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ACTUALITÉ DU RENSEIGNEMENT

Intelligence spending at record \$80.1 billion in first disclosure of overall figure – *The Washington Post*

The government announced Thursday that it had spent \$80.1 billion on intelligence activities over the past 12 months, disclosing for the first time not only the amount spent by civilian intelligence agencies but also by the military.

Director-General's CEPS Keynote Speech «Nexus of Australian Security and Intelligence» *Director-General of Security Address to Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security International Conference – 8 October 2010*

I have been asked to speak today about the nexus of Australian security and intelligence. As the head of an Organisation whose business – and raison d'être – is security intelligence, both subjects are a somewhat necessary preoccupation of mine, and the other officers of ASIO. The nexus is simple: good intelligence contributes to enhanced security decision-making, both at a strategic and a tactical or operational level – in the Cabinet Room or on the battlefield, at the negotiating table, in police headquarters or even by individual citizens deciding about travel overseas. An intelligence apparatus that improves your ability to make decisions on the basis of well-informed assessments about the capabilities and intentions of those who may in some way threaten our nation, its citizens or interests, has long been recognised as a real advantage.

ASIO Report to Parliament 2009-10

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation's (ASIO) Report to Parliament 2009–10 was tabled by the Attorney-General on 21 October 2010. This is an unclassified version of a highly classified report which ASIO presents to the Attorney-General each year. The ASIO report details the ongoing nature of threats to national security in an evolving environment and the work undertaken by ASIO to counter these threats. Terrorism, foreign interference and espionage, including cyber intrusions, remained constants in the Australian threat environment.

The ASIO report highlights the importance of recognising Australia as part of the global security environment an environment where rapid technological advances present new challenges in protecting the security of Australia.

Director-General's Address to National Security College Conference – 5/27/2010 'Limits of Sovereignty and Constraints of Multilateralism - implications for domestic security'

Intelligence agencies must cope with the restrictions of liberal democracy, or risk being a threat to that democracy itself. But so too does liberal democracy rely on a strong foundation of security, stability and social cohesion; foundation which is in large measure provided by a nation's security and intelligence apparatus, operating both within the limits of sovereignty and the constraints of multilateralism.

ODNI Issues New Security Standards for Intel Facilities

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has issued new standards for the construction of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs).

Intelligence, Information Technology and Cyber Programs – Andrew Davies

The 2009 Defence White Paper has much to say about military hardware, which has naturally captured the headlines, but there are also some initiatives that cover the enabling technologies and capabilities that allow the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to operate as a coherent whole and in a whole of government context. There is a discussion of the further development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and the networking of the ADF. Two major initiatives are an Australian-owned surveillance satellite and a new cyber warfare capability. Both of these have applications well outside of the defence domain and will present some challenges in their implementation. However, the White Paper discusses these initiatives in generalities only.

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The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) – Annual report 2009

This annual report is a public account of the activities of the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) in 2009. It also enables the AIVD to provide an overview of its observations, actions and achievements across the full scope of its professional activities. Through this report, and within the limits of what is possible for a “secret” service, we hope to offer an insight into our work and into the contribution we make to a safe and secure society.

Today, six-and-a-half decades later, the AIVD continues to safeguard national security and protect Dutch democracy. Focusing upon the information needs of our government and public sector, whilst at the same providing information, analyses and advice of use to our partners and keeping an eye on the social and political environment, we operate at all times from a position of professional independence.

Le défi du renseignement – Les Cahiers de la Sécurité, n°13, juillet/septembre 2010

Sommaire-résumé, 32 pages.

Mysterious Cold War Signals

An important part of the Cold War was fought in the aether. All sorts of radio signals, communications in voice, Morse or in data, radar and navigation signals were transmitted and intercepted by East and West.

Often, the secrets behind the signals were revealed, either by TechELINT or espionage. However, some signals remained unidentified and some of them even rose to the stardom of mysterious Cold War signals.

Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009

October 2010 – Kevin Strom, John Hollywood, Mark Pope, Garth Weintraub, Crystal Daye, Don Gemeinhardt

Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery.

L'Allemagne et le contrôle parlementaire des services de renseignement

Thorsten Wetzling – IFRI, octobre 2010

Cet article aborde cette problématique en examinant comment le Parlement allemand a mis en œuvre son devoir de contrôle du Renseignement en enquêtant sur trois cas spécifiques. Dans le cadre des affaires « BND en Irak », Murat Kurnaz et Khaled El-Masri, le principe de responsabilité n'a été que faiblement favorisé, voire a parfois été empêché, par l'accroissement du contrôle exercé sur la gouvernance du Renseignement.

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..... PRIVATISATION DU RENSEIGNEMENT & DE LA SÉCURITÉ

Private Contractors: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the use of contractors reached a level unprecedented in U.S. military operations. As of March 31, 2010, the United States deployed 175,000 troops and 207,000 contractors in the war zones. Contractors represented 50 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) workforce in Iraq and 59 percent in Afghanistan. These numbers include both armed and unarmed contractors. The presence of contractors on the battlefield is obviously not a new phenomenon but has dramatically increased from the ratio of 1 contractor to 55 military personnel in Vietnam to 1:1 in the Iraq and 1.43:1 in Afghanistan. This increase is the logical outcome of a series of decisions going back decades. Yet the U.S. Government has not systematically explored the essential question: Does using contractors in a conflict zone make strategic sense? This paper explores that question. It examines the good, the bad, and the strategic impact of using contractors in conflict zones. It concludes with policy recommendations for the future employment of contractors and outlines additional actions needed to understand and cope with the rapidly expanding use of armed contractors worldwide.

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..... FORCES ET OPÉRATIONS SPÉCIALES

Afghan warlord's private army trained in Australia

SENIOR militia fighters loyal to a notorious Afghan warlord have been flown to Australia to train with elite special forces as part of a covert strategy to strengthen military operations against the Taliban.

Unique training opportunity links SOF, conventional and allied nation forces

Coordination and synchronization between conventional and special operations forces (SOF) is crucial on the modern battlefield since both share integral roles within an area of responsibility – whether it involves intelligence gathering or conducting combat operations.

Jackal Stone 10 SOF Exercise Concludes

Jackal Stone 10, a multinational Special Operations Forces military exercise, concluded in Poland and Lithuania on Sept. 27, marking the third consecutive year of the capstone training event for U.S. Special Operations Command Europe.

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◆ SECDEF Predicts More Women in Special Ops Forces

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said yesterday he anticipates that more women will serve in military special operations in the future. "My guess at some point is that there will be a careful step in that direction with the special operations forces," Gates told about 300 ROTC students here at Duke University.

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..... GUERRE DE L'INFORMATION

📰 WikiLeaks and the Real Face of Modern War – Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS

The US, its allies, and the world are going to have to learn to live with the fact that this is almost certainly going to be at least a half century of conflict with non-state actors who are ideologically driven and are not subject to any meaningful pressure or controls by either the legalities of war or a concern for human rights.

They will manipulate and be manipulated by state actors to drive insurgency and terrorism to extremes. They will manipulate civil violence and terrorism, along with intimidation, kidnappings, and disappearances.

◆ Mind Games. A brief history of information warfare – Philip M. Taylor | Oct 7, 2010, Tablet

Israeli information warriors—both government operatives and the media they work to manipulate—fail to understand global media warfare. Their mishandling of the crises in Lebanon and Gaza and the recent flotilla incident has cast Israel as the villain in the global theater of war and conflict. Israel has not understood the difference between how it sees itself and how others perceive its actions, or if it has, it seems not to care whether the audience dislikes its performance on the Middle Eastern stage.

Many Western observers are bemused by the actions of a democratic nation that arguably has the best cause in the world but the worst propaganda, especially on a regional and wider global level. Perhaps, for domestic political purposes, Israel is too preoccupied with domestic opinion—which, in reality, can be relied upon to be largely patriotic given that the Jewish state is bordered by so many hostile neighbors.

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..... CYBERMENACES

◆ Modern Warfare, Too – The Stuxnet attack on Iran is a new development in the evolution of cyberwarfare Michael Tanji, Tablet

Two themes have emerged in media coverage of Stuxnet: that it is a "cyber weapon" designed to disable critical infrastructure computer systems, and that its sophistication is such that only a powerful nation-state could have created it. The reality is that Stuxnet is something special, but not in the way that most observers have noted.

◆ Londres prend conscience des risques de cyberattaques – Le Figaro

Les services secrets britanniques envisagent de se doter d'une «capacité de dissuasion» sur Internet. Mercredi, pour la première fois, Iain Lobban s'est exprimé en public sur son domaine d'activité devant des spécialistes de la sécurité à Londres. Une intervention en forme de mise en garde.

◆ Iain Lobban's speech at the IISS in London

Making the first major public address by a GCHQ Director, the head of the Government's listening post said there was «a real and credible» threat to critical national infrastructure. However there was also «an opportunity which we can seize if Government and the telecommunications sector, hardware and software vendors, and managed service providers can come together». Mr Lobban addressed a selected audience of journalists, opinion formers, government officials, academia and industry representatives on issues related to cyber security and the threat posed by cyber attacks.

◆ Commission proposes new EU cybercrime law

The European Commission wants to harmonise the laws of EU member states dealing with cyber-attacks. It wants to create a new Directive on attacks on information systems, it said in a statement.

◆ Defending a New Domain – The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy – William J. Lynn III

Right now, more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to hack into the digital networks that undergird U.S. military operations. The Pentagon recognizes the catastrophic threat posed by cyberwarfare, and is partnering with allied governments and private companies to prepare itself.

📰 Cybersecurity – Key Challenges Need to Be Addressed to Improve Research and Development

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has so far failed to live up to its responsibility to coordinate a national cybersecurity R&D agenda, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in a report released this week. As a result, the U.S risks falling behind other countries on cybersecurity matters, and being unable to adequately protect its interests in cyberspace.

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TERRORISME

◆ **Is the Main Source of Chechen Rebel Weapons Georgia, or the Russian Army? – The Jamestown Foundation**
 On October 25, Russian Deputy Prosecutor General Ivan Sydoruk, deliberately or not, undercut Kadyrov's accusations against Georgia, stating that most of the weapons in the hands of rebels in the North Caucasus came from Russian military units.

◆ **Lutte anti-terroriste dans le district du Caucase du Nord – Ivan Soukhov**
 Le 19 janvier 2010, le président Medvedev a décidé la création du District du Caucase du Nord (DCN). Depuis la mise en place de cette nouvelle structure administrative, les acteurs sécuritaires russes ont enregistré certains succès sur le front nord-caucasien. Il est clair, toutefois, que ces succès n'ont pas mis un terme à l'activité insurrectionnelle dans le Caucase-Nord.

Ces derniers mois, les combattants ont été en mesure de perpétrer une série d'attentats retentissants. En août, un attentat à l'explosif a été perpétre à Piatigorsk. Ce dernier attentat, qui a coûté la vie à 20 personnes, semble d'ailleurs constituer un avertissement direct adressé au nouveau représentant plénipotentiaire du Président russe dans le district du Caucase du Nord, Alexandre Khloponine. En effet, quoiqu'il en soit de ses commanditaires, qu'il s'agisse des insurgés ou de clans caucasiens, cet attentat vient contredire toutes les tentatives de Khloponine pour convaincre les investisseurs que le nouveau district est en mesure d'être pacifié.

◆ **European Reports Paint Grim Picture of Kadyrov's Chechnya – The Jamestown Foundation**
 The emerging consensus is that the spread of militant Islam in the North Caucasus can be and should be tamed by addressing the real needs of the people. If the West consciously turns a blind eye to the processes, the locals are likely to rely on Islamic militancy in increasing numbers. This outcome would be not only contrary to the West's interests, but also to a great extent contradict Russia's own long-term well-being.

◆ **Is there a Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan? – The Jamestown Foundation**
 Yet a year after the killing, and following many more years of targeted attacks by Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IMU not only has a new leader, Abu Uthman Adil, but is also supposedly becoming more active in Tajikistan and the northern areas of Afghanistan (for Adil, see Furqon.com, August 17). Assessing the capabilities and future of the IMU is thus highly pertinent in light of intensified drone attacks against the group's forces, the planned U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan and ongoing talks with the Taliban.

◆ **Security and Defense: The day after – Jerusalem Post**
 When Israel thinks of a nuclear Iran, it's not just concerned about change in balance of power; it's more concerned about nuclear terrorism. In February 2009, a professor named Abdallah Nafisi gave a lecture in Kuwait and discussed how the tunnels that are used by smugglers under the Mexican-American border could be used in a potential terror attack against the US.

◆ **New terrorism centre watching home-grown jihadis**
 THE nation's intelligence agencies are running "hundreds" of terrorism investigations and home-grown jihadis are posing one of the greatest threats to security, the country's top spy has warned.
 The remarks, by the Director-General of Security and head of ASIO, David Irvine, came at the opening of the latest national security showpiece, the Counter-Terrorism Command Centre. The centre, based at ASIO's headquarters in Canberra, will cost \$9.1 million over four years and be run by a small group of agency officers, as well as staff from ASIS, federal police and the Defence Signals Directorate.

◆ **The Legacy of Syed Ahmad Barelvi in India – R. Upadhyay, South Asia Analysis**
 On his return from Mecca, Ahmad Barelvi also known as founder of Wahhabi movement in India, founded an organization namely Tariqah-i Muhhamdiyah (The Way of the Prophet Muhammad) and designated himself as Amir al Mumin (Commander of the Believers). Fully inspired with Waliullah's political thought for converting the Ajlafs into true Islamists, he toured the length and breadth of the country particularly Bihar, Bengal, Punjab and Kashmir and found that the Ajlafs were still following Islam within their pre-Islamic cultural mindset like visiting even the Hindu mystics, also following their recommendations for overcoming their worldly problems, having no inhibition in wearing their pre-Islamic dresses. They constituted the larger majority of Muslim society and were therefore the main target area of Barelvi for their brainwashing and turning them into full-fledged Muslims.

◆ **Organizational Innovations in Counterterrorism: Lessons for Cyber-security, Human Trafficking, and Other Complex National Missions – Daniel R Langberg**
 One issue that demands particular attention in the contemporary security environment is how best to apply whole-of-government approaches to complex national missions, ranging from combating terrorism and trafficking in persons to securing cyberspace. These and many other twenty-first-century security challenges require an agile and integrated response; however, our national security system is organized along functional lines (diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, etc...) with weak coordinating mechanisms across these functions. Today, there is no definitive model for integrating capabilities and funding for inherently interagency missions.

Yémen : Anwar Al-Awlaki, le 'Ben Laden' de l'internet cible de la CIA – Alain Rodier, CF2R, Note d'actualité n°227
 La CIA aurait lancé un contrat sur la tête d'Anwar al-Awlaki, surnommé le « Ben Laden de l'Internet » après avoir reçu l'aval des plus hautes autorités de Washington. Il s'agit là d'une première car il semble qu'aucun citoyen américain n'ait fait l'objet d'une telle mesure, même du temps de la Guerre froide. Il a été désigné officiellement comme un « élément terroriste » par l'ordre 13224

Somalia's Second Islamist Threat: A Backgrounder on Hizb al Islam – Nathaniel Horadam

The Islamist militant group al Shabaab continues to pose the greatest threat to stability in Somalia, and has only strengthened its positions within the country since Ethiopia's withdrawal in January 2009. The fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has limited territory in most of the country and now controls only a few square kilometers in Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the only military force preventing the TFG's collapse, but it has a strictly defensive mandate, and the pro-government Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama'a lacks the military capacity to defeat al Shabaab on its own. Another Islamist militant group, Hizb al Islam, has suffered over the past year from al Shabaab's rise despite a nominal alliance between the groups. Hizb al Islam has endured many defections due to the disparate interests of its factions and successive military defeats. Nonetheless, the group still holds and administers several strategic locations in and around Mogadishu, and the coastal town Harardhere in Mudug region. Its militias continue to conduct operations, and it counts some of the nation's most prominent and influential clan leaders and clerics among its ranks. It may not pose the threat within Somalia and internationally that al Shabaab does, yet it continues to act as a destabilizing force in the country.

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PROLIFÉRATION ET TRAFIC D'ARMES

Tokyo Drift? – Dr Tomoya Saito

Dr Tomoya Saito's article appeared in «CBRNe WORLD Autumn 2010». This article describes the CBRN defence capability in Japan after the subway sarin attack in Tokyo

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues – CRS, December 2009

Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan's nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards.

**Armes légères – Gestion des frontières terrestres et trafic illicite
 Jihan Seniora et Cédric Poitevin, GRIP**

Le trafic illicite des ALPC à travers les frontières terrestres se caractérise par des dynamiques particulières à prendre en compte dans les réponses que l'on peut lui apporter : le lien entre le trafic illicite des armes et la criminalité transnationale organisée ; le rôle des communautés transfrontalières ; les zones frontalières comme refuges pour les trafiquants d'armes et enfin, le « trafic de fourmi ». Ces aspects influençant la demande en armes, l'intensité et le sens des trafics entre pays limitrophes méritent une attention particulière dans les efforts de renforcement de la surveillance des frontières et des contrôles aux postes frontaliers.

Plusieurs défis se posent à un contrôle des frontières efficace contre le trafic illicite des ALPC. Le premier est la nécessité de considérer la circulation des ALPC illicites comme une thématique à part entière dans la conception et la concrétisation de la gestion des frontières. Deuxièmement, aux postes frontaliers mêmes, il convient d'optimiser le contrôle en clarifiant le rôle des agences impliquées dans la gestion et les besoins humains et techniques en fonction des réalités du terrain. À cela doit s'ajouter une surveillance coordonnée et assidue entre les postes frontaliers.

**Iran and the West: Next steps – Patience with Iran is needed for a negotiated solution
 Laicie Olson and Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard Jr. (Ret.)**

There has been much rhetoric suggesting that the United States, Israel, or both could become embroiled in a military conflict with Iran. While Jeffrey Goldberg has suggested in *The Atlantic* that Iran may be able to breathe easy for up to a year, former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton gave the country only days. Whether driven by fear or excitement, it is easy to get caught up in the march to war. But it is crucial to take a step back and evaluate before sounding the drums.

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CRIMINALITÉ ET MAFIAS

Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment, July 2010 – FATF-GAFI

The report provides an assessment of the global systemic ML/TF threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimise the harms they can cause. This report was prepared by a team of experts from across the globe. They provided important content, peer review and validation throughout the project with the aim of producing this assessment. The project team comprised members from law enforcement and other agencies responsible for identifying and combating ML/TF from 10 jurisdictions and 8 international organisations.

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Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?
Rand Corporation

U.S. demand for illicit drugs creates markets for Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and helps foster violence in Mexico. This paper examines how marijuana legalization in California might influence DTO revenues and the violence in Mexico. Key findings include: 1) Mexican DTOs' gross revenues from illegally exporting marijuana to wholesalers in the United States is likely less than \$2 billion; 2) The claim that 60 percent of Mexican DTO gross drug export revenues come from marijuana should not be taken seriously; 3) If legalization only affects revenues from supplying marijuana to California, DTO drug export revenue losses would be very small, perhaps 2–4 percent; 4) The only way legalizing marijuana in California would significantly influence DTO revenues and the related violence is if California-produced marijuana is smuggled to other states at prices that outcompete current Mexican supplies. The extent of such smuggling will depend on a number of factors, including the response of the U.S. federal government. 5) If marijuana is smuggled from California to other states, it could undercut sales of Mexican marijuana in much of the U.S., cutting DTOs' marijuana export revenues by more than 65 percent and probably by 85 percent or more. In this scenario, the DTOs would lose approximately 20% of their total drug export revenues.

When crime pays: measuring judicial efficacy against corruption in Brazil – Carlos Higinio, et al., 2010

In Brazil, corrupt agents can be prosecuted independently by both administrative committees and judicial courts. This paper proposes a method of measuring judicial efficacy by comparing the respective performances of both administrative committees and judicial courts to punish the same corruption cases. Using this sample as a proxy for all corruption cases, the study suggests that the Brazilian judicial system is highly ineffective in fighting corruption.

Organised Crime in New Zealand 2010 – NewZealand Government

The report reveals that today's organised crime networks are involved in a range of illegal markets. They are agile, innovative and operate across international borders. The world-wide profits run to billions of dollars annually and organised crime presents a current and growing threat across the globe. The responses required to address these threats need to be equally sophisticated and New Zealand Police, together with our partners, are engaged in a range of initiatives. Some of these are highly visible - for example running traditional criminal investigations - while others involve supporting legislation reviews, tightening regulations or cooperating with international partners to make the New Zealand environment increasingly hostile for organised criminals.

Mafia SA – SOS Impresa

Mafia SA, florissante société anonyme avec un C.A. 2009 de 135 milliards d'euros, selon l'association SOS Impresa, qui vient de publier son XI^e rapport sur criminalité mafieuse et entreprises.

Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa – GAO-10-856 September 24, 2010

The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies.

La piraterie maritime dans le golfe d'Aden : État des lieux – Maud Hubert, GRIP

En forte recrudescence depuis quelques années, la piraterie maritime au large de la Somalie a contraint la « communauté internationale » à intervenir militairement pour sécuriser les voies maritimes transitant dans la région. Cette note d'analyse dresse un état des lieux de la piraterie maritime dans le golfe d'Aden (aspects juridiques, origines, enjeux, modus operandi) ainsi que des réponses apportées par la « communauté internationale ».

Persistence in the Political Economy of Conflict: The Case of the Afghan Drug Industry
George Mason University – Maciej M. Łatek, Seyed M. M. Rizvi, Armando Geller

Links between licit and illicit economies fuel conflict in countries mired in irregular warfare. We argue that in Afghanistan, cultivating poppy and trading drugs bring stability to farmers who face the unintended consequences of haphazard development efforts while lacking alternative livelihoods and security necessary to access markets. Drug trafficking funds the crime-insurgency nexus and government corruption, in turn foiling attempts to establish a unified governance body. We show how individual rationality, market forces, corruption and opium stocks accumulated at different stages in the supply chain counteract the effects of poppy eradication. To that end, we use initial results from a multiagent model of the Afghan drug industry. We define physical, administrative, social and infrastructural environments in the simulation, and outline objectives and inputs for decision making and the structure of actor interactions.

East Africa Bribery Index 2010 – Transparency International

Kenya's East Africa Bribery Index captures citizens' first hand experience of bribery and corruption in Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda. Findings indicate that except for Rwanda, where bribery was found to be negligible, all countries face major corruption challenges in key institutions such as the judiciary, the police and local authorities. Public service institutions were perceived as the most bribe-prone institutions, compromising access to water, electricity, health and education services.

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RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX

► **Crisis Guide: Pakistan – Council on Foreign relations, October 7, 2010**

Pakistan has been called the world's most dangerous country, with its mix of militants, nuclear weapons, and chronic domestic upheaval. This interactive presentation traces Pakistan's evolution and the competing internal and external influences that have contributed to regular upheaval and stunted political and economic development. It also offers a range of expert perspectives on Pakistan's history and its future prospects. These five scenarios explore possible paths for the Pakistani state as it enters its seventh decade.

📖 **Tadjikistan et Asie centrale : à l'aube d'une nouvelle guerre ?** **Alain Rodier, CF2R – Note d'actualité n°224, octobre 2010**

Le Tadjikistan était en paix depuis plus d'une dizaine d'années, la dernière opération terroriste d'envergure remontant en 1998 quand des rebelles ont attaqué un bataillon des troupes du ministère de l'intérieur dans la banlieue de Douchanbe faisant alors 20 victimes et 110 prisonniers. La guerre civile s'était officiellement terminée le 27 juin 1997, de nombreux activistes islamiques déposant alors les armes. Toutefois, une partie d'entre eux n'a pas renoncé à la lutte et s'est exilée en Afghanistan. La violence est de nouveau apparue en août 2010. Cette dernière est peut-être le signe de la reprise de désordres importants dans le pays. D'autre part, un embrasement de l'Asie centrale dans l'avenir n'est pas à exclure, surtout lorsque les forces de l'OTAN auront évacué l'Afghanistan.

📖 **National Security Information Environment Roadmap: 2020 Vision - Australian Government**

The National Security Information Environment Roadmap: 2020 Vision provides for the first time a single strategy to overcome the many barriers to information sharing within the Federal national security community. This public document details the journey of change the national security community will take over the next ten years to realise the vision of a secure, coordinated and effective national security information management environment.

📖 **Defence White Paper 2010 – New Zealand Government**

This Government is committed to making sure New Zealand has a strong and effective defence force. That's why, before the 2008 general election, we promised to undertake a comprehensive defence review. This White Paper delivers on that promise. It is the first White Paper we've had for 13 years, and it is an excellent step forward for defence policy in New Zealand. It sets out the future strategic direction for the New Zealand Defence Force, provides a framework for reform, and outlines how we can get the best value for money from our defence budget. The White Paper looks at global security, the challenges New Zealand is likely to face, and what resources and capabilities our defence force will need to protect us and advance our interests.

📖 **NATO 2020: Assured security; dynamic engagement**

Analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO – May 2010
At their Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April, 2009, Alliance leaders directed Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to convene a broadly-based group of qualified experts to prepare the ground for a new NATO Strategic Concept. The Group of Experts, led by its chair Madeleine K. Albright (United States) and vice-chair Jeroen van der Veer (The Netherlands), began work in September 2009. In line with its mandate to encourage an open discussion of NATO's organisation and purpose, the Group engaged in an extensive series of seminars and consultations with scholars and officials, civilian and military alike, from within and outside the Alliance. The Group, which submitted an interim statement to NATO's governing body (the North Atlantic Council) on November 24, 2009, presents now its final report. The document includes a summary of findings (Part One) and a more detailed discussion of leading issues (Part Two). The analysis and recommendations are intended to assist the Secretary General in drafting a new Strategic Concept for submission to NATO heads of government at the November 2010 summit in Lisbon.

📖 **Les sanctions isolent-elles vraiment l'Iran ? – Mehdi Mekdour, GRIP**

La révélation des ambitions nucléaires iraniennes en 2002 a donné lieu à un bras de fer entre Téhéran et certains États comme la France, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni. À la suite de l'échec des premières tentatives de négociation, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a voté des résolutions sanctionnant le comportement peu coopératif de l'Iran. Parallèlement, Washington et ses alliés ont adopté des sanctions unilatérales avec pour objectif d'isoler le régime des Ayatollahs et l'amener à coopérer. Afin de contrer cette stratégie d'isolement, les autorités iraniennes ont débuté une campagne de séduction à la recherche de soutiens auprès d'États d'Amérique latine et d'Afrique. Pour certains, l'Iran est devenu le symbole de l'opposition à l'impérialisme occidental. Tandis que d'autres voient en cette crise une opportunité de se positionner comme un élément clé sur la scène internationale et dans une moindre mesure, tenter de contrer l'influence des cinq Grands (Chine, France, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni et Russie).

📖 **Post-Soviet Central Asian National Interests in Afghanistan – Joshua Foust**

Afghanistan's neighbors that garner the most attention in policy debates about resolving its conflicts are Iran and Pakistan. The five post-Soviet states to Afghanistan's north—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—also will have a hand in determining Afghanistan's future, though their relevance is often discounted and there is little understanding of exactly what their role might be. Joshua Foust's paper explains how and why these bordering countries do not view the war in Afghanistan in the same terms as do the United States, Russia, Europe, or the Security Council collectively. In some cases, the interests of these Central Asian neighbors run counter to those of the more global players seeking to determine Afghanistan's future.

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CONFLITS ARMÉS

Empathy as a Combat Capability – Sarah Russell-Farnham

A fundamental challenge facing Australian soldiers operating in the contemporary battlespace is the complexity of the human terrain. The modern battlespace is inhabited not just by protagonists, but also by a wide range of other groups, often with widely differing objectives, motivations and behavioural drivers. To equip Australian soldiers for the human complexity of the battlespace, the Australian Army must develop empathy as a combat capability. The article advocates that the most effective way for the Australian Army to develop this capability is to study in the discipline of anthropology.

War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency – RAND Corporation

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report's recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation's population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Confinement Conditions at a U.S. Screening Facility on Bagram Air Base – Open Society Foundation

Les Etats-Unis disposent d'une prison secrète en Afghanistan où les détenus subissent de mauvais traitements, selon l'Open Society Foundation. L'organisation assure avoir recueilli le témoignage de 18 personnes qui disent avoir été emprisonnées dans cet endroit entre 2007 et 2010. Les détenus sont exposés à une lumière ou à un froid excessifs, privés de sommeil ou encore laissés sans vêtements. La nourriture est inappropriée, et il est impossible de pratiquer sa religion. Cette «prison secrète», appelée «prison noire», ou «prison de Tor» par les Afghans, se trouve sur la base aérienne située au nord-est de l'Afghanistan, et est distincte de la prison officielle.

The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur

For almost four years, the largest single cause of violent death in Darfur, Sudan's western region, has not been the government-rebel war that erupted in 2003, but fighting among Arab tribes armed by the government to fight the insurgency. Although the inter-Arab conflict claimed about 1,000 lives in the first ten months of 2010, displaced thousands of civilians, and left tens of thousands unprotected, very little is understood about it, or its protagonists, despite a large international presence spearheaded by the 30,000-person African Union/ UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Like the insurgency in its early years, the killing of Arab by Arab is unfolding almost completely unremarked outside Sudan. Unlike the insurgency, the deaths are at least partially recorded, including by UNAMID, and well reported by some Sudanese journalists. This Working Paper examines the background to and the development of the fighting between camel-herding Abbala and cattle-herding Baggara, the main players, and some of the possible repercussions.

RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE

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