Spy vs. spy intrigue between the CIA and Israel, centered around the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv – Yossi Melman
The United States Embassy in Tel Aviv, in a prime beachfront location at 71 HaYarkon Street, is six stories tall, not including the mysteries on its roof. Israeli intelligence operatives and journalists have for many years suspected that atop the embassy and perhaps in its basement are sophisticated surveillance systems that keep a close electronic eye on the Jewish state. Certainly, as is standard in most any U.S. Embassy, there is a suite of offices comprising the CIA station, its staffers given diplomatic titles such as “second secretary.” No attempt is made to hide their identity from Israeli authorities because this host government is considered friendly.

Reconnaissance satellites, first deployed in the early 1960s to peer into denied regions of the Soviet Union and other secretive enemy states, have from time to time been used by civilian agencies of the federal government to assist with mapping, disaster relief, and environmental concerns. These uses have been coordinated by the Civil Applications Office at the U.S. Geological Survey, a component of the Interior Department. Post 9/11, the Bush Administration sought to encourage use of satellite-derived data for homeland security and law enforcement purposes, in addition to the civil applications that have been supported for years. In 2007, it moved to transfer responsibility for coordinating civilian use of satellites to the Department of Homeland Security. The initiative was launched, however, apparently without notification of key congressional oversight committees.

Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The most controversial sections of the act facilitate the federal government’s collection of more information, from a greater number of sources, than had previously been authorized in criminal or foreign intelligence investigations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the national security letter (NSL) statutes were all bolstered. With the changes came greater access to records showing an individual’s spending and communication patterns as well as increased authority to intercept e-mail and telephone conversations and to search homes and businesses. In some cases, evidentiary standards required to obtain court approval for the collection of information were lowered. Other approaches included expanding the scope of information subject to search, adding flexibility to the methods by which information could be collected, and broadening the purposes for which information may be sought.

Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives - March 2010, Frederick M. Kaiser
Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its unanimous 2004 report set the stage for a reconsideration of congressional oversight, concluding that it was “dysfunctional.” The commission proposed two distinct solutions: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting each one both authorization and appropriations power. A follow-up effort in 2010, headed by the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, observed that although “some progress has been made” in overseeing intelligence, the related field of homeland security reflected a “jurisdictional melee” among “fractured and overlapping jurisdictions .... [contributing to] an unworkable system.” Another 2010 study—by the Commission on WMD—concluded that Congress has been slow “to reform itself” and that “congressional oversight remains dysfunctional.”
La tempête médiatique déclenchée par l’assassinat, en février dernier, dans un hôtel de Dubaï, d’un cadre du Hamas, Mahmoud Al-Mabbouh, a conduit les médias et certains commentateurs à parler d’un « échec sérieux » de l’opération israélienne. Ces jugements rapides méritent d’être pondérés à la lumière des faits.

PRIVATEICATION DU RENSEIGNEMENT & DE LA SÉCURITÉ

Private Military Companies and International Law: Building New Ladders of Legal Accountability and Responsibility
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution // Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law – 1-Feb-2010
The Private Military Company («PMC») is a relatively new and growing phenomenon. An urgent and ongoing problem facing courts and policy makers is the accountability of PMCs. This article proposes new approaches to developing accountability by examining the potential of two well-established doctrines: command responsibility and state responsibility. Three primary factors fueled the growth of the private military industry; (1) large scale reduction of military forces after the Cold War; which created a surplus of trained military personnel without jobs; (2) the policy shift to privatizing government services whenever possible; and (3) an increase in regional conflicts.

Secret Recording of Erik Prince Reveals Previously Undisclosed Blackwater Ops
Investigative journalist and Democracy Now! correspondent Jeremy Scahill obtains a rare audio recording of a recent, private speech delivered by Erik Prince, the owner of Blackwater, to a friendly audience in January. The speech, which Prince attempted to keep from public consumption, provides a stunning glimpse into his views and future plans and reveals details of previously undisclosed activities of Blackwater. In a Democracy Now! exclusive broadcast we play excerpts of the recording and speak with Scahill about the revelations.

A “New” Dynamic In The Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas And Other Private Armies
Max G. Manwaring – September 2009
This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states —and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors.

FORCES ET OPÉRATIONS SPÉCIALES

Canadian Special Operations Forces Command - An Overview
Current Security Environment – What is SOF? – Canadian Special Operations Forces Command

History of The United States Air Force Special Tactics and Rescue Specialists (USAF STARS)
July 1996 – October 2002 – Mr. Whitney Wesley – 27 Mo
This study examines how the Special Tactics and Rescue Specialists (STARS) team evolved from an ad hoc team to a semi-permanent command team. It also examines some of the issues that caused the team to be created and finally some of the reasons that the team was disbanded.

Cold Weather Training for Operations, UK perspective
At the time of writing a large proportion of the Royal Marines - the UK’s only Mountain and Cold Weather Warfare Brigade - are deployed on a winter operational tour of Afghanistan. However, 3 Commando Brigade is deployed on the dusty, and plains of the Helmand Province, and not in the mountains. Although the Royal Marines have decades of Cold Weather (CW) experience, they are routinely deployed to a wide variety of environments, and this is an important part of the context of what follows The remainder of the context is that the UK approach to CW training has changed significantly in the last few years. These changes are due to changing priorities, changing resources and changing threats.

Dutch special forces marines recapture the seized German container ship MV Taipan
Le contrôle des forces spéciales américaines en Afghanistan est un pas en avant vers la responsabilisation
Mars 2010 – Les nouvelles mesures prises par l’armée américaine afin de contrôler les activités des forces d’opérations spéciales en Afghanistan sont une avancée bienvenue, mais il faut faire davantage pour renforcer l’obligation de rendre des comptes concernant les pertes civiles résultant d’opérations militaires, a déclaré Amnesty International.

Guerre de l’information

CIA report into shoring up Afghan war support in Western Europe
This classified CIA analysis from March, outlines possible PR-strategies to shore up public support in Germany and France for a continued war in Afghanistan. After the Dutch government fell on the issue of dutch troops in Afghanistan last month, the CIA became worried that similar events could happen in the countries that post the third and fourth largest troop contingents to the ISAF-mission. The proposed PR strategies focus on pressure points that have been identified within these countries. For France it is the sympathy of the public for Afghan refugees and women. For Germany it is the fear of the consequences of defeat (drugs, more refugees, terrorism) as well as for Germany’s standing in the NATO. The memo is an recipe for the targeted manipulation of public opinion in two NATO ally countries, written by the CIA. It is classified as Confidential / No Foreign Nationals.

Concept de la guerre électronique – PIA 03-163 – CICDE

Sûreté de l’information – Situation en Suisse et sur le plan international
Rapport semestriel 2009/II (juillet à décembre)
Centrale d’enregistrement et d’analyse pour la sûreté de l’information MELANI
La Centrale d’enregistrement et d’analyse pour la sûreté de l’information MELANI met en lumière, dans son dixième rapport, les activités cybercriminelles ayant marqué le deuxième semestre 2009. Il a pour temps forts les vols d’informations commis à l’échelle planétaire, les attaques à connotation politique, ainsi que le chantage exercé au moyen d’attaques DDos.
La cybercriminalité possède plusieurs facettes, allant du vol de données commis à des fins d’enrichissement à la défiguration de sites Web, comme exécutoire à une déception politique. Tant les entreprises que les administrations ou encore les partis politiques en font les frais. L’administration fédérale n’a pas été épargnée.

Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for Commander, United States Cyber Command
Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the current Director of NSA, has been nominated to head the US Cyber Command. Last week Alexander appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee to answer questions.

Terrorisme

The Edge of Violence – a radical approach to extremism – Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell
The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a process of radicalisation. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies.
This report is a summary of two years of research examining the difference between violent and non-violent radicals in Europe and Canada. It represents a step towards a more nuanced understanding of behaviour across radicalised individuals, the appeal of the al-Qaeda narrative, and the role of governments and communities in responding.

Inside Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper – New America Foundation – Hassan Abbas – April 19, 2010
Despite comparatively progressive forces taking control of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) after success in the February 2008 provincial elections, stability remains elusive and the law and order situation has gradually deteriorated, raising important questions about the correlation between politics in the province and the nature and extent of militancy there. This essay investigates how different political and religious forces have influenced the state of affairs in the province in recent years.

TerrorismMonitor – Volume VIII, Issue 14, April 9, 2010 – The Jamestown Foundation
Taliban spokesman discusses US media and military strategies in Afghanistan – Abdul Hameed Bakier
Mass arrests of Al-Qaeda suspects in Saudi Arabia illustrate security threat from Yemen – Murad Batal al-Shishani
<h3>Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved</h3>

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been a recognized safe haven for al Qaeda leadership and a base for the Taliban to launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. The United States, in an effort to assist Pakistan in addressing this threat, pledged $750 million between 2007 and 2011 to support development activities in the FATA region. This report focuses on (1) the extent U.S. development objectives align with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan’s objectives, (2) U.S. efforts to track the pledge, (3) U.S. efforts to measure program performance in the FATA, and (4) efforts to monitor assistance in the FATA. GAO reviewed U.S. and Pakistani documents and interviewed U.S. and Pakistani officials in Washington, D.C., and Pakistan. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.


<h3>A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing – Paul Gill (2007)</h3>

Understanding suicide bombing entails studying the phenomenon on three different dimensions: the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization, and the community from which suicide bombings emerge. Political and social psychology allow us to establish the reciprocal relationships that underpin the exchanges between the three dimensions. This method increases our theoretical understanding of suicide bombing by moving away from the unidimensional models that have previously dominated the terrorism literature.

<h3>BWPP Biological Weapons Convention Universalization Report 2009</h3>

BUILDING A GLOBAL BAN: Why States Have Not Joined the BWC

From February 2006 until April 2008, the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP) was entrusted with the implementation of the first EU Joint Action in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) – the first systematic undertaking intended, amongst other things, to promote the universalization of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

<h3>Arms Transfers to Europe and Central Asia – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – Feb-2010</h3>

United Nation member states are currently discussing the feasibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT) which would seek to create better controls on international arms transfers. This Background Paper is one of a series produced by SIPRI to inform these discussions. Military expenditure and arms imports in Europe and Central Asia have increased during the past decade. Military reform and modernization have been offered as justifications for the significant increase in military spending and arms procurement in Eastern Europe, but other factors such as unresolved border disputes, territorial claims and separatism also play a role. Russia, Germany, France and the UK are among the world’s largest arms exporters. European and Central Asian states have contributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) via transfers and licensed production. They have also developed national legislation and systems for controlling arms transfers and have made commitments at the regional level to prevent diversions or destabilizing build-ups of SALW.

<h3>Arms Transfers to Asia and Oceania – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – Oct 09</h3>


The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks raised concerns about the security of Department of Energy (DOE) sites with weapons-grade nuclear material, known as Category I special nuclear material (SNM). To better protect these sites against attacks, DOE has sought to transform its protective forces protecting SNM into a Tactical Response Force (TRF) with training and capabilities similar to the U.S. military. This testimony is based on prior work and has been updated with additional information provided by protective forces’ union officials. In a prior GAO report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel System Issues (GAO-10-275), GAO (1) analyzed information on the management, organization, staffing, training, and compensation of protective forces at DOE sites with Category I SNM; (2) examined the implementation of TRF; and (3) assessed DOE’s two options to more uniformly manage protective forces; and (4) reported on DOE’s progress in addressing protective force issues. DOE generally agreed with the recommendations in GAO’s prior report that called for the agency to fully assess and implement, where feasible, measures identified by DOE’s 2009 protective forces study group to enhance protective forces’ career longevity and retirement options.

<h3>Environmental Decontamination Following a Large-Scale Bioterrorism Attack: Federal Progress and Remaining Gaps – Crystal Franco and Nidhi Bouri – Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Volume 8, Number 2, 2010.</h3>

Feds Would Face Problems in a Bio Attack Clean-Up: Analysis Reveals Progress but Some Gaps Remain. The authors of this report, published ahead-of-print in the upcoming issue of the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, examine the nation’s ability to decontaminate indoor and outdoor areas following a large-scale biological attack, identify gaps, and recommend actions that should be taken by DHS and the U.S. Congress to improve capacity.

Kenneth Katzman - Congressional Research Service - March 2010

**Proliferation et trafic d’armes**

**BWPP Biological Weapons convention universalization report 2009**

**Arms transfers to europe and central asia** – Stockholm international peace research institute – Feb-2010

**Arms transfers to asia and oceania** – Stockholm international peace research institute – Oct 09

**Nuclear security: doe needs to fully address issues affecting protective forces’ personnel systems** – March 2010

**Environmental decontamination following a large-scale bioterrorism attack: federal progress and remaining gaps** – Crystal Franco and Nidhi Bouri – Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. Volume 8, Number 2, 2010.
Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2009-FY2010 – Crystal Franco
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Volume 7, Number 3, 2009.
Since 2001, the United States government has spent substantial resources on preparing the nation against a bioterrorist attack. Earlier articles in this series analyzed civilian biodefense funding by the federal government for fiscal years (FY) 2001 through 2009. This article updates those figures with budgeted amounts for FY2010, specifically analyzing the budgets and allocations for biodefense at the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and State; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Science Foundation. This year’s article also provides an assessment of the proportion of the biodefense budget that serves multiple programmatic goals and benefits, including research into infectious disease pathogenesis and immunology, public health planning and preparedness, and disaster response efforts. The FY2010 federal budget for civilian biodefense totals $6.05 billion. Of that total, $4.96 billion is budgeted for programs that serve multiple goals and provide manifold benefits.

How U.S. weapons technology is finding its way to Iran – Mc Clatchy

Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control
Amy F. Woolf – Congressional Research Service – April 21, 2010
The United States and Russia signed a new START Treaty on April 8, 2010. Many analysts, both in the United States and Russia, supported negotiations on a new treaty so that the two sides could continue to implement parts of the complex monitoring and verification regime in the 1981 START Treaty. This regime was designed to build confidence in compliance with the START and to provide transparency and cooperation during the treaty’s implementation. The verification regime in the new START Treaty differs in some respects from the regime in START. These differences reflect an interest in reducing the cost and complexity of the regime, updating it to account for changes in the relationship between the United States and Russia, and tailoring it to address the monitoring and verification complexities presented by the new limits in the new treaty. The verification regime is likely to receive scrutiny in both the Senate, which will ultimately vote on whether to consent to ratification, and the public.

U.S. Biosecurity and the Center for Biosecurity’s Work: A Series of Interviews from Homeland Security: Inside and Out
On March 17, 2009, for their radio show, Homeland Security Inside and Out, co-hosts Col. Randy Larsen and Dave McIntyre interviewed Tara O'Toole, Tom Inglesby, D.A. Henderson, and senior staff of the Center for a series of discussions about U.S. biosecurity strategy and a host of related issues, as well as the Center’s current work in the field.

Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug-Related Violence: Evidence from a Scientific Review
International Centre for Science in Drug Policy
Violence is among the primary concerns of communities around the world, and research from many settings has demonstrated clear links between violence and the illicit drug trade, particularly in urban settings. While violence has traditionally been framed as resulting from the effects of drugs on individual users (e.g., druginduced psychosis), violence in drug markets and in drug-producing areas such as Mexico is increasingly understood as a means for drug gangs to gain or maintain a share of the lucrative illicit drug market. The present systematic review evaluated all available English language peer-reviewed research on the impact of law enforcement on drug market violence. The available scientific evidence suggests that increasing the intensity of law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely to reduce drug gang violence. Instead, the existing evidence suggests that drugrelated violence and high homicide rates are likely a natural consequence of drug prohibition and that increasingly sophisticated and well-resourced methods of disrupting drug distribution networks may unintentionally increase violence. From an evidence-based public policy perspective, gun violence and the enrichment of organized crime networks appear to be natural consequences of drug prohibition. In this context, and since drug prohibition has not achieved its stated goal of reducing drug supply, alternative models for drug control may need to be considered if drug supply and drug-related violence are to be meaningfully reduced.

Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan: The Coin of the Realm – Colonel Louis Jordan, SSI
“The bottom is starting to fall out of the Afghan opium market.” So says the 2009 Afghanistan Opium Survey by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Issued in September 2009, this report is a clarion for those who point to progress in this troubled part of the world. Though counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan are an effort of the International Community (IC), a large part of the success is due to the efforts of a small group of professionals known as the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) who lead the effort to thwart insurgent operations.

Diamonds and Human Security, Annual Review 2009
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which regulates the world trade in rough diamonds, is the only thing standing between the industry and a return to blood diamonds. And it is failing, according to the 2009 edition of Partnership Africa Canada’s Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review. The failure of the KP, the report says, is not caused by warlords and sanctions busters but by governments at the centre of its administration which refuse to get tough on blatant smuggling, human rights abuse and money laundering.
**Mexique, la guerre des cartels redouble de violence** – CF2R, Alain Rodier, Note d’actualité n°211
Depuis décembre 2006, plus de 18 000 personnes ont été tuées au Mexique dans le cadre de la guerre contre la drogue déclenchée par le président Felipe Calderon. La majorité de ces morts, qui augmente de mois en mois, est à imputer aux cartels qui se livrent des combats sans merci. Cette véritable guerre fait aujourd’hui plus de morts que les conflits irakien et afghan réunis ! Il faut reconnaître que les enjeux financiers sont énormes puisque la grande majorité de la cocaïne produite en Amérique latine est commercialisée par les cartels mexicains.

**Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence**
February 16, 2010
Currently, no comprehensive, publicly available data exist that can definitively answer the question of whether there has been a significant spillover of drug trafficking-related violence into the United States. Although anecdotal reports have been mixed, U.S. government officials maintain that there has not yet been a significant spillover. In an examination of data that could provide insight into whether there has been a significant spillover in drug trafficking-related violence from Mexico into the United States, CRS analyzed violent crime data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report program. The data, however, do not allow analysts to determine what proportion of the violent crime rate is related to drug trafficking or, even more specifically, what proportion of drug trafficking-related violent crimes can be attributed to spillover violence. In conclusion, because the trends in the overall violent crime rate may not be indicative of trends in drug trafficking-related violent crimes, CRS is unable to draw definitive claims about trends in drug trafficking-related violence spilling over from Mexico into the United States.

**Anti-Money Laundering – Better Communication Could Enhance the Support FinCEN Provides to Law Enforcement**
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Financial Services Committee, House of Representatives – Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Financial investigations are used to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, crimes that can destabilize national economies and threaten global security. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), within the Department of the Treasury, supports law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to investigate financial crimes by providing them with services and products, such as access to financial data, analysis, and case support. This statement discusses the extent to which the law enforcement community finds FinCEN’s support useful in its efforts to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. This statement is based on work GAO completed and issued in December 2009.

**Annual Report 2009-10 of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India**
Full text of the Annual Report 2009-10 of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs.
Internal Security – Crime Scenario in the Country – Police Forces – Other Police Organisations and Institutions

**RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX**

**Unclassified Report On Military Power Of Iran** – April 2010
Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) - Military Power of Iran
Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an unclassified and classified report to Congress on the current and future military strategy of Iran. Below is the unclassified report in response to the congressional direction.

**Préparer les engagements de demain** – Juin 2007 – DICOD
Situations auxquelles les forces armées françaises pourraient être confrontées dans les 30 ans

**Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa**
The 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa and more recent attacks have highlighted the threat of terrorism to U.S. interests on the continent. Political instability and civil wars have created vast ungoverned spaces, areas in which some experts allege that terrorist groups may train and operate. Instability also heightens human suffering and retards economic development, which may in turn threaten U.S. economic interests. Africa’s exports of crude oil to the United States are now roughly equal to those of the Middle East, further emphasizing the continent’s strategic importance. This report provides a broad overview of U.S. strategic interests in Africa and the role of U.S. military efforts on the continent as they pertain to the creation of AFRICOM. A discussion of AFRICOM’s mission, its coordination with other government agencies, and its basing and manpower requirements is included.
How Insurgencies End – RAND Corporation
Based on a survey of 89 different insurgencies, has some worrying pointers for anyone who thinks they will know for sure when is the right time to open talks based on a survey of 89 different insurgencies, has some worrying pointers for anyone who thinks they will know for sure when is the right time to open talks.

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and worldview – Anne Stenersen
The aim of this report is to get a better understanding of the Taliban movement and its role in the Afghan insurgency post-2001. The approach to this is three-fold: First, the report discusses the nature of the Afghan insurgency as described in existing literature. The second part looks at the organizational characteristics of the largest and most well-known insurgent group in Afghanistan: the Taliban movement (or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) led by Mullah Omar. The third and most extensive part of the report analyses the Taliban leadership’s ideology and worldview, based on the official statements of its organization and leaders.

Lastly, the report discusses the Taliban leadership’s attitudes towards negotiations and power-sharing. For the time being, it looks like any attempt to negotiate with the Taliban leadership directly would serve to strengthen the insurgent movement, rather than weakening it. A more realistic approach is probably to try to weaken the Taliban’s coherence through negotiating with, and offering incentives to, low-level commanders and tribal leaders inside Afghanistan. The insurgent movement consists of a wide variety of actors, which may be seen as proof of its strength – but it could also constitute a weakness if properly and systematically exploited. This effort, however, requires extensive resources, both in terms of manpower and knowledge of the Afghan realities.

Kandahar Province Survey Report – March 2010 – NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED//REL GCTF
This report details the findings of an Attitude and Perceptions Survey in Kandahar province. The report uses descriptive and inferential statistics for the purpose of assessing attitudes and perceptions and providing information for planning purposes. The findings are structured around three priorities: to understand how connected district residents are to their district government, to promote good governance, and to determine what drives popular support or opposition to the insurgency.

Getting away with murder? The impunity of international forces in Afghanistan - Amnesty, février 2009
Millions of Afghans face violence and insecurity worse than at any period since 2001. The first part of this Briefing Paper focuses on one particular incident: the night time killing of two brothers by international forces, on 16 January 2008. The confusion regarding which international forces are doing what in Afghanistan is the focus of the second part of this Briefing Paper. Forces from the more than 40 countries with UN-sanctioned troops in Afghanistan operate with a variety of mandates, chains of command, rules of engagement, and degrees of respect for the rule of law.


Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Kenneth Katzman - Congressional Research Service - March 2010
Following two high-level policy reviews and the appointment of a new overall U.S. commander in Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration says it is pursuing a fully resourced, integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address what the Obama Administration considered to be a security environment that was deteriorating despite an increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008. Some of the deterioration was attributed to Afghan disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the relative safe haven in parts of Pakistan enjoyed by Afghan militants.

The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Impacts upon U.S. Interests in Pakistan – Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on November 5, 2009. C. Christine Fair - Georgetown University, Security Studies
After many years of viewing the Afghanistan and Pakistan theatres as distinct if not competing for priority, the Obama administration has inextricably linked the two when it unveiled its White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. (This policy has come to be known as the “Af-Pak” strategy.) While this phrase is a useful mnemonic to remind all that the two theatres are in fact deeply linked, the term also—albeit inadvertently—suggests erroneously that U.S. interests in the two countries are symmetric. Yet, U.S. interests in both states vary in important ways. Contemporary thinking about the “Af-Pak” theatre fostered what Steve Cohen has called a “transitive property of security” which suggests that to stabilize Afghanistan, you must stabilize Pakistan. To stabilize Pakistan, the United States must encourage India to undertake actions in Afghanistan and in Kashmir that will attenuate Pakistan’s strategic anxiety. Ostensibly, this would allow Pakistan to focus away from its conventional Indian threat and focus its attention and resources upon its internal security challenges as Pakistan claims. Proponents of this “regional approach” contend that once Pakistan feels at ease with its larger neighbor, it can abandon its long-standing policy of relying upon militant groups to prosecute its interests in Afghanistan and in India. In this testimony, I argue that this formulation is flawed and indeed critically inverts the primacy of U.S. interests. Arguably Pakistan—not Afghanistan—is the epicenter of the most intense U.S. national security interests including regional conventional and nuclear stability, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. This suggests that, to a great degree, focusing resources upon Pakistan will greatly enable a pacification of Afghanistan and dampen the Indo-Pakistan security competition.
Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local

Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies

Recent decades have seen a dual and simultaneous shift in conflict trends. With the end of the Cold War and superpower support, conflicts have become increasingly intrastate and increasingly localized, dependent for their sustenance upon local assistance and national resources. Yet this localization of conflict has coincided with the increasingly international aspect of conflicts, with humanitarian intervention and UN peacekeeping becoming ever more prevalent. The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for understanding these shifting relations between the global and the local. This is accomplished through an analysis of actor-network theory and its rejoinders to reductionist understandings of conflict. Rather than reducing the eruption of violence down to greed, grievance, or ancient hatred, actor-network theory aims to examine conflict networks and their specific composition of local, material, and global actors. Three aspects of these networks are highlighted in particular: the personal networks of local individuals, the material actors, and the conflict network as a system. With these clarified the final section turns to an analysis of some of the primary modalities through which global actors relate and embed themselves within local networks.

Can the EU be More Effective in Afghanistan? – Centre for European Reform

The European Union is not making an impact in Afghanistan that matches its financial, civilian and military assistance to the country. It is too poorly organised to capitalise fully on its strengths as a multilateral organisation, and its member-states lack a clear vision of the role they want the European institutions to play. The Lisbon treaty, which streamlines the EU’s foreign policy machinery, presents a chance to reshape the EU’s presence in Afghanistan and to improve the lines of reporting to Brussels. But the treaty’s cursory prescriptions leave much room for interpretation. This policy brief makes recommendations on how to transform the EU’s institutions in Afghanistan in ways that reduce duplication and minimise the chances of the various EU offices contradicting each other. A more sensible institutional presence alone will not turn the EU into an effective actor in Afghanistan. It must also demonstrate that it can offer unique expertise and resources not currently at the disposal of its member-states and other international organisations. The EU has not done well in determining where its strengths lie and what issues it should focus on in Afghanistan. This policy brief recommends concrete steps in key policy areas, building on the EU’s recently adopted action plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians

This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also include American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.

Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings

This report discusses major judicial opinions concerning suspected enemy belligerents detained in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The report addresses all Supreme Court decisions concerning enemy combatants. It also addresses a few notable decisions by federal district courts that are the subject of ongoing habeas litigation. Finally, it describes a few federal court rulings in criminal cases involving persons who were either involved in the 9/11 attacks or were captured abroad by U.S. forces during operations against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated entities.

Air power against Maoists

Although easy in theory, the practical challenges in employing air power in a kinetic role against the Maoists are too many. Sudhanshu Sarangi, who was the head of counter-insurgency operations and intelligence in Orissa till June 2009, makes a passionate case in Hindustan Times for using the assets of the Indian Air Force (IAF) against the Maoists — to support ground troops and to neutralise armed enemies. This demand goes against prevailing wisdom in the media commentary and has been rejected by the Union Home Minister himself in the Parliament, while emphasising that the use of IAF would continue for evacuation and for mobility of troops.

Conflict Networks: Collapsing the Global into the Local

Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies

Recent decades have seen a dual and simultaneous shift in conflict trends. With the end of the Cold War and superpower support, conflicts have become increasingly intrastate and increasingly localized, dependent for their sustenance upon local assistance and national resources. Yet this localization of conflict has coincided with the increasingly international aspect of conflicts, with humanitarian intervention and UN peacekeeping becoming ever more prevalent. The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for understanding these shifting relations between the global and the local. This is accomplished through an analysis of actor-network theory and its rejoinders to reductionist understandings of conflict. Rather than reducing the eruption of violence down to greed, grievance, or ancient hatred, actor-network theory aims to examine conflict networks and their specific composition of local, material, and global actors. Three aspects of these networks are highlighted in particular: the personal networks of local individuals, the material actors, and the conflict network as a system. With these clarified the final section turns to an analysis of some of the primary modalities through which global actors relate and embed themselves within local networks.