectacular effect.

The book discusses the intelligence capacities of both larger, more established states and those of smaller and weaker states. Sometimes such states exist in a regional context, as is the case in the Great Lakes region. Here stronger states (Tanzania, Uganda) coexist with smaller ones (Burundi, Rwanda). Sometimes the size of a state does not necessarily translate into strength; the Democratic Republic of Congo is geographically large, but its state formations are relatively weak and in need of further development.

CIA officers working with Libya rebels

CIA officers are coordinating with antigovernment fighters and sharing intelligence, but the Obama administration is undecided whether to supply weapons. Leading lawmakers from both parties are against the idea.

Libye : à propos des mercenaires – CF2R

Beaucoup de choses ont été dites ou écrites sur les « mercenaires » servant dans les forces de sécurité libyennes. Il semble que la vérité soit beaucoup plus nuancée. A savoir que cela fait des dizaines d’années que des étrangers servent le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, soit au sein d’unités militaires, soit dans des milices armées. Leur importance réelle sur le plan opérationnel reste limitée.

British Special Forces & the Fall Of Tripoli

With Tripoli now in the hands of the rebels, reports are coming in that are fleshing out the role of British special forces in the operation to take the city. There are thought to be less than 50 United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) operatives inside Libya, with around 30 soldiers from the 22nd Special Air Service (22 SAS), a detachment from the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) along with associated support elements. MI6 operatives are also said to be on the ground and working closely with UKSF.

Libye. Une victoire des forces spéciales de la coalition ?

Officiellement il n’y a jamais eu de soldats de la coalition sur le terrain. Pourtant, la présence de forces spéciales occidentales sur le sol libyen est de plus en plus précise et ont permis l’avancée spectaculaire des rebelles.
Brigadier General Patrick M. Higgins – Commander, Special Operations Command Africa
interviewed by SOTECH Editor Jeff McKaughan

Training in Trans-Sahara Africa
The Malian patrol finally reached its objective, a small village north of Gao, following a long drive through the northern territories of vast desert in this Trans-Saharan nation slightly smaller than twice the size of Texas. This mission is an example of just one of many similar targeted missions the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Trans Sahara, or JSOTF-TS, accomplishes every year in Africa. Initiated in late 2006 by a handful of Special Operations officers, the JSOTF-TS was created as a unique organization capable of orchestrating counter-terrorism objectives under the auspices of the U.S. State Dept. initiated and led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, or TSCTP, with its integrated three-dimensional strategy of diplomacy, development and defense.

GUERRE DE L’INFORMATION

Patriot Hacker The Jester’s Libyan Psyops Campaign
It appears as if the patriot hacker known as The Jester (th3j35t3r) may have embarked on his own psyops campaign aimed at breaking the spirit of the troops loyal to Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi.

DGSE, MI6 et guerre psychologique en Libye
Les services de renseignement occidentaux ont renforcé leur présence en Libye, dans le but d’appuyer les rebelles et de déstabiliser les piliers du régime Kadhafi.

Words That Kill: Rumours, Prejudice, Stereotypes and Myths Amongst the People of the Great lakes Region of Africa
Much of the violent conflict in Burundi, Rwanda and the Kivu provinces of Congo over the past fifty years has been because of discrimination—and political, social and economic exclusion. In the worst cases the extreme intolerance of people of a different ethnic identity has taken the form of massacres and genocide. When this happens, people are being excluded or killed not for what rights or wrongs they have done—nor for what they believe, or even for what they have—but for their identity: for what they are, how they identify themselves and are identified by others. A few years ago, a respected research institute in the Great Lakes region organised a small regional conference in Bujumbura on the subject of the “identités meurtrières” — the “deadly identities” — that characterise the region. A year or so later, a small group of distinguished analysts from different academic disciplines began to meet periodically to share understandings and perspectives from the three core countries of the region. Two years ago, they decided to carry out some initial research on “Rumours, myths, prejudice and stereotypes in the Great Lakes region”.

CYBERMENACES

Evaluating Cyber Security Awareness in South Africa - Marthie Grobler, Joey Jansen van Vuuren, Jannie Zaaiman
To prevent innocent internet users from becoming victims of cyber attacks, an intensive awareness campaign is planned to educate novice internet and technology users with regard to basic security. The motivation for this awareness project is to educate all South Africans using the internet, in an attempt to strengthen the awareness level concerning the South African network - i there are local communities that are not properly educated, their technology devices may remain unprotected. This may leave the South African internet infrastructure vulnerable to attacks, posing a severe threat to national security.

In this specific project, national security will be promoted through awareness training focusing on the newly released broadband capability and knowledge transfer within rural communities. To evaluate the current level of cyber security awareness, a series of exploratory surveys have been distributed to less technologically resourced entities in rural and deep rural communities within South Africa. This paper discusses the preparation, evaluation and training of South African rural communities with regard to cyber security awareness. Due to the networked nature of the internet, the level of awareness has an influencing impact on the global community. Thus, to ensure a safely protected South African network, it is necessary to target the communities that can inadvertently leave the network vulnerable.

Le cybercafé et la cybercriminalité – Syndicat national des exploitants de Cyber de Côte d’Ivoire

TERRORISME

Le groupe islamique de combat libyen – CF2R, Notes d’actualité 255
African Counter-Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001
Ratification of the many counterterrorism conventions and protocols is the cornerstone of global efforts against terrorism. Africa’s generally low rates of ratification can be explained by political and capacity related factors, including that states do not see counter-terrorism as a sufficient priority and resist the manner in which the agenda is presented. Ratification matters, but those promoting counterterrorism measures must be more honest about what is likely and more humble about what is possible. Rather than pursuing a checklist approach to satisfying UN commitments, counter-terrorism strategy in Africa should include efforts to build foundational law enforcement, cooperation and prosecution capacity and embed human rights values.

Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats? – Findings from a New Database on Religion, Violence and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008 –GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, social science research has inadequately addressed the question of how and to what extent religion matters for conflict in Africa. This paper presents an innovative data inventory on religion and violent conflict in all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008 that seeks to contribute to filling the gap. The data underscore that religion has to be accounted for in conflict in Africa. Moreover, results show the multidimensionality (e.g. armed conflicts with religious incompatibilities, several forms of non-state religious violence) and ambivalence (inter-religious networks, religious peace initiatives) of religion vis-à-vis violence.

In 22 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries, religion plays a substantial role in violence, and six countries in particular—Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda—are heavily affected by different religious aspects of violence.

Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies
There are many definitions of terrorism and many ways to count it. The key, from a US policy viewpoint, is how the US government makes that count and what data it uses for measuring the threat and shaping its counterterrorism policies. With this in mind, the Burke Chair has compiled a set of tables showing terrorist attacks in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia from 2007-2010. The building steps implemented to decrease the chance of an accidental war.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – CSIS
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged from a decades-long militant Islamist tradition in Algeria. In 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA) because of the GIA’s extensive targeting of civilians. Gradually, the GSPC evolved to encompass global jihadist ideology in addition to its historical focus on overthrowing the Algerian state. In 2006, the GSPC officially affiliated with al Qaeda core, soon rebranding itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In the following years, AQIM was able to conduct a small number of large-scale attacks, most notably its 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers. In recent years, counterterrorism pressure and weak governance have combined to shift the center of AQIM’s presence to the Sahara-Sahel region. AQIM continues to make its presence known through smuggling operations, kidnappings, and clashes with security forces in the desert. In the coming years, general instability within the region could allow AQIM to further expand its influence.

West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has undertaken increasingly frequent and effective attacks in the past year, posing a dangerous and growing threat in Africa’s Sahel region. Reversing this trend presents a particularly complex challenge as AQIM has simultaneously strengthened ties to local communities and regional criminal networks. Efforts to counter AQIM will require collaborative region-wide strategies that feature complementary security and development approaches.

AQMI : un problème régional – Orion
Les récents événements éclairent d’une façon encore plus sombre les analyses et les conclusions de cette note, rédigée quelques jours avant le drame. Elle incite notamment à circonstancier les prises de position en ce qui concerne le recours à la force armée.

“C’est une entrée en guerre qui se dessine, mais cette escalade pourrait être sans issue. On voit mal à quoi pourrait aboutir une militarisation de la question”, sinon à “aggraver la situation et renforcer encore le sentiment anti-français, déjà de plus en plus fort”. Dans ce contexte, les solution à rechercher ne peuvent qu’être régionales.

Sitting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- Security threats in the Sahel are characterized by layers of intertwined and crosscutting interests at the local, national, and regional levels.
- International partners’ misunderstanding of these complex dynamics leaves them susceptible to manipulation by illegitimate national actors.
- Regional cooperation against transnational illicit trafficking and terrorism is hamstrung by governments that have calculated that their international standing is enhanced by the perpetuation of instability.
Au Sahel, une coopération internationale engageant les pays concernés est indispensable mais difficile à mettre en œuvre - Alain Rodier
Dans cet entretien, Alain Rodier décortique la stratégie adoptée par Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) en Afrique du Nord et au Sahel, et cerne les objectifs que s’est assigné d’atteindre ce groupe terroriste.

PROLIFÉRATION ET TRAFIC D’ARMES

West Africa Coast Initiative – UNODC
In order to significantly improve this situation the UNODC, DPA/UNOWA, DPKO and INTERPOL West African Coast Initiative (WACI), within the context of the ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan and the Freetown Commitment, strives to create Transnational Crime Units (TCU) to enhance national and international coordination, as well as to enable intelligence-based investigations. TCU will be elite inter-agency units, trained and equipped to fight transnational organized crime and to coordinate their activities in an international framework. This innovative concept could be expanded beyond the initial four target States to serve as a model for all ECOWAS members.

Lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères en Afrique de l’Ouest
Manuel de formation des forces armées et de sécurité - Direction Anatole Ayissi, Ibrahima Sall / UNIDIR - 2003
Bien former et bien préparer les forces armées et de sécurité pour qu’elles contribuent efficacement à la lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères, tel est l’objectif de ce Manuel de formation des forces armées et de sécurité ouest-africaines. Il s’inscrit ainsi au cœur du projet de développement, de paix et de sécurité initié par la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) depuis bientôt trois décennies.

Étude sur la prolifération des armes légères en République Démocratique du Congo
Réalisée à la demande du PNUD

Pentagon Looks to Africa for Next Bio Threat
No, it’s not a deleted scene from Outbreak. The Pentagon agency charged with protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction is looking to the insecure storage of pathogens at clinics in Africa as the next flashing red light for a potential biological outbreak.

Ticking Time Bombs: Ineffective Weapons Stockpile Management in Africa
Weapons and ammunition explosions at government depots, in particular at military stockpiles across the world, highlight the risks posed by inadequately managed and poorly stored weapons stockpiles. In Africa, the physical risks posed by these stockpiles, and the explosions that occur as a result of them, have left many communities suffering injury and death. While there have been a number of legal and political initiatives adopted to assist African governments in better managing and securing their stockpiles, there are still a range of challenges that contribute to continued explosions occurring on the continent.

Brits thwarted Zim arms ship
MI6 launched operation to stop Chinese weapons from reaching Mugabe after disputed 2008 elections.

CRIMINALITÉ ET MAFIAS

Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya
International Peace Institute - Peter Gastrow
Transnational criminal networks are corrupting and undermining state institutions in some countries to such an extent that they pose a threat to the state itself, according to two new reports from IPI made public on October 4th in Nairobi at a policy forum addressed by Kenyan Prime Minister Raila A. Odinga.
Peter Gastrow, IPI’s Director of Programs, said, “The threat posed by transnational organized crime is not confined to the harmful effects of the international narcotics trade or human trafficking. For many developing countries and fragile states, powerful transnational criminal networks constitute a direct threat to the state itself—not through open confrontation—but by penetrating state institutions through bribery and corruption and by subverting and undermining them from within. Governments that lack the capacity to counter such penetration, or that acquiesce in it, face the threat of state institutions becoming dysfunctional and criminalized, and of the very foundations of the state being undermined.”
Cocaine Trade Finds West Africa Window

The transcontinental cocaine trade is growing by exploiting West African states for transit hubs and cheap labor with potentially profitable outcomes for drug lords, traffickers and terrorist organizations. Sometime early last month, Malian and UN officials discovered a partially torched skeleton of a Boeing 727 aircraft on a small, makeshift airstrip in Gao, a remote city in northeast Mali, that was once the capital of the Songhai Empire and epicenter of the trans-Saharan trade route. No bodies were found. When, in coordination with Malian military forces, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) travelled to the former capital of the fallen empire to investigate, one of the Office’s representatives confirmed that the aircraft had departed from Venezuela, landed in Gao, but ultimately crashed after one failed takeoff attempt on 5 November. While no significant amount of drugs was reported to have been found aboard the aircraft, US and European intelligence agencies alleged that the plane was believed to have been transporting a large amount of cocaine and other illegal substances through North Africa. The UNODC estimated the plane could have been carrying up to at least 10 tonnes of cocaine and that the incident “was the first time the [UN had] heard of a plane of this size […] being used to smuggle drugs from South America to Africa.”

Popular Views on Crime in Tanzania

This brief explores popular perceptions of the crime situation in Tanzania, and the government’s effectiveness in handling this issue. The findings presented are based on three Afrobarometer surveys of public attitudes conducted in 2003, 2005 and 2008. The findings indicate that Tanzanians saw modest improvements in their personal safety and security between 2003 and 2005, but that there have been no further gains since then. Furthermore, although levels of theft victimization are still very high, Tanzanians nonetheless offer a generally positive assessment of the government’s efforts to reduce crime.

Resolving Intractable Conflicts in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone - Clingendael Institute

The war in Sierra Leone, which raged between 1991 to 2002, shares many features with other ‘intractable’ African conflicts characterized by a profusion of warring parties, the resort to extreme violence and brutal methods, the disposal of natural resources that generate greed, as well as a general background of natural collapse. This conflict therefore long seemed without end, an observation long corroborated by the fact that five years of attempts to bring peace through a negotiated settlement produced very poor results.

The purpose of this study is to assess which factors have allowed events to unfold in such a way, and in particular what type of (international, regional and local), actions have been undertaken in order to bring the war to an end. The first section is dedicated to analysis of the causes and nature of the conflict. The second part, which covers the period from 1996 to 2000, then focuses on the failed attempts to bring peace. The effective resolution of the conflict is the topic of the third part, which will also include some considerations about the current situation in order to highlight, inter alia, the fragility of the peace process.

Mains-d’œuvre africaines : un instrument au service de la politique intérieure et de la diplomatie libyennes

Laurence Aïda Ammour, CF2R, Tribune libre n°16

Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation - German Institute of Global and Area Studies

This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating between violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.
**Rapport Libye : un avenir incertain - CF2R**
Organisée à l’initiative du Centre international de recherche et d’études sur le terrorisme et d’aide aux victimes du terrorisme (CIRET-AVT) et du Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R), et avec le soutien du Forum pour la paix en Méditerranée, une délégation internationale d’experts s’est rendue tour à tour à Tripoli et en Tripolitaine (du 31 mars au 6 avril), puis à Benghazi et en Cyrénaique (du 19 au 25 avril), afin d’évaluer la situation libyenne en toute indépendance et neutralité et de rencontrer les représentants des deux parties.

**Libya after Qaddafi: State Formation or State Collapse?**
**German Institute for International and Security Affairs**
Under pressure from the rebellion, an international intervention, and comprehensive sanctions, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime is on the verge of collapse. As of late March 2011, regime forces are focused on retaining control of the north-western Libya, raising the prospect of protracted civil war and partition. Qaddafi’s demise is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Libya’s renewed stabilization. The post-Quaddafi state will essentially have to be built from scratch. However, political players will likely be more focused on the redistribution of wealth than on state building institutions. Scenarios for the post-Quaddafi era include a new deal among former regime elites that would lead to a renewed instability in the medium-term, or a more protracted, but ultimately more sustainable, state-building process. Hastening Qaddafi’s fall should be the main priority of Germany and other EU member states now. External actors should also support the Interim National Council as the nucleus of a post-Qaddafi government. However, they should refrain from playing an active role in the state-building process that will follow Qaddafi’s demise, as this would risk discrediting the process.

**The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic**
This working paper compares the experiences of Liberia and the Central African Republic, two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-conflict security sector reform. It seeks to shine light on the factual effect of the state’s security forces on the security of African citizens and the role of foreign security forces in security sector reform.

**RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX**

**Youth Militias, Self Determination and Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-delta Region of Nigeria**
The Niger-delta region, Nigeria’s oil belt has been the site of a generalised ethnic and regional struggle for self-determination since 1998, the location of often violent confrontations between local ethnic communities and agents of the Nigerian state and oil companies involved in the extraction and exploitation of oil in area. What began as community agitation has undoubtedly undergone several transformations. The first profound transformation was the flowering of civil society, which mobilised a popular civil struggle. In the second, the agitation was extended from that against multinational oil companies (MNCs) to include the Nigerian state. The third transformation involved the elevation of the agitation from purely developmental issues to include the political demands such as federal restructuring, resource control and the resolution of the national question through a conference of ethnic nationalities. The current and fourth stage of the transformation has seen the entrance of youths, youth militancy and youth militias with volatile demands and ultimatums that has elevated the scale of confrontations and violence with the multinationals and the state.

L’espace sahéo-saharien se caractérise par une conflictualité quasi générale qui n’épargne aucun de ses Etats, et par une collusion entre les réseaux de la criminalité internationale et ceux du terrorisme islamiste incarné par Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), dont les activités ont projeté la région dans le champ de confrontation globale de la mouvance djihadiste internationale. Mr le ministre Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga est unanimement reconnu comme l’un des meilleurs spécialistes des questions sécuritaires de l’espace sahélien. Il livre dans cette interview sa vision particulièrement éclairante des enjeux sécuritaires de cet espace géopolitique à part entière.

**L’Afrique sans Kadhafi : le cas du Tchad**
La chute violente de Mouammar Kadhafi, mort après sa capture le 20 octobre dans sa ville natale de Syrte, est porteuse d’une promesse de transition démocratique en Libye. Cependant, elle place aussi la Libye et ses voisins au premier rang desquels le Tchad, face à une multitude de potentiels nouveaux problèmes.

**Incidences sécuritaires du changement climatique au Sahel : perspectives politiques – OCDE, Février 2011**
Africa Center for Strategic Studies - Marie Trémolières, OCDE

Dans cette étude, les implications sécuritaires du changement climatique sont définies comme l’ensemble des facteurs affectant la stabilité globale de la région et celle des États qui la composent. La stabilité s’entend comme un concept dépassant les seuls conflits violents, pour intégrer une large gamme de risques et de vulnérabilités ayant un lien direct ou indirect avec la sécurité. Ce travail multidisciplinaire est divisé en trois champs d’études : climatologie, géographie, sciences sociales. L’objectif est, à partir des résultats obtenus et de leur croisement, de partir de la vulnérabilité, le climat et les préoccupations sécuritaires explique le choix géographique du projet. Bien que le point de départ de l’analyse concerne les sept menaces liées au changement climatique définies dans le rapport Solana (2008), elle intègre un certain nombre d’autres sources et s’appuie sur les quelques études de cas disponibles pour construire son argumentaire. Une synthèse des conflits ayant affecté le Sahel (Salliot, 2010) met en évidence les facteurs déclencheurs ou aggravants de nature climatique et/ou environnementale.

Une mise en relation de cette synthèse, des résultats du Hadley Centre (UK Met Office Hadley Centre, 2010) et de la littérature scientifique sur les interactions entre changement climatique et sécurité révèle des pistes de réflexions utiles à la formulation des politiques de développement et des mécanismes d’adaptation et d’alerte. Ces recommandations politiques pourraient nourrir le dialogue entre les pays de l’OCDE et de la zone sahélienne.

Pays charnière entre les ensembles maghrébin et sub-saharien, la Mauritanie est confrontée depuis quelques années à de fortes menaces sécuritaires. Outre le terrorisme, elle est également prise dans le maillage des flux criminels qui s’étendent du golfe de Guinée à la Méditerranée. Laurence Aïda Ammour dresse l’inventaire de ces menaces et des mesures prises par les autorités mauritiennes afin d’y faire face.

Est-il aujourd’hui concevable d’aborder les enjeux stratégiques méditerranéens en faisant l’impasse sur la géopolitique du théâtre sahélien ? Le Sahel est un espace charnière entre Méditerranée et Afrique subsaharienne. Espace tampon mais surtout espace de contact et d’échanges, difficilement contrôlable, l’arc sahélien développe une conflictualité endémique sur laquelle les différents acteurs ont peu de prise. Les facteurs déstabilisateurs sont nombreux : la fragilité des États de la région, les luttes internes de pouvoir, la militarisation croissante de la zone, la forte pression démographique, un climat d’insécurité généralisé, propice aux trafics en tous genres et finalement les diverses interventions étrangères, qui visent à se positionner au sein de ce couloir stratégique et à prendre le contrôle des richesses.

Dans cette étude, les implications sécuritaires du changement climatique sont définies comme l’ensemble des facteurs déclencheurs ou aggravants de nature climatique et/ou environnementale.

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Dans cette étude, les implications sécuritaires du changement climatique sont définies comme l’ensemble des facteurs déclencheurs ou aggravants de nature climatique et/ou environnementale.
Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
Matthias Basedau, Georg Strüver, Johannes Vüllers and Tim Wegenast – Giga Hamburg

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that religious structures such as overlapping ethnic and religious identities are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes likelier. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African armed conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if yes, in which way? To answer these questions, this paper draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g. demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g. inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Based on logit regressions, results suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. The findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis: Overlaps of religious and ethnic identities and religious dominance are conflict-prone; religious polarization is conflict-prone only if combined with religious discrimination and religious tensions.

Beyond Mugabe: Preparing for Zimbabwe’s Transition - CSIS
Zimbabwe presents a set of critical, immediate challenges for U.S. policy. Different scenarios, including an unsanctioned snap election, a military coup, and President Robert Mugabe’s early death, could precipitate a sharp, even violent, crisis later this year. The United States can best respond by reinvigorating its active engagement with southern Africa and with the volatile and rapidly changing situation in Zimbabwe. This report details possible scenarios and offers options for strengthening Washington’s immediate and medium-term leverage in partnership with South Africa and the Southern African Development Community. Beyond Mugabe: Preparing for Zimbabwe’s Transition draws on a series of discussions by a CSIS Working Group on Zimbabwe as well as the author’s travel to Zimbabwe and intensive additional consultation with civil and political society within Zimbabwe.

Emerging Security Threats in West Africa – May 2011
This special research report provides an analysis of a set of new issues that have been emerging in the West African subregion and possible implications for the Security Council in the coming year(s). It identifies some key emerging threats to peace and security in the 16-state subregion and their linkages to existing security challenges. The report points to a key feature: the fact that some of the new threats are essentially criminal rather than political in nature. However, it explains also the growing political and security implications. The report also highlights action already taken by the Council to recognise these threats and considers options available to the Council to tackle these issues going forward. The raw material for the study was derived from literature research; field research in a number of countries in the West African subregion (including Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria); and interviews in the region with diplomats, government officials and officials of relevant international intergovernmental bodies (e.g. UN Office in West Africa or UNOWA, UN Office for Drugs and Crime or UNODC, the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS and the AU), NGOs and academics.