Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness – GAO-11-621

Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness—that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions—a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission.

This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD's corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations.

Abbreviated Annual Report for 2009 - Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (the EOS Committee)

Each year, the EOS Committee submits a report to the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) outlining its activities. This abbreviated annual report for 2009 presents some of the principal issues from the more comprehensive report. References to the full report are provided for important issues. Chapter I provides a brief introduction to the Committee's mandate and composition. Chapter 2 contains an outline of the Committee's oversight activities, including inspections, investigation of complaints and matters raised on the Committee's own initiative. The chapter also provides a brief overview of important meetings, conferences and study visits in Norway and abroad.

Chapters 3 – 6 describe the oversight of the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), the National Security Authority (NSM), the Norwegian Defence Security Service (FOST) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (E-tjenesten). With a few principal exceptions, the services' contact with the Committee in connection with oversight activities has been constructive. Experiences from 2009 have shown that the Committee's activities contribute to safeguarding the rights of the individual, as well as generating confidence in the general public that the services operate within their legal framework.

Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services

Quel est le rôle du parlement dans l'examen des services de renseignement ? Pourquoi les parlements devraient-ils posséder un intérêt actif dans le contrôle des services de renseignement ? Quel est l'étendue du mandat de contrôle du parlement ? Quels sont les principaux défis du contrôle des services de renseignement ? Comment ces défis peuvent-ils être surmontés ?

Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight

This paper examines the work, the place, and the functioning of intelligence services in open and free societies. The paper considers the various elements that are necessary for creating a coordinated, civilian intelligence structure that is reflective of the needs of a democratic society and the threats to the state, and lists the main criteria for democratic control, supervision, accountability, and oversight of their activities. Correspondingly, the legal framework, the role, functions and procedures of executive and judicial control and supervision, and of legislative oversight are presented. In addition, some of the main problems facing states in transition whilst establishing democratic control and with the reform of their intelligence services are discussed.

2010 Data Mining Report – Office of the Director of National Intelligence

For the Period January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2010
Entity Profiling for Intelligence Using the Graphical Overview of Social and Semantic Interactions of People (GOSSIP) Software Tool – Peter Kwantes, Phil Terhaar

This paper aims to fill this gap by presenting statistical findings on the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in failing states. It utilises data from the Private Security Database that account for instances of military outsourcing by public actors (governments and international organisations) in failing states in the period 1990–2007. Starting from the assumption that PMSCs play an increasingly important role in the security environment in failing states by supplementing, substituting or compensating public forces, the paper raises three interlinked questions. To what extend is private security a common feature in countries that face episodes of state failure? Under which conditions are PMSCs present in countries with weak or failing governments? And what kind of effect do PMSCs have on political instability in general?

The Privatisation of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment

This paper to aim to fill this gap by presenting statistical findings on the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in failing states. It utilises data from the Private Security Database that account for instances of military outsourcing by public actors (governments and international organisations) in failing states in the period 1990–2007. Starting from the assumption that PMSCs play an increasingly important role in the security environment in failing states by supplementing, substituting or compensating public forces, the paper raises three interlinked questions. To what extend is private security a common feature in countries that face episodes of state failure? Under which conditions are PMSCs present in countries with weak or failing governments? And what kind of effect do PMSCs have on political instability in general?

Air Force Contingency Contracting Reachback and Other Opportunities for Improvement

RAND, by John A. Ausink, Laura Werber, Mary E. Chenoweth

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have placed great demands on the Air Force’s highly skilled contracting workforce. This report examines «reachback» — the use of contracting capability outside the theater of operations to accomplish contracting tasks for customers in the theater — as a potential means for reducing the deployment burden on military personnel. The authors analyze after-action reports written by contingency contracting officers (CCOs) who served in Iraq and Afghanistan, the results of focus groups with CCOs, interviews with subject matter experts, and purchasing data, and conclude that reachback might improve performance in some areas because of greater personnel continuity, standardization of processes, and the ability to access personnel with higher-level skills. Although reachback has the potential to reduce deployments and increase the effectiveness of some contracting functions, there is also a need for policy and procedural changes to address other causes of stress on contracting officers, so that they can concentrate more fully on their primary duty of purchasing goods and services for the warfighter.


Anne-Marie Buzatu, Benjamin S. Buckland – DCAF 2010

This paper will take a look at future trends in the international private security sector, beginning with an overview of some of the emerging private threats impacting the security sector today. This will be followed by a brief analysis of some of the challenges and opportunities posed by these actors to the security sector today and beyond. Finally, the paper will finish with some recommendations for responses to these challenges.

Raven Claw Forges Future Warrior-Diplomats

Trainees faced decisions ranging from eating fish heads full of teeth to providing the host nation with night vision goggles and satellite imagery. Nineteen Airmen tested their powers of diplomatic negotiation and combat readiness in Raven Claw, a week-long exercise devoted to preparing future combat aviation advisors for situations they may face downrange.


The author reviews the basic concepts related to “deception.” Dr. Joseph Caddell defines terms, provides historical examples, and discusses problems associated with deception. He provides a general overview, a “primer” which is not directed at those who already possess a working knowledge of deception operations. Nevertheless, given the complex and everchanging nature of deception in the political-military environment, it may serve as a useful reminder of the basic assumptions and methods concerning the subject.
The Use Of Music In Psychological Operations – SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)
What I find interesting is the number of academics that are fascinated by music in warfare. Besides the TV crew mentioned above, in a period of several weeks I was approached by a British University professor who wanted a lecture on music in interrogation and crowd control, a Texas University professor who wanted me to lecture on music in military operations, and an American TV production company that wanted me to talk about “heavy metal” music in warfare. They all seem to think that the use of music is a major theme, and yet it is quite rare. In fact, looking through dozens of military manuals I found hardly any comments on the subject. So, although this might seem like a major propaganda theme to those who study music, it is rarely used as PSYOP (compared to other themes like “surrender” or “hand in your weapons”), and often the music originates from a combat soldier or line unit rather than a PSYOP unit.

Cyber Security: The Road Ahead – Fred Schreier, Barbara Weekes, Theodor H. Winkler
Cyberspace is defined by its ubiquitous connectivity. However, that same connectivity opens cyberspace to the greatest risks. As networks increase in size, reach, and function, their growth equally empowers law-abiding citizens and hostile actors. An adversary need only attack the weakest link in a network to gain a foothold and an advantage against the whole. Seemingly localized disruptions can cascade and magnify rapidly, threaten other entities and create systemic risk. However, vulnerabilities in cyberspace are real, significant and growing rapidly. Critical national infrastructure; intelligence; communications, command and control; commerce and financial transactions; logistics; consequence management; and emergency preparedness are wholly dependent on networked IT systems. Cyber security breaches, data and intellectual property theft know no limits. They affect everything from personal information to national secrets. This paper looks at the way these problems are likely to develop, as well as at some of the ways they may best be tackled at the national and international level.

Ultrasurf, ou comment le gouvernement syrien piège ses opposants avec un malware
Nous avons cherché à comprendre comment le pouvoir de Bachar el Assad s’y prenait pour voler les comptes Facebook, Twitter, ou Gmail de ses opposants, et comment il parvient à les identifier pour les arrêter. Nous avons réussi à mettre en lumière l’un des procédés du gouvernement Syrien afin de piéger ses opposants.

Defense Department Cyber Efforts: More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities – GAO-11-421
The U.S. military depends heavily on computer networks, and potential adversaries see cyberwarfare as an opportunity to pose a significant threat at low cost—a few programmers could cripple an entire information system. The Department of Defense (DOD) created U.S. Cyber Command to counter cyber threats, and tasked the military services with providing support. GAO examined the extent to which DOD and U.S. Cyber Command have identified for the military services the (1) roles and responsibilities, (2) command and control relationships, and (3) mission requirements and capabilities to enable them to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace operations. GAO reviewed relevant plans, policies, and guidance, and interviewed key DOD and military service officials regarding cyberspace operations.

Are We Winning?
Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against al Qaeda and Associated Movements – American Security Project
Security is a fundamental responsibility of government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but the United States has not built alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. Terrorists have expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral authority of the United States is at an all-time low. Changes in the Earth’s climate are more evident every day, but the United States has failed to act, alone or with allies, to avoid disaster. America needs a new national security vision for this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic. Yet the quality of our discussion on national security has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversation. Artificial differences have been created and real differences have been left unexamined. The character of our national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the need for honest discussion has grown more urgent. Only by developing real analysis and thoughtful answers can a genuine foreign policy consensus be rebuilt for a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America again marshal all her resources—military, diplomatic, economic, and moral—to meet the challenges of a complex world.

9/11 ten years on: Terrorism as a manageable risk
The threat of jihadist terrorism has evolved in recent years. The core organisation of al-Qaeda is weakened. The large majority of other Islamist extremist organisations have not followed its call for global jihad and are pursuing more local agendas. Homegrown terrorists remain a challenge for Western security, especially if they have ties to established jihadist groups. Current counterterrorism works, however, to the extent that the probability of mass-casualty attacks in the US and Europe has diminished. Terrorism is a real but manageable risk that Western governments should no longer overemphasise.
Militants in Pakistan Military: Signs of Danger – RSIS, Sajjad Ashraf

The increasing radicalisation of the Pakistani Armed Forces mirrors the growing militancy in the country. Demanding action from a fractured military and society would lead to greater chaos.

Patterns in Terrorism in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia: 2007-2010

Center for Strategic and International Studies

There are many definitions of terrorism and many ways to count it. The key, from a US policy viewpoint, is how the US government makes that count and what data it uses for measuring the threat and shaping its counterterrorism policies. With this in mind, the Burke Chair has compiled a set of tables showing terrorist attacks in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia from 2007-2010. ce-building steps implemented to decrease the chance of an accidental war.

First inventory of policy on counterterrorism: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States - 'research in progress' 2006 – Rudie Neve, Lisette Vervoorn, Frans Leeuw, Stefan Bogaerts

This report presents a first inventory of measures aimed at combating radicalisation, extremism and terrorism (referred to in this report as counterterrorism policy) in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Commissioned by the NCTb, the WODC (the Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice) carried out a study into counterterrorism measures in place in the countries investigated in early 2006. This study comprises the first international inventory of a number of policy fields under development, whereby the counterterrorism policies discussed here are characterised by extremely rapid development and innovation. This inventory can serve as point of departure for the registration of policy developments and to obtain an insight into their effectiveness. The continuous monitoring of the developments is therefore recommended.

Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo-Taliban

By Charles R Blair

The greatest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure emanates from jihadists both inside Pakistan and South and Central Asia, generally. While there is a broad appreciation of this danger, there are few substantive studies that identify and explore specific groups motivated and potentially capable of acquiring and employing Pakistani nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials. This report fills that gap by exploring the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT) and the dozens of groups that compositely fill its ranks. Originally this report was to be a section of TAP's South Asian Nuclear Security Report—scheduled for release by FAS in winter 2011-2012. However, when Usama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan on May 2, 2011, and with ongoing concerns about Pakistan's links to jihadist organizations targeting the U.S. and her interests, FAS decided to immediately release the section that explores the PNT as well as its constituent groups and allies.

Pakistan's Madrasas: Moderation or Militancy? The Madrasa Debate and the Reform Process

Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre

Why have the madrasas become a subject of such controversy? What roles do madrasas play in Pakistani society? What are the main challenges and opportunities for madrasa reform? Since 11 September 2001, Pakistan's madrasas have received much attention from the media, policy analysts and politicians. The bulk of the literature has asserted strong links between madrasas and militancy. Madrasas have thus become the focus of a much larger debate on Islam and militancy. This security discourse has placed the most radical madrasas in the spotlight and has left out the moderate, non-militant and non-political madrasas. From a broader policy implication perspective, one can more constructively and fruitfully approach the “madrasa challenge” by looking at the diversity of schools existing in this sector, in terms of size, financing, and theological and ideological positions, as well as at their links to political groups. This report presents the core issues in the debate and identifies some of the challenges and opportunities for reform. The paper is based on a review of existing secondary source literature and primary sources, including 17 interviews with madrasa leaders in Pakistan, Pakistani government officials, as well as academics, analysts and journalists who in different ways have analyzed madrasa reform or the related debate. The interviews were conducted in April and May 2010 and February 2008.

The Taliban's Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence – CTC Sentinel, Ben Brandt

Given the efficacy of the insurgents' intelligence operations, detailed analysis of the history, scope, and structure of the Taliban's intelligence function is crucial for successful counterinsurgency operations, as is an understanding of the collection and counterintelligence tactics it employs, and the aims which it seeks to achieve by the use of intelligence.

Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety – By Shaun Gregory

Two high-profile attacks by terrorists on highly secure military bases in Pakistan, the first on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the second on the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran near Karachi in May 2011, have renewed international anxiety about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. This article addresses several worrying trends in Pakistan that are coming together to suggest that the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan may very well be compromised at some point in the future.

US EU Cooperation Against Terrorism – Congressional Research Service

This report features a historical overview of EU efforts against terrorism within the context of EU-US counterterrorism cooperation. The report acknowledges a revival of the EU's momentum to improve law enforcement cooperation against terrorism in cooperation with the US. It concludes, however, that despite closer collaboration, the US and EU continue to face challenges as they seek to promote closer cooperation in police, judicial, and border control fields.
Al Qaeda After Bin Laden. Implications for American Strategy – RAND, by Brian Michael Jenkins
Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on June 22, 2011.

Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and plan operations against the United States and its interests across the globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen.

National Strategy For Counterterrorism – June 2011
This National Strategy for Counterterrorism articulates our government’s approach to countering terrorism and identifies the range of tools critical to this Strategy’s success. This Strategy builds on groundwork laid by previous strategies and many aspects of the United States Government’s enduring approach to countering terrorism. At the same time, it outlines an approach that is more focused and specific than were previous strategies.

PROLIFÉRATION ET TRAFIC D’ARMES

National reports on arms exports – Henning Weber and Mark Bromley – SIPRI Fact Sheet
Since the early 1990s an increasing number of governments have chosen to publish national reports on their arms exports. These reports vary enormously in both the amount of information they contain and the level of detail they provide. This Fact Sheet compares the level of detail provided in national reports on arms exports produced worldwide.

Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet
In Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet, South Asia Center Non-resident Senior Fellow Barbara Slavin outlines the penalties imposed on Iran as a result of its nuclear program; its support for organizations the U.S. government has designated as terrorist; and its human rights abuses. It also discusses the impact of these penalties on Iran’s nuclear advancement, and the consequences for the overall Iranian economy.

Maritime Counter-proliferation: The Case of MV Light – RSIS, By Euan Graham
The recent turning around of a cargo ship suspected of carrying missile technology was a qualified success for maritime counter-proliferation. It demonstrated both the effectiveness of internationally concerted action and the limits to interdiction operations at sea.

CRIMINALITÉ ET MAFIAS

Narcotics as a growing security concern – Center for Security Studies
The global narcotics trade is gradually becoming an international security threat. The drug-financed Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and drug-related violence in Mexico are examples. Efforts to combat the problem aggressively in either source or transit countries have only worsened it. Meanwhile, terrorists are showing signs of cooperating with drug traffickers, due to a convergence of interests and methods. Unless the narcotics-insecurity cycle is met with greater counternarcotics coordination, it may spread even further.

DTEI 205, Combatting Drugs in Mexico Under Calderon: The Inevitable War
Since the beginning of his administration, President Felipe Calderon launched a war against drug trafficking using the Army and the Federal Police. This strategy has had serious unintended consequences in terms of the level of violence. The paper argues that even if the anti-drug strategy of Calderon has been very costly in terms of violence, there was no other alternative, as the other options were not viable at the beginning of the Calderon administration.

The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact, and Response – RAND
Colombia currently accounts for the vast bulk of cocaine produced in Latin America. In 2009, the country produced 270 metric tons (MT) of cocaine, making it the principal supplier for both the United States and the worldwide market. Besides Colombia, Peru and Bolivia constitute two additional important sources of cocaine in Latin America. In 2009, these two countries generated enough base material to respectively yield 225 and 195 MT of refined product. Between 60 and 65 percent of all Latin American cocaine is trafficked to the United States, the bulk of which is smuggled via the eastern Pacific/Central American corridor. The remainder is sent through the Caribbean island chain, with the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Haiti acting as the main transshipment hubs. In both cases, Mexico serves as the main point of entry to mainland America, presently accounting for the vast majority of all illicit drug imports to the United States.
**World Drug Report 2011 - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna**

Many illicit drug markets have reached global dimensions and require control strategies on a comparable scale. In that context, there is a need to better understand these transnational markets and the manner in which they operate. The yearly World Drug Report is a contribution towards that objective. This year’s edition starts with an overview of the illicit drug situation worldwide and regionally, followed by more comprehensive discussions and statistical trends for the key transnational drug markets, namely opium/heroin, cocoa/coca, amphetamine-type stimulants and cannabis.

**Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: Societal Warfare South of the Border?**

*Small Wars Journal*

This short essay is about impression—gut feelings combined with a certain amount of analytical skill—about recent trends taking place in Mexico concerning the ongoing criminal insurrections being waged by the various warring cartels, gangs, and mercenary organizations that have metastasized though out that nation (and in many other regions as well). The authors spent over eight hours sequestered together about a month ago on a five-hundred mile there and back again road trip to attend a training conference as instructors for the Kern County Chiefs of Police. Our talks centered on Mexican Drug Cartels, 3rd Generation Gangs, 3rd Phase Cartels, Criminal Insurgency Theory, etc. Our impression is that what is now taking place in Mexico has for some time gone way beyond secular and criminal (economic) activities as defined by traditional organized crime studies. In fact, the intensity of change may indeed be increasing. Not only have de facto political elements come to the fore—i.e., when a cartel takes over an entire city or town, they have no choice but to take over political functions formerly administered by the local government—but social (narcocultural) and religious/spiritual (narcocultos) characteristics are now making themselves more pronounced. What we are likely witnessing is Mexican society starting to not only unravel but to go to war with itself.

**Protective intelligence lessons from an ambush in Mexico – Stratfor**

On the afternoon of May 27, a convoy transporting a large number of heavily armed gunmen was ambushed on Mexican Highway 15 near Ruiz, Nayarit state, on Mexico’s Pacific coast. When authorities responded they found 28 dead gunmen and another four wounded, one of whom would later die, bringing the death toll to 29. This is a significant number of dead for one incident, even in Mexico. Whether the objective of the ambush was simply to trap and kill a Zeta military team conducting a raid or to steal a high-value load of narcotics, a look at this incident from a protective intelligence point of view provides many lessons for security professionals operating in Mexico and elsewhere.

**Special Report - If Monterrey falls, Mexico falls – Reuters**

In just four years, Monterrey, a manufacturing city of 4 million people 140 miles (230 km) from the Texan border, has gone from being a model for developing economies to a symbol of Mexico’s drug war chaos, sucked down into a dark spiral of gangland killings, violent crime and growing lawlessness.

**Taking Drugs Seriously - Demos**

Since first coming to public prominence at the end of 2009, legal highs have posed a major challenge to existing legal and legislative structures designed to deal with drugs. With the market in manufactured psychoactive substances like mephedrone moving faster than public policy can accommodate, this report asks whether the assumptions enshrined in the 40-year-old Misuse of Drugs Act are still valid when applied 21st century drugs market. Bringing together stakeholders from across all areas involved in drugs policy - including frontline practitioners such as medical professionals, youth workers and law enforcement - Taking Drugs Seriously brings bold, innovative responses to an area too often dominated by stale rhetoric. The report points a way forward for public policy, taking account of the opportunities for new thinking presented by the challenges of the modern drugs market.

**Rapport annuel 2010 – Miviludes**


**Contrôler les trafics ou perdre le Nord – Notes sur les trafics en Mauritanie**

*Alain Antil, Note de l’Ifri*
Tensions with the United States could lead to more-significant Iranian aid to the Taliban. The Baluchi insurgency in Iran is an important factor in determining Iran's behavior in Afghanistan; and that increasing Afghanistan. The authors find that Iran appears to be pursuing at times contradictory objectives in Afghanistan; that examines Iran's objectives and interests in Afghanistan and the consequent Iranian policies affecting U.S. forces in government that is battling Taliban forces. Iran's complex and, at times, contradictory set of cultural, religious, political, forces in Afghanistan. However, Iran also maintains close and constructive relations with the same Afghan central The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provide measured support to Taliban insurgents battling U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Insecurity and the inflow of billions of dollars in international assistance has failed to significantly strengthen the state's capacity to provide security or basic services and has instead, by progressively fusing the interests of political gatekeepers and insurgent commanders, provided new opportunities for criminals and insurgents to expand their influence inside the government. The economy as a result is increasingly dominated by a criminal oligarchy of politically connected businessmen. On the surface, security conditions in the capital city appear relatively stable. The nexus between criminal enterprises, insurgent networks and corrupt political elites, however, is undermining Kabul's security and that of the central-eastern corridor. Afghan citizens, meanwhile, are squeezed on all sides – by the government, the insurgency and international forces.Nearly a decade after the U.S.-led military intervention began, little has been done to challenge the perverse incentives of continued conflict in Afghanistan. The Burke Chair has prepared a report based on a recent trip to Afghanistan, and discussions with US officials and commanders. The trip report and detailed analyses reveal a NATO/ISAF effort that has made progress in many areas: the fight against the Taliban, the development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), some important aspects of Afghan governance, and some aspects of the development activities that are critical to winning the support of the Afghan people and meeting their urgent needs. It also revealed, however, that serious problems and uncertainties remain and that this progress may be wasted unless the US and its allies do a better job of assessing the risks that remain in the war, resourcing it over time, and showing the necessary strategic patience.

The focus of this working paper, purposefully left open to debate and amendment, in turn, is on civilian deaths caused by drones within Pakistan as reported by eight non-governmental and news organisations. This focus reflects the mission of www.everycasualty.org to be a hub of information and debate on the recording of conflict's casualties. The Burke Chair has prepared a report based on a recent trip to Afghanistan, and discussions with US officials and commanders. The trip report and detailed analyses reveal a NATO/ISAF effort that has made progress in many areas: the fight against the Taliban, the development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), some important aspects of Afghan governance, and some aspects of the development activities that are critical to winning the support of the Afghan people and meeting their urgent needs. It also revealed, however, that serious problems and uncertainties remain and that this progress may be wasted unless the US and its allies do a better job of assessing the risks that remain in the war, resourcing it over time, and showing the necessary strategic patience.
Libye : un avenir incertain – CF2R, CIRET-AVT
Organisée à l’initiative du Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R) et du Centre international de recherche et d’études sur le terrorisme et d’aide aux victimes du terrorisme (CIRET-AVT), et avec le soutien du Forum pour la paix en Méditerranée, une délégation internationale d’experts s’est rendue tour à tour à Tripoli et en Tripolitaine (du 31 mars au 6 avril), puis à Benghazî et en Cyrénaïque (du 19 au 25 avril), afin d’évaluer la situation libyenne en toute indépendance et neutralité et de rencontrer les représentants des deux parties.

RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX

China’s New Marine Interests: Implications for Southeast Asia – RSIS, Yang Fang
China has for the first time included a chapter on marine development in a Five Year Plan. This emphasis on the marine economy presents both challenges and opportunities.

Maritime Security in Northeast Asia: Naval Competition and Maritime Safety
Jon M. Van Dyke - Spring 2011

L’espace sahéro-saharien se caractérise par une conflictualité quasi générale qui n’épargne aucun de ses Etats, et par une collusion entre les réseaux de la criminalité internationale et ceux du terrorisme islamiste incarné par Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), dont les activités ont projeté la région dans le champ de confrontation globale de la mouvance djihadiste internationale. Mr le ministre Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga est unanimement reconnu comme l’un des meilleurs spécialistes des questions sécuritaires de l’espace sahélien. Il livre dans cette interview sa vision particulièrement éclairante des enjeux sécuritaires de cet espace géopolitique à part entière.

Les futurs chocs mondiaux – OCDE • Future Global Shocks – OECD
Le rapport analyse 5 risques majeurs potentiels pour les années à venir, à savoir : une pandémie (de type SRAS) – une cyber-attaque visant une infrastructure critique – une nouvelle crise financière – un conflit socio-économique (dû par exemple à la raréfaction d’une matière première) – une tempête géomagnétique (d’origine solaire qui paralyserait l’ensemble du réseau informatique).

The Failed States Index 2011
The Failed States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Failed States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

Russia’s North Caucasus: An Arc of Insecurity – Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich
Although Chechnya no longer makes international headlines, instability persists and has actually spread within the wider North Caucasus region. Degrading socio-economic conditions, an unstable political situation, and increasing religious tension have made the North Caucasus susceptible to Islamist insurgency and terrorist activity. The modernisation strategy for the North Caucasus launched by Moscow in 2008 has failed to reverse the situation so far. Turning into an arc of insecurity, the region poses a growing challenge to stability within Russia and beyond.

Global Conflict: Future Trends and Challenges Towards 2030
Key points include: 1. Deaths from conflict have been declining on a continuous trend, reducing by 90% since the 1950s. This trend should continue given economic growth, globalisation, democratisation, and better international conflict management cooperation. However, many fragile states in danger of conflict have institutional deficits with a mismatch between state capacity and the scale of complex challenges faced. These often include structural unemployment. 2. Democracy is not a Western export and is widely valued. All democracies are finding that power is being diffused to an ever greater multiplicity of actors and current democratic systems do not make it easy to agree and implement long term policies. 3. Power transitions create perilous moments in history. Future risks include: potential great power rivalry; proliferation of weapons and components; low-cost wars; failure of international governance to adapt to new powers; ageing populations and youth bulges; and resource competition/market volatility. 4. Conflict is likely to move into new frontiers, including cyber, space and robotics, particularly as the cost of traditional war makes other options more attractive. Links between terrorist and criminal networks are also becoming more common.