Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape – Considerations for the 112th Congress

Statement of Michael E. Leiter, National Counterterrorism Center – Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security

The past two years have highlighted the growing breadth of terrorism faced by the United States and our allies. Although we and our partners have made enormous strides in reducing some terrorist threats—most particularly in reducing the threat of a complex, catastrophic attack by al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership in Pakistan—we continue to face a variety of threats from other corners. These of course include those commonly referred to as “homegrown terrorists” who have longstanding ties to the United States and who are often inspired by al Qa’ida’s ideology. While these newer forms of threats are less likely to be of the same magnitude as the tragedy this nation suffered in September 2001, their breadth and simplicity make our work all the more difficult.

Oral Statement of James R. Clapper Jr., Director of National Intelligence

House Permanent Select committee on intelligence

The Intelligence Community is a team. It is a community. And I’m very proud to be associated with my colleagues here today, who represent literally, in toto, hundreds of years of public service and involvement in the intelligence profession. I want particularly to comment, though, on two of the organizations.

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community – 10 February 2011

Written Statement of James R. Clapper Jr., Director of National Intelligence – House Intelligence Committee

This statement goes into extensive detail about numerous state and non-state actors, crosscutting political, economic, and military developments and transnational trends, all of which constitute our nation’s strategic and tactical landscape. Although I believe that counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counterintelligence are at the immediate forefront of our security concerns, it is virtually impossible to rank—in terms of long-term importance—the numerous, potential threats to U.S. national security. The United States no longer faces—as in the Cold War—one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats—and the actors behind them—that constitute our biggest challenge. Indeed, even the three categories noted above are also inextricably linked, reflecting a quickly-changing international environment of rising new powers, rapid diffusion of power to non-state actors and ever greater access by individuals and small groups to lethal technologies. We in the Intelligence Community believe it is our duty to work together as an integrated team to understand and master this complexity. By providing better strategic and tactical intelligence, we can partner more effectively with Government officials at home and abroad to protect our vital national interests.

Changing intelligence dynamics in Africa

Which school of thought is the most valid: intelligence as the power behind the throne, the mediocre bureaucracy that delivers unhelpful intelligence reports, or the entity that must adapt to the times and constantly reinvent itself to stay relevant and to ensure its survival? Though there has been little critical analysis of the role of African intelligence services – not least because they have tended to operate in the political shadows - there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that talk of their persuasive powers is reasonably well founded. And yet a more introspective study reveals a more nuanced picture - their power is wielded at varying times and in differing circumstances, to differing and not always spectacular effect.

The book discusses the intelligence capacities of both larger, more established states and those of smaller and weaker states. Sometimes such states exist in a regional context, as is the case in the Great Lakes region. Here stronger states (Tanzania, Uganda) coexist with smaller ones (Burundi, Rwanda). Sometimes the size of a state does not necessarily translate into strength; the Democratic Republic of Congo is geographically large, but its state formations are relatively weak and in need of further development.
Drones for German Foreign and Security Policy?
The use of drones of various sizes has led to a paradigm shift in military aviation all over the world. Drones do not only complement the capabilities of manned aircraft, they also increase efficiency, save costs and improve safety. In 2000, the U.S. Armed Forces only had about 50 drones; in October 2009, they already had more than 6,800. Drones have long since busted the traditional military straitjacket. Technological trends such as automation, digitization and miniaturization significantly increase the range of their current uses – from disaster control, protection of major events and critical infrastructure up to counter-terrorism. They also give rise to many new, unusual applications, which cannot be entirely foreseen, such as the monitoring of oil and gas pipelines, of migration movements, the protection and monitoring of the transport of dangerous goods.

At what risk? Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations
Second Interim Report to Congress – Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Regrettably, our government has been slow to make the changes that could limit the dollars wasted. After extensive deliberation, the Commission has determined that only sweeping reforms can bring about the changes that must be made. We must expand responsibility and accountability for contracting outcomes. The business of contracting must be treated commensurately with its cost in taxpayer dollars and with its mission-critical role in contingency operations.

Small Arms and Private Security Companies Parliamentary Handbook 2010
In October 2007 the Board of the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted a Policy Statement on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Privatization of the Security Sector. The Forum acknowledged the negative impact that the private security sector can have, if unregulated, on security governance, fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Therefore the Forum is now ready to engage with parliaments and parliamentarians across all regions to jointly address these challenges, and to ensure that we place the control and use of weapons by Private Security Companies firmly within the Small Arms and Light Weapons agenda.

The Forum recognises that the privatization of security can often make a valuable contribution by increasing the state’s and public institution’s effectiveness in the realm of security. Yet it is the lack of legitimacy and accountability that has resulted in cause for concern, hence the requirement for effective oversight mechanisms. This handbook does not elaborate on the positive contributions that Private Security Companies make to public security; it focuses on the risks involved of having a weak or inadequate legal framework for these expanding activities. The privatization of the security sector is a very important issue related to democracy, which is why we – the politicians – have a duty to become involved with it. We, as the representatives of the people, are one of the most relevant actors in this area and must act as guarantors of law and effective human rights.

Operation Dawn of the Gulf of Aden (2011)
Operation Dawn of Gulf of Aden was a naval operation by the Republic of Korea Navy against Somali pirates in the Arabian Sea. The operation was spurred by the pirates’ seizure of the South Korean chemical tanker Samho Jewelry. In response, the South Korean government sent a destroyer and 30 South Korean Navy SEALs (ROKN SEALs) to retake the ship and rescue its crew. After trailing the tanker for several days and fighting a preliminary engagement that neutralized four of the pirates, the ROKN SEALs retook the ship by force on January 21, 2011 in a successful boarding action that resulted in the death of eight and the capture of five out of seventeen pirates.

‘Prevent, Prepare’ Key Special Ops Roles – Secretary of Defense Public Affairs
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined strategic defense priorities: prevail in war, prevent and deter conflict, prepare for future conflicts and contingencies, and preserve and enhance the force. «Today I want to unpack the ... ‘prevent’ and ‘prepare,’ and discuss how I see [special operations forces] playing a critical role in both of those areas,» Dr. Janine Davidson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for plans, yesterday told attendees here at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 22nd Annual Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict Symposium.

Army Special Ops Continues to Grow, Increase Optempo
U.S. Army Special Operations Command has more than doubled its manpower since Sept. 11, 2001, and according to its deputy commander, mission requirements and operations tempo will continue on an upward glide path. Maj. Gen. Kurt Fuller said special operations forces are presently working on 116 missions in 53 countries -- and «that’s actually sort of low. It’s usually somewhere between 60 and 65 countries, small numbers of people in most spots that total between 5,500 and 6,000 people.»

Tally Helfont – FPRI’s Program on the Middle East
Tally Helfont, of FPRI’s Program on the Middle East, analyzes the content of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad U.S. cell’s propaganda as a means to explain its ideological foundations and the way in which it was used to further the PIJ’s goals of terror fundraising in the United States.
**WikiLeaks in the Arab Press – Tally Helfont, 2/2011**

On November 28, 2010, WikiLeaks—a non-profit media organization known for publishing secret and classified information obtained from anonymous sources—released 250,000 American diplomatic cables, detailing high-level meetings between prominent American diplomats and their international counterparts. These cables, many of which dealt with the Middle East and featured frank and often embarrassing statements by several Arab leaders, sent ripples throughout the region. [1] The disproportionately high number of cables dealing with the Middle East has been attributed to the United States’ increased focus on the region during the past decade, in addition to the “war on terror.” [2] Coverage of the leaks, or more specifically the extent and frequency of the coverage, has varied from country to country. In a region where secrecy is paramount and “public candor is rare,” the WikiLeaks cables highlight the great divide between Arab public opinion, “tends to favor a strong Iran, even a nuclear-armed Iran, as a counterweight to Israel and to US hegemony” and the hawkish views of Arab leaders about “Persians or pragmatism about Israel.”

**Cybermenaces**

**Défense et sécurité des systèmes d’information – Stratégie de la France**


L’objectif de ce document est de préciser les grandes lignes de la stratégie poursuivie par la France depuis la publication du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale afin de garantir, dans le cyberespace, la sécurité de nos compatriotes, de nos entreprises et de la Nation.

**The cost of cyber crime**

The overall cost to the UK economy from cyber crime is £27bn per year, according to the first joint Government and industry report into the extent and cost of cyber crime across the UK, launched today by the Office of Cyber Security & Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office and information intelligence experts Detica. With society now almost entirely dependent on cyber space, developing effective strategies to tackle cyber crime requires a better understanding of its impact. Its breadth and scale have been notoriously difficult to understand and past attempts to set cyber crime policy or develop strategies have been hampered by a real lack of insight into the problem.

«The Cost of Cyber Crime» report reveals that whilst government and the citizen are affected by rising levels of cyber crime, at an estimated £2.2bn and £3.1bn cost respectively, business bears the lion’s share of the cost. The report indicates that, at a total estimated cost of £21bn, over three-quarters of the economic impact of cyber crime in the UK is felt by business. In all probability, and in line with worst-case scenarios, the real impact of cyber crime is likely to be much greater.

**Cyberspace Operations – Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12**

Force’s foundational doctrine publication for Air Force operations in, through, and from the cyberspace domain. AFDD 3-12 represents known sanctioned ideas and practices in the three chapters described below. This document means to provide insight for Airmen4 to follow. This document speaks to Air Force support of maintaining Cyberspace Superiority, a common military function.

**Cyber threat landscape faced by financial and insurance industry – Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo**

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, February 2011

Opportunities for criminals to engage in transnational activities have expanded with globalisation and advancements in information and communications technologies. Cyber criminal activities will increasingly affect the financial security of online business. It is widely accepted that the financial and insurance industry is the “target of choice” for financially motivated cyber criminals. Yet there is a lack of understanding about the true magnitude of cyber crime and its impact on businesses. Drawing on data from a 2008 Australia-wide survey conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the threat landscape faced by the financial and insurance industry by assessing the top four risk areas reported by the survey respondents. The paper also examines whether the results from the financial and insurance industries differ from other industries and identifies ways in which industries (particularly the financial and insurance industry), can neutralise or reduce cyber crime opportunities.

**New Guide on Cyber Security Incident Management to support the fight against cyber attacks**

The EU’s ‘cyber security’ Agency ENISA (the European Network and Information Security Agency) has issued a new guide on good practice, practical information and guidelines for the management of network and information security incidents by Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).

**Informationising’ Warfare: China Unleashes the Cyber and Space Domain**

In the age of globalisation, warfare now encompasses political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and psychological dimensions, in addition to the earlier land, sea, air, space, and electronics spheres. As a result, the military sphere may no longer necessarily serve as the dominant sphere in present or future conflicts. On the contrary, there is increasing likelihood that future wars will be conducted in spheres not traditionally concerned with war. As a matter of fact, Lian Xiangru’s diplomatic battle of “returning the jade in an undamaged condition to Zhao” and the virtual war conducted by Mo Zì and Gongshu Ban, were classical examples of winning or precluding a war with non-military actions.
An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq - Rand
This monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group’s power and influence. The authors draw on captured documents that give details on the daily financial transactions of one specific sector within Anbar province and of the financial transactions of the AQI provincial administration. Some of their conclusions are: AQI was a hierarchical organization with decentralized decisionmaking; AQI in Anbar was profitable enough to send substantial revenues out of the province in 2006; AQI relied on extortion, theft, and black market sales to fund its operations in Anbar; AQI needed large, regular revenue sources to fund its operations, but its administrative leaders did not hold much cash on hand. The authors’ interpretation of data on compensation practices and participants’ risk of death indicates that AQI members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group. The authors also find that mounting attacks required organizational expenditures well beyond the cost of material used in attacks. One major conclusion is that disrupting AQI’s financial flows could disrupt the pace of their attacks.

Al Qaeda’s Operating Environments: A New Approach to the War on Terror
The environment in which an al Qaeda affiliate operates is one of the most important factors in assessing the threat it poses to US interests. Defeating the militant Islamist network led by al Qaeda requires a nuanced strategy that supports the appropriate combination and prioritization of policies and approaches for each environment in which an al Qaeda affiliate or franchise operates. The US government has not articulated such a strategy, a deficiency that acquires urgency because terrorist groups based abroad have been linked to three attacks against the American homeland in the past year. Building a strategy to oppose the al Qaeda network requires detailed understanding of its different operating environments, the ties between its various parts, and how territory affects its vitality. A comprehensive strategy should deny the al Qaeda network access to operating environments from which it can pose a major threat to the United States and the West.

Global Ambitions: An Analysis of al Shabaab’s Evolving Rhetoric – Cody Curran
Al Shabaab’s rhetoric has evolved over time and developed an increasingly global militant Islamist undertone as the group has gained strength in Somalia. The message of al Shabaab’s published statements has conveyed the transition in Somalia’s political situation from a nationalistic struggle against the Ethiopian occupation to a broader conflict within the context of global jihad. Al Shabaab’s statements also reveal an evolving understanding of the utility of propaganda, which the group has used in order to win the support of the Somali people in their fight to uproot the Somali government and replace it with an Islamist state. A closer examination of al Shabaab’s changing rhetoric concerning goals, operations, and threats suggests that al Shabaab’s tactics and strategy have shifted, and while the establishment of an Islamist state in Somalia remains its top priority, al Shabaab’s desire to participate in the global jihad can no longer be denied.

The Facebook Jihad – RSIS Commentary, Iftekharul Bashar
While the world remains engrossed in debates triggered by Wikileaks, a new threat from cyberspace is emerging. Social networking sites have now become a potential space for recruiting extremists. We may call this the Facebook Jihad. On 4 JANUARY 2011, the governor of Pakistan’s Punjab Province Salman Taseer was killed by one of his body guards, Malik Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri confessed to the murder because of Taseer’s vocal opposition to the country’s blasphemy law. Within a few hours of this assassination, a Facebook page for the alleged killer was created. The page gathered nearly 2000 fans in an hour and hundreds of people wrote messages, praising the killer. Although the page was removed shortly afterwards, this incident represents an emerging scenario where social networking in cyberspace could become a tool of radicalisation at a much faster pace, and with less control than through conventional websites. It has been quite some time since the world came to know that a large number of extremists are tech-savvy. They know how to use the cyberspace for pursuing their goals. Social networking sites are now a potential space for recruiting urban jihadists.

Understanding the Indian Mujahideen – Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)
India has been plagued with insurgency and militancy over the last five decades. The long festering insurgency in Northeast India is presently at a low ebb. The Khalistani militancy was nipped in the bud in the early 1990s, although there have been renewed attempts at a revival. The militancy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been ongoing for the past two decades. These insurgencies, by and large, have remained confined to their own geographical precincts. However, a disturbing phenomenon has occurred over the past few years. Terrorism, by and large motivated by Islamic jihad, has spread to the Indian hinterland. Increasingly, the targets of attack are not restricted to the state symbols and the security forces, as was the feature in the heyday of the Northeast and J&K militancies, but have now extended to the innocent and defenceless civilian populace. The terror attacks today target not only the populace in general but also the economic and commercial hubs of the Indian heartland in particular.

The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: Islam And Transnational Militancy
Belfer Center, Thomas Hegghammer
Foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida, because war volunteering is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy. For example, when Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their home countries right away, but travel to a war zone such as Iraq or Afghanistan first. A majority of al-Qa’ida operatives began their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi groups today are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations.
Foreign Fighters, Sovereignty, and Counter-Terrorism: Selected Essays – Michael Noonan, FPRI’s Program on National Security held a conference on the foreign fighter problem, July 14-15, 2009, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. Michael Horowitz, Michael P. Noonan, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Harvey Sicherman, and Stephanie Kaplan served as panel moderators. Nearly 100 individuals from academia, government, NGOs, the media, the military, and the public attended, and another 180 individuals from around the world participated by webcast.

Prolifération et trafic d’armes

Using Enrichment Capacity to Estimate Iran’s Breakout Potential
While diplomats and officials claim Iran has slowed down its nuclear drive, new analysis shows that Iran’s enrichment capacity grew during 2010 and warns against complacency as five world powers resume talks this week.

Presidential commission urges caution on ‘synthetic biology’ – By Rob Stein, Washington Post Staff Writer
The emerging field of «synthetic biology» holds great promise for producing new medicines, cleaning up the environment, and providing alternative energy sources and other benefits, but the U.S. government needs to take precautions to ensure that laboratory-made microbes do not cause unexpected catastrophes, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues has concluded in its first report.

Italy: New program studies ways to prevent and respond to biosecurity threats
A new €6 million ($8.2 million) project funded by the European Commission will study both how to prevent and respond to biological threats to the world’s crops and forests.

The five-year project will bring together experts from eight nations, including Italy, the United States, Israel and Turkey. It began operations on Feb. 1, but is being officially launched on Thursday in Turin.

Small Arms Proliferation in South Asia: A Major Challenge for National Security
South Asia has been perpetually plagued by numerous intractable threats and challenges, particularly those emanating from unresolved territorial and boundary disputes. It is arguably the second most dangerous region in the world after West Asia; and radical extremism in the Af-Pak region is nudging it rapidly towards acquiring the pole position. One of the major reasons for this dubious distinction is the large-scale proliferation and easy availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Pentagon Looks to Africa for Next Bio Threat
No, it’s not a deleted scene from Outbreak. The Pentagon agency charged with protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction is looking to the insecure storage of pathogens at clinics in Africa as the next flashing red light for a potential biological outbreak.

Criminalité et mafias

Deterrence, Economics, and the Context of Drug Markets – Shawn D. Bushway and Peter Reuter
Part I contended that a productive and nuanced discussion about the relative merits of the punishment threat can be carried out within the context of the economic model of rational choice. Within this discussion, we pointed out that the model can predict, a priori, cases where particular deterrence strategies will be ineffective (e.g. severity-based strategies in a world where current punishments are already severe). But this use of the rational choice model is inherently limited, because it fails to exploit the “market” part of the basic rational choice model. This is particularly important when speaking about deterrence strategies in a world where much of the punishment is being directed at drug markets, and drug dealers, either directly or indirectly. This observation is true whether the issue is severity or certainty based strategies.

Coproduction in deterring crime – Philip J. Cook
Long prison terms are an inefficient way to control crime. A reallocation of existing resources from prisons to policing could reduce crime rates if the prison budget cuts came in the form of reduced use of long prison terms. This article offers support and precision to a long-held tenet of criminology—that would-be criminals are more likely to be deterred by an increased probability of punishment than increased severity.

In this policy essay, I expand their thought experiment to bring in the role of private citizens. The effectiveness of the police in threatening punishment for crime is greatly influenced by private inputs, particularly the provision of timely information and cooperation after arrest. Private choices also are the primary determinants of the ecology of criminal opportunities (Cook, 1986). Thus, private action combines with public law enforcement resources to coproduce crime control. If the goal were to enhance the deterrence effect, then it would pay to consider ways to encourage private inputs into crime control.

La presse menacée par le crime organisé – Reporters Sans Frontières, Février 2011
Measuring the effectiveness of drug law enforcement – Katie Willis, Jessica Anderson and Peter Homel

Seizing drugs and arresting those who import, manufacture, grow and/or distribute these drugs is often viewed as the most important purpose of drug law enforcement. This view is certainly strong in popular media depictions of organised drug criminals. Unfortunately, the reality is perhaps far less entertaining or straightforward, although just as, if not more, important. While there is no doubt that a key role of drug law enforcement is to remove drugs and high-risk offenders from the community, the most critical factor is what this actually achieves in the longer term. That is, a community that is less burdened by the impact of drugs, such as crime, illness, injury and death. Increasingly, there is both internal and external pressure on drug law enforcement to demonstrate not just how much work they do (the seizures and arrests), but how well they do it (the community impacts)—something that has so far proven very difficult. This paper outlines the nature of these challenges and summarises findings from a national project that shows a practical and effective way forward in measuring the impacts of drug law enforcement.

Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium - Rand

The supply of and demand for qualified police officers are changing in a time of increasing attrition, expanding law-enforcement responsibilities, and decreasing resources. These contribute to the difficulties that many agencies report in creating a workforce that represents community demographics, is committed to providing its employees the opportunity for long-term police careers, and effectively implements community policing. This book summarizes lessons on recruiting and retaining effective workforces.

Development in Afghanistan's Counterinsurgency: A New Guide – Dr. Mark Moyar

This guide offers a comprehensive alternative approach, derived from the leader-centric model of counterinsurgency and based upon a wide variety of counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and previous conflicts. According to this approach, the primary purpose of development aid in counterinsurgency should be to improve local security and governance, because development is less important than security and governance and is effective only where security and governance are present. Development aid should be used to co-opt local elites, not to obtain the gratitude of the entire population, and should be made contingent on reciprocal action by those elites. The elites must be selected carefully, as the selection of certain elites will empower malign actors or alienate other elites. The number of organizations involved in development activities should be kept as small as possible, and greater attention should be paid to the selection of leaders for those organizations, as leadership quality has a great impact on project effectiveness. In select districts and provinces, governors should be permitted to use development aid to bolster patronage networks. The current aid streams flowing into Afghanistan far exceed the capacity of leaders and development personnel to handle them, so aid levels should be reduced, and emphasis on quantity of aid spent should be replaced with emphasis on attainment of COIN objectives. In Afghanistan, senior leaders of USAID and other foreign development organizations still prefer long-term development to short-term stabilization, to the detriment of the counterinsurgency. If they cannot be convinced to change their ways, then their participation in Afghanistan may need to be downsized.
Artillery Lessons from the Early 21st Century – Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

Today, battle experience or the experience of the artillery arm of a nation in live firing during battle is rare. Given the rarity of inter-state wars, this eventuality is not surprising. The US-led coalition forces invading Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom in March-April 2003, comprised of artillery from the US Army, the US Marine Corps and the Royal Artillery. Recent papers in journals such as Field Artillery and Military Review of the US or the Royal Artillery Journal of the UK are indicative of the many lessons emerging from this operation. The crux of the lessons emerging is that surface-delivered fire power is inescapable and needs much more attention. The operation also has a core finding that the maximum casualties to US-led forces, either in Afghanistan or Iraq, have been from mortars. From Iraq, the most fundamental lesson emerging is that indirect fires are an indispensable element of ground operations. In addition, the meaning of precision is getting erroneously mixed up with the hype of precision munitions. The insight is that when we mean precision, the target may or may not be one specific point.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War – International Crisis Group

An arms race, escalating front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and a virtual breakdown in peace talks are increasing the chance Armenia and Azerbaijan will go back to war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Preventing this is urgent. Increased military capabilities on both sides would make a new armed conflict in the South Caucasus far more deadly than the 1992-1994 one that ended with a shaky truce. Neither side would be likely to win easily or quickly. Regional alliances could pull in Russia, Turkey and Iran. Vital oil and gas pipelines near the front lines would be threatened, as would the cooperation between Russia and Turkey that is central to regional stability. Another refugee crisis would be likely. To start reversing this dangerous downward trend, the opposing sides should sign a document on basic principles for resolving the conflict peacefully and undertake confidence-building steps to reduce tensions and avert a resumption of fighting.

There has been significant deterioration over the past year. Neither government is planning an all-out offensive in the near term, but skirmishes that already kill 30 people a year could easily spiral out of control. It is unclear if the leaders in Yerevan and Baku thoroughly calculate the potential consequences of a new round of tit-for-tat attacks. Ambiguity and lack of transparency about operations along the line of contact, arms deals and other military expenditures and even the state of the peace talks all contribute to a precarious situation. Monitoring mechanisms should be strengthened and confidence-building steps implemented to decrease the chance of an accidental war.

Regional Security In East Asia: An Fpri Conference Report – Jacques deLisle

Gilbert Rozman argued that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from «economics in command» to «security in command.»


The pattern of Asian geopolitics can be examined by employing three analytical perspectives. The first employs East Asia and the vigorous debate over the meaning of the rise of China as an intellectual prism to observe the currents of geopolitical continuity and change that are currently abroad in the Asian region. The second explores the extent to which the interacting forces of geopolitics and military modernization foster the rise of new force projection capabilities that may affect the strategic environment in Asia—particularly in East Asia. Here, the focus is mainly on the arsenals of the three indigenous Asian giants, China, Japan and India, all of whom have developed, or are in the process of developing, significant air and maritime assets whose operations have the potential to intersect in East and South East Asia. Russia is not as much a presence because it no longer possesses its powerful Soviet-era Pacific Fleet and has, in essential respects, retreated to its traditional role as a Eurasian land power. The third examines the future of Sino-American relations in Asia in the context of the debate over China's ascent and U. S. decline—a discussion that has intensified since the implosion of the U.S. financial system in 2008 and the onset of the worst global recession since the 1930s.

Countering Pakistan's Asymmetric Warfare

India faces numerous, complex and unique security challenges, which range from unresolved border disputes with China and Pakistan, to insurgencies in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and the Northeastern states, the growing menace of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) and terror attacks across the length and breadth of the country. China, despite its recent belligerence at the tactical level, is still considered a threat in the long term. As far as current threat levels are concerned, most of them are directly or indirectly linked to Pakistan and its strategy of asymmetric warfare executed through a well-calibrated design, to exploit the fault lines in India’s socio-politico-economic structure.

Animal Rights Don’t Justify Human Wrongs – Julie Bindel

Feminists, vegetarians and animal-rights activists accuse Peta of being inherently misogynist, with a philosophy based on a general intolerance of those opposed to Peta’s value system. Many claim that the organisation hates humans more than it loves animals. One lifelong vegetarian and animal liberationist who asked not to be named says: «Peta would sooner give chickens the vote than give a damn about people. They are misanthropes, through and through.»
Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity And Central Asia's Growing Importance For Stability In Afghanistan And Pakistan – The Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate

As water demand for food production and electricity generation increases, in part as a result of the quickening pace of climate change, so too must our efforts to provide water security. While much of our focus currently rests on Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must also consider the interests in the shared waters by India and the neighboring five Central Asian countries—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. This report draws on staff travel to the region and the work of experts in government, academia, and international institutions. It provides significant insight and several key recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Central and South Asia with respect to this vital transboundary resource.

Red Footprints in Gilgit-Baltistan: China’s Expanding Presence in PoK

The debate around the China-Pak axis and that of the relationship between the ‘all-weather friends’ has drawn concern from the regional players, most significantly, India. Cementing the ties further, Chinese President Hu Jintao cast light on the decades-old strategic partnership, and characterised the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad as one that was “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans.” As recent reports seem to suggest, a subtle move by Pakistan to allow increased Chinese activity in the strategic area of Gilgit-Baltistan has added fuel to the fire that threatens to alter the existing security scenario in the region.

Amérique Latine : situation sécuritaire en 2010 - Alain Rodier, CF2R

La situation sécuritaire en Amérique Latine en 2010 continue à se dégrader. Sept pays de ce continent se classent dans les huit premiers du monde en ce qui concerne le rapport nombre d’homicides/nombre d’habitants. Cette insécurité permanente constitue un frein au développement économique de la région qui permettrait aux populations de sortir de la pauvreté dans laquelle elles sont majoritairement cantonnées. Le cercle vicieux suivant est donc bien enclenché : la violence accentue la crise économique qui pousse les plus défavorisés vers le crime organisé, lequel génère de la violence et ainsi de suite...

Changing Nature of Conflict: Trends and Responses – Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have witnessed what can justifiably be termed a paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. The world is no longer concerned primarily with threats of a conventional nature such as conflicts between states or groups of states. Sub-conventional conflicts, ranging from intra-state conflicts to global terrorism, are gaining prominence. The world is being increasingly confronted with violence so amorphous that security forces are struggling to cope with it.

The emerging security environment is radically different from what it was even a decade ago. In the increasingly globalised world, the new security challenges are products, not of conventional inter-state rivalries, but of economic, demographic and societal tensions that are trans-national in nature.

Incidents of conflict are on the rise due to a multiplicity of factors, ranging from weak and illegitimate state institutions, marginalisation of people in border areas (generating sanctuaries for various insurgent groups), large scale population displacements and ineffective regional security arrangements.

Will Russia End Eastern Europe’s Last Frozen Conflict?
The Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate