Un FBI à la française – Entretien avec Bernard Squarcini
Politique internationale n° 127, printemps 2010

Le renseignement face aux nouvelles menaces – Entretien avec Erard Corbin de Mangoux
Politique internationale n° 127, printemps 2010

UK Security Policy Framework
May 2010 – Cabinet Office

National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration
GAO-10-822T, June 2010
Recent attempted bomb attacks in New York’s Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today’s threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult—if not impossible—for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical.

LexisNexis Open Source Intelligence Roundtable «OSINT 2020: The Future of Open Source Intelligence»
Assistant Deputy Director for Open Source, Dan Butler, and Civil Liberties Protection Officer, Alex Joel, Deliver Remarks at Open Source Intelligence Roundtable
The LexisNexis-hosted OSINT Roundtable was created to make a public space for discussion about the government’s needs for Open Source Intelligence — a recognized discipline in strategic and tactical national security decision-making — in order to facilitate relationships between government officials and private sector leaders.
The Sun In The Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI And Afghan Insurgents

Many accounts of the Afghan conflict misapprehend the nature of the relationship between Pakistan’s security services and the insurgency. The relationship, in fact, goes far beyond contact and coexistence, with some assistance provided by elements within, or linked to, Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) or military. Although the Taliban has a strong endogenous impetus, according to Taliban commanders the ISI orchest rates, sustains and strongly influences the movement. They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.

This paper seeks to appraise the relationship between Afghan insurgents and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).3 It is not intended to be a precise analysis of this relationship, which is inevitably dynamic and opaque, or to specify how it is manifested in any particular location. Rather, it explores its principal dimensions as expressed by insurgent commanders and those with first-hand knowledge or experience of the Afghan insurgency.

Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy – Final Report to the Minister for Intelligence Services, September 2008, South Africa

What is the proper role of non-military intelligence services in a democracy? The aim of the review was to strengthen mechanisms of control of the civilian intelligence structures in order to ensure full compliance and alignment with the Constitution, constitutional principles and the rule of law, and particularly to minimise the potential for illegal conduct and abuse of power.

The review was expected to cover the following intelligence structures: the National Intelligence Agency (NIA); the South African Secret Service (SASS); the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC); the National Communications Centre (NCC); the Office for Interception Centres (OIC); and Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC).

Applications for Navy Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Rand - Brien Aliire, James G. Kallimani, Peter A. Wilson, Louis R. Moore

There has been tremendous growth in demand for unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) by the United States military since 2001, and the Navy is making large investments in a number of programs, including acquisition of high-altitude maritime surveillance systems, demonstration programs for carrier-capable unmanned combat aircraft, and acquisition of rotary and small fixed-wing tactical UASs. In this book, RAND provides an evaluation of the Navy’s ongoing and proposed UAS programs and describes the most promising applications of those UASs to the Navy’s operational tasks. The book identifies robust communications as a key enabler for UASs in many operational tasks and recommends steps the Navy can take to ensure these communications are available. Additionally, it identifies some operational tasks that are better suited to manned aircraft and recommends limiting investment in UASs for these tasks.

Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War

We exploit the recent reclassification of CIA documents and examine whether there is evidence of US power being used to influence countries’ decisions regarding international trade. We measure US influence using a newly constructed annual panel of CIA interventions aimed at installing and supporting leaders during the Cold War. Our presumption is that the US had greater influence over foreign leaders that were installed and backed by the CIA. We show that following CIA interventions there was an increase in foreign-country imports from the US, but there was no similar increase in foreign-country exports to the US. Further, the increase in US exports was concentrated in industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage in producing, not a comparative advantage. This is consistent with US influence being used to create a larger foreign market for American products. Our analysis is able to rule out decreased bilateral trade costs, changing political ideology, and an increased supply of US loans and grants as explanations for the increase in US exports to the intervened country. We provide evidence that the increase in US exports arose through direct purchases of US products by foreign governments.
**Cowboys in the Middle East: Private Security Companies and the Imperfect Reach of the United States Criminal Justice System** – Christopher M. Kovach

The issue of accountability remains salient. While the United States' criminal justice system has made strides toward holding PSCs accountable—namely by extending military court-martial jurisdiction over PSC troops and permitting federal district courts in the United States to try certain crimes committed abroad—these advances do not go far enough. Haling civilians before courts-martial may be unconstitutional, and the framework for bringing accused criminals back to the U.S. is rarely used. Ultimately, these approaches ignore the military need for swift, visible punishment; the lack of teeth also sends the dangerous message to troops that tossing off a uniform leads to a tripling of one's salary and freedom from obeying those pesky laws of war.

This article explores how to prevent that from happening. The first section details the perceived impunity to the law enjoyed by PSCs and its effect on regular troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second section discusses how to bring PSCs before the law through an examination of the relevant international law. It also critiques two expansions to the U.S. criminal justice system—bringing contractors before courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or before federal district courts via the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act—and explains their ineffectiveness.

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**FORCES ET OPÉRATIONS SPÉCIALES**

**Special Forces capabilities of the European Union military forces** – 2004 – Modigs, Ronny

The purpose of this monograph is to determine what Special Forces capabilities are required by the European Union's military forces. The European Union's commitment, in 1999, to the established Helsinki Headline Goals outlined that a European military force shall be used in the framework of the Petersberg Tasks. These tasks are the missions and environment upon which the framework this monograph is based. Deduced and described from Special Operation Forces theory, special operations are distinguished from unconventional operations and strategic military intelligence operations. Thus, Special Forces are distinguished from Unconventional Forces. A case study analyzes different missions Special Operations Forces have conducted since the Cold War ended in order to determine what capabilities Special Forces need. This study determines that a viable EU Special Forces concept must, first of all, have a strategic utility to conduct Special Operations but not Unconventional Operations.

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**(SOF) truth about ARSOF logistics transformation** – Alvis, Jason M. – 2009

United States Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) transformation included significant changes and additions to the support units assigned to ARSOF. Amidst all of the structural and personnel additions and changes, ARSOF cannot completely transform without considering the human dimension. The human dimension is important because ARSOF missions cover the spectrum of conflict and right individual is necessary to understand and logistically support the diverse capabilities of ARSOF. One way to consider the human dimension is through the Special Operations Forces (SOF) Truths. The SOF Truths can be applied to the tenets of the Army's approved change analysis construct, DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities). Doctrine, training, leadership and personnel are the most important tenets of the DOTMLPF for ARSOF logistics transformation. The U.S. Army and the Department of Defense have necessary courses and curricula that can be tailored to maximize the ARSOF logistician's training and leadership potential with minimal cost to the Army or ARSOF units. Consistent analysis of doctrine by ARSOF, focused training curriculum and courses for the ARSOF logistician, and the selection of leaders and personnel that volunteered or were specifically recruited by ARSOF are the way to best consider the human dimension, fulfill the SOF Truths and complete ARSOF logistics transformation.

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**Vietnam Studies – U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971** – Colonel Francis J. Kelly

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now.

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**OSS Simple Sabotage Field Manual (Declassified)** – 17 January 1944

This Simple Sabotage Field Manual — Strategic Services (Provisional) — is published for the information and guidance of all concerned and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for this subject.

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**GUERRE DE L’INFORMATION**

**Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations** – Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.

Once again, we hear discussion within the U.S. Army on whether the name psychological operations (PSYOP) should be changed—an issue that has arisen periodically for years. The term, defined broadly as the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior of foreign audiences, is characterized by some as “toxic,” “disinformation,” “unsavory,” and with other pejorative words. This criticism inhibits the ability of PSYOP units to support U.S. military forces and to interact with other executive branch agencies—or so goes the criticism.

Thus, some argue, the term must be replaced. I believe this would be a mistake.

The psychological dimension of a conflict is as important as its physical dimension and psychological Operations (PSYOPs) have become even more relevant in this age of information, especially for a nation-state where the threat in the socio-psychological domain is more pronounced. While combating the menace of terrorism, the psychological dimension assumes great significance, as terrorists use violence as a psychological weapon by terrorising the multitude, rather than physically affect a few, and in this sense, they fight a psychological war also. The relevance of psychological operations is much greater than the successful conduct of tactical operations. This article is an attempt to conceptualise the term PSYOPs in the Indian context.


As the UK’s dependence on cyber space grows, so the security of cyber space becomes ever more critical to the health of the nation. Cyber space cuts across almost all of the threats and drivers outlined in the National Security Strategy: it affects us all, it reaches across international borders, it is largely anonymous, and the technology that underpins it continues to develop at a rapid pace. This is why the Government is publishing, alongside the first annual update of the National Security Strategy, the first Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom.

The Cyber Security Strategy recognises the challenges of cyber security and the need to address them. It stresses that the UK needs a coherent approach to cyber security, and one in which Government, organisations across all sectors, the public, and international partners all have a part to play. The Strategy outlines the Government’s approach - it establishes two new organisations that the UK needs in order to weave together new and existing work to make cyber space a safe, secure and resilient place where we can live and work in confidence.

Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Is Needed to Protect Federal Information Systems from Evolving Threats – GAO-10-834T, June 2010

GAO is providing a statement describing (1) cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures, (2) control deficiencies that make federal systems vulnerable to those threats, and (3) opportunities that exist for improving federal cyber security. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.

Understanding the Various Types of Denial of Service Attack – Raja Azrina Raja Othman – CyberSecurity Malaysia

This paper describes the different types of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. It will not be possible for me to go into the details for recovery from each type of attacks within this paper, since it will make it very lengthy and redundant to many other resources already available. Instead, referrals are made to other sites for more information in dealing with each specific type of attacks.

However, the purpose of describing the different types of attacks is to illustrate the different approaches and variations of DoS attacks in order to provide an overall recovery steps and best practice in networking to prevent high impact disaster against such attacks by ways of technology and legal framework. This is because I believe, it is not possible to prevent DoS attack in isolated approach, for example protecting merely at the perimeter devices, such as applying CISCO ACLs, while forgoing the configurations and patches on the application hosts. This paper is also useful as reference when analyzing possible symptoms of DoS.

FAS Podcast “A Conversation With An Expert,” Featuring Charles Blair, Director of the Terrorism Analysis Project

June 21, 2010

My special guest today is Charles Blair, Director of the new FAS Terrorism Analysis Project. The Terrorism Analysis Project focuses on the nexus of violent non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction. Prior to joining FAS, Charles was a research associate with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism where, among other projects, he managed the Global Terrorism Database, the largest open-source compilation of terrorist events in the world. Charles is an expert in radiological and nuclear weapons.

Let’s begin, I would like to start off with a question about the FAS Terrorism Analysis Project. Can you tell us briefly about the new program, what the goal of the program is, and give us some details on the flagship project?

Transcript (pdf) – “A Conversation With An Expert”

The role of Islamic charities in international terrorist recruitment and financing

Evan F. Kohlmann – DIIS Working Paper no 2006/7

Danish Institute for International Studies reported that during the 1990s the Turkish relief organization IHH had links with Al-Qaeda and global jihad networks.
**Anti-Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities**

Hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

**The Pakistani Taliban's Suicide Bomber Trainer: A Profile of Qari Hussain Mehsud**

Brian Wolfe – American Enterprise Institute, May 10

Qari Hussain Mehsud (typically referred to as Qari Hussain) built his ruthless image around one activity—the training and indoctrination of suicide bombers. As a senior commander in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Hussain is in a position to organize and indoctrinate aspiring militants in suicide missions. He takes pride in recruiting individuals to carry out destructive operations that focus on what he views as enemy forces, including Pakistani and Western targets. Until recently, Hussain’s operations have primarily been confined to Pakistan, but a video originally released on May 1 claims Qari Hussain and the TTP are responsible for the attempted bombing in Times Square on that same day.[1] (Details on the event can be found here) A Wall Street Journal report states that the Times Square suspect, Faisal Shahzad, trained at a Hussain-run camp in South Waziristan, where he was brought by a Jaish-e-Muhammad intermediary known as Mohammed Rehan.[2] Although officials are still investigating TTP connections to the man who placed a vehicle laced with explosive materials in Times Square, if the ties are accurate, then the TTP and Hussain may have enhanced their international capabilities and shifted their targeting priorities.

**How Tribal Are the Taleban? Afghanistan's Largest Insurgent Movement Between Its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology**

Afghanistan Analysts Network

Discussions about whether ‘moderate’ Taleban exist have overshadowed deeper questions about the character of the Afghan Taleban movement. As a result, there is considerable confusion as to whether the largest and most influential insurgent movement is mainly driven by ethnic, religious or political motives. This paper aims to clarify the often complex forces that shape the Afghan Taleban movement. In addition, this paper discusses the place of tribes and their institutions within Afghan society. A distinction is made between what is real and what is myth, as constructed by Afghans and also by foreign observers. Furthermore, this paper looks at the beginning debate about whether the Taleban have morphed into a ‘Neo-Taleban’ movement.

**Projet de résolution du Conseil et des représentants des gouvernements des États membres réunis au sein du Conseil sur la création d’équipes multinationales ad hoc avec des pays tiers**

Conseil de l’Union Européenne – mai 2010

Le caractère transnational du terrorisme, conjugué au fait que, dans bien des cas, les terroristes quittent l’UE pour échapper à la justice et continuer à mener des activités terroristes, rend de plus en plus nécessaire l’instauration d’une coopération non seulement entre les États membres de l’UE, mais aussi avec des pays tiers également touchés par le terrorisme.

La présidence propose donc de créer des équipes multinationales ad hoc avec des pays tiers lorsque cela est nécessaire, pour la période requise et sur une base volontaire, dans le but d’améliorer la connaissance des activités des réseaux et organisations terroristes opérant à l’intérieur de l’UE ou hors de celle-ci et d’échanger des informations au sujet des activités terroristes et des processus de radicalisation afin d’être davantage au courant de la planification d’attentats terroristes destinés à frapper des États membres de l’UE. Les équipes seraient composées d’experts en matière de lutte antiterroriste issus des États membres de l’UE et des pays tiers concernés. Le contenu et la forme de l’accord mettant en place ces équipes seraient déterminés au cas par cas.

**The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report for 2010**

Terrorism continues to impact on the lives of Member States’ citizens both inside and outside the EU. In 2009, seven people (five police officers and two soldiers) were killed and scores of individuals injured as a result of terrorist attacks in Greece, Northern Ireland and Spain. In some cases it is difficult to differentiate between criminality and acts of terrorism or extremism. Terrorism is not an ideology but a set of criminal tactics which deny fundamental principles of democratic societies. EU Member States have agreed to regard terrorist acts as those which aim to intimidate populations, compel states to comply with the perpetrators’ demands, and/or destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

**Keyboard Commandos**

The folks who threaten political violence aren’t hiding — they’re tweeting and posting

You might think that Facebook, with its well-publicized lack of privacy, would be the last place that paranoid, insular groups would choose as a place for organizing. But the reality is that a wide range of far-right organizations are using social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube to recruit members, spread their philosophy, and even, in some cases, to espouse violence and other illegal activities. For some groups, Facebook pages become a sort of central command — their meeting place, operating manual, source of information and inspiration, and outreach tool.

**Family jihad tour: European parents are ‘taking children to terror training camps’**

German intelligence is warning of a new breed of terrorist - whole family groups travelling to training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border where they graduate in explosives, fundraising and suicide bombing training.

**CTTA – Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis** – June 2010, RSIS

Surge in the Red Tide: India’s Maoist Insurgency

Armed Struggle for export? A preliminary analysis of the links between communist rebels in the Philippines and India.
Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack.

The Small Arms Survey 2010 reviews a range of issues related to gangs and armed groups, focusing on their use of violence, as well as emerging efforts to prevent and curb the damage they inflict on society. The volume includes studies of prison gangs, girls in gangs, and pro-government groups; it also features case studies from Ecuador and Southern Sudan. Rounding out the book is original research on the global ammunition trade and on options for controlling illicit firearm transfers by air.

1. Emerging from Obscurity: The Global Ammunition Trade
2. Controlling Air Transport: Practice, Options, and Challenges
3. Gangs, Groups, and Guns: An Overview
4. Elusive arsenals: Gang and Group Firearms
5. Gang Violence Worldwide: Context, Culture, and Country
6. The Danger of Dungeons: Prison Gangs and Incarcerated Militant Groups
7. The Other Half: Girls in Gangs
8. An Ecuadorian Alternative: Gang Reintegration
9. Getting Past Suppression: Street Gang Interventions
10. Force Multiplier: Pro-government Armed Groups
11. Back to the Brink: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan
12. Options for Engagement: Armed Groups and Humanitarian Norms

The report describes a Defense Department that is well aware that some of the money paid to contractors winds up in the hands of warlords and insurgents. Military logisticians on the ground are focused on getting supplies where they are needed and have «virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided» for the local truck convoys that transport more than 70 percent of all goods and materials used by U.S. troops. Alarms raised by prime trucking contractors were met by the military «with indifference and inaction,» the report said.

The findings are, to put it mildly, disquieting. The mistrust of employees towards their senior management is unmistakable. Despite this, control mechanisms are not in place in most organisations and hence, the need for risk mitigating strategies is unquestionable. It is time that India Inc. sits up and ends its tolerance of unethical behaviour, bribery and corruption. Managements of companies have not only to act ethically but also to intensify their efforts to protect their companies from fraud. They should develop pro-active risk management mechanisms that can anticipate, prevent, understand, detect and respond to fraud.

This report highlights the urgent need for action from managements of companies against fraud. Even a strong regulatory system cannot always prevent fraud. The key lies in management decisions and recommendations to establish formal control systems that can help prevent or at least deal with fraud. I am hopeful that this survey will not only enhance awareness but also persuade corporates to move faster on the road to fraud prevention and risk mitigation.

Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are flooding regional markets. This not only provides a ‘hard pill to swallow’ to health and pharmaceutical boards but also to law enforcement authorities. An ISS research study on organised crime in southern Africa has identified the trafficking and trade of fake medicines as an emerging concern. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperating Organisation (SARPCCO) and INTERPOL recognise it as a priority crime, which has led to a number of regional initiatives to stamp out the trade.

Si le gouvernement Uribe a pu se prévaloir d’une lutte efficace contre les narcotrafiquants, il n’en reste pas moins que les organisations criminelles colombiennes sont toujours bien actives dans le pays comme à l’étranger. Toutefois, de nombreux changements sont intervenus ces dernières années.
The Korean Question: An Unresolved Issue of Asia’s Cold War – Emrys Chew – RSIS, June 2010
The sinking of the Cheonan is emblematic of a Korean War that was never formally concluded. The open-ended Korean question, driven by competing nationalisms, focuses attention on the lack of closure in Asia’s Cold War.
**Failed States Index 2010 – Foreign Policy**
The Failed States Index ranks 177 countries to determine those most at risk of state failure, according to twelve metrics: demographic pressures; refugees/IDPs; group grievance; human flight; uneven development; economic decline; delegitimization of the state; public services; human rights; security apparatus; factionalized elites; external intervention. Foreign Policy also offers an interactive map with rankings and score breakdown by indicator.

**Les enjeux sécuritaires dans le Sahel africain : grille d’analyse – Mehdi Taje, CF2R**
Le Sahara est souvent appréhendé en tant que zone de séparation entre deux champs géopolitiques distincts, l’Afrique du Nord ou Afrique « blanche » et l’Afrique noire. Dans les textes arabes médiévaux, le Sahel désigne l’espace compris entre le Maghreb et le « Bilad as Sudan », pays des Noirs. Espace de jonction entre deux plaques tectoniques aux particularités affirmées et ancrées dans le temps long, cet espace se situe à la croisée de deux champs géopolitiquement non conciliés. Ligne de frontière entre Méditerranée et Afrique subsaharienne, le Sahel, en organisant la transition entre l’Afrique du Nord et l’Afrique noire, subsaharienne, reste une voie de commerce traditionnel, une voie de passage des flux migratoires entre l’Afrique et l’Europe, tout en étant également une zone grise qui échappe au contrôle régulier des États riverains. C’est un fait, nul ne peut le contester. Néanmoins, il convient d’être précis dans son appréhension en tant que zone grise, en apportant quelques éléments d’appréciation.

The explosion of violence in southern Kyrgyzstan is the result of social pressures, economic hardship and political malpractice. The interim government’s constitutional referendum can do little to address these problems.

**CONFLITS ARMÉS**

**Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments**
SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) – June 29, 2010
As the United States and international community aim to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces, having a reliable system for monitoring progress toward that objective is critical. The CM rating system has not provided reliable or consistent assessments of ANSF capabilities. For example:
- Measurements used in the assessment system have overstated operational capabilities.
- Top-rated ANSF units have not indicated a capability to sustain independent operations.
- The CM rating system has inadvertently created disincentives for ANSF development.
- ANSF capability reports have included outdated assessment data.

In addition to these weaknesses, serious challenges affect U.S. and Coalition assessment efforts, including security conditions, mentor shortages, and inadequate training. Further, systemic ANSF deficiencies have undermined efforts to develop unit capabilities. These include logistics problems, personnel attrition, inadequate personnel authorizations, infrastructure deficiencies, corruption, drug abuse, and illiteracy. In late April 2010, IJC replaced the CM rating system with a new unit-level assessment called the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT).

**Marine Corps Operational Concepts Third Edition – June 2010**
Military excellence is defined by the excellence of our Marines; their thinking, ability to innovate, adapt, and to overcome the challenges presented by complex environments, threats, and conditions. Marines continue to rely upon our history of naval character, responsiveness and military professionalism to guide our Corps into the future. In these pages, you won’t find an answer to every problem posed by the future. Instead, you should consider it as both a window into many different futures and a mirror to allow you to reflect upon your own ability to operate within them. Many of the words and phrases herein — power projection, seabasing, crisis response, enhanced MAGTF operations, engagement and countering irregular threats — should be very familiar to all Marines. Don’t let this familiarity lure you into thinking there is nothing new within these pages. Old ideas can take on an entirely new life when placed with a new context - and if there is one constant reflected in our view of the future, it is that there is no longer a single context but many.

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- l’apport d’expertise au profit des parties prenantes aux politiques publiques (décideurs, administration, parlementaires, médias, etc.),
- la démystification du renseignement et l’explication de son rôle auprès du grand public.

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