



Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement

TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

Research Paper n° 3 - November 2005



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Général Alain Lamballe

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PRÉSENTATION DU CF2R

Fondé en 2000, le CENTRE FRANÇAIS DE RECHERCHE SUR LE RENSEIGNEMENT (CF2R) est un think-tank non gouvernemental, indépendant, régi par loi de 1901, spécialisée sur l'étude de l'ensemble des domaines historiques, techniques et politiques du renseignement. Autour de ces thèmes, le CF2R développe :

- des activités de réflexion et de recherche, réservées à ses seuls membres actifs (dîners-débats, groupes de travail) ;
- des actions de sensibilisation à l'intention de la presse, des parlementaires, des universités et des décideurs économiques ;
- des publications, pour l'information du grand public,
- des études et des formations, à la demande de clients divers.

Dans cette perspective, le CF2R est structuré en plusieurs commissions :

- Histoire du renseignement,
- Fonctionnement du renseignement,
- Renseignement technique et technologies du renseignement,
- Opérations spéciales,
- Actions psychologiques et influence,
- Privatisation des activités de sécurité et mercenariat,
- Intelligence économique et diplomatie d'entreprise,
- Drogue, criminalité et mafias,
- Terrorisme et islamisme.

En parallèle, le CF2R réalise des études à caractère régional afin de suivre un certain nombre d'évolutions géopolitiques.

Le CF2R dispose d'une trentaine de chercheurs associés. Tous sont experts en leur domaine et disposent à la fois de compétences académiques reconnues et d'une véritable expérience de terrain. Ils interviennent à la demande, en fonction de leurs spécialités, de leurs disponibilités, des projets considérés et du degré de confidentialité requis.

Les publications du CF2R comprennent :

- des rapports de recherche et des notes d'actualité rédigés régulièrement par ses experts,
- la revue quadrimestrielle *Renseignement et opérations spéciales* (180 pages) (éditions L'Harmattan),
- le bulletin électronique hebdomadaire *Renseignor* (Renseignement ouvert par l'écoute des programmes radiophoniques étrangers en langue française),
- la lettre mensuelle *Intelligence et Stratégie* (8 pages),
- la collection *Culture du renseignement* (éditions L'Harmattan),
- ainsi que divers ouvrages collectifs (éditions Ellipses).

Enfin le CF2R développe des partenariats avec des centres de recherches français et étrangers, ainsi qu'avec le projet SPYLAND (parc d'attractions consacré au monde du renseignement).

CF2R PRESENTATION

Founded in 2000, the Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R) (French Center for Intelligence Studies) is an independent non-governmental think-tank. The center specialises in the history, techniques and politics of intelligence. Around these broad themes, the CR2R develops:

- Research activities and workshops, which are provided exclusively to its active members (lunch-conferences, working groups) ;
- Sensitisation activities aimed for the media, members of parliament, universities and economic decision-makers ;
- Publications addressed to the general public ;
- Studies and training sessions provided according to clients, needs and requests;

In this perspective, the CF2R is structured into different commissions:

- . Intelligence History,
- . Intelligence Management,
- . Technical intelligence and intelligence technologies,
- . Special and covert operations,
- . Psychological operations and deception,
- . Private military companies and mercenary activities
- . Competitive intelligence and influence,
- . Drugs, criminality and mafias,
- . Terrorism and Islamic extremism

In parallel, the CF2R conducts regional studies and research, allowing a follow-up on a number of geopolitical situations.

The CF2R has at its disposal around thirty Associate Researchers. All are researchers in their own field of expertise and have both reckoned scholar competencies as well as real hands-on experiences. They get involved in a particular project depending on their speciality, availability, and the security level required by the project.

Some of the CF2R,s publications include :

- . News reports and research papers written by experts on a regular basis,
- . Quarterly issued magazine, *Renseignement et Opérations Spéciales* (180 pages, L'Harmattan editor),
- . Weekly electronic bulletin, *Renseignor*, (Open Intelligence gathered from foreign radio programs in French),
- . Monthly newsletter, *Intelligence et Strategie* (8 pages),
- . The collection *Culture du Renseignement*, (L'Harmattan editor),
- . In addition, many collective books (Ellipses editor).

Finally, the CF2R develops partnerships with French as well as foreign research centers and is closely associated to the SPYLAND project, an amusement park dedicated to the world of intelligence.

PRESENTATION DE L'AUTEUR

Le général de brigade (cadre de réserve) Alain Lamballe, spécialiste reconnu de l'Asie du Sud, a effectué l'essentiel de sa carrière militaire dans le renseignement et les relations internationales.

Le général Lamballe est issu de l'académie militaire de St-Cyr et titulaire d'un doctorat de 3^{ème} cycle en sociologie politique (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). Il est diplômé de l'Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) en hindi, ourdou et hongrois, du Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l'Afrique et l'Asie Modernes (CHEAM), de l'université de Delhi (en hindi). Il possède également des diplômes militaires de langues étrangères (anglais, italien, allemand, hindi).

Au cours de sa carrière, le général Lamballe a exercé de nombreuses responsabilités opérationnelles. Il a débuté sa carrière comme chef de section d'infanterie, puis chef de commando de chasse en Algérie. Il a commandé une compagnie de combat du 19^e Groupe de Chasseurs Mécanisés (Villingen, Allemagne) et a été commandant en second du 46^e Régiment d'Infanterie (Berlin, Allemagne).

En matière de renseignement et de relations internationales, le parcours du général Lamballe, riche et diversifié, l'a conduit à occuper six postes diplomatiques, en Europe occidentale, centrale et balkanique et en Asie du Sud et à effectuer de multiples missions temporaires dans divers pays et auprès de diverses organisations internationales. Le général Lamballe a été deux fois attaché de défense (Hongrie et Pakistan, avec accréditation simultanée au Sri Lanka et aux Maldives), deux fois attaché militaire adjoint (Inde et Royaume-Uni) et une fois conseiller militaire (au sein de la délégation française négociant les accords sur la maîtrise des armements conventionnels à Vienne, en Autriche). A titre civil, il a ensuite été directeur d'un département chargé des affaires politico-militaires au sein de la mission en Bosnie-Herzégovine de l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe. En plus de ses affectations à l'étranger, le général Lamballe a servi au Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, à deux reprises, la première fois comme officier de zone Asie du Sud-Est, puis Asie du Sud, et la seconde fois comme chef du secteur Europe. A Paris, il a également servi dans des organismes de renseignement.

Enfin, le général Lamballe est un chercheur connu dans le monde universitaire. Il est l'auteur d'un ouvrage consacré sur *Le problème tamoul à Sri Lanka* (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1985), de plus de 70 articles sur les problèmes politiques, économiques et militaires de l'Asie du Sud, l'Asie du Sud-Est, la Chine et l'Europe. Il participe à de nombreux colloques et est régulièrement sollicité pour des conférences, en France et à l'étranger. Il se déplace régulièrement dans tous les pays d'Asie du Sud. Il est aujourd'hui chercheur indépendant, membre de l'équipe de recherche Asie 21 du groupe Futuribles. Il est directeur de séminaire sur l'Asie du Sud au Collège Interarmées de Défense et chargé de cours sur l'Asie du Sud à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Politiques, à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales et à l'Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme. Il est également un intervenant régulier sur cette région du monde au Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques. Il assume par ailleurs les fonctions de directeur de recherche au Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R).

AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY

Brigadier-General (rtd) Alain Lamballe, reckoned as a South Asia specialist, has made most of his military carrier in intelligence services and international relations.

Brigadier-General Lamballe graduated from the Military Academy of Saint-Cyr and has a PhD of political sociology (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). He also graduated from the Paris School of Oriental Languages and Civilisations with Hindi, Urdu and Hungarian diplomas. He has a degree in Hindi from the Delhi University. He also has military foreign languages' degrees (English, Italian, German and Hindi). Brigadier-General Lamballe then graduated from the Paris Centre of Higher Studies on Modern Africa and Asia.

Throughout his carrier, Brigadier-General Alain Lamballe has been in charge with numerous operational responsibilities. He started off as an infantry platoon leader, then headed an antiguerilla commando in Algeria. He commanded a combat company from the 19e Groupe de Chasseurs mécanisés (Villingen, Germany), and has been second in command of the 46e Régiment d'Infanterie (Berlin, Germany).

Concerning intelligence and international relations, Brigadier-General Lamballe's carrier led him to carry out six diplomatic assignments, in Western, Central and Balkan Europe as well as in South Asia.

Brigadier-General Alain Lamballe has twice been a Defence Attaché (Hungary and Pakistan, with simultaneous accreditation in Sri Lanka and Maldives), twice a Military attaché in India and in the United Kingdom, as well as a Military Advisor (within the French delegation which negotiated the agreements on conventional armaments' control in Vienna, Austria).

As for his civil services, he has headed the Department for politico-military affairs within the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also served within the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale – at first as a zone officer for South East Asia and South Asia, then as a Europe Sector Chief. In Paris, he also served intelligence services.

Finally, Brigadier-General Lamballe is a university reckoned researcher. Author of *The Tamil Problem in Sri Lanka*, (L'Harmattan, Paris, 1985), he has published more than 70 articles on political, economic and military issues concerning South Asia, South East Asia, China and Europe. He travels regularly to all South Asian countries. He is now an independent researcher, member of the Asia 21 Research Team for the Futuribles Group. He also heads the Seminar on South Asia in the Collège Interarmées de Défense (Joint Services Defence College) and teaches South Asia classes in Ecole des Hautes Etudes Politiques, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales and Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme. He is a regular speaker at the Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques. Moreover, he is a Research Director of the Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement (CF2R).

RESUMÉ

L'Asie du Sud, qui représente près d'un quart de la population mondiale, peut être comparée aux Balkans, au Moyen-Orient ou au Caucase, car elle est une région régulièrement secouée par la violence. Depuis le départ du pouvoir colonial britannique, depuis l'indépendance de l'Inde et le Pakistan (1947), puis la division du Pakistan et la naissance du Bangladesh (1971), depuis l'indépendance du Sri Lanka (1948), le terrorisme a prospéré sans tenir compte des évolutions politiques, démocratiques ou dictatoriales, civiles ou militaires. Il s'est affirmé comme un moyen de poursuivre les politiques nationales ou internationales. Il a également incarné la poursuite des guerres sur le territoire de l'ennemi et des conflits fratricides internes, dans des nombreuses zones culturellement différentes.

Près de la moitié de la population musulmane du monde vit en Asie du Sud. L'endoctrinement islamiste se développe essentiellement au Pakistan et au Bangladesh, mais aussi en Inde et au Népal, dans les écoles coraniques aussi bien que dans des écoles d'Etat. Les madrassahs pakistanaises accueillent de nombreux étudiants étrangers, principalement du Sud-Est asiatique, mais aussi du Bangladesh, d'Afghanistan et des pays arabes

Avec Al-Qaeda, l'Asie du Sud est devenue le centre du monde terroriste. L'intervention massive des Etats-Unis et de leurs alliés en Afghanistan a concentré l'attention sur cette région du monde. Cette situation particulière fait de l'Asie du Sud un foyer vivace du terrorisme islamique, dont les répercussions dépassent largement l'espace régional. Le terrorisme djihadiste local est étroitement lié avec le terrorisme mondial. C'est pourquoi elle reste une préoccupation majeure pour les Etats-Unis et les pays européens, d'autant plus que les liens entre Al-Qaeda et les organisations islamistes locales, particulièrement celles du Cachemire, sont avérées. Les activistes sont parvenus à infiltrer les forces armées du Pakistan et probablement celles du Bangladesh. Mais l'islamisme, aussi important soit-il, n'explique pas toutes les formes d'insurrections et de terrorisme qui frappe l'Asie du Sud. Il y a d'autres idéologies derrière les terrorismes dans cette partie du monde. L'idéologie d'extrême-gauche, historiquement liée à l'expansion du communisme chinois et à la volonté d'influence de Pékin, s'étend désormais au Népal - avec les Maoïstes - et jusqu'à Tamil Nadu à travers les Etats d'Uttaranchal, de l'Uttar Pradesh, de Bihar, de Jharkhand, de Chhatisgarh, de Maharashtra et d'Andhra Pradesh en Inde. Cette menace représente un autre défi pour le sous-continent. Si ces Etats venaient à vaciller sous les coups des terroristes d'extrême-gauche, le Nord-Est se retrouverait isolé de la partie principale de l'Inde.

En Asie du Sud, le terrorisme tue et va continuer à faire des victimes. Il ne disparaîtra pas dans un proche avenir. Le nombre des victimes d'insurrections ou du terrorisme, va continuer à largement dépasser celles des guerres interétatiques. De larges régions de l'Inde, du Pakistan, du Népal et du Sri Lanka resteront soumises à des attaques terroristes. Le Bangladesh et le Bhoutan ne sont désormais plus épargnés. Les terroristes locaux n'ont aucun scrupule et leur imagination n'a aucune limite. Dans l'avenir, de nouvelles attaques

dévastatrices sont à craindre qui causeront d'énormes dégâts humains et environnementaux aux Etats de la région.

Ainsi, aborder le terrorisme contemporain sans évoquer l'Asie du Sud serait une profonde erreur. L'étude des événements locaux peut aider à comprendre la nature et les connexions internationales du terrorisme. C'est à cet objectif que répond cette étude. La première partie est consacrée aux **aspects internes du terrorisme** ; elle analyse les menaces terroristes telles qu'elles existent aujourd'hui dans les divers Etats de la région et dégage leurs caractéristiques. Puis, l'accent est mis sur la typologie des groupes militants, leurs modus operandi, le rôle des forces de sécurité, les liaisons qui peuvent exister entre le terrorisme et la guerre, entre le terrorisme et les armes de destruction massive, entre le terrorisme et l'éducation, le facteur économique, l'appareil administratif et l'arsenal juridique. La deuxième partie examinera les **aspects internationaux du terrorisme** en Asie du Sud, à travers le terrorisme transnational, les accusations réciproques que se lancent régulièrement l'Inde, le Pakistan et le Bangladesh, la coopération régionale mise en oeuvre pour combattre le terrorisme et les connexions entre terrorisme régional et international.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Asia, which represents almost a quarter of the world population, is much to be compared with the Western Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus: a violence prone area. Since the departure of the colonial British power, since the independence of India and Pakistan (1947) and thereafter the partition of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh (1971), since the independence of Sri Lanka (1948), terrorism has prevailed irrespective of political dispensations, democratic or dictatorial, civilian or military. It has been a regular continuation of international and national policy. It has also been the continuation of international wars on the enemy's territory and internecine internal conflicts in remote culturally different areas.

Almost half of the whole Muslim world population lives in South Asia. Indoctrination goes on mainly in Pakistan and Bangladesh but also in India and Nepal in madrassahs as well as even in some countries' State schools. The Pakistani madrassahs still receive students from abroad, mainly from South-East Asia, but also from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Arab countries.

With Al Qaeda, South Asia has even become the centre of the terrorist world. The massive intervention of the USA and its allies in Afghanistan has focussed the attention on this area. The situation in South Asia, which remains a hotbed for Islamic terrorism, will have repercussions elsewhere. The local Muslim terrorism will now be as closely linked to worldwide terrorism. So, it will remain a major concern for the USA and European countries, more so because of Al Qaeda's loose way to federate various extremist organizations, especially those operating in Kashmir, and to infiltrate to a certain extent the armed forces of Pakistan and possibly Bangladesh's ones.

The Islamist extremism, as important as it is, does not explain all the forms of insurgencies and terrorisms which exist in South Asia. There is no single ideological source of terrorism in this part of the world. The extreme leftist ideology, historically attributed to China, the big northern neighbour, and now spreading from Nepal - with the Maoists - up to Tamil Nadu through Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh in India, represents another major challenge for the sub-continent. If this belt collapsed under violent extreme leftist militants' strikes, the North-East would be even more isolated from the main part of India.

In South Asia, terrorism kills and will continue to do so. It will not come to an end in the foreseeable future. The number of victims of insurgencies, the latter extensively using terrorism, far exceeds the area's international wars' deaths' figures. Wide areas of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka are prone to terrorist acts. Bangladesh and Bhutan are not more spared. The local terrorists have no qualms. Their imagination has no limits. In the future, new devastating forms of attacks may appear and will cause huge human and environmental damages to the local populations and states.

Therefore, studying contemporary terrorism without referring to South Asia would be incomplete. A perusal of the events taking place there may help understand the nature and the international connections of terrorism.

In a first part related to **the internal aspects of terrorism**, this study will briefly analyze the terrorist threats as they materialize today in the various South Asian States and mention some characteristics, in order to have a broad idea of this scourge in the region. Then it will, in detail, focus on thematic issues: the typology of the militant groups, their modus operandi, the role of security forces, the links which may exist between terrorism and war, between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, between terrorism and education, the economic factor and the administrative set-up and legal arsenal. The second part will examine **the international aspects of terrorism in South Asia**: the trans-national terrorism within the area, the mutual accusations made by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the regional cooperation implemented to fight terrorism and the nexuses between the regional and world terrorisms.

INTRODUCTION

South Asia, according to the common definition, includes seven countries, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. It is contiguous with Afghanistan, China and Myanmar. The five countries of Central Asia, previously a part of Soviet Union, may also be included in the geo-strategic environment of South Asia.

South Asia is like the Western Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus a violence prone area. It is not by chance if the concept of non-violence was born in that region. In fact, its creator, the Mahatma GANDHI was himself assassinated by a Hindu fanatic. Since the departure of the colonial British power, since the independence of India and Pakistan (1947) and thereafter the partition of Pakistan and the subsequent birth of Bangladesh (1971), since the independence of Sri Lanka (1948), terrorism has prevailed irrespective of political dispensations, democratic or dictatorial, civilian or military. It has been regularly a continuation of international and national polity. It has been also the continuation of international wars on the enemy's territory and internecine internal conflicts in remote culturally different areas. It resulted in the assassination of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Bhutanese and Sri Lankan politicians, including Heads of State and Prime Ministers (*see appendix 1*).

With Al Qaeda, South Asia has even become the centre of the terrorist world. The massive intervention of the USA and its allies in Afghanistan, contiguous to Pakistan, has focussed the attention on this area. Therefore, studying contemporary terrorism without referring to South Asia would be incomplete. A perusal of the events happening there may help us to understand the nature and the international connections of terrorism.

The study tries to synthesize terrorism as it appears in multifaceted forms in South Asia, which represents almost a quarter of the world population.

In a first part related to the internal aspects of terrorism, the study will first briefly analyze the terrorist threats as they materialize today in the various South Asian States and mention some characteristics just to have a broad idea of this scourge in the region. Then it will focus in details on thematic issues : the typology of the militant groups, their modus operandi, the role of security forces, the links which may exist between terrorism and war, between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, between terrorism and education, the economic factor and the administrative set up and legal arsenal.

The second part of the study will examine the international aspects of terrorism in South Asia : the transnational terrorism within the area, the mutual accusations by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the regional cooperation to fight terrorism and the nexuses between the regional and world terrorisms.

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PART ONE

THE INTERNAL ASPECTS

1. OVERVIEW ON INSURRECTIONS AND TERRORISM IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA

Terrorist acts are quite common in most of the seven countries traditionally included in South Asia. Four of them, India, Pakistan (the two most populated ones), Nepal and Sri Lanka suffer the most. Terrorist acts are committed by individuals on their own names, but most of the times on behalf of extremist organizations, highly motivated and acting without any qualm.

Insurrections and terrorism in India

India has been engaged in fighting insurgencies, which extensively practice terrorism, in the North-East (an area covering 255,000 square kilometres) since independence, particularly in Assam (one of the main insurgent movements, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland may have up to 1,500 fighters), Nagaland (where the armed militants may number 5,000), Manipur (possibly 5,000 armed militants and even more), Tripura (about 1,000 cadres from various movements) and in some parts of Meghalaya. Some “liberated zones” are under the control of insurgents, like in Manipur. In Tripura, in late 1970s, private armies comprising immigrated Bangladeshis took to underground activities to retaliate against the tribal insurgent groups¹.

There are also extremist leftist groups, proclaiming to be Maoist, recruiting mainly peasants, especially among tribes and oppressed castes, which operate in several parts of India (States of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh but also in some south-eastern parts of Uttar Pradesh and north-eastern areas of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra). They have started to be present but not necessarily active operationally in other southern States, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala and even in northern States, Uttaranchal, Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab². Belonging to a so-called Naxalbari movement (from the name of a village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal), they started on 2 March 1967 their militant activities, resorting to terrorism, against political and administrative authorities and big landowners. In some places, they run a parallel

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 299.

² « An insidious campaign », K. Srinivas REDDY, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 October 2003.

« Ready for talks with other States too : People’s war », K. Srinivas REDDY, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 July 2004.

« Naxalites : while we were sleeping », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 November 2004.

administration and have established People's Courts (Jana Adalats)¹. The strength of these Maoist militant movements is about 7,000 armed cadre². As a backlash, private armies raised by the dominant classes are themselves indulging in terrorism against Naxalites and sympathizers. Ranvir Sena (also called Ranbir Sena), an "army" of upper caste landlords, is one of them in Bihar which also aims to protect the Biharis working outside of the State, particularly in contiguous Assam³. Although these armies have been banned, they continue to operate⁴.

The main insurgency is in Jammu and Kashmir. It is carried out since 1989 by Islamic groups. The number of armed militants may be around 3,500. The Kashmiri Jihadis may be pure mercenaries or religiously motivated. Many of their leaders are highly politicised and benefit from their positions⁵.

The estimates of militants of the various insurgencies at the present time may be compared with the number of Sikh militants during the Sikh insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. According to a former director general of the Punjab police, they were about 10,000 at the peak period, of whom about half were active⁶.

Communalism, as it is called in India, that means relations between communities, mainly Hindus and Muslims, provoke killings, sometimes through real terrorist acts.

The number of organizations likely to resort and resorting to terrorism is impressive. It is very difficult to know precisely their activities because they may split in several factions (like in Kashmir and the North-East), disappear, change names and reappear or may be dormant (*see in appendices 1 and 2, the list of the main terrorist acts and in appendix 3 the list of the main militant organizations*).

Since 1989, may be as many as 80,000 people died in Kashmir (according to separatists but less, possibly 37,000, according to the Indian government⁷). More recent estimates made by the insurgent movements put even the number up to 100,000⁸. In Assam, 10,000 people have been killed in the last two decades. In Nagaland, the number of people killed may be as high as 25,000. In Manipur, more than 10,000 have lost their life in three decades of violence⁹. To that figures should be added the victims of Naxalites and about

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 327.

« Jharkhand : vigilantes in a cycle of violence », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 September 2003.

² « Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 329.

« Ranvir sena warns ULFA and Assam government regarding protection of Biharis », « New Indian Express », 18 November 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 November 2003.

⁴ « Private armies », Farzand AHMED in « India today », 15 March 1984.

« Ranbir sena kills five dalits », K. BALCHAND, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 March 2004.

⁵ « Power struggle after Musharraf will be very fierce : Ahmed Rachid », interview by Sharmeen OBAID, on website « [www.satribune](http://www.satribune.com) », 3 April 2004.

⁶ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 216.

⁷ « Kashmir : the view from New Delhi », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 4 December 2003, page 1.

Interviews with officials.

⁸ « India/Pakistan relations and Kashmir : steps toward peace », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 24 June 2004, page 13.

⁹ « Thailand hosts Indian rebel, govt talks », in « Dawn », internet edition, 8 December 2003.

« Police open fire on Manipur protesters », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

22,000 killed through many terrorist acts during the insurrection which happened in Punjab from 1978 to 1993. Due to a very stern and efficient action, this last movement was suppressed, although not really in 1984 as sometimes thought due to the signature of an accord but in 1993¹. It is a rare example of success.

Altogether, the number of people who lost their life due to insurrections in India is rather difficult to assess and varies according to sources. But it is for sure many times more than the number of soldiers killed in actions during the various international wars which India fought against China and Pakistan, to which can be included an armed intervention in Sri Lanka².

Insurrections and terrorism in Pakistan

Terrorist activities are more diffuse in Pakistan than in India. However some hot spots can be identified. Insurgencies developed in the past, particularly in Baluchistan. New ones are brewing up in the same province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Leftist militant movements, a reminder of the Naxalites, appeared in the 1970s in the North-West Frontier Province. Peasants, led by the Mazdoor Kissan Party, seized land from the feudal chief of Hashtnagar. Some kind of revolt is still simmering there³, although easily contained.

Assassinations between Sindhis and Mohajirs (who migrated from India, mainly from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, in 1947) or their descendants were common in Karachi and Hyderabad up to 1998. Tensions still persist and are likely to degenerate again at any time into urban terrorism and riots. Political crimes and ordinary violence make the capital of the Sindh province one of the most dangerous towns in South Asia if not in the world.

Furthermore, Sunni and Shia organizations fight against each other, in Karachi but also in Punjab, Baluchistan and in the so-called Northern Areas, a part of historical Kashmir. In the decade of the 1990s, Sunni and Shia feuds have led to the deaths of more than 5,000 people⁴.

So, Muslims are killing other Muslims. Extremist militant Islamic organizations have flourished in Pakistan and they have committed numerous terrorist acts (*see in appendices 1 and 2, the list of the main terrorist acts and in appendix 4 the list of the main militant organizations*). They used to call themselves sipahs and lashkars (both words meaning armed formations).

¹ The return of peace is dated from the so-called Rajiv-Longowal accord as mentioned in the article « Terrorists gun down 15 bus passengers », in « The Hindu », 26 July 1986.

Interviews with officials. K. P. S. GILL, the then Director General of Police in the Punjab State made an unambiguous claim in 1993 that the Sikh insurgency had been comprehensively defeated.

² The South Asia Terrorism Portal gives incomplete figures of losses due to insurgencies and terrorism, considering that pre-1992 data is not available for the North-East. See www.satp.org.

The number of killed people during the four wars between India and Pakistan (including the one around Kargil) is estimated to be a little bit more than 13,000, which is relatively low compared to the populations and the military strengths of the two countries. See address of Altaf HUSSAIN, the founder and leader of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (previously named Mohajir Qaumi Movement) during an international conference, November 5, 2004 in New Delhi organized by the Hindustan Times.

The number of Indian soldiers killed during the armed intervention in Sri Lanka is about 1,200 according to « Colombo's military commitment not in Delhi's interest », Rajiv DEVRAJ, in « Dawn », 18 November 2004.

³ « The raging fire that was », Raza NAEEM, letter to the editor, in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 November 2003.

⁴ « The clash of fundamentalisms, crusades, jihads and modernity », Tariq ALI, Verso, London, New York, 2003, page 325.

Some of them fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from that country in 1989, they moved to Kashmir to carry on the struggle against India. Other organizations have been specially created for the struggle in the Indian part of Kashmir. The number of their Jihadis would be about 25,000¹ but varies from time to time. Among them may be found Talibans and members of Al Qaeda who have fled from Afghanistan. They strike at any time anywhere in Pakistan.

Terrorism in Bangladesh

India asserts that extremist Islamic organizations are reinforcing their influence in Bangladesh. This is confirmed by a report of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service dated December 10, 2003 (*see in appendices 1 and 2, the list of the main terrorist acts and in appendix 5 the list of the main militant organizations*). The Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami (HuJI) is the main militant outfit, with an estimated strength of 15,000. The Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen is supposed to have training centres in 57 districts².

Left-wing extremist groups which include Maoists are active in the northern and western parts of the country³. Furthermore, trouble is time and again brewing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, where the former guerrilla outfit Shanti Bahini used to be active⁴.

Ahmadis who follow a special form of Islam are also under threat.

Insurrections and terrorism in Nepal

The main source of terrorism is the Maoist movement which started aggressive action in February 1996. Its activities has now spread in many places all over the country, in the mountainous areas as well as in the flat Terai along the border with India (*see in appendix 2, the list of the main terrorist acts*). Mid 2003, the insurgents might have partially controlled two thirds of the territory but not permanently and created so-called "autonomous people's governments"⁵. The situation has worsened since then, the government presence being even more reduced. In many places, only the urban centres and district headquarters are under governmental control. The Maoists have broken down a large part of the administrative

¹ « Policy Analysis », n° 472, 5 March 2003, Subodh ATAL, published by the Cato Institute, Washington.

² « Jamiat-ul-Mujahiddin has training centres in 57 districts », article initially published in « Daily Star », Dhaka and reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 25 August 2003.

³ « Outlawed left wing extremists active in five northern districts », in « Independent Bangladesh », 8 October 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

« Left wing extremists intensify activity in 10 Southwestern districts », in « Independent Bangladesh », 18 December 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 December 2003.

« Rebels kill 8 in Bangladesh », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 31 May 2004.

⁴ « Tension in Chittagong as tribals begin stir » Haroon HABIB, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 December 2003.

⁵ « Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

« Escalating body-count », Deepak THAPA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 February 2004.

structure of the country¹. In some areas, they even hold parallel elections². Mid 2004, they have forced the government officials to vacate their posts in many places of the country and infiltrated the education sector, designing curricula for primary school students with their own ideology. The government loses its grip in many rural areas. Economy is in recession³.

The estimated strength of the militants may be as high as 12,000 and even 15,000, out of whom at least 4,000 and at the most 5,500 may be armed, incorporated in the People's Liberation Army. They have a sophisticated arsenal and a high-tech communications network. So far, the number of victims has exceeded 10,000, out of which almost 7,000 Maoists⁴.

Terrorism in Bhutan

In Bhutan, terrorist acts have been comparatively rare (*see in appendices 1 and 2, the list of the main terrorist acts*). They have mostly been committed by Bhutanese of Nepali origin but some have been connected with the insurgencies of the North-East of India.

Insurrections and terrorism in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was torn by a marxist and nationalist insurgency led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), or People's Liberation Front (PLF), which resorted to terrorism in 1971 and 1988. The movement has finally accepted democracy and has in 2004 even some ministers in the government.

Sri Lanka is now confronted with a major insurgency, led by the movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) which since 1978 but mainly from 1983 fights to get

¹ « Tentative political coherence and insurgent consolidation », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

² « Failing State », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

³ « Maoists overrun the Hinterland », article of Keshab POUDEL in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 June 2004.

« Spiralling crisis », editorial in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 August 2004.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

⁴ « Hit and run », Robert KARNIOL in « Jane's Defence Weekly », 27 March 2002.

« Népal : les derniers des Maos », Bruno PHILIP in « Le Monde », 30 January 2003, page 17.

« 14 killed in Nepal fighting » in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 September 2003.

« Is another Vietnam in the making for US in Nepal », Conn HALLINAN in « South Asia tribune », 8 February 2004.

« 1,651 security personnel and 1,141 civilians in Maoist insurgency, says Government spokesperson », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

« Insurgency toll crosses ten thousand », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 February 2004.

« Nepal terrorist groups. Communist party of Nepal-Maoist », document of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, updated April 2004.

« Tentative political coherence and insurgent consolidation », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

independence for the Tamil inhabited northern and eastern parts of the island¹. The Tigers resort extensively to terrorism (*see in appendices 1 and 2, the list of the main terrorist acts*).

The LTTE have developed into a formidable 18,000-strong fighting force², may be even almost 20,000³, which has to be reckoned with. It includes almost a conventional army and even naval units, the Sea Tigers, who may number 2,000 to 3,000 and have a training centre at Nachchikuda, on the coastal region of the Palk Strait⁴. Small air units may also exist. A suicide commando unit, called Black Tigers, which include Black Sea Tigers, has been created (a Black Tiger day is celebrated every year on July 5, to commemorate the suicide attack of July 5 1987 – see appendix 2. It is different from the Heroes day, celebrated on 27 November, to commemorate the first guerrilla to die in combat, on 27 November 1982). The Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS) is a dreaded intelligence wing. The movement has also its own police. The LTTE have a very powerful procurement establishment⁵ and have established an indigenous weapons production programme which includes the building up of anti-aircraft missiles and maritime attack craft⁶.

The LTTE have also their own merchant fleet, with probably more than ten freighters and tankers travelling mostly under Panamanian, Honduran and Liberian flags, to carry arms and ammunition from abroad. They are seeking international recognition of their maritime wing, on par with the Sri Lankan fleet.

Violence has also erupted between members of the mostly Hindu Tamil community and the Muslim community. Following attacks by the Tigers, Muslims, who happen to be most of them Tamils, have started to react. Arms are being hoarded. So, a new Islamic form of terrorism is likely to happen in the island.

Even more than the Nepalese Maoists, the LTTE have conquered and secured territories mainly in the north-central area (with the town of Kilinochchi serving as the headquarters of full-fledged military forces and even as an interim Tamil capital city) and partially and more recently in the eastern parts of the island. They have their own administration, including a school system with special history books⁷ and a judicial system. They operate a radio network (Voice of Tigers).

So far, the number of victims reaches almost 65,000 (out of which 17,780 from the

¹ The movement began around 1972, originally as an extremist wing of the Tamil United Liberation Front. See « Taming the Tigers », Raj CHENGAPPA, in « India today », 30 June 1982.

The word Tigers has been selected most probably because it was the symbol of the once powerful Chola empire of South India which spread Tamil glory up to South-East Asia.

² « LTTE removes rebel commander », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 7 March 2004.

³ « The LTTE and the KP factor », Iqbal ATHAS, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 October 2003.

⁴ « Fishing in choppy waters », V. SURYANARAYAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 February 2004.

⁵ « The LTTE and the KP factor », Iqbal ATHAS, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 October 2003.

⁶ « Commentary n° 77. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and operations. A preliminary analysis », Peter CHALK, winter 1999, publication of the Canadian security intelligence service, 17 March 2000.

« Will LTTE give peace a chance ? », Cdr Vijay SAKHUJA, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

« Tiger vs tiger in eastern Sri Lanka » D. B. S. JEYARAJ, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 March 2004.

« Sea Tigers – threat to Indian security » V. SURYANARAYAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 July 2004.

⁷ « Call for debate on LTTE's history book », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 January 2004.

militant side)¹. Beginning of 2004, an internal rift between northern Tamils and Eastern Tamils has started to be known, which is likely to diminish the strength of the movement². A guerrilla within the guerrilla may occur.

¹ « Despite truth, Tamil Tigers still snatch children », Amy WALDMAN in « The New York Times », reproduced in « International Herald Tribune », 7 January 2003.

« 132 LTTE cadres killed during ceasefire », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 November 2004.

² « LTTE admits internal rift » V S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 5 March 2004.

« Karuna rejects amnesty offer : LTTE calls for calm » V S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 March 2004.

« Financial issues precipitated crisis in LTTE », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 14 March 2004.

« The Karuna factor », in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

« LTTE/Karuna faction to be registered », in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

2. A PROBLEM OF TERMINOLOGY

First of all, we have to differentiate terrorism and insurgencies. Contrary to common assessments, they should not be confused. They are not to be placed at the same level. Insurgencies against the national administrations and governments try to achieve various political aims. Terrorism may be a means used by insurgents to achieve these aims, as it appears commonly in South Asia. But other means are also used, like pure guerrilla warfare implying pinpoint attacks and ambushes (in Kashmir and the North-East of India and in Nepal) and occasionally even limited conventional warfare (for the LTTE in Sri Lanka). Furthermore, terrorism may exist without insurgencies. So, sometimes, distinction is not easy to do. In South Asia, it is in fact impossible to study terrorism without including insurrections.

Insurgencies need mountainous and/or woody areas to prosper. Kashmir, the North-East of India and some parts of central India are advantageous to the militants and conversely unfavourable to the security forces. Terrorism may happen anywhere, in open or sheltered countryside as well as in towns. Insurgencies and terrorism may receive a shot in the arm if carried on in areas contiguous to foreign countries, especially of course if the latter are hostile and if frontiers are porous and difficult to monitor. So it happened for the Punjab insurgency in the 1980s, a State which has a common border with Pakistan, so it happens now in the North-East of India, connected with the Indian mainland through the Shiliguri corridor, 150 km long with a width varying from 21 to 50 km, and surrounded by Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, countries which may be friendly or not, cooperative or not. It may happen to make things more of a mayhem that some neighbouring countries have a very loose control on their own minority frontier areas. Such is the case for Myanmar which faces many insurgencies. Coastal areas may be favourable for arms smugglers as it happens in the Southern States of India¹.

No proper definition of terrorism has been elaborated. No resolution could be adopted by the UN to define it. The South Asian countries disagree on the subject. India would like to adopt a broader definition than Pakistan which wants to differentiate terrorism from freedom fighting. As far as the Indian part of Kashmir is concerned, in India the word "terrorist" is used referring to people who throw bombs, kill individuals either military or civilians, blast buildings and lay mines whereas in Pakistan the term "freedom fighter" is commonly used to define the same people.

Whatever we call the man who in Jammu and Kashmir kills wantonly or not innocent civilians and members of the Establishment (officials, functionaries, paramilitary and military personnel), he most of the time has failed in his educational, professional and family life. He generally comes from a large family. But he is normally very dedicated to his cause and is ready to die for it and even more wishes to die for it. He knows no qualms to commit

¹ « Army warns gvt about arms smugglers », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 December 2004.

cold-blooded murders¹. The problem of recruitment of Muslim militants fighting in the Indian part of Kashmir does not arise, the volunteers are many. Incitement is not missing for the supreme sacrifice. Martyrs receive a divine award, being granted paradise. They provide honour and pride to their kin. Furthermore, their families get human recompenses, in the form of financial assistance.² During the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, families of killed militants also received grants³. The militants killed in action were honoured as martyrs. Most of the militants were coming from the urban middle class and from lower and middle class peasant families belonging to the Jat Sikhs who had not benefited from the Green Revolution and industrialization. They were young, between late-teens and mid-twenties, not so well educated and showed a spirit of adventure, always ready to serve a sacred cause⁴. Such portraits of a fighting militant, alive and dead, are not limited to Kashmir and Punjab, they may apply for other areas of South Asia as well.

In fact, Pakistan has been pushing hard in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to add an exemption clause to the definition of a terrorist act, which would exclude the so-called freedom fighters operating in Indian Kashmir. It behaves in the same way in other international organizations and during all seminars and meetings. In the UN meetings, Islamabad always defends this stance which excludes freedom fighting from the scope of terrorism⁵.

So many definitions exist which are arguable⁶ but it is generally admitted that the objective of terrorism is always of a political nature⁷. Considering difficulties to define terrorism, a detailed study of the typology of the militant groups may help to understand terrorism in South Asia better.

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, Harper Collins publishers, New Delhi, 1995, pages 146 and 147.

Interviews in Kashmir.

² « Dealing with global terrorism. The way forward », Major General Vinod SAIGHAL, Sterling publishers private limited, New Delhi, 2003, pages 286, 287, 293, 294.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 43.

⁴ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 204, 205, 206, 207 and 208.

⁵ « UN SC adopts anti-terror resolution : Pakistan insists on definition », in « Dawn » internet edition, 9 October 2004.

⁶ « Understanding and combating terrorism in South Asia », Beenish HAFEEZ in « Regional studies », quarterly of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, spring 2004.

⁷ « Terrorism. An instrument of foreign policy », Kshitij PRABHA, South Asian publishers, New Delhi, 2000, page 17.

3. TYPOLOGY OF THE MILITANT GROUPS

Various criteria can be used to define the militant groups resorting to terrorism in South Asia : causes, aims, ideologies, religions, degrees of involvement in international affairs, etc.

Causes

The causes of the existence of terrorist organizations and insurgent movements are many and sometimes overlap. Poorness and bad governance, high rates of unemployment and illiteracy, feeling of lack of interest by the Establishment towards backward castes and tribes and as a whole towards minorities, are the most frequent ones in South Asia.

The Sikhs considered to have been discarded during and after the partition of British India. They became a tiny group in Pakistan dispersed in Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas but remained a major community in the Indian Punjab. They were afraid to be reabsorbed by Hinduism as they were not the majority in their own province. The general reorganization of the Indian provinces on linguistic lines in 1956 did not extend to Punjab. The Sikhs felt to have been discriminated upon¹. Ten years later, in 1966, the redemarcation of the Punjab State which made the province smaller but gave the Sikhs the majority did not satisfy them fully. Furthermore, they criticized the sharing of river waters (from the Sutlej for instance) with the neighbouring States as being highly detrimental to them. A big unemployment and the arrival of labourers as farm-hands from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, considered as a threat to the Sikh identity, were not considered as a blessing of the Green Revolution and added to the discontent².

Lack of efforts to redress social disparities and discrimination explains the Naxalite agitation in several parts (mainly central but not exclusively) of India and the Maoist struggle in Nepal. These movements recruit in outcasts, lower castes and in tribes.

In the North-East of India, unresolved ethnic and tribal identity problems vindicate the insurgencies, according to the militant organizations. The mishandling of a famine in 1959 in Mizoram triggered a revolt³ and later on, with the imposition of the Assamese

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 153 and 156.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 159.

³ « Introduction », Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 5.

language and lack of development, an insurgency¹ which took long to resolve. The arrival of Buddhist Chakmas from Bangladesh made things even worse. The Indian government was accused to change the demographic structure of Mizoram². Tribals and non tribals are afraid to loose their identities. In Assam, Muslim outsiders from East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, the country with the highest population density in the world, have migrated in millions. The massive arrival of Muslim Bangladeshis is one of the main causes of insurgencies in this State. These international migrations come in addition to national ones, concerning people coming from other mostly the poorest Indian States like the Marwaris originating from Rajasthan and the Biharis. This foreigner and stranger presence has been strongly resented. The Indian authorities at the federal and State levels, especially the leftist parties including the Congress Party, never agreed to stop the illegal immigration and evenmore to send back to Bangladesh the clandestine workers. The reasons are that a significant amount of the new comers have received the Indian citizenship and constitute a very useful vote bank for the left³ and that the Bangladeshis are appreciated by the employees specially in jobs where the Assamese do not excel. The Assamese have lost in competition to Marwaris in trade, Hindu Bengalis in clerical jobs and Muslim Bengalis in utilization of land and water⁴. This has resulted in alienating the natives and sparking insurgencies which still go on. In Tripura, the insurrection is mainly due to the migration of Bangladeshi (previously East Pakistani) outsiders in the State and the alienation of land by non-tribals. The tribals are now a minority in Tripura⁵.

Rightly or wrongly, blames are addressed to New Delhi for exploiting the resources of the North-East, tea, oil and gas, timber without giving much if any benefit for the local population. Even refineries were built outside of the region. Such a grievance is not unique in India, it happened for instance too in Bihar and Orissa which have been exploited for their mineral wealth but it did not generate insurgencies there. A similar reproach is done by Baluchistan which condemns Islamabad for exploiting fisheries along the Makran coastline of 600 miles, gas, iron ore, copper and other minerals of great economic value, with few advantages and royalties if any given for the Baluchis⁶.

So most of the times, causes are purely national, but outside intervention may in some cases have a role and should not be discarded. Anyway, foreign interference always compound genuinely local situations.

Aims

The various aims to be achieved by the militant organizations differentiate them. Some want to reach secession and accession to an other country ; that is the aim of most extremist groups in Indian Kashmir which desire to join Pakistan.

¹ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 184.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 260.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 111.

⁴ « Beyond the roots : undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the question of ethnic Assamese identity », Pahi SAIKIA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 81.

⁵ « Global security paradoxes 2000 -2020 », major general (retired) Vinod SAIGHAL, Manas publications, New Delhi, 2004, pages 193, 196 and 197.

⁶ « Bugti criticizes army operation », Aziz MALIK in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

Some militant movements want to obtain independence. Often their designation includes the word "liberation". Separatist organizations exist in Indian Kashmir, possibly in Pakistani Kashmir as well, for Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas (that means Northern Kashmir or at least a part of it, sometimes called Balawaristan - comprising within the so-called Northern Areas, the Gilgit Agency around Gilgit and Baltistan around Skardu). Similarly, during many years, the Naga movements could have been included in that category. An Assamese militant outfit, the United Liberation Front of Assam, claims independence. The basic demand of the non-tribal Vaishnavite Meitei insurgents is for an independent Manipur. Various Islamic groups of Manipur want to establish an independent Islamic State carved out of the small State, whose Muslim population represents about 8%. In Meghalaya, some movements of the tribal Khasis, like the Hynniewtre National Liberation Council, want to have a sovereign homeland, to be called Bri Hynniewtre. The Sikhs revolted against the central government to create an independent Khalistan. In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have to be put in that group ; they have embarked in a war against the central government in order to secede from the Sinhalese inhabited areas and to create their own Tamil State in the North and East of the island.

Some other groups try only to get autonomy, within the existing country, in order to protect their cultures and languages which they believe to be threatened, such as most of the insurrectional movements of the various States in the North-East of India. The ones originating in Nagaland, which since 1947 demanded independence would be satisfied now, so it seems although not sure, with the creation of an autonomous Greater Nagaland, or Nagalim, including naga inhabited areas of neighbouring provinces, that means some eastern parts in Assam (inhabited by Kukis who in fact do not consider themselves Nagas but are sometimes sympathetic to them and also by some Nagas proper, particularly in the Karbi Anglong hill district¹), four districts of northern part of Manipur (Chandel, Tamenglong, Ukhrul and Senapati) and two districts of Arunachal Pradesh (Changlang and Tirap). A Garo militant group wants a Greater Garoland or Achik Land comprising the two Garo Hills districts of Meghalaya and large chunks of Kamrup and Goalpara districts of Assam, within the framework of the Indian constitution². In Assam, the Bodos who consider themselves the first sons of the soil want to achieve autonomy of their areas in the lower part of the State and they have partly succeeded with the creation in December 2003 of a Bodoland Territorial Council³ but some still wish the creation of a full-fledged State, Udaychal, within the Indian Union or even sheer independence.

In West Bengal, the Kamtapur Liberation Organization fights for a separate Kamtapur homeland carved out of six northern districts, including the tribal-dominated Jalpaiguri district and also the Goalpara district of Assam⁴.

In the North-East, some small minorities living within the area of a predominant tribe, fighting to get independence or autonomy, may have to fight for the protection of their

¹ Karbi Anglong hill district shares a 40 km long border with Nagaland. « Police, NSCN militants exchange fire », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

² « Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

« Meghalaya : a mushrooming of insurgent groups », Anirban ROY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 August 2004.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, pages 142 and 143.

« Bodoland Territorial Council to come into being tomorrow », Barun Das GUPTA in « The Hindu » internet edition, 6 December 2003.

⁴ « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 110, note 7.

own rights. To mention just an example, it happens to be so in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya. The Garos want to achieve full autonomy, through the creation of a full-fledged State within the Indian Union. But within their territory, the tribal Hajongs demand a separate entity. To achieve their aim, they have created their own militant movement¹.

Some militant Muslim movements that have gained ground in Assam want a separate and autonomous homeland which would comprise the districts of Nowgang, Dhubri, Kamrup and Karimganj and the Hailakandi part of the Cachar district. They demand a financial help for the existing Islamic schools called madrassahs² and the creation of an Islamic university³.

In Bhutan, the militants of Nepalese origin try to broaden the political base of their community living mainly in the south. They want their coreligionists to get rights as full-fledged citizens, keeping their faith and language.

The Chakmas in the Chittagong Hill Tracts favour also autonomy within Bangladesh in order to keep their Buddhist culture.

Some terrorist actions may aim at destabilisation of institutions. It is possibly what Muslim militants are doing in Pakistan. They express their dissatisfaction about the relations between President MUSHARRAF and the Americans to fight Islamic extremism. In India, the various insurrections put together constitute a serious threat to democracy.

Ideologies

Ideology may be another mean to classify militant organizations. Marxism is more or less professed by the LTTE. The United Liberation Front of Assam claims to work for a socialist type of government in an independent Assam. The Meiteis of the People's Liberation Army in Manipur are Maoists. The other main insurgent groups of Manipur, the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak and the Kangleipak Communist Party share more or less the same ideology. Also left-oriented are the Nagas of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland and the Tripuris of the Tribal National Volunteers⁴.

The Maoist form of communism has mainly been prevailing in the various peasant extremist movements, the so-called Naxalite organizations like the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the People's War Group (PWG), active in rural areas of nine States in central and southern India and marginally even in north India⁵. On September 21, 2004 those two movements have merged to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist)⁶. As the MCC

¹ « Meghalaya : a mushrooming of insurgent groups », Anirban ROY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 August 2004.

² The original plural is madari but the word madrassah is commonly used in English for the plural as well.

³ « Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh : implications on India's security », Nirmal JINDAL, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 212.

⁴ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, pages 134, 181 and 182.

⁵ The Maoist Communist Centre operates in Bihar and Jharkhand and the People's War Group in other States. See « U. S. move may thwart PW's plans », K. Srinivas REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 May 2004.

⁶ « Left wing extremism : synchronized onslaught », article of Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

and the PWG before, this new party defends the poor peasants against the rich landlords, demands the redistribution of lands and refuses the World Bank-aided Projects¹. The Maoist insurrection in Nepal shares the same ideology and takes mainly its inspiration from the Peru's Shining Path². It did not make any clear commitment to a multi-party democracy but wants to abolish the monarchy and establish a Marxist regime³. Similar extreme leftist movements also exist in Bangladesh and in Bhutan where they want to create communist States⁴.

Islamist fundamentalist groups of the North-East of India which recruit mainly among the immigrants from Bangladesh endeavour to promote the Muslim ideology including by force⁵. In Bangladesh, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and the Jamiat-ul-Mujahiddin try and launch an armed Islamist revolution. In Pakistan, several militant movements want to impose an Islamic regime. They rule the North-West Frontier Province and partially Baluchistan. In Islam, politics, economy and religion are not separated. Ideological thoughts and religious practices intermingle. For radical Islamists, who are not absent in South Asia, the Koran is the exclusive reference book for governance in any field, including the administration of justice. They largely ignore the concept of nation States and look for Dar-ul-Islam all over the world. They dream of an international Islamic society. For them, islamization of the world is the key world as before marxization was for the communists. South Asia contributed to the contemporary radical Islamism through some of its thinkers. One of them, Abul Ala MAWDUDI, born in British India in 1903 who died in Pakistan in 1979, was the most important theoretician of political Islam based on a single law, the Sharia, imposed by God and to be applied to all fields of governance and all spheres of life. As the builder of the Jamaat-i-Islami in 1941, he is considered as one of the foremost figures of Islam in the last century. He influenced the Egyptian Muslim brothers⁶.

Like Islam, Sikhism does not separate politics and religion. In the history of Sikhs, both have been intertwined. The insurgents of the 1980s and 1990s in Punjab carried forward

« CPI (ML), MCCI merge, form new party », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 October 2004.

« Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

¹ « Looking for a breakthrough », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 13 October 2004.

« War, peace and the people », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 17 October 2004.

² « Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

³ « Spiralling crisis », editorial in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 August 2004.

⁴ « Outlawed left wing extremists active in five northern districts », in « Independent Bangladesh », 8 October 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

« Rebels kill 8 in Bangladesh », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 31 May 2004.

⁵ « Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh : implications on India's security », Nirmal JINDAL, and « ISI's Eastward operations. Old links in North-East India and new ones in South-East Asia », Anil BHATT, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 212.

« The North-East : Islamist shadow », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 25 October 2004.

⁶ « Origines et réalités de l'islamisme activiste », Jean-Philippe CONRAD, in « Stratégique », Paris, n° 2-3, 1997, page 22.

« Political Islam in the Indian subcontinent. The Jamaat-i-Islami », Frédéric GRARE, Manohar, a publication of the French Research Institutes in India, New Delhi, 2001, pages 10, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 65.

this age-long tradition¹ although their ideological belief in that field does not appear so staunch as for the Muslims.

Religions

A logical criterion to classify the insurgent movements is religion. For instance, the Kashmiri fighters who make use of terrorism in Indian Kashmir, are all Muslim.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in Sri Lanka, are Hindu but they are not branded as Hindu militants². The insurgents of the North East of India are mostly Christian.

In India and in Bangladesh, communalism between communities, more precisely between Hindus and Muslims, may cause deaths through terrorist acts, sponsored or not by extremist organizations. Sometimes, fractions or sects or subdivisions within the same religion create tensions, occasionally leading to terrorism. Sunnis and Shias oppose each other, mainly in Pakistan. In the same country, the Ahmadis and the Zikris are not considered by many to be Muslims and may be discriminated upon and even threatened and attacked physically. Ahmadis in Bangladesh face the same fate. Individual Christians, missionaries or not, foreigners or not, have been targeted in India and in Pakistan by isolated aggressors and by extremist organizations.

Degrees of involvement in international affairs

An other criterion to sort out the militant groups is their degrees of involvement in international affairs. Some pursue national objectives while other ones have international aims. Their commitment in world matters may also concern not only the aims to be achieved but also the means which are employed by the various movements, in other words the level of material and financial help being provided from abroad and the participation of foreigners in local insurgencies. In India, the foreigners who operate in the various Kashmiri secessionist movements are mostly coming from Pakistan but also from Afghanistan, Arab countries and various other countries. According to Indian officials and other sources, the total figure of foreigners may constitute up to 60 to 80% of the militants in Jammu and Kashmir³. Since the terrorist acts in the United States, in 2001, the number of non Pakistanis and non Afghanis operating in Jammu and Kashmir has decreased significantly⁴. In Pakistan, foreigners operate in Taliban and Al Qaeda movements and are mainly Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks⁵.

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 152 and 153.

² « Dealing with global terrorism. The way forward », Major General Vinod SAIGHAL, Sterling publishers private limited, New Delhi, 2003 page 25.

³ « Al Qaeda active in Jammu and Kashmir, says army chief », in « Times of India », 12 October 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

« Kashmir : the view from New Delhi », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 4 December 2003, page 1.

« Risk-reduction measures in Kashmir », Brian CLOUGHLEY in « Nuclear risk reduction in South Asia », Michael KREPON and Chris GAGNE, New Delhi 2003, page 182.

A list of countries of origin of foreigners operating in Kashmir is available at www.satp.org.

⁴ Interviews with officials.

⁵ « Pakistan captures 100 foreign militants », B. Muralidhar REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 21 March 2004.

The following table offers an example of classification according to degrees of involvement in international affairs.

Movements	Aims		Means	
	National	International	National	International
Naxalbari movements in India (Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, with a few pockets in Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Haryana and Punjab)	Creation of special entities. Ideological aims (defence of backward classes)	Some common ideology with the Maoist movement in Nepal but no clear assessment of a common future State including Nepal and some parts of India. Some anti-American activities. Connections also with Maoist organizations in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.	Indigenous movement	Some connection with the Maoist movement in Nepal. Possible involvement of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence. Arms training given by the LTTE
Militant movements of the North-East of India	Originally independence but now more and more, autonomy, through, for instance, achievement of a status of a State or Territory within the Indian Union. Unification of various Naga territories within a Greater Nagaland		Indigenous movements	Help provided from abroad (China, Myanmar and Bangladesh). Some movements possess rear bases in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Previously Bhutan had also bases for Indian insurgent movements

Maoist movement in Nepal	Change of regime. Abolition of the monarchy	Some common ideology with the Naxalbari movements in India but no clear assessment of a common State including Nepal and some parts of India. Connections also with Maoist organizations in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.	Indigenous movement	None. China apparently does not provide any help. Arms training given by the LTTE
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (army of the prophet)	Anti-Shia movement	Not much	Indigenous in Pakistan	Help from some Arabic countries
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Anti-Shia movement	Not much	Indigenous in Pakistan	Help from some Arabic countries
Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (movement of the Shia law)	Anti-Sunni movement	Not much	Indigenous in Pakistan	Help from Iran and Ismaelia organizations
Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI)	Creation in Pakistan and Bangladesh of Islamic regimes			The two branches of the movement in Pakistan and Bangladesh cooperate
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Independence of Tamil Eelam (Tamil inhabited provinces of Sri Lanka)	May wish to spread, in a later stage, the movement in South India in order to create an other Tamil State or a unique Tamil State on both side of the Palk Straits	Indigenous movement	Many international involvements for financial reasons. Diaspora sends funds. Imports of weapons

Various Kashmiri militant organizations	Secession from India and accession to Pakistan, or for some movements full-fledged independence	Pakistan involved	Indigenous movements in India	Big international involvement (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, diasporas abroad, particularly in USA and UK). Funds collected abroad. Participation of foreign militants.
Talibans, Al Qaeda	Creation of Islamic dispensations in Afghanistan and in Pakistan	Revolution abroad. Jihad against USA, the Western world, Israel and India. Attack against the Western economic interests	Indigenous	The USA contributed to the creation of Talibans for the fighting against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Presently, big international involvements, particularly from Islamic countries. Participation of foreign militants. Interests shown in weapons of mass destruction

4. MODUS OPERANDI OF THE MILITANTS GROUPS

The militant groups, which are real political actors although mostly underground, use a lot of modus operandi which include the various forms of terrorism and which may vary according to circumstances. They normally claim responsibility for their deeds but sometimes do not for known or unknown reasons. They may even deny them. Their arsenal is impressive, sometimes quite sophisticated. Training is a must for terrorists to be acquainted with modern weapons and devices. Therefore a minimum of infrastructure, like ranges, is needed, whether in the country of operations or abroad. The terrorist groups resort to bomb attacks, mine laying, hand grenades throwing, hostage takings,... against soft targets, that means civilian unprotected ones and also hard ones, that means military protected ones.

Frequently, in India as well as in Pakistan, the Muslim insurgents take shelter and refuge in convenient hide-outs like religious schools and mosques, which may even be transformed into arms and ammunition dumps and in strongholds. They think that security forces will not dare to intervene in such sanctuaries. Those establishments may in fact occasionally become battlefields, either because of provocations of militants who want to create a major eventful incident or because of deliberate and thoughtful actions of security forces. Similar situations have happened in the gurudwaras (temples) of the Sikhs during the Punjab insurgency. In Sri Lanka, Buddhist temples have sometimes been targeted.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, most of the times the killers resort to individual terrorist acts, not to massive ones although in 2004 the latter have happened, especially during religious festivals and in mosques at prayer time. Terrorists mostly target civilians, killing them or kidnapping them. But members of security forces are also attacked, especially in the North-West Frontier Province where landmines activated by remote control have in 2004 killed soldiers moving in convoys. Attacks have been perpetrated against Christian schools and churches as well as against hospitals.

Foreigners are occasionally assaulted, mainly Americans, British and French. The Macedonian consulate in Karachi was also aimed¹. Offices of international organizations, like International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have also been attacked, especially in the Northern Areas². Members of Non Governmental Organizations may also be targeted, especially in the North-West Frontier Province for the motive of having non Islamic activities. American convoys, supplying forces in Afghanistan, have been attacked in several areas. Pakistani oil tankers

¹ « Alertes », n°8, January 2003, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

² « IFAD, UNDP offices attacked in Diامر », article in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 July 2003.

have been targeted in Baluchistan on their way to Afghanistan to supply US and allied forces¹.

Sometimes, government properties have been targeted, for instance gas pipelines which have been destroyed in Baluchistan and Punjab. Electricity transmission lines and power transformers have been blown up in Baluchistan. Train tracks have also been ripped off by saboteurs.

After the earthquake of October 8, 2005 in the North-West Frontier Province and Azad Kashmir, the extremist religious groups and the militants have stepped in rapidly to save people and to bring relief to the victims. In so doing so, they have improved their image compared to the army which is said to have intervened too late².

India

The Muslim militants fighting in Indian Kashmir attack persons, like political opponents, mainly but not exclusively during electoral campaigns, policemen, informers of the security forces, renegades, personnel of the security forces and members of the Hindu and Sikh communities. The extremists try in Jammu and Kashmir to intimidate the Muslims who may collaborate with the Indian dispensation, but mainly the non Muslims in order to achieve an ethnic cleansing especially in the Srinagar valley³ and some predominantly Muslim areas of Jammu.

The members of the nomadic Gujjar tribes of the remote Pir Panjal region, suspected to be stoolpigeons, become easy prey to the insurgents when they move with their cattle to the highlands in summer time⁴. Militants always try to coerce people into staying away from elections⁵. They pressure the media to adopt an anti-Indian stance⁶. The journalists who do not toe the line of militants may be killed⁷. Judges are intimidated and pressurized so that they do not punish militants. Those who do not abide are assassinated⁸. The Kashmiri militants target public buildings and occasionally hijack aircraft. They attack employees who are involved in road-laying works, engineers and workers who are building the railway line (broad gauge) between Jammu and Srinagar⁹. In doing so, they try to disrupt the communication network and hit the supply lines of the security forces. Kidnapping and

¹ « Tanker taking oil for US forces attacked », in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 July 2004.

² « Jihadis have stepped into administrative vacuum in earthquake-affected areas, says President Musharraf », in « Daily Times », 27 October 2005.

« The State fails, the Jihadi prevails », article of Mohammad SHEHZAD in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 November 2005.

³ About 350,000 Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) had to leave the Srinagar valley for security reasons since 1989. See « Kashmir : learning from the past », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 4 December 2003, pages 13 (note 33), 16.

⁴ « Gujjars undaunted », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 June 2004.

⁵ « J and K : elections again », article of Praveen SWAMI in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

« Explosion in Srinagar government building », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 April 2004.

⁶ « Kashmir : the view from New Delhi », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 4 December 2003, page 17.

⁷ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 85.

⁸ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 66.

⁹ « Militants now target roads », Luv PURI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 7 September 2003.

« Bodies traced », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 June 2004.

holding of hostages may be made to obtain in exchange the release from jail of hard core militants. Occasionally, foreigners have been kidnapped and sometimes massacred, not only in Jammu and Kashmir but elsewhere in India.

Internecine murders have happened between Muslim insurgent movements in Kashmir time and again while fighting for supremacy. Such feuds may break up between locals or between locals and foreigners. It is not unsurprising considering the large number of outfits.

Some of the Kashmiri extremist movements operate also in various parts of India¹. The Islamist extremists may strike anywhere in the country, including in the big towns, like Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata.

The Sikhs perpetrated bank robberies. They attacked Hindu temples and targeted Hindu religious leaders. They laid ambushes, using landmines, against vehicles of security forces. They have struck not only in Punjab but in other places in India. They have also resorted to plane hijackings ; they even blasted an Air India aircraft midair over the Atlantic Ocean².

The various insurgent movements in the North-East regularly call strikes coinciding with important dates for the country, like independence day and birth anniversaries of historical leaders. On such dates they may resort to terrorist acts (the last example is the various blasts in Assam and Nagaland, on October 2, 2004, birth anniversary of Mahatma GANDHI (see appendix 2). The tribal and non tribal militants attack persons and destroy properties, including pipelines and industrial sites like refineries. They also kidnap people. Additionally they ambush trains, blow up railway and road bridges, disrupting communications with the rest of India, particularly in the strategically located Shiliguri corridor in the Bodo area³. They loot banks, offices and petrol pumps. The various insurgent movements of the North-East seem to coordinate more and more their actions⁴. They regularly disturb electoral campaigns, dissuading through threats people to participate in the democratic process⁵. They may also persuade voters to bring to power a political party which is favourable to them. Such has been the case for the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN), which came to power in Kohima after the elections of February 2003⁶.

Fighting and terrorist acts may also happen not against the Establishment but between local tribes and communities as well as between locals and outsiders. It has happened several times in Assam, in the Brahmaputra valley where Bangladeshi Muslim

¹ « The chasm between rhetoric and reality », article of G. PARTHASARATHY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 182, 187 and 204.

³ Three national highways, 31, 37 and 52, and railway links follow the corridor, north and south of the Brahmaputra. See « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 146.

⁴ « Manipur : insurgent show of force », article of Praveen KUMAR in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.

⁵ « Left wing rampage », Saji CHERIAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 April 2004.

« Manipur : bullets over ballots », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 April 2004.

« Fear factor no campaign in Manipur », in « Hindustan Times », 13 April 2004

« Meghalaya : extortion dynamics », SASHINUNGLA, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 19 April 2004.

⁶ Interview in Nagaland with a member of legislative assembly, May 2004. Villages which would not vote « correctly », would have to pay a collective fine of one lakh (100,000) rupees.

immigrants have been massacred in big numbers and in the Karbi Anglong district between Karbis and non Karbis (Kukis but also Marwaris originating from Rajasthan, Biharis, Nepalis and Bengalis)¹. Occasionally, Muslim immigrants are also victimized through individual terrorist acts. Internecine feuds have occasionally happened too in Manipur between the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak and an other militant outfit². In that State, the non-tribal Meiteis of the Imphal valley have resented the advantages granted by the constitution to the hill tribes which happen to be mostly Christian³. They had been converted to Vaishnavite Hinduism in the 17th century but have turned back to their pre-Hindu belief⁴.

The Naxalites/Maoists in central and other parts of India attacks land owners, money lenders, politicians, police-informers and members of the security forces (the later mainly through ambushes) and occasionally waylay passenger vehicles. They may attack trains, police stations (to kill policemen but most of the time to loot weapons) and communication facilities. They also kidnap prominent local leaders and policemen to put pressure on provincial governments⁵. They have occasionally attacked American business interests⁶. They also damage coal and bauxite mines. They try to disturb elections, intimidating people to boycott them⁷. Sometimes they launch large scale attacks, at the company level⁸. In the areas they are more or less administering, they distribute booty among poor tribals, romanticising a Robin Hood image. Occasionally, they openly stage big rallies, including in the biggest towns⁹.

In India, communalist fights happen time and again between Hindus and Muslims. Serious ones happened in 1993, in Mumbai, after the destruction, end of 1992, by Hindu zealots of a famous mosque at Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh. Many Muslims were killed. In 2002, murderous anti-Muslim riots happened in Gujarat, after a train of Hindus was attacked by Muslims. These communal troubles may be ignited and expanded by terrorist elements who may infiltrate and excite mobs. Other communal feuds have occurred, for instance between the Nagas and the Kukis in Manipur¹⁰.

¹ « Assam : ethnic face-off », Animesh ROUL, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 17 November 2003.

² « PREPAK terrorists killed in Manipur », in « Rediff », 18 November 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 November 2003.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 190.

⁴ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 287.

⁵ See different articles in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁶ « Maoist group targeting US interests in India », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 August 2003.

« Left wing rampage », article of Saji CHERIAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 April 2004.

⁷ « Left wing extremism : synchronized onslaught », article of Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

⁸ « MCC kills 4 in Gaya », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 14 March 2004.

« 17 policemen killed by naxalites », PTI release in « The Hindu », internet edition, 21 November 2004.

⁹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 333.

¹⁰ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 294 and 295.

Bangladesh

Police is regularly attacked by uncontrolled elements using occasionally terrorism. Public events may time and again be targeted. Politicians belonging to the opposition and members of non Governmental Organizations may also be aggressed and killed. Ahmadi mosques are targeted. Untoward incidents have occurred against the press.

Nepal

Public and administrative buildings are attacked by the Maoist insurgents. Banks, schools, telecommunication centres and power plants are targeted. Bridges have been blown up, roads blockaded, disrupting communications. Indian and other foreign properties and projects in Nepal are being destroyed. Army camps are also attacked. Political opponents, journalists, informants and members of security forces are assassinated. General strikes and shutdowns (bandhs in local language) are called and never defied. The Maoists have managed to create a fear psychosis¹. Apart from terrorist acts, they launched local conventional attacks with several thousands men acting together, against valuable targets like district headquarters, including in the flat areas called Terai, along the Indian border². Most of the time, they wage a real guerrilla warfare carrying out ambushes and using landmines and booby traps on highways and roads. The militants may also impose blockades of major towns including the capital city.

Furthermore the insurgents abduct civilians (including students, teachers, labourers, ...) to attend training in indoctrination camps³. The kidnapped people may be released afterwards.

Bhutan

The Nepalese insurgents have launched attacks on security forces and resorted to kidnappings. The militants originating from the North-East of India have occasionally strike in Bhutan itself, for instance in markets, but mostly in Assam where they can easily target Bhutanese travellers.

Sri Lanka

Highly known and respected sites may be attacked, like Buddhist temples. Terrorist acts have also been made against markets, passenger trains and the international airport of Colombo.

Sinhalese political leaders, informants of the police belonging to any community are

¹ « Escalading body-count », Deepak THAPA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 February 2004.

² « Failing State », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

³ « Tentative political coherence and insurgent consolidation », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

targeted. Journalists, academics and activists are assaulted for their political affiliations and stances against the secessionist movement.

Moderate Tamil personalities are intimidated so that they do not collaborate with the Sri Lankan government or even do not participate in the democratic process. If they do not comply, they may be physically aggressed and even killed¹. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam want to be the sole representatives of the Tamil community. They have finally accepted to participate in the 2004 legislative elections but because of intimidation of rival candidates, elections have been distorted². So the success of the Tamil National Alliance, a proxy of the LTTE, cannot be considered as the result of a genuine electoral test. It is a mockery of democracy.

As already shown in the past, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam may fight the government troops in a conventional way in pitched battles.

Sea piracy

Attacks are not limited to land. Ships are not unfrequently subjected to terrorist acts in some Indian harbours. If these acts are reckoned as sea piracy, India is ranked at the third place in the world list of countries suffering from that scourge³. At sea, some attacks have been carried out by the LTTE against ships of the Sri Lankan navy, using small embarkations, full of explosives, sent for crashing at full speed. So far, no merchant ships have been targeted deliberately.

Suicide squads, female and children terrorists

Suicide squads have been used by various militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir since 1999, in Pakistan more recently at the instigation of Jaish-e-Mohammad⁴ and by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam since the founding of the movement (about 220 recorded cases for Sri Lanka alone⁵), including at sea. Suicide squads, allegedly called Osama, may even have been created in the Muslim community in the eastern part of Sri Lanka⁶ although they have not yet come into action. So suicide attacks are carried out by Muslims (Sunnis as well as Shias) and Hindus.

Women also have joined the insurgency movements, mainly in Sri Lanka where they even commit suicide attacks. In India, female militants are found particularly among the Naxalites/Maoists⁷. In the Maoist movement of Nepal, women are more and more numerous and some have become battalion vice commanders and political commissars. Many of them

¹ Such killings happened during most of the electoral campaigns, including the one which preceded the 2 April 2004 elections. See « LTTE hand suspected in two attacks in Sri Lanka », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 March 2004.

« LTTE and elections », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 March 2004.

² « The fall of Karuna », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 April 2004.

³ « Alertes », n°10, March 2003, page 2, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

⁴ « Fidayeen : the chickens come home to roost », Kanchan LAKSHMAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

⁵ « Hope of peace – and high anxiety – in Sri Lanka », article of Celia W. DUGGER in « International Herald Tribune », 10 April 2002.

⁶ « New threat to Sri Lanka peace process », Nihak NAYAK, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁷ « Women naxals attack railway station », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 March 2004.

are non-Aryan, they are from Tibeto-Burman origin. A significant number has joined voluntarily, some have been forced to. More than 10% of the Maoists killed in 2003 by the security forces are females¹. Female suicide-bombers have not yet operated in Pakistan although some recruitments may have started².

Children may occasionally be recruited in Kashmir for instance for intelligence and logistics purposes (cooks, cleaners, porters and guides) but also to throw hand grenades through an open window of a military car and for any other type of aggressive action. Recruitment has been detected in Doda district³. The children of nomadic tribes of Gujjars and Bakerwals are particularly vulnerable⁴. Boys and girls are also forcibly recruited by the Naxalites/Maoists who use them for intelligence gathering, carrying food and weapons and delivering extortion notes⁵. Children have been regularly enrolled in Sri Lanka by the LTTE⁶ and in Nepal by the Maoist movement which uses them to gather intelligence on security force movements⁷. In the latter country, sometimes poverty forces parents to give their children to the insurgent groups in return for money⁸.

Armament

Originally, the insurgents used primitive weapons. For instance, in the late 1960s, the Naxalites had choppers, spears, sickles and countrymade guns. Today, many militant movements are very well equipped and armed. Their armament may be more sophisticated than the police and paramilitary forces. In their arsenal are to be found modern light weapons, machine guns, mortars, mines, anti-aircraft guns, missiles, ...

Till now, the terrorist organizations have rarely used ground to air missiles. The LTTE destroyed 2 planes of the Sri Lanka air force at the end of April 1995 with such missiles. The possibility exists that similar attacks by LTTE and other extremist movements occur in the future. It is known that some of the militant organizations based in Pakistan possess Stingers which they received from the USA to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The number of those missiles placed now in wrong hands may be limited but other types of

¹ « 16 killed in clashes in Nepal », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 November 2003.

« Women now swelling the ranks of Maoists », Rita MANCHANDA, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 November 2004.

² « Fidayeen : the chickens come home to roost », Kanchan LAKSHMAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

³ Interviews of the author in Kashmir, 2001 and Delhi 2004.

« Jehadi groups step up recruitment of children », Praveen SWAMI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 September 2003.

⁴ Discussions of the author in Srinagar, 2001.

« Terrorists recruiting tribal children », article of Luv PURI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 February 2004.

⁵ « Child combatants in the People's War Group », P. V. RAMANA, in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁶ « LTTE under pressure over child soldiers », article of Lucien RAJAKARUNANAYAKE in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 February 2003.

⁷ « HRW urges end to killing in Nepal », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 October 2004.

⁸ « Nepal : back to the gun », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 22 October 2003, page 4.

« Arming the children », P. G. RAJAMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 March 2004.

« Nepal terrorist groups. Communist party of Nepal-Maoist », document of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, updated April 2004.

anti-aircraft missiles may be acquired from so-called rogue States.

Cyber-terrorism

Cyber-terrorism has started to be used in South Asia on a moderate scale. There seems to be a parallelism between the number of cyber attacks between India and Pakistan and the level of tension between the two countries.

In 1998, the Tamil militants swamped Sri Lanka embassies sending hundreds e-mails per day for more than two weeks. All the mails carried the same message : " We are the internet Black Tigers and we are doing this to disrupt your communications". In 2002, an unsophisticated attack has been launched against the Pakistani government website¹.

Vulnerabilities do exist in South Asia. For instance, the water distribution networks of some main cities, which include Dhaka, are computerized and may be attacked.

Infiltration of government institutions

Some insurgent movements and extremist groups try and succeed to infiltrate government institutions.

It happened during the Sikh insurgency in the Indian Punjab where policemen empathized with the militants and some even committed terrorist acts on their behalf². It still happens now mainly in Jammu and Kashmir. Sympathisers of the Kashmiri militants may work at every level in the administrations, including the police. Non sympathisers may wish to buy their safety showing little or no activity, fearing that otherwise their attitude could be considered as hostile by militants³. Infiltration is to be found too in the States where Naxalites/Maoists are active, particularly in Andhra Pradesh. Militants and politicians happen to make use of one another⁴. The Naxalites/Maoists control votes which they can deliver in bulks. In some remote parts of the newly formed Jharkhand State, and elsewhere as well, they are virtually running a parallel dispensation⁵.

Infiltration of provincial governments is common in the North-East. A kind of collusion between the authorities and the criminal organizations generates impunity and foster terrorism. Political patronage makes militancy growing⁶. In Assam, ruling parties and

¹ « Cyber-terrorism », Syed Imad-ud-Din ASSAD , rubric « The Review », in « Dawn », internet edition, 22 August 2003.

« La bonne excuse du cyberterrorisme reproduction in « Courrier International », Paris, 9 - 15 January 2003, page 49, of an article initially published in « The Guardian », London.

« IT body recommends plan to counter cyber-terrorism », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 11 May 2003.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 170, 184, 215 and 216.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 74.

« Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 140 and 146.

⁴ « Politician-Naxalite nexus in Andhra Pradesh », P. V. RAMANA, in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁵ « India's neglected tribals », M. J. AKBAR in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 October 2003.

« Left wing extremism : synchronized onslaught », article of Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

⁶ « Les insurrections du Nord-Est de l'Inde », Alain LAMBALLE in "Stratégique", 1/2000, Paris.

militant organizations had at certain periods, mainly in the late 1980s, close links. Insurgents had penetrated the State's bureaucracy, posting even their own men in the police and intelligence agencies. The United Liberation Front of Assam's writ ran supreme¹. Similarly, a nexus has developed in Tripura between the major political parties and the extremist groups. In Arunachal Pradesh, an agreement was allegedly reached between the Chief Minister and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) (NSCN - K), according to which the former would receive a complete support to be elected again unchallenged, under the condition that he would follow later on the directions of the militant outfit². In Nagaland, in the 1990s, the insurgents were leading a parallel government which, according to some reports, presented bills to official departments. They could even advertise in local newspapers for recruiting³. In 2004, the provincial government is still controlled by the militants⁴. The Manipur administration has almost completely collapsed, the militants run a parallel government, call the shot, intimidating even ministers. They have access to government offices and files. It is the only State in India where a paramilitary force staged a "guns down" stir.⁵

Collusion between the government officials, politicians and policemen with the underground groups in the North-East has been publicly denounced, including in July 1995 by the lieutenant-general commanding the Eastern Command during a press conference in his headquarters in Kolkata. Such accusations were also made in a report written by an other lieutenant-general who had been the Governor of Nagaland and Manipur⁶.

Just like the intelligence agencies try to infiltrate the militant groups, the latter may have their own men in the security forces. For instance the United Liberation Front of Assam boasts to control more than 150 members of different Indian security forces⁷.

In Pakistan, ambiguity happens especially in the western provinces. The North-West Frontier Province is ruled from Peshawar by a coalition of religious parties which more or less supports the ideology of militants fighting against the Americans. Such a situation exists

« Shadow-boxing in Meghalaya », Anirban ROY, senior correspondent, Hindustan Times, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », weekly report, internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.

¹ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 140.

« Allies in the closet. Over-ground linkages and terrorism in Assam », Jaideep SAIKIA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

« Violence and hope in India's Northeast », S. K. SINHA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 16.

² « The terrorist economy in India's Northeast. Preliminary explorations », Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 281.

⁴ « PW - full coffers and a long reach », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », 29 April 2004.

« Nagaland, India's Waziristan », Kuldip NAYAR in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 July 2004.

« Nagaland : a frozen peace », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 2 August 2004.

« Now for a breakthrough » in « The Hindu », 10 December 2004.

⁵ « The terrorist economy in India's Northeast. Preliminary explorations », Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

« Manipur : rebels in top gear », article of Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 February 2004.

« Cross-border challenges », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « Frontline », Chennai, 3-16 July 2004.

⁶ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 285 and 286.

⁷ « CRPF jawan was our man, says ULFA », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

also in Quetta where religious parties participate in the government of Baluchistan¹. At the federal level, infiltration of the intelligence agencies, the police and the army by militants is also regularly mentioned². An organization sponsoring Islamisation, called Tanzeem-ul-Ikhwan, consisting of retired officers, maintain close links with the army³. The Indian intelligence agencies estimated that in 2001 there were 15,000 Pakistani military personnel who belonged to the Taliban and Al Qaeda⁴.

¹ « Quetta a haven for Taliban, says report » in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 November 2003. The Karachi daily quotes an editorial of the « Washington Post », dated 29 October 2003.

² « Origines et réalités de l'islamisme activiste », Jean-Philippe CONRAD, in « Stratégique », Paris, n° 2-3, 1997, page 22.

« Al Qaeda seeking new recruits in Pakistan : report », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 October 2003.
« Fidayeen : the chickens come home to roost », Kanchan LAKSHMAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

³ « South Asian conflicts : Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sri Lanka », major-general (rtd) Afsir KARIM in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2001, page 11.

⁴ « The Taliban-Al Qaeda after one year of war », SREEDHAR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 54.

5. SECURITY FORCES AND TERRORISM

The police units are responsible to maintain law and order. But to assure general security they are not numerous enough and sufficiently equipped in none of the South Asian countries. It happens that the insurgents have more sophisticated weapons and equipment than the police forces¹. Therefore, special paramilitary forces have to be created and even then those units are not sufficient to cope with the situation, compelling the use of pure military forces.

Paramilitary forces

In British India, security forces were created specially to monitor the tribal populations and the borders. They still exist. The main ones were and are the Assam Rifles in the North-East of present India, with the headquarters in Shillong (formerly the capital city of undivided Assam and now the capital of Meghalaya) and the Frontier Corps, in the western part of present Pakistan, with two headquarters in Peshawar and Quetta.

Altogether, the paramilitary forces are quite numerous, numbering for India more than one million, that means almost as many men as in the army. The Assam Rifles are under the administrative control of the Ministry of defence but work under the Ministry of home affairs. They have expanded since independence up to a strength of about 80,000. They are officered by the army but the men are recruited locally or from other places in India. They mainly serve in the North-East States but also elsewhere in the country if needed, like for instance in Jammu and Kashmir. After 1947, similar forces have been established, like for instance the Manipur Rifles and the Tripura Rifles, those two forces belonging to the relevant States and not to the central government. The Eastern Frontier Rifles operate in West Bengal².

Among the most prestigious other paramilitary forces which have been created recently in India are the Rashtriya Rifles, which are manned by military and paramilitary personnel on deputation. The officers are generally coming from the army but cadre also includes specialized airmen and even sailors, civilians, like policemen, administrators, lawyers, ... Those units, organised like in the army, are specially tailored to deal with terrorism and at the same time to foster pacification of the population. In theory, they may be deployed anywhere in India (they have been for instance in Nagaland³) but, in 2004, they are to be found only in Jammu and Kashmir.

¹ « A violent road to Lumbini », C. J. Raja MOHAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 December 2003.

² « Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 283.

The main other Indian paramilitary forces are :

- the National Security Guards (NSG), created in 1986, (to protect Very Important Persons – VIP-, to conduct anti-sabotage checks, to neutralise terrorist threats to vital installations, to rescue kidnapped people and thanks to a special squad to deal with plane-hijacking), which may include volunteers from the army¹,
- the Special Protection Group, to protect Very Very Important Persons,
- the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which will include 200 battalions in 2006 against 175 now²,
- the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF, responsible for protection of industrial sites, which since February 2000 includes airports and responsible too since November 2004 for some VIP security), with a strength of almost 100,000³,
- the Railway Protection Force (RPF, originally concerned primarily with railway property but since 1st July 2004 providing also security to passengers in the main trains in cooperation with the Government Railway Police, GRP for other trains⁴),
- the India Reserve Battalions (IRBs or IRBNs), raised by the central government but placed at the disposal of State governments, recruiting youth of the States concerned (there are already many now, a new one may be raised in Manipur and 25 will be raised to be deployed in naxalite-affected States, Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East⁵),
- the Coast Guards, monitoring the coastlines and territorial waters,
- the Border Security Force (BSF) monitoring the border areas,
- the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), patrolling along the Tibet border, created in 1961, and also responsible to make roads up to the forward posts on high altitudes, will induct helicopters in a new air wing to be created for air-maintained posts, will have more battalions to cope with replacing Assam Rifles along the North-East border,
- the Special Frontier Force (SFF), created on November 14, 1962, just after the Indo-China war, originally specialized on Tibet⁶, belonging to the intelligence service Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (most of the members are ethnic Tibetans),
- the Special Service Bureau (SSB), occasionally deployed on borders, particularly with Nepal.
- the Special Security Bureau battalions⁷.

Some of these specialized forces protect people. Other ones have been created to guard sensitive points, industrial facilities, railways stations, trains, airports, harbours, etc. Some fulfil both kinds of tasks. All of them are used to fight against terrorism. A few have even commando forces, like the Special Ranger Groups and the Black Cats, so called because

¹ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 36.

« Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 196.

² « CRPF launches modernisation plan », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 October 2004.

³ « Need for more sub-inspectors in Central Industrial Security Force », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

« CISF for VIP security », PTI release in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 November 2004.

⁴ « RPF takes up security for train », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 July 2004.

⁵ « Security machinery may be revamped in northeast », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 September 2004.

These units apparently constitute the Home Guards, according to the article « Home Guards being strengthened », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 November 2004 (see below in the text).

« Ban on six Manipuri outfits extended », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 November 2005.

⁶ « China-South Asia : issues, equations,policies » Swaran SINGH, Lancer's books, New Delhi, 2003, page 54.

⁷ « CRPF launches modernisation plan », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 October 2004.

of their uniforms, an elite anti-terrorist commando of the National Security Guards. The Black Cats has even a women unit¹. The Central Industrial Security Force trains also its own commandos, deployed mostly in airports for the security of VIP². Furthermore, there is a Counter Piracy Operations Centre³.

Normally, the paramilitary forces have their own specified responsibilities. Just to mention the Border Security Force, it is in charge on monitoring borders. Sometimes however, responsibilities overlap which is a source of confusion and rivalry. For instance, in the North-East, the frontier with Bangladesh is guarded by the Border Security Force but the frontiers with Myanmar and Bhutan are monitored by the Assam Rifles⁴. It has been proposed that the Indian-Nepalese border should be policed by the Special Service Bureau⁵. In Kashmir, the Border Security Force has also the responsibility of road openings on certain stretches to find improvised explosive devices, along with the Central Reserve Police Force and the army. VIP protection is carried out by several paramilitary forces, the National Security Guards, the Special Protection Group and even surprisingly by the Central Industrial Security Force.

The police forces are controlled by the various States but the specialized forces mentioned above depend on the federal government. Normally State governments have to pay for the deployment of central paramilitary forces, except in the North-East. At the beginning of 2004, the centre has also accepted to pay for the Naxalite-affected (or to be more appropriate now Maoist-affected) States⁶. In some Maoist-affected areas of Andhra Pradesh, there is an efficient anti-Naxalite/Maoist security squad, a commando force, the Greyhounds. But most of the times in that State and even more in other States, particularly in Jharkhand and Bihar, the local police is notoriously under-equipped and the moral of personnel sagging. Apart from the Central Industrial Security Force, which depends on New Delhi, there seems to be Industrial Security Forces at the province level as well⁷.

At the provincial level, each Indian State has its own so-called Armed Police Force, different from normal police, supposed to be adequately equipped to fight unlawful criminal and terrorist elements and able to operate at unit level, mainly platoons and companies. State polices may be detached in other States for a limited period of time⁸. Some States have Home Guards, like Assam and Nagaland in the North-East. Union Territories may also have Home Guards. States may have at their disposal India Reserve Battalions, sanctioned by the Union home Ministry. Union territories may also get some, like Pondicherry which has one battalion⁹. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Special Operations Group (SOG) is an elite branch of

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 191.

« Why should other cats be black, ask Black Cats », Navika KUMAR in « The Sunday Express », New Delhi, 6 June 2004.

« Women Black Cats team formed », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 October 2005.

² « Need for more sub-inspectors in Central Industrial Security Force », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

³ « Sea Tigers – threat to Indian security » V. SURYANARAYAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 July 2004.

⁴ « NE militants may smuggle arms », in « Northeast Herald », Dimapur, 9 May 2004.

⁵ « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 110.

⁶ « Naxalite-affected States to get central forces free of cost », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 January 2004.

⁷ « More battalions planned », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 July 2004.

⁸ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 311.

⁹ « Home Guards being strengthened », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 November 2004.

the police, specialized in the fighting against terrorists¹. It consists of local volunteers, operating as commandos in small elements, in uniform or in civilian cloth, mingling at will with the population and the tourists. It is considered to be very efficient in identification of terrorists and their supporters and in eliminating them. Some other States have created Special Operations Groups, like Maoist-affected Jharkhand, where the SOG consists of one company of the Central Reserve Police Force, two platoons of the Armed Police and a platoon of normal police. In that particular State, the SOG is therefore an amalgamation of a federally controlled police unit (CRPF) and State controlled police (Armed Police and normal police)². West Bengal has also raised end of September 2004 a Special Operations Group to deal with the militants³. Orissa also uses a SOG⁴. Some States have created, when needed, their own police commando units. Punjab did it⁵ as well as Kerala⁶.

Obviously the police forces are more numerous in troubled areas. For instance, in Jammu and Kashmir, the police strength is from 70,000 to 80,000⁷, in Assam, 50,000 in 2001⁸, in a small State like Manipur, it is 14,000, the third largest in the region after Assam and Nagaland⁹. The morale in specialized units of police and paramilitary forces, like in Andhra Pradesh and Kashmir, may be high, but in several States like Manipur, it may be low in normal police forces.

In Mizoram, special units of kin of those killed by the militants were created with some success.

Surrendered militants may also be used, for instance mainly in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East but also in Naxalite/Maoist-affected States. They are incorporated in tailored units, like in Kashmir, the Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood)¹⁰ or

¹ The International Crisis Group mentions that it has been disbanded : « India/Pakistan relations and Kashmir : steps toward peace », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 24 June 2004, page 11. This information is wrong, according to sources mentioned below in this footnote.

« 9 persons killed in JK », in « Greater Kashmir », Srinagar, 25 May 2004.

« Five CRPF jawans killed in fidayeen attack », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 December 2004.

Interviews of the author with higher authorities in New Delhi and Srinagar.

² « SOG commandos combating left-wing guerrillas », UNI press release, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 September 2004.

³ « A bizarre confluence of hostile partisans », Jawed NAQVI in « Features » column, in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 September 2004.

⁴ « Orissa : Maoist flowering under benign neglect », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 November 2005.

⁵ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 220.

⁶ « When commandos took on terrorists », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 December 2004.

⁷ « Forces working at cross purposes in J and K », Jay RAINA, in « Hindustan Times », 8 May 2004.

⁸ « Multi-force operations in counter terrorism. A view from the Assam theatre », Wasbir HUSSAIN, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, July 2001.

⁹ « Manipur : impending collapse of governance », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 9 August 2004.

« Manipur : old script, new lessons », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 10 October 2005.

¹⁰ « Nepal : dangerous plans for village militias », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 February 2004, page 5.

The same name applies for a subversive group and for units of surrendered militants, which is rather confusing. In a chapter of the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Tel Aviv, K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI mention that the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon is a subversive group which is active outside Jammu and Kashmir. It was operating too in Jammu and Kashmir but surrendered. The name Ikhwani is now used as a generic term to refer to all

recruited by existing paramilitary forces like the Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force and the Assam Rifles¹. The army has even proposed to set up a Territorial Army battalion comprising exclusively of Ikhwanis². The Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam (SULFA), regrouping some former militants of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), have initially been enrolled by the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force. But it proved a wrong measure. SULFA appeared as a conglomerate of criminals, pursuing terror, operating under the protection of the provincial government³. In the Naxalite/Maoist areas, surrendered militants provide information but may generate problems because they are prone to violence and they easily indulge in crimes ; such a situation may be due to the insufficiency of the rehabilitation programme⁴. In Nepal, surrendered or captured Maoist militants are also incorporated in so-called Village Security Forces⁵.

In Kashmir as well as in some States of the North-East of India, Village Defence Committees (VDCs) have been created to allow villagers to defend themselves against insurgents. In Kashmir, they sometimes comprise of members of several religions that means mainly Muslim and Hindu. Badly paid, the members occasionally complain not to be able to pay much attention to agriculture, their main source of living. Nevertheless, they keep on doing their security duty. In Assam, the usual term is Village Defence Parties (VDPs) ; 11,000 are supposed to be raised. Weapons, generally but not always of old vintage, have been given to members of VDCs and VDPs⁶.

To fight Jihadi elements, private, that means non-official, Civil Defence Committees are also organized all over the country by an extremist Hindu organization, the Vishwa

surrendered militants in Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, the Jamiat al-Ikhwan Muslimun is also known as a revivalist movement, similar to the organization which came into existence in India after the collapse of the Istanbul caliphate in 1924 (see « The clash of fundamentalisms, crusades, jihads and modernity », Tariq ALI, Verso, London, New York, 2003, page 96). The Akhwan-ul-Musalmeen (an other spelling) who arrived in Afghanistan are the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood (« Militant Islam : the nemesis of Pakistan », Satish KUMAR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2000, page 26).

¹ « 1000 former Bodo Liberation Tigers cadres to be recruited into paramilitary forces », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 February 2004. Information first mentioned in « Sentinel Assam », Guwahati, 18 February 2004.

² « Photos of terrorist camps in Pak. available : army », in « The Hindu » internet edition, 18 September 2003.

³ « SULFA. Terror by another name », Ajai SAHNI and Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, July 2001.

« Counter terror operations. Limitations to security forces », Mallika A. JOSEPH, research paper of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 2004.

⁴ « Surrendered Naxalites : a menace », P. V. RAMANA, in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁵ « Nepal : dangerous plans for village militias », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 February 2004, page 3.

⁶ « 800 Gujjar Muslims join counter-terrorist operations », Luv PURI in « The Hindu » internet edition, 15 February 2004.

« Nepal : dangerous plans for village militias », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 February 2004, page 5.

« Assam attacks : Mulford offers FBI help », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 October 2004.

« A successful campaign against jihadi militancy integrates a divided society », Liv PURI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 November 2005.

Hindu Parishad¹.

In Pakistan, paramilitary forces monitor the border areas. The Frontier Corps stationed mainly along the Afghan border has now a strength of 70,000, equally divided between the two western provinces, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan (35,000 in each). Furthermore, Khasadars and levies recruiting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province represent an extra force of about 22,000 men but they have no licensed weapons and are poorly trained. They were supposed to be incorporated in the Frontier Corps but the project fizzled out due to financial constraints². However, a new project takes shape to transform them into a unified paramilitary force and to provide them with an adequate training within a three year program. It has started beginning of 2004 and will permit the Frontier Constabulary, an other paramilitary force to resume its duty at the border areas³. The Frontier Constabulary, about 17,500 strong, is basically tailored to maintain law and order in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas but it may be used, occasionally, in all the provinces, including to provide security to the multinational companies⁴. A reorganization of the Baluchistan police is also contemplated. The levies will be disbanded and a new force, the Baluchistan Constabulary, will be inducted⁵. The Defence Security Guards (DSG), manned by the army, are charged with the protection of the gas installations in Baluchistan⁶

The Rangers are about 30,000, equally divided between the two eastern provinces India (Punjab and Sind) on the Indian border. The Frontier Corps and the Rangers recruit their members locally but are officered by army cadre from anywhere in Pakistan. A new Anti-Terrorist Force has also been created⁷. Other paramilitary forces have been raised for instance a levies force of 1,000 men recruited by the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Ministry of interior in the Marri area of Baluchistan⁸. The Federal Security Force, started by Zulfiqar Ali BHUTTO, was disbanded by General Zia-ul-HAQ. The Maritime Agency monitors the coastlines and the territorial waters of the Arabian Sea.

Provinces have their own police forces which may include elite units to deal with terrorists, like in Punjab.

In Nepal, an Armed Police Force, fashioned on the model of the Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), has been created to cope with the Maoist insurgents. A brigade of this force will be raised for the security of Kathmandu and one battalion for each of the 75 districts of the country. Simultaneously, the normal police can now better carry out its

¹ « VHP plans civil defence committees », Sunnv SEBASTIAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 March 2004.

² « Peshawar : plan to merge Khasadars, levies into FC hits snags », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 September 2003.

³ « Landi Kotal : first Khasadar batch passes out » and « Ghallanai : small dam in Mohmand inaugurated », in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 February 2004.

⁴ « FC to be called back from Punjab, Balochistan : militants have moved to Mehsuds" area, Sherpao », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 October 2004.

⁵ « New force to replace levies in Balochistan », Ihtashamul HAQUE, in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 November 2004.

⁶ « Balochistan : opening another front ? », Kanchan LAKSHMAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 January 2005. « New force to replace levies in Balochistan », Ihtashamul HAQUE, in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 November 2004.

⁷ « Inquiry ordered into massacre : 45 deaths confirmed, Quetta under curfew », Saleem SHADIK and Amanullah KASI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 March 2004.

⁸ « 15-point demand given to Tariq Aziz, says Bugti », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 September 2004.

normal duties in a situation of internal war. All police forces reach the number of 40,000¹. Village Defence Committees, similar to those existing in India, mainly equipped with cast-off rifles, have also been established², maybe as many as 4,000³.

In Bhutan, the police forces number less than 6,000 and have a small experience of fighting against terrorism. The Royal Bhutan Guards are also not qualified enough. A counter-insurgency force has been reportedly created⁴.

In Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Rifles have various tasks, including the monitoring of the borders and the fighting against unlawful elements. The Ansars constitute an other but less important paramilitary force⁵. A Rapid Action Battalion has also been recently raised to tackle law and order ; it also deals with terrorism. Altogether, the Bangladeshi paramilitary forces number about 30,000.

In Sri Lanka, the police used to be under the Ministry of defence. With the creation for the first time of a Ministry of home affairs in December 2001, it was placed within its fold⁶. A Special Task Force has been tailored to deal with terrorism⁷. Paramilitary forces may number about 90,000.

Military forces

The army mainly but also other services, specially the air force, may be used to fight insurgencies and terrorism when situation cannot be coped with by police and paramilitary forces. In both India and Pakistan, and also in Nepal and Sri Lanka, the army and more rarely air units are employed for these roles. Normally, the army units cordon off a target area and the police and paramilitary forces undertake pinpoint actions against insurgents and terrorists. The Indian army intervened in Nagaland as soon as 1956. The Indian Air Force delivered air strikes in 1966 against insurgents in Mizoram and in 2004, the Pakistani Air Force strafed and bombed insurgents in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In Sri Lanka, the air force has intervened several times against the Tamil insurgent positions and camps and the navy is permanently operating to check supplies of weapons.

According to Pakistani sources, as many as 600,000 men belonging to police, paramilitary forces and military units participate in Indian Kashmir in the fighting against

¹ « Insurgency development and destruction », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

² « Nepal : dangerous plans for village militias », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 February 2004, page 5.

³ « Failing State », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

⁴ « Bhutan raising counter-insurgent force to tackle Indian terrorists », « Kuensel Online », 17 May 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 May 2003.

« The shadow of militancy lingers », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 March 2004.

⁵ « Arms trafficking : transit route or destination ? », Anand KUMAR in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 April 2004.

⁶ « On the brink again » Iqbal ATHAS in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 10 November 2003.

⁷ « Karuna or Prabhakaran : who will survive ? », Bandulla JAYASEKARA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 March 2004.

the Islamic militant organizations. Three army corps are stationed in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (with headquarters at Badami Bagh, at the outskirts of Srinagar, Nagrota, close to the town of Jammu and Leh in Ladakh). The Northern Command, to which the three army corps are subordinate, is also located in the same State, at Udhampur. Obviously these corps apart from fighting terrorists have the traditional missions to monitor the international frontier with Pakistan, Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China (there are no recognized frontiers with these two countries in Kashmir, hence the terms Line of Control and Line of Actual Control). Some units of the Territorial Army are also used to fight the terrorists¹.

In the North-East, an army corps is located in the State of Assam, in Tezpur and an other one in Nagaland, at Dimapur. Obviously, these two corps carry on the normal duty to face potential enemies, China, Bangladesh and Myanmar but, in peace time, most of their units are oriented, in cooperation with paramilitary forces, to combat terrorists, monitoring of the extremist movements and keeping order.

Special forces are earmarked for unconventional warfare which includes tough counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism operations. Although they are supposed to intervene in all the three dimensions, land, water and air, they consist mainly of army personnel but in the future they will recruit cadres from the navy and the air force as well².

Possibly one third of the 1,200,000 man strong Indian army is committed at any one time to non really military tasks which relate more to maintaining law and order. It has to face many counter-insurgency challenges and terrorism.

The regular Indian army recruits in the troubled areas as well. There is a Kashmir Regiment, an Assam Regiment and a Naga Regiment (regiments are traditional units for administrative and training purposes and comprising of several battalions which are operational units, deployed anywhere as necessary). The Assam Regiment recruits soldiers from all the North-East States. The Naga Regiment recruits young men from other hilly areas of India, even outside the North-East, for instance from the State of Uttaranchal. So, it is a mixed regiment. Insurgencies are likely to favour desertions within army ranks and to recruit ex-armymen. The Indian army is no exception. Assamese soldiers abandoned a unit of the Assam Regiment in 1961. During the insurgency in Punjab, some Sikh soldiers deserted and some Sikh units even mutinied. A few ex-army officers provided help to insurgents. It happened not only in Punjab but well before in Mizoram, mainly jawans (private soldiers) and non-commissioned officers³. So Indian ex-servicemen have occasionally, voluntarily or under pressure, joined insurgencies but their number has remained relatively small and no detrimental consequences followed for the military community.

A new war doctrine of the Indian army has been elaborated and made known end of October 2004. It includes many facets like terrorism. According to the document, terrorism has to be fought in peace time through curbing of infiltrations, elimination of terrorists in the hinterland and winning the hearts and minds of the local involved population. Experts have

¹ « Photos of terrorist camps in Pak. available : army », in « The Hindu » internet edition, 18 September 2003.

« New terrorist build-up near Hil Haka », Praveen SWAMI in « The Hindu » internet edition, 6 December 2003.

² « Pranab assures funds for Special Forces modernisation », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 November 2004.

³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, pages 54 and 184.

« Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 177, 205 and 244.

also considered that future wars may include elements of terrorism¹. A separate doctrine for special forces is being drawn up².

In Pakistan, the now 600,000 strong army has been involved in combating terrorism, and generally speaking to suppress insurgencies like those of some Baluchi tribes in 1948, 1958-1959, 1962-1963 and 1973-1977. It is again operating in Baluchistan and is nowadays present in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province to support the action of paramilitary forces in the search of remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda members and to prevent any crossing of the Afghan border by militants. Some 75,000 men of the security forces (army and Frontier Corps) are now deployed on this border, manning 700 check-posts and pickets, that means 12,5 % of the army strength or more than the strength of the Frontier Corps. The Special Services Group, an elite commando unit, is intervening against hardcore militants, particularly in the tribal areas. A Quick Reaction Force, based at Tarbela, has been recently created to face emergency situation, anywhere in the country. It has been sent to the tribal areas³.

In Nepal, the military units are involved to crush the insurgent Maoist movement since 2002. The Royal Nepalese Army has grown up to a strength of 76,000 men against 55,000 in 2003, 44,000 in 1996 and 25,000 in 1984⁴. A unified command has been created, centralizing under the Royal Nepalese Army all operations carried out by paramilitary forces⁵. Some desertions have happened but in small numbers.

In Sri Lanka, the army has been committed since the beginning of the Tamil insurgency in 1983. Its strength has increased from 11,000 in 1984⁶ to at least 120,000 now⁷, that means more than ten times in ten years. Some specialized units have been created for deep penetration in Tamil held areas in order to get intelligence and if need be to assassinate militant leaders. These long range patrols have met some successes⁸. However, despite some modernization, the army remains insufficiently operational. The desertion rate has been most of the times alarmingly high, sometimes 10% of the strength, and there is a poor response to

¹ « Terrorism, nuclear threat factored in new war doctrine », in « The Hindu » internet edition, 30 October 2004.

² « Pranab assures funds for Special Forces modernisation », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 November 2004.

³ « 8 Al Qaeda men, 2 troops killed in gunbattle : copters take part in operation. 18 held », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 3 October 2003.

« Bases of terrorists along border busted : Safdar », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 November 2004.

⁴ « Winds of change », Bhabani Sen GUPTA in « India today », 30 June 1984.

« Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

« Is another Vietnam in the making for US in Nepal », Conn HALLINAN in « South Asia tribune », 8 February 2004.

« Nepal seeks more arms », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 September 2004.

⁵ « Doubts over Nepal's new approach to Maoist rebellion », Sonam PANDEY in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 November 2003.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

⁶ « Ominous presence in Tamil Nadu », Shekhar GUPTA in « India today », 31 March 1984.

⁷ « Lankan army for more UN jobs », AFP release in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 September 2004.

⁸ « On the brink again » Iqbal ATHAS in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 10 November 2003.

« Key anti-LTTE operative shot dead », V.S. SAMBANDAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 August 2004.

recruitment drives to fill the 10,000 vacancies annually¹. The military personnel is almost exclusively Sinhalese, which is not what is best to fight a Tamil insurgency.

In Bangladesh, the army (76,000 men in 1984², 110,000 in 2004³) had to deal with the Chakma Buddhist militant movement operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts but without committing many units.

The Bhutanese army has also increased its strength up to 10,000, to be compared with 6,000 in 1990⁴.

Generally speaking, the military in South Asia like elsewhere in the world is not happy to be committed to fighting of insurgencies for long periods because it diverts the army, exceptionally the air force and the navy (in Sri Lanka), from their normal task. But it is a fact that in South Asia, the military has done that, since independences of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, sometimes for more than half a century, although unwillingly and they had even to be trained for that too, just like the police and paramilitary forces.

Training establishments for paramilitary and military units

Fighting terrorism which resorts more and more to suicide attacks is a hard task which require highly qualified personnel.

Many specialized training establishments have been created in India for paramilitary and military forces.

The Special Frontier Force of the Research and Analysis Wing has its own school, located at Chakrata, north of Dehra Dun, in Uttaranchal.

Several schools provide specialized training for Indian paramilitary forces, like the Internal Security Academy at Mount Abu in Rajasthan and the National Police Academy in Hyderabad, the capital city of Andhra Pradesh⁵. There is a combat training school run by the National Security Guards at Maneshwar in Haryana⁶. A recruit training centre of the Central Reserve Police Force has been established at Perigome, near Kannur in Kerala⁷. The National Industrial Security Academy is located in Hyderabad. Apart from this establishment, the Central Industrial Security Force has its recruit training centres like the one at Thakkolam in Tamil Nadu and a facility to train commandos at Anantpur in Rajasthan⁸.

The Army Training Command, located in Shimla, the capital city of Himachal Pradesh, imparts training on counter-insurgency operations and fighting terrorism⁹. The army has established a counter-insurgency jungle warfare school in 1970 at Vairengte in Mizoram¹⁰, close to the border with Assam and whose agenda also includes counter-

¹ « U. S. can learn from Sri Lanka army », V.S. SAMBANDAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 June 2004.

² « Back to the barracks », Sumit MITRA in « India today », 15 November 1984.

³ « The military balance 2003-2004 », published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, October 2003, page 135.

⁴ « Terrorism sans frontières », Jaideep SAIKIA, paper delivered at the international seminar on terrorism and low intensity conflicts in South Asia, 6-8 March 2002, Kolkata.

⁵ « CRPF passing out parade on January 20 », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 12 January 2004.

⁶ « When commandos took on terrorists », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 December 2004.

⁷ « CRPF launches modernisation plan », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 October 2004.

⁸ « Need for more sub-inspectors in Central Industrial Security Force », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

⁹ « Training command celebrates 13th raising day », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 October 2003.

¹⁰ « India, US troops to begin wargames in Mizoram area », in « Dawn », internet edition, 28 March 2004.

terrorism courses¹. In that school, training is being now imparted to all army units and some paramilitary forces.

In India, the human rights dimension of conflicts has been given full consideration. A centre for law warfare studies (CLAWS) was recently set up².

The Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan has its Simli Dam Training Centre, to train sharp shooters³. (The Simli dam is located between Islamabad and Murree). There is a Defence Services Intelligence Academy in Quetta, the capital city of Baluchistan.

Training should not concern only technical matters but include as well psychological ones. The stress factor in units serving in strife-torn areas, in terrorist-affected regions concerns the security forces of all the South Asian countries. The paramilitary forces have suffered most of it. The latest example is the killing on November 28, 2004, near Baramulla, in Indian Kashmir, of seven members of the Central Reserve Police Force by one of their colleague⁴ although the United Liberation Front of Assam has claimed that the killer, a native from lower Assam, was their man, which is denied by the official sources⁵. The pacification aspects of the struggle against insurgencies and terrorism has also to be taken into consideration. Well trained, dedicated and efficient officers are needed for the security forces to participate in non-conventional conflicts, said to be of low intensity but which are in reality demanding. Lack of these qualities has been noticed occasionally in the North-East of India, where postings there were considered as punishments. Some officers have been reported for misbehaviour, heavy drinking, sexual abuse and even corruption⁶. Mishaps have also been reported in the Pakistani security forces particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, in the Sri Lankan army, and in the Nepalese security forces.

Use of sophisticated weapons and equipment

Helicopters are commonly used to fight insurgents, not only in Jammu and Kashmir but in Naxalite/Maoist-affected of Central India as well⁷. Unmanned remote aircraft start to be inducted in some Indian police forces like in Andhra Pradesh to monitor the movements of naxalites⁸. They are commonly used by Americans in Afghanistan and in cooperation with the Pakistani army over the tribal areas and the frontier areas. Sometimes, very sophisticated weapons may be used against tipped off and localized terrorists. American cruise missiles have been launched from aircraft, surface ships and submarines, against suspected individuals in Afghanistan. No army of South Asia is able to do that. However, the Indian army is occasionally using drones to locate terrorist groups and even observation satellites, in Kashmir as well as in the North-East⁹.

Furthermore, hand-held thermal imagers whose number is increasing have proved

¹ « Army'jungle school a global hit », Rajat PANDIT in « The Times of India », 10 April 2004.

² « Pranab assures funds for Special Forces modernisation », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 November 2004.

³ « Resurgent sectarianism », Syed Saleem SHAHZAD in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

⁴ « Killing of jawans shocks CRPF », in « The Hindu », 29 November 2004.

⁵ « CRPF jawan was our man, says ULFA », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

⁶ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 245 and 246.

⁷ « Army choppers to keep naxals in check », Srinivas REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 17 March 2004.

⁸ « Unmanned aircraft for State police soon », special correspondent in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 October 2005.

⁹ « Army to flush out Manipur ultras », in « The Pioneer », New Delhi, 21 May 2004.

useful to locate militants. The induction of electronic surveillance equipment and the implementation of electronic counter measures have increased the efficiency of the Indian security forces¹.

Deweaponisation

Deweaponisation of the population is being looked after in India and Pakistan. In fact, it is not an easy task because in some areas of South Asia, like the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, Punjab, Bihar and some of the North-East States in India, it was and still is a habit to carry weapons (originally swords, daggers, axes, ... but now fire-arms) and it is quite common to find arms manufacturing units (legal or semi-legal in the former country, illegal in the second)². The Pashtoons, or Pathans as they are also called, living in the northern part of Baluchistan, in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are very well known for their love of weapons. This habit belongs to their culture since ages. The tribesmen feel offended when they are disarmed by security forces. The Sikhs in the Indian Punjab also are fond of arms (traditionally they must carry a dagger) and that includes fire-arms³.

As many as 3.5 millions small arms are allegedly available for any potential conflicts in South Asia⁴.

Pacification

Paramilitary forces and army units combat terrorism and at the same time promote pacification to entice the population (establishment of medical camps with free treatment for civilians, building and running of schools, making of roads and bridges, providing drinking water, drilling of borewells, making bus stop sheds, ...). It happens to be so mainly in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East of India as well as in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Coordination of security forces and intelligence agencies

In India, an operational unified command to fight the extremist and terrorist movements has been created in each of three disturbed provinces, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Manipur, with the army in charge. The first one was created in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996⁵. The last one in Manipur was established only on September 16, 2004⁶. The

¹ « New tactics paying off in J and K : army chief », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 13 October 2003.

² « Private armies », Farzand AHMED in « India today », 15 March 1984.

« South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 July 2003.

« Patrolling India's lawless North-East », Mira MACDONALD in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 August 2003.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 206.

⁴ « Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

⁵ « Patil suggests steps to counter terrorism in J and K », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 22 November 2004.

⁶ « Unified headquarters set up in Manipur », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 21 September 2004.

Assam one, created on January 20, 1997, does not seem to be efficient, because of competition between different security forces¹. A regional coordination for the whole North-East of India appears to be a must to counter the somewhat common strategy being carried out by the various insurgent movements. A tentative North-East Regional Security Coordination Committee had been set up in May 1992 to coordinate the actions of police and paramilitary forces but it did not work out².

Generally the army is satisfied with an operational unified command because it is under its authority, the highest security authority locally in Jammu and Kashmir and in Assam being a lieutenant-general, a corps commander. Conversely, the paramilitary forces and even more, the police, may be dissatisfied to work under the military, as it appears to be the case in Assam. The police claims rightly that it knows better the area and the population, recruiting in that very population but the army is more apolitical and not subject to infiltration by insurgent elements. The setting up of a Strategy Group, in Assam, chaired by the Chief Secretary, the highest civil servant in the State, is not really satisfactory³. Despite some improvements, rivalry may still exist between the security forces. Such detrimental situations are to be found in some North-Eastern States, most particularly in Manipur⁴.

The setting-up of these unified commands does not seem to have improved significantly the cooperation of the intelligence agencies. Most of the hard intelligence seems to be obtained now as before by the army itself. Furthermore, there is still a delay of passage of intelligence due to the continuing trend to send always information up and rarely at the same time to the local commanders where it would be most needed. When information comes down, it may be of no value⁵. As a rule, intelligence gathering is better done by local people than outsiders. Cooperation needs confidence, which has not always existed between them.

In Pakistan, coordination may work more efficiently because of the omnipresence of the army, although discrepancies also happen.

Military and paramilitary forces need to be hand in glove with the intelligence agencies. Apart from the coordination issue, the output of the intelligence agencies, civilian and military, at the central level as well as at the local level, is an essential criterion of efficiency.

¹ « Assam : spreading terror from the Kashmir camp » Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 June 2004.

« Quest for Swadhin Asom : explaining insurgency and role of the State in Assam », Dilip GOGOI, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 49.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 283.

³ « Multi-force operations in counter terrorism. A view from the Assam theatre », Wasbir HUSSAIN, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, July 2001.

⁴ « Manipur : the death of innocence », Pradip PHANJOURAM and Bibhu Prasad ROUTHAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 17 November 2003.

« Manipur : impending collapse of governance », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 9 August 2004.

⁵ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, pages 212 and 213.

Interviews in India.

6. LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND WAR

Links between terrorism and war exist. Series of terrorist acts or even a single significant one may lead to tensions between two States if one of them accuses, rightly or not, the other one to be the sponsor. Some extremist organizations based abroad may even claim credit for such actions. In such cases, escalation into a full-fledged conflict becomes possible. For instance, India accused a Pakistan based Kashmiri militant organization and Pakistan itself of having staged the terrorist attack on the Federal Parliament in New Delhi, in December 2001. That resulted in a deployment of the Indian army on the Pakistani border and, as a reaction, a similar move of the Pakistani army. A major stand-off remained for many months, increasing the risk of a conventional war, and possibly later on a nuclear one.

Isolated terrorist acts may evolve into a full-fledged guerrilla. Then guerrillas may lead to some kinds of conventional wars when the fighting militants have conquered a part of the national territory and dispose of heavy armament. In Sri Lanka, pitched battles between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the army have already happened. A similar situation may also be found later on in Nepal.

When army units are bogged down to fight terrorists, they cannot train properly for a conventional conflict. However, in such a case, soldiers are used to face some kind of dangers, they become seasoned and when operating in border areas, they happen to know the terrain where a war may break up. That is particularly true in Jammu and Kashmir. So adverse and positive aspects exist for an army operating against insurgents and terrorists.

7. LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Militant organizations resorting to terrorism are known to be interested in weapons of mass destruction. The Japanese sect Aum has been known for gas attacks in Tokyo. In South Asia and in its vicinity, some outfits have carried on and may be still carrying on researches to make deadly non conventional weapons. If they achieve their aims, they would present lethal danger to most Western and non Western countries. They would not hesitate to commit massive nuclear, chemical and biological terrorist acts because they feel more or less secure, not being necessarily associated with a rogue country, and anyway because they do not care about retaliation which would bring too huge collateral damage. Delivery vehicles need not be medium and long range missiles, which the militant organizations do not have, but just ordinary cars and trucks, planes and ships, containers in harbours, ...

Never before in history could small groups and even individuals be in possession of so powerful weapons. The new phenomenon has been known under the name of Singles' Weapons of Mass Destruction (SIMAD)¹.

Nuclear weapons

Pakistan is the only country in the world where are to be found together fully established and active extremist militant organizations and nuclear weapons. Probably nowhere else more than in South Asia is there a bigger possibility that terrorist organizations may have access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear ones. In such a thing happens, that would be a major setback to prevent hyperterrorism².

The disclosure beginning 2004 of a massive "non official" "non State" proliferation network led by a Pakistani scientist, A. Q. KHAN, since many years from Pakistan to Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia, the motherland of Bin Laden, Libya, Iran) and non Muslim

¹ Comment in « Bibliographie prospective », a monthly publication of Futuribles International, Paris, November 2004, of Véronique LAMBLIN on the study « Future S and T management policy issues. 2025 global scenarios », Jerome GLENN and Theodore GORDON, published in « Technological forecasting and social change », volume 71, n° 9, November 2004, Amsterdam, pages 913-940 and available on the website www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws/home/505740/description.

² « Nuclear terrorism and South Asia », Rajesh M. BASRUR and Hasan-Askari RIZVI, CMC occasional papers, US Department of Energy, Oak Ridge TN 37831, USA. The two authors, the first one Indian and the second one Pakistani, are adamant in their optimistic conclusion : Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not expected to fall into unauthorized hands.

« Inside Al Qaeda : global network of terror », Rohan GUNARATNA, Vanguard books, Lahore, 2003. The author asserts that Al Qaeda wants to build nuclear-capable Islamic States to wage war on the USA. According to him, Bin Laden favours weapons of mass destruction. Review of the book in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 July 2003.

countries (North Korea and even Myanmar, which faces many insurgencies carried out by ethnic minorities)¹ brings to the fore the possibility that Al Qaeda as well as other extremist organizations may have some technological know-how already. Some basic nuclear research has been proved to have been done by Al Qaeda, maybe with the help of Pakistani engineers (the name of Bashir al DIN MAHMOOD has been mentioned). Some Islamic extremists may have worked and possibly still work in Pakistani sensitive research nuclear centres. President MUSHARRAF pretends to control the nuclear weapons fully now. Even if it is true, it may be possible also that a counter-coup d'Etat, staged by an other general, an extremist one, succeeds. In such a case, Al Qaeda as well as other extremist organizations could have easy access to the atomic arsenal. It is generally agreed that terrorist organizations may use nuclear devices, but first only as radiological weapons, a so-called dirty bomb, to contaminate a target population and/or a geographical area. In Pakistan, things could evolve an other way. Scenarios have been elaborated in various fiction books².

No proliferation towards militant organizations is known in India. But two former managing directors of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India have been accused by the American administration to sell sensitive technology including on weapons to Iran. New Delhi denied the accusation³.

Moreover, conventional attacks by terrorist organizations against nuclear facilities in Pakistan and in India could generate major disasters, similar as far as the effects are concerned to what happened with Tchernobyl.

Chemical and biological weapons

Chemical and biological terrorist activities may also be an option. Some laboratories and factories discovered in Afghanistan where Taliban and Al Qaeda members could have been able to produce chemical and biological weapons, particularly with anthrax, remind of the topicality of the danger. Research has been made by scientists belonging to Al Qaeda, including possibly by the number two of the group and his chief ideologue, Ayman AL-

¹ « Rogue states and rogue weapons, Pakistan must help the U. S. combat proliferation », Mansoor IJAZ and James A. ABRAHAMSON in « International Herald Tribune », 7 February 2003.

« Policy Analysis », n° 472, 5 March 2003, Subodh ATAL, published by the Cato Institute, Washington. « Pakistan secretly allows US to secure its nuclear weapons », in « South Asia Tribune », webnewspaper, 8 February 2004.

« Pakistan's nuclear inquiry is a sham », Brahma CHELLANEY in « International Herald Tribune », 10 February 2004.

« Musharraf embarrassé par les aveux du père de la bombe pakistanaise », Marie-France CALLE in « Le Figaro », 12 February 2004.

« Le Pakistan est au cœur du marché noir mondial du nucléaire », Françoise CHIPAUX in « Le Monde », 13 February 2004.

« Pakistan gave Iran nuclear lead : CIA », Sridhar KRISHNASWAMI in « The Hindu », 25 November 2004. The article quotes a CIA report.

² «The smiling Buddha » written some years ago by an Indian brigadier but maybe not published and more recently 3-4 November 2001 « The fight against terrorism. An unorthodox atomic scientist. Pakistani nuclear expert is also an Islamist » Dennis OVERBYE, James GLANZ in « International Herald Tribune », in 2003 « The third world war » by Humphrey HAWKSLEY and in 2004 « Is New York burning ? » by Dominique LAPIERRE and Larry COLLINS.

« Pakistan gave Iran nuclear lead : CIA », Sridhar KRISHNASWAMI in « The Hindu », 25 November 2004.

« Al Qaeda can make dirty bomb : CIA », release of AFP in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 November 2004.

³ « India asks US to withdraw sanctions », J. N. in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 October 2004.

ZAWAHIRI, an eye surgeon with a serious scientific background. Recovered documents in Afghanistan in 2002 show that Al Qaeda was able to make mustard agent, sarin and VX¹.

Some extremist organizations may have access to chemical and pharmaceutical factories in Pakistan and in India, two countries, particularly the second one, which have very well advanced facilities, including research laboratories. Militant groups may also attack chemical establishments and create huge man-made environmental and human disasters in such overpopulated countries. The Bhopal catastrophe in December 1984, due to accidental causes, brings to the fore the magnitude of the danger. The pathogenic agent of the lung plague may be used as a biological weapon². A few cases of this sickness have been found already in some western border areas of India³, but it is impossible for the moment to determine their origin. Biological weapons would have to be used with care by terrorists, especially in border areas, because they may have boomerang effects.

Anti-proliferation bill

On April 28 2004, the United Nations Security Council has unanimously approved a binding resolution, according to which the member States must pass laws to keep weapons of mass destruction out of reach of terrorists. Pakistan initially raised objection to the text because of its retroactive status ; finally this clause was dropped to accommodate the Pakistani misgivings⁴. An anti-proliferation bill was passed by the Pakistani senate on September 18, 2004, to provide control on exports of material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons as well as delivery systems⁵.

¹ « Le terrorisme international et l'Europe », Thérèse DELPECH, Institut d'Etudes de Sécurité de l'Union Européenne, Cahier de Chaillot n°56, December 2002, pages 25 and 26 with note 68.

« Al Qaeda may already have produced bio, chemical weapons », article in « Washington Post », 23 March 2003, reproduced in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 23 March 2003.

« The brain behind Osama », excerpt from the book « The true face of Jihadis », Amir MIR, Marshal books Lahore, in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 October 2004.

« Al Qaeda can make dirty bomb : CIA », release of AFP in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 November 2004.

² « La guerre des germes », Ken ALIBEK and Stephen HANDELMAN.

« Germes. Les armes biologiques et la nouvelle guerre secrète », Judith MILLER, Stephen ENGELBERG and William BROAD, edited by Fayard, Paris, 2002.

³ « La peste en Inde - simple hasard ? » in « Horizons et débats », Zurich, avril 2002.

⁴ « Keep WMD off terrorists' hands, U. N. tells nations », Sridhar KRISHNASWAMI in « The Hindu », 30 April 2004.

« Queries proliferate. The resolution seems riddled with contradictions », in « The New Indian Express », Bangalore, 1 May 2004.

⁵ « Senate okays nuclear anti-proliferation bill », Amir WASIM in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 September 2004.

8. TERRORISM AND EDUCATION

In South Asia, the rate of educated people is generally low, although there are notorious exceptions, like Kerala and the North-Eastern States in India and Sri Lanka as a whole. Uneducated populations are more likely to accept extremist ideologies although it is not a general rule.

Nationalistic teachings spawn hatred. Hindu and Islamist extremisms feed off one another.

Conversely, terrorism deteriorates education even further. In troubled areas, schools are most of the times, targeted and destroyed. Such is the case in Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Furthermore, teachers flee. There is a snowball effect.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, many of the extremist Muslim organizations and political parties have their own schools, the madrassahs, also called sometimes madaris (which is in fact the plural of the Arabic word madrassah) or deeni madaris (deeni in Urdu means religious) or in English seminaries. According to some estimates, as many as two thirds of Pakistani kids are now going to such schools which may reach the number of 20,000 in the country and even 50,000 if unregistered madrassahs are included. The reason is that the schooling and food are free. The poor families have in fact no alternative¹. Furthermore, the State schools are not numerous enough and/or the teachers are lacking. The madrassahs, either Sunni or Shia, may act as fountainheads of extremist militants, who may later be taught military matters by the army or any other organizations like intelligence agencies and become terrorists. It is even mentioned by normally reliable sources that military related teaching may be done in seminaries themselves². Some of the Sunni establishments served as the hotbeds of the so-

¹ « The J and K peace process : chasing the chimera », K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

« Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

« Killers strike again », Kunwar IDRIS in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 March 2003.

Paper delivered by Alex ALEXIEV, in seminar « Secret Intelligence Services and the new terrorism, conditions of successful containment », organised by the Hanns Seidel Stiftung, at Wildbad Kreuth, 11-12 March 2003.

Address of Altaf HUSSAIN, the founder and leader of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (previously named Mohajir Qaumi Movement) during an international conference, November 5, 2004 in New Delhi organized by the Hindustan Times.

² World Bank report, country assistance strategy 2000 and 2001 quoted in « Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus in abetting insurgency in India's North-East », Saswati CHANDA and Alok Kumar GUPTA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir

called Talibans before they went to Afghanistan and controlled it¹. The best known establishments are the Binori mosque complex in Karachi and the Akora Khattak seminary near Peshawar.

In his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, President MUSHARRAF banned the most extremist organizations and ordered the arrest of some of their leaders. Furthermore, he announced the reform of the madrassah system, in order to ensure that religious extremism and terrorist ideology are not propagated anymore. Instead, academic subjects like English, economics, mathematics, general sciences, social studies, Pakistan studies (that means history) and computer technology should be taught alongside with religion. A State monitoring and evaluation system was supposed to be introduced. In fact, many extremists do not want to abide². The reform to introduce the teaching of academic subjects is hardly if at all implemented. The government has backtracked and the madrassahs still propagate anti-India and anti-Western jihad³. The nomination in September 2004 as education Minister of a retired lieutenant-general, a former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, is hardly to contribute to an improvement of the situation. It rather signals an end to the reform plan⁴.

Even in State scholar establishments, sectarian teaching is being carried out, instilling into the mind of the youth hatred towards the non-Muslims, mainly Hindus and Christians. History was rewritten at the time of Zia-ul-HAQ. MUSHARRAF has not paid any interest in changing the curricula⁵. A culture of Islamic militancy is being taught. Some Pakistani educationists complain about it. Textbooks should be completely reshaped to take into account the heritage of all major Muslim and non Muslim contributions and the provincial textbook boards should be taken to task if they do abide to the central official teaching policy⁶.

Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 285 and page 290 (note 20).

¹ The most prominent Sunni madrassahs include the Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqani at Akora Khattak, the Markaz-ad-Daawa-wal-Irshad at Muridke, close to Lahore, the Jamiat-ul-Uloom Islamia in Karachi, the Dar-ul-Uloom at Pashtoonabad, the Dar-ul-Iftah-ul-Irshad at Nazimabad and the Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat at Rawalpindi. See « The J and K peace process : chasing the chimera », K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001 and « Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tel Aviv. The Binoria mosque complex in Karachi is known the world over.

² « Government trying to control Madaris, says report », report published in « Washington Times », and mentioned in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 March 2003.

³ « Unfulfilled promises : Pakistan's failure to tackle extremism », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels; 16 January 2004, page 11.

⁴ « Education in Pakistan », B. Muralidhar REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 22 September 2004.

⁵ « Intolerance ? Bigotry ? ignorance ? », Ardeshir COWASJEE, in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 January 2004.

« Myth and hate as history », B. G. VERGHESE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 June 2004.

Thoughtful books have been written on the subject, particularly « Murder of history in Pakistan », K. K. AZIZ, 1993, « Enemies within and enemies without : the besieged self in Pakistan textbooks », Rubina SAIGOL, 2002 and « The subtle subversion : the state of curricula and textbooks in Pakistan », written by a group of 30 Pakistani academics, under the auspices of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad, 2002-2003.

⁶ See for instance the book « The subtle subversion : the state of curricula and textbooks in Pakistan », A. H. NAYYAR and Ahmed SALIM.

« Primacy of textbooks revision », Omar R. QURAIHI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 November 2004.

India, Nepal and Bangladesh

In India, too, Muslim religious schools do exist. They may be used to recruit members for the extremist organizations. Their number is increasing particularly in Uttar Pradesh, bordering Nepal. Many new madrassahs have also been established in Assam, Tripura and even in Arunachal Pradesh¹. Nepal, particularly in its southern part, the flat Terai, has more and more madrassahs². In Bangladesh, the same phenomenon is also to be seen. 6,500 madrassahs are said to exist now compared to about 1,500 at the time of independence. 1.8 million students are attending these religious establishments³. New madrassahs are also created in Sri Lanka.

In India, extremist Hindu organizations have their own private schools as well which incalculable national identity and patriotism in reference to the dominant group and may ultimately promote ethnic and religious intolerance and hatred. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Sangh Parivar, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the most militant wing, the Bajrang Dal, may spread anti-minority feelings, directed mainly against the Muslims and occasionally against the Christians. They use their schools to indoctrinate, and in some cases even militarily train the younger generations. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) runs a large private network of schools through its Vidhya Bharati educational front. Other RSS educational organizations include the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA), running hostels for adivasis (aborigines) children, the Seva Bharati for dalits (oppressed people) and the Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation, teaching children basic reading and writing⁴. Private establishments capitalize on freedom they enjoy to select specific texts, especially for the study of regional languages. Time and again, there has been a tendency to rewrite history in a nationalistic way to indoctrinate minds.

Even State schools, when nationalistic parties have the power, may communalise, that means "saffronize", the education⁵. So say the secular political groups. The Congress-led

¹ « Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its role in North-East insurgency », Krishan GOPAL, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 196.

² « The J and K peace process : chasing the chimera », K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

« Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

« A violent road to Lumbini », C. J. Raja MOHAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 December 2003.

³ « The J and K peace process : chasing the chimera », K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

« Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

⁴ « Revising Indian history. Teachers or missionaries ? Hindu right reaches for young minds », Somini SENGUPTA in « International Herald Tribune », 15 May 2002.

« RSS schools and how they spread hate », Nandini SUNDAR in Mumbai-based « Economic and political weekly », abridged version reproduced in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 December 2004.

⁵ Thoughtful books have been written on the subject, particularly « Prejudice and pride », Khrihna KUMAR, 2001 and « Communalisation of education in India », written by the Delhi historians, 2001.

« Myth and hate as history », B. G. VERGHESE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 June 2004.

« Another rewrite for India's history books », Randeep RAMESH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 27 June 2004.

government which came to power in 2004 has revisited the educational programmes.

The religious and religion-oriented parties are not the only ones to promote sectarian teachings. The Maoists have established strongholds in some schools and universities, for instance in the Jawaharlal Nehru university in New Delhi. Some of its professors are proud to mention that the ideologue of the Nepalese Maoist movement is an alumnus of that prestigious establishment. The students' wing of the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist), a parent entity of the Naxalite/Maoist movement, has won the president's post in the students election of this university in October 2004¹.

The situation in Nepal emphasizes the link existing between the absence of schooling and terrorism. It is not by chance that the Maoist insurgency started around the village of Gam, a remote area in the Western part of the country, totally deprived (without roads, water, electricity and schools)². Relatively educated and well-off people may also be involved in the insurgency, like the retired Gurkha soldiers of the British and Indian armies who are reported, at least for some of them, along with retired and deserters from the Royal Nepalese Army, to train the Maoist militants³, in fact probably under constraint.

Collusion between States and sectarian schools

Normally the private schools, either Muslim or Hindu, work independently of the administration. However they may be used by the government to promote an official nationalist policy. That has been seen in Pakistan during the regime of Zia-ul-HAQ and after and to some extent in India by the Bharatiya Janata Party led governments.

Obviously, the schools, either public or private, should promote harmony and not hatred. It is far from being the case in South Asia.

« Education : beyond review », K. N. PANIKKAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 June 2004. This article is very critical against the last BJP-led government.

¹ « Naxalites : while we were sleeping », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 November 2004.

² « Au Népal, l'armée se lance à l'assaut de la rébellion maoïste », Françoise CHIPAUX in « Le Monde », 9 May 2002.

³ « Nepal terrorist groups. Communist party of Nepal-Maoist », document of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, updated April 2004.

9. ECONOMIC FACTORS

The link between poorness and terrorism does exist. But insurrections, using terrorism, may develop in the economically better-off areas, as it happened in the Punjab, one of the richest States of India and as it happens now in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka. However, generally, militant extremists may be recruited more easily in poor and under developed communities, suffering from unemployment, specially if injustice is prevailing. The central and to some extent the North-East parts of India provide perfect examples. In those areas are living many tribes which have been largely neglected not to say exploited since independence by unscrupulous entrepreneurs benefiting from forests, ore and coal mines. The Adivasis, or original inhabitants, of central India, many of them still animists, left even more outside of the national mainstream than the mostly christianised tribes of the North-East, feel particularly dejected. In the North-East, most insurgents come from the urban unemployed youth¹. At the same time, the insurgencies need money to conduct their activities. So the extremist organizations must entertain good relations not only with the haves not, without whom there is no popular militancy but with the haves as well who can provide the necessary financial resources. So, terrorism has complex relations with economy.

When the extremist organizations are powerful, they may control a large part of the economy. This is particularly true across the Afghan-Pakistan border and in the North-East of India², in Sri Lanka and in Nepal³. As it appears in Assam and other North-East Indian States, profit making may be the end game instead of a means to achieve a political aim⁴.

Drug trafficking

Most of the times, the extremist organizations participate in organized crimes to get money. They resort to drug trafficking and smuggling. A part of the LTTE resources come from drugs, brought through Tamil Nadu⁵. The heroin trafficking seems to bring to the

¹ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 40.

² « Les insurrections du Nord-Est de l'Inde », Alain LAMBALLE in "Stratégique", 1/2000, Paris.

« Shadow-boxing in Meghalaya », Anirban ROY, senior correspondent, Hindustan Times, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », weekly report, internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.

³ « Maoists overrun the Hinterland », article of Keshab POUDEL in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 June 2004.

⁴ « SULFA. Terror by another name », Ajai SAHNI and Bibhu Prasad ROURAY, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, July 2001.

⁵ « Concealment is an art », in « The Hindustan Times », date unknown.

« Transnational terrorism and radical extremism », Tara KARTHA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 1999, page 42.

movement a lot of money¹. Marijuana is also produced in Sri Lanka itself, particularly in the LTTE controlled areas of the Trincomalee district². In Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan (mainly in Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province and the Northern Areas), the production of drugs is increasing³. It used to provide finance to some Islamist movements and does it again. Smuggling is quite common along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. A similar situation prevails on the notional borderline between India and Nepal, through which drug trafficking is rampant to the benefits of extremist groups of all hues⁴. In the North-East of India, the drugs trade is flourishing as well. Heroin comes from Myanmar, Laos and Thailand and passes through on the way to the rest of India and abroad⁵.

Money collectings and extortions

Money collectings and extortions for the benefit of extremist outfits are made nationally and internationally.

In the North-East States of India, where few politicians dare to challenge the insurgents, people are forced, since a long time, to give a part of their income to the extremist movements. Forest contractors, businessmen and even civil servants are taxed by the outfits. Almost every vehicle in the insurgency-affected areas on major roads pays "toll taxes" at different points, at various outfits, depending on their territorial influence⁶. In Assam, the tea estates and other vital industries have been traditionally forced to finance the militant organizations. The non compliance brings about reprisals which include murders. Sometimes, however, the companies refuse to abide by the demands of the militants. In such a case, security measures have to be increased, by the courageous recalcitrants themselves or by official security forces. To encourage the attitude of refusal, police and other paramilitary units have to show up. No security lapse may be allowed⁷. In Mizoram, senior government officers paid taxes to the militants when the latter were at the peak of their influence⁸. The Garo insurgents in Meghalaya extort money from traders and exporters⁹. In Manipur, the insurgents resort to abductions for ransom. Assassinations may follow¹⁰. It has been proved

¹ « Commentary n° 77. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and operations. A preliminary analysis », Peter CHALK, winter 1999, publication of the Canadian security intelligence service, 17 March 2000.

« Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 76.

² Interviews in South Asia.

³ « Islamabad : anti-poppy cultivation drive to continue », in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 April 2003.

« Poppy production surges in tribal belt : report », in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 May 2003.

⁴ « A violent road to Lumbini », C. J. Raja MOHAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 December 2003.

⁵ « Patrolling India's lawless North-East », Mira MACDONALD in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 August 2003.

⁶ « The terrorist economy in India's Northeast. Preliminary explorations », Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

⁷ « Assam : resisting extortion. HLL leads the way », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

⁸ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 243.

⁹ « Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

¹⁰ « Manipur : the death of innocence », Pradip PHANJOURAM and Bibhu Prasad ROURAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 17 November 2003.

that, in this State, an ex-Chief Minister, a former Deputy Chief Minister and many former Members of Legislative Assembly (the provincial assembly) gave funds to the insurgents¹.

The Naga militants levy taxes, with the approval of ministers². Everywhere in Nagaland, villagers are obliged to provide them food and lodging. Pharmacy owners are constrained to give medicines free, printers must print propaganda documents free, ... Collection from the drivers who pass on the National Highway connecting Dimapur, the biggest town in Nagaland and a hub of many terrorists, to Imphal, the capital of Manipur via Kohima is an other source of revenue. The vehicles which go from Imphal to Moreh on their way to Myanmar are also taxed by the Naga militants (Kukis being the majority have in the past contested the control by the Nagas of this Manipuri border town thriving with smuggling but suffered a lot). Cars and trucks may also be stolen³. Unorthodox solutions are proposed to get rid of extortions, like the one made by a minister of the Nagaland government who wanted to officially fund the insurgent movements, in the hope of dissuading them to get money illegally⁴. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah Group) own shares in business ventures abroad like in Ireland⁵.

The Kamtapur Liberation Organization has started an extortion drive in the northern parts of West Bengal, targeting mainly the tea plantations⁶.

In the central part of India, since long, the Naxalites/Maoists receive money from contractors who in doing so are buying their security. Shopkeepers and farmers are not even spared⁷. In Jharkhand, money is also collected through levies on mining, coal and kendu leaf tradings as well as through payments made by officials⁸.

The Islamist organizations operating in Kashmir need a lot of money. Extortions are carried out in Kashmir itself. Protection payments are sometimes made by private and public companies, for instance by local subcontractors of the Indian Railways Construction

¹ « Special Powers Act cannot be withdrawn : Pranab », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 August 2004.

² « Hostile territory », Sumanta SEN, in « India today », 31 March 1982.

« Arunachal Pradesh : legitimising insurgency ? », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 25 August 2003.

« Meghalaya : extortion dynamics », SASHINUNGLA, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 19 April 2004.

« Nagaland : arresting the slide », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 June 2004.

« Nagaland, India's Waziristan », Kuldip NAYAR in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 July 2004.

³ « Socio-ethnic conflicts in the North-East : four case studies », lieutenant-general N. S. I. NARAHARI, January 1997.

« Nagaland : the dynamics of extortion », SASHINUNGLA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

⁴ « Nagaland : a frozen peace », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 2 August 2004.

⁵ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 38.

⁶ « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 112.

⁷ « Naxalite influx », Coomi KAPOOR, in « India today », 15 January 1984.

« PW – full coffers and a long reach », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », 29 April 2004.

« Regrouping of naxalites in Telangana on », N. RAHUL in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 October 2004.

⁸ « Jharkhand : anti-Naxal strategy and use of POTA », Sanjay K. JHA, in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

Company (IRCON) which is building the new railway line between Jammu and Srinagar¹. Much money is raised in Pakistan as well as in the Kashmiri diasporas of UK and USA². National Democratic Front of Bodoland Foundations may be used for that purpose, like the Muslim Al Akhtar Trust³ (previously called Al Rashid). In UK, the journals of the Jamaat-i-Islami regularly appeal for funds, officially for humanitarian aid, in fact most probably for the Kashmiri militants⁴. Incidentally, in USA, the Indian community and to a lesser degree the Pakistani community are rich. Some of their members contribute to fund extremist organizations, Muslim as well as Hindu.

The Hindu nationalist schools have received time and again money from abroad, particularly USA and UK, for instance through branches of extremist organizations based there⁵. The creation and maintaining of the madrassahs in Pakistan cost a huge amount of money, which comes mainly from Saudi Arabia (for the Sunni establishments)⁶ and Iran (for the Shia ones). The Bangladeshi madrassahs are primarily financed by the Gulf countries. Transactions, mostly non transparent, are being carried out. Saudi Arabia finances the Nepalese madrassahs. The Sri Lankan madrassahs receive funds from Saudi Arabia and Iran⁷.

In Sri Lanka, civil servants out of fear help the Tamil militant movement to collect illegal taxes⁸. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam collect taxes not only in the Tamil families in the whole island but also among Muslims, especially in the Eastern province⁹. They operate a worldwide network to get financial resources in the Tamil diaspora, in North America (mainly in Canada, which is a hub of that activity) and Europe (especially in the United Kingdom and France), sometimes channelled through humanitarian bodies and other non-governmental organizations. Illegal Tamil immigrants may be helped by the LTTE to obtain forged identity papers and to get jobs¹⁰. Obviously they become indebted to the militant movement. Pressure, blackmail and threats are commonly practiced and the Tamils and occasionally non Tamils have in fact no choice but to abide ; they have to cooperate and

¹ « Pundir murder investigation exposes protection racket », Praveen SWAMI, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 13 July 2004.

² « A nexus with terror », Praveen SWAMI, correspondent of « Frontline », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 17 February 2003.

³ « The Taliban strike back », B. RAMAN in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2003.

⁴ The Jamaat-i-Islami is a political party created in undivided India before independence. Apart from India, it exists now in Pakistan and Bangladesh. There are separate parties, with the same name, in Azad Kashmir and in Jammu and Kashmir. See « Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent : the Jamaat-i-Islami », Frédéric GRARE, a publication of the French Research Institutes in India, Manohar, New Delhi, 2001, pages 78 and 94.

⁵ « Taxing times for communalism », Javeed NAQVI in « Dawn », internet edition, 12 July 2004.

⁶ « India and Pakistan : u-turns and pitfalls », Ashok KAPUR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 25.

⁷ « Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

⁸ « Un Etat de facto pour les Tigres tamouls », article of Cédric GOUVERNEUR in « Le Monde diplomatique », February 2004.

⁹ « SLMC preparing blueprint for separate unit in the North-East », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 December 2003.

¹⁰ « Commentary n° 77. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and operations. A preliminary analysis », Peter CHALK, winter 1999, publication of the Canadian security intelligence service, 17 March 2000.

« US court ruling seen as aiding Tamil rebels », Amantha PERERA in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 January 2004.

pay a contribution, a kind of tax, to the militant movement. Imports of weapons and ammunition are done through very well organised financial circuits, through mainly Singapore and Hong Kong in connection with the booming arms bazaar of South-East Asia. Substantial amounts of money are used to buy arms¹.

In Nepal, the Maoist insurgents collect taxes and force individuals and institutions to give donations. Businessmen and government employees are routinely paying "revolutionary taxes". Travellers are not spared. The staffs of the international governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations, and aid agencies are under threats if they do not abide².

Economic consequences

When done internally in the insurgency-affected and terrorist-affected countries themselves, extortions may affect negatively the prices of essential goods and services, at any time, whether terrorist acts are committed or not, whether peace talks are going on or not. Situation becomes worse when various militant outfits and several factions of one organization compete to cut their share. Furthermore, fake cadres collect money in name of insurgent groups to which they may not belong. Cases have been reported in Nagaland and in Kashmir but exist certainly elsewhere as well. The Kashmiri militant outfits complain occasionally about non authorized fund raisers who work for themselves and not on their behalf³. So crooks take benefit of the situation. It happens sometimes that extorted money is used for the personal advantage of leaders. It seems to be so in Kashmir and in the North-East where some of the men in charge of the militant outfits live in luxurious houses. An underground economy, boosted by insurgencies and terrorism, coupled with pure non political criminal activities, ruins development policies.

The operations against insurgents and terrorists, carried out by the security forces, paramilitary units and military units, disturb the life of the local population and generate problems for the economy, sometimes in the road network and in air traffic (it happens to be so close to the air bases used in Pakistan by the Americans, where civilian planes cannot land for the time being⁴). A positive effect is that troops need supplies, like food, which may create a boom for agriculture and labour for logistical purposes, which reduces

¹ « Commentary n° 77. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and operations. A preliminary analysis », Peter CHALK, winter 1999, publication of the Canadian security intelligence service, 17 March 2000.

Comment of Rohan GUNARATNA in « US court ruling seen as aiding Tamil rebels », Amantha PERERA in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 January 2004.

² « United Nations and foreign aid agencies threaten to pull out of country », in « Himalayan Times », 18 March 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 March 2004.

« Tentative political coherence and insurgent consolidation », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

« HRW urges end to killing in Nepal », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 October 2004.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

³ « Nagaland : the dynamics of extortion », SASHINUNGLA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

« Hizb cautions people against fund raisers », in « Greater Kashmir », Srinagar, 25 May 2004.

⁴ « Fokker flight operations », letter of Doctor Mansoor Akbar KUNDI in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 October 2004.

unemployment. Such favourable consequences occur in India, particularly in Kashmir and the North-East.

Migrations may be the causes, at least partially as mentioned earlier for Punjab and the North-East of India, but more often they are the consequences of insurgencies and terrorism. Displaced persons from troubled areas disrupt the local economy, sometimes on a wide extent. Their resettlement costs a lot of money.

During the trouble in the Indian Punjab in the 1980s, a significant number of Sikhs left to settle elsewhere in India. In Kashmir, the majority of Pandits, who were mainly living in the Srinagar valley, were pushed away by a series of deadly attacks by the Kashmiri insurgent groups. Farmers from Akhnoor area, north of Jammu, had to move with their families, altogether 50,000 people, during heavy fightings on the Line of Control in 1999 and could not come back for several reasons, including because their houses were destroyed¹. Many Muslim Kashmiris migrated on their own in quieter places within Jammu and Kashmir, for instance to Ladakh, and other parts of India, mainly in big towns, just to flee insecurity but find it hard to survive². Some more happy ones settle handicraft shops.

In the North-East of India, internal displacements of persons have been common. For instance, in Tripura, between 1998 and 2003, almost 20,000 families had to move³. Sometimes, a policy of resettlement is implemented to cut the links between the population and the insurgents. It was done in Mizoram where most of the villages were regrouped. So, 80% of the population migrated to settle in new places with some success to achieve security but with a lot of economic hardship which generated discontent of the population⁴. Such a method cannot be used everywhere.

The fighting in the tribal areas of Pakistan pushes the population away in thousands and disturb the movement of commodities with the settled areas and with Afghanistan⁵.

In Nepal, some sources mention that 200,000 persons have been displaced. Other estimates put even that number to over two millions. Young men and boys leave villages to avoid the pincer of security forces and the Maoists and they try to reach the bigger cities and the Terai, bordering India. It happens that villages have no men at all⁶. Obviously, that is highly destructive for the agricultural activities and social life.

The number of people who had to move from one place to another place in Sri Lanka because of the Tamil insurgency is estimated to be about one million. Mainly Sinhalese and Tamils have suffered. So have the Muslims, although to a lower extent. 100,000 of them have been evicted from the Jaffna peninsula in October 1990 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

¹ « No end to troubles of Kargil refugees », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 July 2004.

² « Kashmiris begging in Mumbai to survive », in « The Asian Age », New Delhi, 23 May 2004.

³ « Tripura : creating an unenviable record », Babhu Prasad ROUFRAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 20 October 2003.

⁴ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 238.

« Ethnic conflicts and internal security. A plea for reconstructing civil society in Assam », Samir Kumar DAS, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 41.

« Counter terror operations. Limitations to security forces », Mallika A. JOSEPH, research paper of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 2004.

⁵ « Thousands displaced, civilians killed : bar commission's report on Wana action », Waseem Ahmad SHAH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 22 September 2004.

⁶ « Women now swelling the ranks of Maoists », Rita MANCHANDA, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 November 2004.

« Drifting into disaster », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

Eelam when the latter were controlling the area. Thousands of Muslims are still living in refugee camps in the northwest and east¹. They have not come back after the government captured again Jaffna in 1995. In the Eastern province, Muslims are still harassed by the LTTE who would like them to go away.

So displacements may be forced upon the population by governments or by militants. People may also move on their own will, just because of the dangers involved while staying in troubled areas.

Losses of individual and industrial properties may be very important. To be convinced, one has to see the devastated areas around Trincomalee in the eastern part of Sri Lanka. The number of houses destroyed through terrorist acts is impressive and reminds what happened in the Balkans in the 1990s, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The harbour and industrial areas of Trincomalee (which include Indian oil assets, about 30 leased out giant tanks dating from World War II) in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka may, at any time, be destroyed by the Tamil militants who control the region all around². This would be a major blow to the Sri Lanka economy.

Some industrial estates have been destroyed or damaged in Assam, for instance the oil refineries. Pipelines have been sabotaged in that State too as well as in two Pakistani provinces, Baluchistan and Punjab. Firms may be obliged to close down their factories under the pressure of insurgent movements, like in Nepal in August 2004³.

Agriculture suffers in troubled areas. In Kashmir, near the Line of Control, soils may become barren due to the high toxicity after bombings and shellings. Farmers may be discouraged to go to the fields, being afraid of mines or of being caught in crossfire between security forces and insurgents. Shepherds may be denied pasturelands if under threats of militants. This happens in some higher parts of Kashmir. Arable land is also still mined in Sri Lanka, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula and for the moment cannot be cultivated⁴.

Considering that the fishermen from Rameswaram, a small town of the Indian Tamil Nadu, located at the west end of the Palk Strait, were helping the Tamil separatists in the island, Sri Lanka occasionally forbade them access to their usual catching areas. Such initiative disrupted the local economy⁵. In fact, the Tamil militants control the coastal regions of the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Strait. Major incidents happen, Indian fishermen being caught by the Sea Tigers and their trawlers confiscated. Release of fishermen and vessels is done after payment of huge ransoms⁶. India finds itself in a predicament as it does not recognize the LTTE.

Terrorism reduces and sometimes even puts an end to tourism, diminishing considerably the resources and affecting the ways of life of many people. Such consequences

¹ « LTTE and Muslims », Nirupama SUBRAMANIAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 21 October 2003.

« New threat to Sri Lankan peace process », Nihar NAYAK, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

² « Be prepared for Sept. 29 : Kadirgamar », V. JAYANTH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 September 2003.

³ « Maoists blockade affects Kathmandu », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 August 2004.

« Les maoïstes resserrent l'étai sur Katmandou », Marie-France CALLE in « Le Figaro », internet edition, 21 August 2004.

⁴ « Sri Lanka : Jaffna craint une reprise des combats », Marie-France CALLE, in « Le Figaro », Paris, 14 November 2003.

⁵ « Fishing for trouble », Sreedhar PILLAI in « India today », 15 November 1984.

⁶ « Jayalalithaa for joint naval exercises to check LTTE », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 8 December 2003.

« A sound and just proposal », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 9 December 2003.

« Fishing in choppy waters », V. SURYANARAYAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 February 2004.

are to be found in India (specially in Kashmir, formerly a paradise for domestic and foreign tourists and in the North-East, an attractive and original mixture of plains, hills and mountains with an extensive wild life). They are to be found also in Pakistan (mainly in Punjab previously visited for its Mughal treasures, and in the beautiful Himalayan region), in Nepal and in Sri Lanka (with its variety of monuments and landscapes). Hotels under threats may be obliged to close, like in Nepal. Transport companies suffer, mainly but not exclusively air companies. In Nepal again, a bus company had to discontinue its service¹. In that country, the insurgency may also affect foreign investments, mainly but not only Indian companies which have been obliged to close down their activities.

The governments may feel obliged to curb the high-tech communications network to deny these facilities to insurgent groups. For instance, in India, the mobile phone system most of the time does not operate in sensitive areas, like Kashmir and the North-East, as well as in other frontier areas like Rajasthan. Such constraints may be an hindrance to economic development.

Many efforts have been done for the North East. Most of the time, as it happens now, a Union Minister for development of the North-East region has been in charge. But corruption seriously limits in the militant-affected areas the scope of rehabilitation programmes which are not cost-effective. The funds being provided by the governments profit partially the militant organizations and are leaked to terrorist groups. Official funds are siphoned-off by officials, and at the end, the poor receive very little². In Assam, a lot of advantages like grants and loans have been given through the 1990s to the surrendered members of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), called SULFA, who have constituted a State within the State, who own hotels, residential, commercial and industrial properties like flour mills. In fact, normal citizens are disadvantaged³. ULFA has even established transport agencies, tanneries, garment factories, hotels and various other industrial sites in Bangladesh ; it also owns trawlers. In the same country, the All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF) is operating beauty parlours⁴. In Nagaland, some militant leaders have invested in industries and hotels⁵. In Southern Bhutan, the town of Sandrup Jongkhar has

¹ « Népal : les maoïstes font fermer de grandes sociétés népalaises », in « Le Figaro », internet edition, 17 August 2004.

² « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 246.

« Insurgency and development. The Assam experience », H. N. DAS, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002.

« Quest for Swadhin Asom : explaining insurgency and role of the State in Assam », Dilip GOGOI and « Causes of economic backwardness and plan for growth », Dipankar SENGUPTA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 50 and 131.

³ The situation in India Northeast has been well documented in the following articles « The terrorist economy in India's Northeast. Preliminary explorations », Ajai SAHNI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001 and « SULFA. Terror by another name », Ajai SAHNI and Bibhu Prasad ROURAY, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, July 2001.

⁴ « Beyond the roots : undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the question of ethnic Assamese identity », Pahi SAIKIA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 75.

« North-East attacks point to ISI involvement », Vijay KUMAR, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 October 2004.

⁵ « Nagaland : the dynamics of extortion », SASHINUNGLA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

made great economic strides due to the presence there of Indian militants from Assam¹. Official money is blackened. The other way round happens of course too : black money of the extremist outfits is laundered and injected into normal economy.

In India, because of corruption, the central authorities are inclined to intervene directly and to bypass the States, particularly in the North-East. But interventions decided in Delhi, far away from the concerned areas, are not always well targeted.

Corruption and mishandling are equally important in Pakistan where the navy, air force and mainly the army control a significant part of the economy². Time and again, security forces have been accused to capitalize on their influence to get money and to divert from their tasks of monitoring the borders, maintaining law and order and fighting terrorism. For instance, in Punjab, housing schemes extend up to the border for the benefits of serving and retired officers. In the same province, the army is said to exploit some farmers of the Okara region of Punjab who are working on fertile military lands. A paramilitary force, the Rangers, supposed to monitor the Indian border and to check any incursion of illegal immigrants, smugglers and terrorists, are engaged in commercial activities. They obtain a part of catches from poor fishermen on the Sindh coastal areas of Badin and Thatta. They are said to buy fish caught at sea and in inland waters like lakes, at cheap rates and to sell it in Karachi at twenty times the purchase price. They furthermore extract a levy from local people³.

The troubles generated by insurgencies and terrorism discourage the local and even more the international investments. After having been served an extortion note of a big amount by Naga militants, Oil India Limited (OIL) suspended work in the Changland district of Arunachal Pradesh. The Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) has been warned by one insurgent movement not to start commercial mining at Domiasat in the West Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya⁴. Road constructions have also been delayed⁵. A deal signed in June 2005 by South Korea's Posco to build a steel project in Orissa may be hampered by the Maoists⁶.

The destruction of gas pipelines in Baluchistan dissuades the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan through Afghanistan. The Asian Development Bank calls for the creation of a multilateral security agency to protect the proposed gas pipeline⁷, a project which cannot be carried out now anyway because of the continuing troubles in Afghanistan.

In Nepal, foreign industrial sites, particularly Indian ones, have been attacked.

¹ « Terrorism sans frontières », Jaideep SAIKIA, paper delivered at the international seminar on terrorism and low intensity conflicts in South Asia, 6-8 March 2002, Kolkata.

² « Armée et politique au Pakistan », "Défense nationale", Paris, March 2000.

³ « Fishing and the Rangers », in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 October 2004.

« After Punjab lands, army grabs fishing business of coastal Sindh », M. A. SIDDIQUI in « South Asia Tribune », webnewspaper, 31 October 2004, available on website www.satribune.com.

« Row over fishing rights in Badin coastal belt », Shaikh AZIZ, in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 November 2004.

« Peace and the bottom line », Irfan HUSAIN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 November 2004.

⁴ « Meghalaya : a mushrooming of insurgent groups », Anirban ROY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 August 2004.

⁵ « Nagaland : the dynamics of extortion », SASHINUNGLA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

⁶ « Orissa : Maoist flowering under benign neglect », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 November 2005.

⁷ « Dawn internet news alert », 29 January 2003.

Around a dozen companies have closed down their activities, under threats by the Maoists¹.

South Asian insurance companies may be unable to cover major risks due to terrorism because they are not reinsured with international rated companies. Because of the absence of reinsurance, top private general insurance Pakistani companies may find themselves in a predicament if important damages occur due to terrorist acts². In Pakistan, only three companies, two from the private sector and one from the public sector, offer coverage up to a limited amount for losses that occur from terrorism. In India, there is a pool of insurance companies which offer coverage to political violence but such a system does not exist in Pakistan³. Therefore, the fears of foreign investors may not be alleviated. International companies ask high premiums. State Western companies sometimes stop to guarantee the risks in terrorist-affected countries. For instance, the French State company COFACE stopped to cover the activities of French firms in Pakistan for a while⁴ but has started again to do it. The insurance To bring back the private investors, special guarantees have to be given, special insurance must be provided by the local governments and they are not always ready to do it. These governments must take action to regain confidence. In South Asia, it is not that easy. The governments however do try. For instance, Pakistan has concluded an agreement with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to facilitate the risk cover for companies likely to suffer from terrorism⁵.

International trade suffer due to the increase of insurance premiums, making commerce unprofitable. Such a situation has occurred in Sri Lanka⁶.

Due to the whopping amounts involved, the international community is required for reconstruction and rehabilitation. But peace must be restored first. For the benefit of troubled areas in Sri Lanka, twelve donor countries and seven international financial institutions are ready to grant 4.5 billions US dollars but demand that the disbursement of funds is linked to the peace process. On its side, the LTTE insist that they alone, and not Colombo, be made accountable for the outlays⁷.

Increase of security and health expenditure

The extremist organizations resorting to terrorism force the States to spend more on security issues, hindering the development. This is true for India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. More money has to be spent on the police, the paramilitary forces and the military forces. Extra funds have to be directed to protect sensitive points, like public buildings, important factories, airports, harbours, railways stations, ...

Operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan to combat terrorism has led to a 14% increase in defence spending in the first half of the current fiscal year⁸. The "war on terror" vindicates security expenditure and removes any possibility of trimming the armed forces

¹ « Bombs explode in Nepal factory », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 August 2004.

² « Insurance cos offering terrorism cover : bankruptcy feared », Sabihuddin GHAUSI in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 January 2004.

³ « Insurance cover for business sought terrorism-related risks », Sabihuddin GHAUSI in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 October 2005.

⁴ « Alertes », n°10, March 2003, page 3, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

⁵ « Alertes », n°8, January 2003, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

⁶ « The war in Sri Lanka », Maj. Gen. Dipankar BANERJEE, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁷ « LTTE to boycott Japan's review meet », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 September 2003.

« LTTE boycotts aid meeting », in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 September 2003.

⁸ « Anti-terror war pushes defence spending up », in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 March 2004.

even if the relations with India improves¹. According to a Pakistani source, India is supposed to spend 100 millions \$ every month in Kashmir alone, and Pakistan 10 millions \$². The cost of the 20 years of war in Sri Lanka amounts to more than US\$ 6 billions for defence expenditure alone. If peace had prevailed, it has been estimated that the island growth rates would have been 7 to 8 percent and the per capita income would have been more than double of what it is now³.

Victims have to be indemnified, widows (at least 1,000 in Kashmir) and orphans (possibly 30,000 in Kashmir alone)⁴ have to be looked after. In Sri Lanka, the number of victims made by the insurgents or by security forces or by population out of anger and as a retaliation, is also impressive. The government has finally decided to pay compensation to victims of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots (about 1,000 people are concerned)⁵. Psychological stresses even nervous breakdowns have to be cared for. National and private health services as well as national security systems and insurance companies must bear higher expenditure. Compensation has to be given for lost properties.

As a whole, terrorism may demoralize the economic agents.

The militants may also use financial terrorism to disrupt economy. For instance the Maoist movement in Nepal floods the frontier areas close to India with fake Indian currency⁶. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam may have proceeded in the same way in Gujarat⁷. In Meghalaya, the Achik National Volunteer Council is also accused to circulate fake currency⁸.

¹ « Peace and the bottom line », Irfan HUSAIN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 November 2004.

² « Pushtunistan issue may be revived says Gen Beg : situation along Afghan border », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 August 2003.

³ « Sri Lanka. Peace Process under Threat ? », Ameen IZZADEEN, Deputy Editor, The Sunday Times and Daily Mirror, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 July 2003.

⁴ « India/Pakistan relations and Kashmir : steps toward peace », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 24 June 2004, page 21.

⁵ « A laudable step », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 July 2004.

⁶ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 July 2003.

⁷ « Vapi-based advocate held in fake currency racket », in « The Times of India », Ahmedabad, 21 April 2004.

« Rs 30 lakh in fake notes pumped into State. State anti-terrorist squad also suspects involvement of underworld in the fake currency racket », in « The Indian Express », Ahmedabad, 23 April 2004.

⁸ « Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP AND LEGAL ARSENAL TO FIGHT TERRORISM

To cope with the multi-faceted and ever changing threats of terrorism with its dire consequences including in the economic sector, the institutions of the South Asian States have been permanently adapted through new laws and amendments. The fight against terrorism and insurgencies which resort to it necessitates an appropriate and up to date administrative set-up and a legal arsenal.

The constitutions and various security legislations constitute the framework for governance. Obviously, the intelligence agencies play a major role in the struggle against insurgencies and terrorism. States of emergency and curfews may be imposed locally or nationally.

In difficult circumstances, and even more in spells of acute crisis, the role of State Governors in India may be crucial. If President's Rule is applied in one province, that means if the local government is suspended, its Governor comes in charge on behalf of the Federal government. In such a case, he represents both the President (as in normal times) and the Prime Minister. He acts then as the State executive chief. It is therefore understandable that retired generals or former directors of intelligence agencies or former police chiefs have been appointed in insurgency-affected States. Their expertise is a plus at any time. The present Governor of Chhattisgarh, a naxalite-affected State, is a former lieutenant-general. The current Governor of Assam is a lieutenant-general whose last assignment in the army was commander of the IV Corps in Tezpur, a town located in the Brahmaputra valley, in the State itself. His predecessor, also a retired lieutenant-general, is now the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. A retired four star general, who was a former chief of army staff, had been the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir from July 1989 to May 1990 and a second time later. He had received before a similar assignment in Manipur and Nagaland¹. A retired lieutenant-general has also been the Governor of Manipur. Similarly, the Governorships of Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur have been given in the recent past to a former director of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), in fact the same man. A former head of RAW has also been the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. In the first 1990s, a former inspector general of police of Jammu and Kashmir was the Governor of Punjab. In 2004, the Governor of Naxalite/Maoist-affected Andhra Pradesh is the former police chief of the same State. On November 8, 2004, a retired full general and former chief of army staff, has been appointed Governor of Punjab², a State which was terrorist-affected and remains a sensitive border part of the country.

In Pakistan, retired generals have also been appointed as Governors of provinces. Their power is never negligible considering the fact that the military have most of the time assumed power in Islamabad and at any time during civilian rule they were never very far

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 60.

² « New Governor », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 9 November 2004.

from politics. Similarly in Sri Lanka, retired generals have been appointed as Governors of strife-torn provinces. For instance a former major-general was Governor of the Eastern Province before being appointed Defence Secretary on December 1, 2004. The Defence Secretary, a most important man in dealing with counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, is the highest civil functionary in the Ministry of defence. The predecessor of the general was a former inspector general of police¹.

In the same way, the Chief Secretaries, sometimes called Principal Secretaries, who are in each province, the highest civil servants, and as such are accountable for the functioning of the whole State administration, have generally, in the insurgent-affected States, a security background. For instance, in 2004, the Principal Secretary of Jammu and Kashmir was a graduate from the National Defence College, the highest institution for security studies in the country, and the author of several books and many articles on matters relating to defence and security.

Occasionally special advisers may be assigned to some ministries. For instance, an adviser for Manipur was nominated in October 2004 to the Ministry of home affairs². Higher civil servants who had been dealing with security issues may be posted as advisers to a provincial Governor. Such was the case in Punjab, in 1987 during the Sikh insurgency, of a former director general of the police of this State³.

The Indian constitution has given Kashmir, Nagaland and Mizoram special provisions in favour of the customary laws and procedures, respectively in articles 370, 371 A and 371 G. Furthermore, the sixth schedule of the constitution allows the creation of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) to meet local political, cultural, social and economic claims. They are independent administrative units at the district level, the largest administrative structure within a State. So far, nine ADCs exist in the North-East which include four in Mizoram for the non-Mizos (Chakma, Lakhher renamed as Mara, Pawi renamed as Lai and Hmar), three in Meghalaya (East Khasi Hills, Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills which form the major part of the State area) and two in Assam (Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills).

Furthermore, a Bodoland Territorial Council has been created in Assam to accommodate the Bodo claims. It is at a lower level than the district. There is also a Hill council for the tribal areas of Tripura.

Development Councils have also been created, at the district level, but not necessarily in insurgent-affected areas. The Ladakh part (where in fact insurgency hardly exists) of Kashmir is divided into the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC), created in 1995 to give some kind of autonomy to the mainly Buddhist populated Leh district and the Kargil Autonomous Hill Development Council (KAHDC) corresponding to the Kargil district, predominantly inhabited by Shia Muslims.

These specially tailored structures, Autonomous District Councils, Territorial Councils and Development Councils, are not always working satisfactorily because of the increasing mixture of population. They are also sometimes considered as half-measures, bad governance and bad will⁴ and do not prevent the birth of insurgencies.

The legal arsenal may be based on local and provincial regulations, on national laws and on international conventions. Proclamation of emergency yields no significant success to

¹ « Tyrone Fernando named Governor of north-east province », V. S. SAMBANDAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 December 2004.

² « Adviser for Manipur affairs okayed », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 October 2004.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 182.

⁴ « Three matryoshkas. Ethnicity, autonomy and governance », Sushil K. PILLAI, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 28, note 14.

curb insurgencies and terrorism.

While fighting against terrorism, the governments generally do their best not to violate human rights. The human rights activists are in a position to contest the constraining measures which inevitably accompany the struggle against insurgents and terrorists. It happens to be so in South Asia, more in democratic regimes than in dictatorial ones. Not unsurprisingly, the human rights defenders are more active in India and Sri Lanka than in Bangladesh and even more in Pakistan and Nepal although in the latter countries they make their voice heard too.

Intelligence agencies and security decision-making bodies

The intelligence agencies are obviously committed to the fighting against terrorism. They are more or less controlled by the political authorities and show poor accountability to Parliaments.

In India, the external intelligence agency is the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which includes the National Technical Intelligence Communications Centre operating a string of listening stations, the Counter-Intelligence Team X training agents for covert operations in Pakistan¹) and the Aviation Research Centre. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is the internal intelligence agency. It has offices – Special Security Bureaux - in each State and Special Security Branches at district level. The IB has a special cell dealing with Islamist terrorism. The Indian intelligence agencies are accused of inefficiency, which may be explained partially by nepotism, supposed to happen in the Raw and Analysis Wing. The Intelligence Bureau suffers from lack of incentives, including financial ones, for policemen to serve in it and from lack of autonomy in relations with the Ministry of home affairs. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), though attached to the Integrated Defence Staff, does not carry out fully its tasks to coordinate the functioning of the intelligence wings of the three services. This is due to the absence of a still-to-be-created Chief of Defence Staff. Members of DIA do not possess an inter-services mindset and remain bound to their parent organizations. The DIA hardly operates covertly².

A reorganization of intelligence has been done in 2004 in India. The Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau and the Defence intelligence Agency (DIA) will now have to report directly to the National Security Adviser of the government. Before, the RAW reported to the cabinet secretary (at Prime Minister level), the IB to the home secretary (Ministry of home affairs) and the DIA to the defence secretary (Ministry of defence). Therefore intelligence has been centralized at the Prime Minister level.

The National Security Adviser also chairs the secretariat of the National Security Council (NSC). When the NSC meets in official sessions, it is presided by the Prime Minister, and includes the Ministers of home affairs, foreign affairs, defence and finance. The chiefs of staff of the three services may participate as members in attendance³. Furthermore, there is a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) whose draft minutes will be wetted by the National Security Adviser. It is the CCS which decides to ban extremist organizations⁴.

¹ « How the mole-watchers were shackled », Praveen SWAMI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 July 2004.

² « Handicapped intelligence », Praveen SWAMI in « Frontline », Chennai, 3-16 July 2004.

³ « J. N. Dixit gets to oversee intelligence agencies », Nandini R. IYER in « The Hindustan Times », New Delhi, 7 June 2004.

« J. N. Dixit emerges a key player », Harish KHARE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 July 2004.

⁴ « Ban on six Manipuri outfits extended », special correspondent in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 November 2005.

Despite the fact that the National Security Adviser is a central authority, there are other high-level civil servants in charge of security, which blurs somewhat the system. For instance, the Prime Minister has also an adviser for internal security whose task includes the struggle against terrorism (left-wing movements, insurgencies in the North-East and Jammu and Kashmir) and will also receive reports from the relevant agencies¹. The Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) deals with security issues as well². There is also an All India Anti-Terrorist Front.

In Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) generally work efficiently, but they are affiliated to the military dispensation and lack autonomy of research and analysis. A Pakistan Special Force is reportedly a unit of the ISI, operating in Jammu and Kashmir, wearing the Indian uniform³. The National Security Council (NSC), created in 2004, is chaired by the President of the Republic and has as members the Prime Minister, Ministers of home affairs, foreign affairs, defence and finance, the Senate chairman, the National Assembly speaker, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, the Chiefs Ministers of the four provinces, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy and air force. It may control the functioning of the intelligence agencies, but practically power remains in the hands of the military (through the chief of army staff and the body of the principal officers of the army headquarters and commanders of the army corps which meets regularly). The NSC is a pure advisory body.

In Pakistan, the Crime Investigation Department (CID) is involved in the search of terrorists and criminals.

In Bangladesh, the apex agency is the Directorate General of National Security Intelligence. The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), or sometimes called Directorate General of Field Intelligence, is a military agency. A police special branch and a Presidential Security Force have also been created⁴.

Nepal has no external intelligence agency. The National Investigation Agency (Rashtriya Anushandhan Bibhag) is similar to the Intelligence Bureaux in India and Pakistan.

Sri Lanka has the National Security Intelligence (NSI). The Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII) has five offices abroad, in London, Bangkok, Chennai, Paris and Ottawa⁵. The army has the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). Furthermore, the President of the Republic has a senior adviser who is well versed in disarmament affairs (a diplomat, he is the Sri Lanka candidate to succeed the present United Nations Secretary-General)⁶.

India

According to the constitution, law and order and internal security are provincial subjects and not federal ones. However, for many reasons, the central government has quite often taken over the responsibility either because it wanted to, due to the seriousness of the situation or bad local governance or even collusion with the insurgencies, or because the

¹ « Narayanan may focus on internal security », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 May 2004.

« J. N. Dixit emerges a key player », Harish KHARE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 10 July 2004.

² « Centre watching developments », Vinay KUMAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 14 August 2004.

³ « Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent : the Jamaat-i-Islami », Frédéric GRARE, a publication of the French Research Institutes in India, Manohar, New Delhi, 2001, page 93.

⁴ « Insurgencies in Northeast India », S. K. PILLAI in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, pages 49 and 50, note 15.

⁵ « Sri Lanka opens Paris, Ottawa offices », in « Jane's defence weekly », 12 September 2001, page 33.

⁶ « Sri Lanka names candidate for U. N. Secretary-General », V. S. SAMBANDAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 December 2004.

State governments have relinquished their duties.

Many laws, national and sometimes provincial, have been adopted but some have lapsed. The list is rather confusing and blurring.

An Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was promulgated as early as 1967, a Disturbed Areas (Special Courts) Act in 1976, a National Security Act in 1980 and a Terrorists Affected (Special Courts) Act in 1984. Some other legal tools exist, like the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, the Penal Code (dealing for instance with sedition), the Public Security Act (1992), the Arms Act and the Explosive Substance Act. A Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substance Act was adopted in 1985¹ to fight narco-terrorism. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) is an other piece of legislation.

The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), enacted in 1987 and amended in 1993, lapsed on May 23, 1995 but certain cases are still pending, specially in Kashmir².

A Prevention Of Terrorism Act (POTA) had been enacted but only on 28 March 2002. This was the only real and comprehensive law on the matter and it was criticized by the opposition parties, including the Congress, because it may lead, so they say, to suppress the basic human rights and even to gain political advantages. As many as fifteen States of the Union and six Union Territories, particularly those ruled by the Congress Party, decided not to implement the POTA. They were free to do so, internal security being a provincial matter. The list includes insurgency-affected States, like in the North-Eastern States and some central States like Madhya Pradesh, Chhatisgarh, Orissa. Conversely, Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand have implemented POTA³. Tamil Nadu did it too. An amendment was voted in December 2003 to avoid misuse of the Act⁴. The shift of power with the spring 2004 legislative elections generated new discussions, since the Congress Party and the leftist components of the government coalition wanted to abolish the POTA, in accordance with their electoral promises. Security and legal experts felt jittery over a possible repeal of POTA. They said that this was the only law allowing financial conduits to be booked. According to them, the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA) is irrelevant because it deals only with economic offences and not with funding of terror⁵. The government replied that the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act will be amended to deal with funding of terrorist organizations⁶. Finally, the government repealed the POTA on September 17, 2004⁷ and made an omnibus amendment of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, promulgated on September 21, 2004, which retains some hard provisions of the POTA⁸. Both decisions were confirmed by the Parliament in December 2004 after hot debates and even walk out of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party.

Some legal tools apply only on specific areas in various provinces, not on national level. The Police Act (1861) empowers a State government to declare an area disturbed. The

¹ « Terrorism. An instrument of foreign policy », Kshitij PRABHA, South Asian publishers, New Delhi, 2000, page 59.

² « India/Pakistan relations and Kashmir : steps toward peace », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 24 June 2004, page 15, footnote 49.

³ « No POTA application in 15 States, 6 UTs », J. VENKATESAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 October 2003.

⁴ « POTA reinterpreted », editorial in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 December 2003.

« POTA amendment bill passed », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 December 2003.

⁵ « Govt looks to cut off terror funds », Bhavna VIJ-AURORA in « The Indian Express », 7 June 2004.

« Security, legal experts feel jittery over promise to repeal POTA. Model law to check communal riots : what will state do, sir ? », in « The Economic Times », 8 June 2004.

⁶ « Cabinet nod for repeal of POTA », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 August 2004.

⁷ « One year to review all POTA cases », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », internet edition, 17 September 2004.

⁸ « POTA repackaged », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 September 2004.

Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organized Crimes Act (APCOCA) was adopted in August 2002 but repealed in August 2003.

An Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) regulates the use of forces dedicated to the fighting against terrorism and other criminal actions in specified troubled provinces. It gives extraordinary powers to the security forces as well as uncommon protection. The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act (AFSPA), adopted in 1958 and amended several times, particularly in 1972, is enforced whenever it is necessary in these two States as well as in other States of the North-East which were before included in Assam, like Nagaland¹. In 2004, it is not implemented in Assam but it is in Manipur where it has been in operation without a break since September 1980, when the State was for the first time declared a disturbed area². However due to local protests, it has been repealed on 12 August 2004 in the Imphal municipal area, which represents about 10% of the population of Manipur³. This decision was however contested by the Union home Minister⁴. So it remains unclear who is responsible for implementing the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, the Federal government or the State governments.

An Armed Forces Special Powers Act came into force in Punjab and Chandigarh in 1983⁵. An Armed Forces Special Powers Act is also in force in Jammu and Kashmir since October 1990⁶. Furthermore, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has a Criminal Law enactment Act⁷.

Tamil Nadu makes use of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, to deal with some militant outfits⁸. There is a Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (1999) (MCOCA), dealing with this illegal activity, possibly related to terrorism, in the whole State but particularly in the metropolis of Mumbai. In May 2004, the government of the Chhattisgarh State planned to introduce a Special Security Act to deal with Naxalite/Maoist insurgents⁹. Since June 2, 2004 there is a Gujarat Control of Organized Crime Bill (GUJCOC) which includes almost all the provisions of POTA¹⁰. So, some States have enacted strict laws to fight crimes which include terrorist acts. In such cases, even if the central government adopts a soft legislation, these States may counterbalance it. It may happen after the repeal of POTA, specially in the States run by the opposition.

¹ It is being used in Manipur for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 and may be extended at will. See « Manipur : operational complexities », article of Pradip PHANJOURBAM in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 June 2004.

² « The Furies come to life », M. S. PRABHAKARA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 July 2004.

³ « Armed forces (Special Powers) Act repealed from parts of Manipur », in « The Hindu » 13 August 2004 and reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 August 2004.

⁴ « The Manipur crisis », Rajeev DHAVAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

⁵ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 10.

⁶ « Tripartite talks on Kashmir stressed », Shamim-ur-RAHMAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 14 December 2003.

« Pranab rules out troop reduction along LoC », Shujaat BUKHARI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 June 2004.

⁷ « Terrorism. An instrument of foreign policy », Kshitij PRABHA, South Asian publishers, New Delhi, 2000, page 144.

⁸ « Tamil Nadu imposes ban on People's War Group », article of « The Hindu », 11 September 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 September 2004.

⁹ « Legislation to check naxals mooted », PTI press release, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 27 May 2004.

¹⁰ « Alternative to POTA : assembly passes bill », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 June 2004.

India has also started to deal with anti-national websites. Very occasionally, blocking directives, taken under the Information Technology Act, have been issued by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). Measures were adopted with caution for fear of being accused to silence political opponents. Actually, the Information Technology Act does not mention blocking powers¹. Loopholes exist.

Specialized central agencies may have responsibilities to deal with consequences of terrorism. For instance, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence tracks criminal financial transactions. To coordinate the activities of those organizations which generally belong to various ministries, a Multi Agency Centre has been created².

The administration of criminal justice is criticized for being dilatory and expensive. Many cases have been pending for a long time, which is highly detrimental for deterrence of criminals³. Furthermore, leniency of judges is occasionally regretted by authorities.

India seems to face a crisis related to its anti-terrorist legislation. Debates are going on.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, like in India, the maintenance of law and order is a provincial subject. However, the present military rule has promulgated a Police Order 2002 which is to be implemented by all the provinces without any possible change⁴. According to the 17th amendment to the constitution, no changes concerning police matters can be done by the provinces without the prior approval of the President⁵.

The Anti Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997, amended in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004, each times to give greater powers to the authorities, rather goes unchallenged. New anti-terrorism courts have been established in the beginning of 2002, including an army officer, at least a lieutenant-colonel. The courts have most of the times been lenient with activists of extremist religious parties, whose leaders have not even been told to appear before the judges. The Sectarian Terrorists Activity Record, formed in 1998, is a body which gathers data on sectarian groups and suggests solutions to solve conflicts. It has failed in its tasks⁶. Other texts may be used against alleged terrorists like the Penal Code, the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, the Explosive Act and the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 23 November 1971⁷.

A National Crisis Management Cell, run in the Federal interior Ministry by a Brigadier, deals with anti-terrorism, in cooperation with the various police departments (Criminal Investigation Department - CID- , Federal Investigation Agency - FIA- which controls land, air and sea entry/exit points, ...). A Special Investigation Group (SIG) has been created in summer 2003 within the Federal Investigation Agency with the exclusive

¹ « Bid to block anti-India website affects users », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 September 2003.

² « Joint Task Force to track hawala transactions », G. ANAND, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 October 2004.

³ « Naxalite-affected States to get central forces free of cost », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 January 2004.

⁴ « Nibbling away at autonomy », Farhatullah BABAR, in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 October 2004.

⁵ « Erosion of provincial autonomy », letter of senator Farhatullah BABAR to the editor, in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

⁶ « Is the enemy within or without ? », Aileen QAISER in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 October 2003.

⁷ « Sheltering Al Qaeda man a punishable offence LHC told », in « Dawn », internet edition, 8 February 2003.

« Expert testifies in blast case », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 August 2004.

task of countering terrorism¹. An anti-terrorism court judges the persons accused of terrorist acts.

Nepal

In Nepal, a Terrorist and Destructive Activities (control and punishment) Ordinance was passed 26 November 2001².

Sri Lanka

In 1979, Sri Lanka has enacted a Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) which is highly criticized by various political parties and in many Tamil circles. It is rather draconian, allowing for 18 months detention without trial and arbitrary arrests. Furthermore, an Emergency Regulation n°15a allows the security forces to bury or cremate any people killed by them, without mentioning names of the deceased and without any inquiry³. The Public Security Act allows the promulgation of emergency regulations.

Bhutan

In 1992, Bhutan promulgated a National Security Act which is implemented against extremists of national or foreign origins⁴. In 2001, a Civil Procedure Code was enacted.

Violations and defence of human rights

The militant organizations regularly violate the human rights. By definition, they do not sign the international conventions and accords. Most of the time, they do not abide by them. However, according to the common article 3 of the Geneva conventions, non-State actors must also follow humanitarian laws.

The LTTE ignored the accord approved by the UN assembly in May 2000 forbidding the recruitment of children under 18. That movement started to recruit children in big numbers as early as the beginning of the 1980s years and never stopped to do it, including during truces. More than 1,300 children are members of the LTTE forces⁵. An other estimate

¹ « Government to ban renamed groups », Syed Irfan RAZA in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 April 2003.

« Pakistan to raise new anti-terrorism force », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 August 2003.

² « International laws to control terrorism : a comparative study », Dr .S. SANYAL in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2004, page 63.

³ « The Tamil tragedy », Chaitanya KALBAG in « India today », 31 August 1983.

« Web of hate », no author's name, in « India today », 31 August 1983.

⁴ « Parops call for strong action to make the militants leave Bhutan », in « Kuensel », Thimphu, 17-23 March 2001.

« 111 persons convicted for collaborating with terrorist groups active in India's northeast », in « Kuensel online », Thimphu, 4 September 2004.

⁵ « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 17 February 2003.

by a US-based Non Governmental Organization, Human Rights Watch, mentions the present figure of 5,000 children in the Tigers' ranks; some of them as young as ten¹. Kashmiri movements occasionally violate this UN accord too.

Sometimes, anywhere in South Asia, judges are intimidated by criminals and extremists and cannot implement the anti-terrorist laws and regulations in a unbiased way. That constitutes signs of demises of States. Pressure is also brought to bear on governments to repeal anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist laws. So, in Manipur, massive demonstrations have happened in summer 2004 against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which is allegedly misused².

Governments are supposed to respect the conventions and agreements. However, the South Asian countries stand far from any reproach in the human rights field as a whole. Human Rights Commissions have been established, particularly in India and Pakistan but also in Nepal and Sri Lanka. So, there is now a greater accountability and oversight of security forces but the insurgent movements may not be spared either. In Sri Lanka, the Jaffna University Teachers' Human Rights Group has accused the LTTE to have killed 140 Tamil political opponents from end 2002 to end 2004³. In India, the contenders complained that the special powers given to the government and armed forces under several acts (particularly the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act and Prevention Of Terrorism Act) were contrary to the country's international obligations and that they shut out all avenues of redress by preventing all legal proceedings against members of security forces without the previous sanction of the central government. In Nepal, the Human Rights Commission has documented massacres and disappearances, most of them attributed to the Royal Nepalese Army⁴. In Pakistan, human rights defenders advocate the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulations, framed by the British in 1901 which define collective responsibility of tribes, in the areas of the North-West Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan. Amnesty International supports them, declaring that these regulations should be changed⁵.

Amnesty International condemns the creation of militias like the Village Defence Committees or similar organizations, specially when they are not accompanied by strong regular police stations. These militias, most of the times, do not abide by the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/67 on Civil Defence Forces (recommending their use only for self-defence, voluntary recruitment, supervision by public authorities, accountability for their activities). They may commit human rights abuses and may be used to settle by force any kinds of problems, including land disputes and caste feuds. Such a danger exists particularly in Nepal⁶. Amnesty International expressed its concerns about the fate of civilians in southern Bhutan during the military operations in December 2003 against

« South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 January 2004.

¹ « LTTE still enlisting child soldiers », Randeep RAMESH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 November 2004.

² « Police open fire on Manipur protesters », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

³ « Stop the killings », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 September 2004.

⁴ « A nation under siege », article of Deepak THAPA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 September 2003.

« Nepal : back to the gun », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 22 October 2003, page 1.

« US courts Nepal as anti-terror partner », in « BBC news, world edition », 6 April 2004.

⁵ « AI condemns killing of innocent people : Wana operation », in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 March 2004.

⁶ « Nepal : dangerous plans for village militias », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 February 2004, pages 2, 3, 5, 6.

Indian insurgents settled there¹. It has also condemned India and Pakistan and has singled out Nepalese security forces for carrying out many unlawful killings².

Amnesty International is not the only Non Governmental Organization monitoring the performance of governments and militant movements in the field of human rights. Other Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) do it as well. They have criticized the Indian government for its action in Kashmir and the Pakistan government for its operations in the tribal agencies. The US-based Ensaaf enforces human rights and fight impunity in India (“ensaaf” means justice in several South Asian languages) ; criticizing the Indian past governments and the Hindu extremist organizations, it has mainly defended the Sikhs but has started to work in favour of the Muslims of Gujarat and of the Nagas. The New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) has urged the Nepalese soldiers and the Maoist militants to stop killing civilians and has accused the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to recruit forcibly child soldiers³. It has expressed its satisfaction for the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in India which it criticized before for having been used against political opponents and religious minorities⁴.

Christian churches also condemn violations of human rights, more often those committed by the security forces. It happens to be so in the North-East of India and in Sri Lanka.

Cultural organizations may defend the cause of extremist movements, like the International Movement for Tamil Culture⁵.

The press may be very critical. Such is the case in India of The Hindu which criticizes the terrorist-related legal arsenal for giving too much power to the security forces and leading to abuses. The daily from Chennai asserts that the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act imposes a real military rule, quite like an emergency. According to it, the Police Act would be sufficient because it empowers a State government to declare an area disturbed and to deploy police as required by the situation.⁶ The Hindu has criticized the amendment of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act promulgated at the end of September 2004 which was made to take into account the repeal of the Prevention Of Terrorism Act, saying that the government has made a sort of legal sleight of hand⁷.

¹ « Amnesty International seeks access to border areas of Bhutan », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 December 2003.

² Amnesty International in its 2003 report.

³ « HRW urges end to killing in Nepal », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 October 2004.

« LTTE still enlisting child soldiers », Randeep RAMESH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 November 2004.

⁴ « Repeal of India’s anti-terror law is a cosmetic change », Kranti KUMARA, courtesy of World Socialist Website, reproduced in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 December 2004.

⁵ « International Tamil meet to discuss Eelam issue », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 May 2004.

⁶ « The Manipur crisis », Rajeev DHAVAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

⁷ « POTA repackaged », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 September 2004.

« Terrorism by ordinance », Rajeev DHAVAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 October 2004.

PART TWO

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

11. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Transnational terrorism exists in South Asia, either State sponsored or not. Time and again, Indians are arrested in Pakistan, accused to be terrorists and condemned¹. In the same way, Pakistanis are also nabbed in India, brought to trial and sentenced². In fact, beyond the mere assessment, there is a difference of magnitude of events which can be attributed to India and Pakistan. Transnational terrorism is not limited to these two countries but extends to all the South Asian countries and even to the countries contiguous to South Asia. It is facilitated by the fact that in several areas like in the North-East of India, the North-West of Pakistan and in Kashmir, the same populations live on both parts of the borders or Line of Control as far as Kashmir is concerned, which may have become real political frontiers but are not genuine ethnic and cultural boundaries. In the same way on both sides of maritime borders the same populations may live, as it is the case in the southern Indian province Tamil Nadu and the northern province of Sri Lanka.

India-Pakistan

From the late 1970s, some Sikh extremists who wanted to create an independent Khalistan were trained in Pakistan and then crossed the border to fight against the Indian security forces³. Militants and smugglers operated jointly across the border for their mutual benefits. Pakistan was enticed to stoke the insurgency because Punjab provides the main gate of access to Jammu and Kashmir⁴.

Although militancy in Jammu and Kashmir began as an indigenous movement, gradually the foreign component, primarily Pakistani and Afghan, have come to dominate. With the exception of a section within the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, all other terrorist groups currently active in Kashmir are non-indigenous. The insurgency has been supported and is being supported by Pakistan based organizations and by Pakistan itself. Militants cross the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir from the Pakistan side to the Indian one. Infiltrations and exfiltrations have been going on for many years. Only winter conditions reduce them. Training camps for militants exist in Azad Kashmir and in the Northern Areas. Such are the

¹ « Sialkot : life term for Indian terrorist », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 April 2003.

² « Life term for three Pakistanis », J. VENKATESAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 August 2003.

³ « Pakistan connection », Raju SANTANAM in « India today », 15 October 1984.

« More sabre-rattling », Suman DUBEY in « India today », 15 November 1984.

« Pak.'s grand Punjab subversion plan », in « The Hindu », 30 July 1986.

« Terrorism. An instrument of foreign policy », Kshitij PRABHA, South Asian publishers, New Delhi, 2000, page 93.

« Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 75.

⁴ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 206.

assessments of USA and many other countries mentioned in the media. The Pakistani authorities themselves admit, time and again, the existence of training infrastructure for terrorists¹. They also acknowledge cross-border terrorism tacitly,² or even openly³. Some sources mention that there are between 2,500 to 3,500 fighters trained in Pakistan who are operating in Indian Kashmir, up to 60% being Pakistani nationals. In Pakistan, the number of Jihadis may be as high as 500,000⁴, a figure which could be considered exaggerated by any standard as no reliable estimates are available. Many, may be up to 3,500, are ready at any time to cross the Line of Control and fight against the Indians⁵.

Fencing of the Line of Control, sometimes close to it, sometimes well inside Indian part to avoid destruction by Pakistani shootings and shellings, has been recently made, in the same way as it has been done on the international border between India and Pakistan, in Punjab (198 km in the plains) and partially in Rajasthan. In Jammu and Kashmir, the fence covered about 500 km out of the 740 km of the Line of Control in June 2004. Thanks to the cease-fire on the Line of Control, work is said to have been completed at the end of 2004, except some parts which cannot be fenced due to the rugged terrain. Most parts are electrified and equipped with night vision thermal imagers, ground sensors and other sensitive items⁶. So in the future the infiltration may be reduced in a significant way if it proves efficient, which is not yet sure. In some areas, the fence can be damaged by firing and shelling from the Pakistani side.

The Pakistani involvement in support of the insurgencies affecting the North-East of India has also been acknowledged by the US State department. During conflicts with India, Pakistan tried to activate the insurgencies in the North-East to tie down Indian troops. In fact, Zulfiqar Ali BHUTTO had written in his book *The myth of independence*, published in 1968, that some districts of Assam, adjacent to East Pakistan, could be claimed⁷. In 1957, PHIZO, the

¹ « Diامر terrorist camp dismantled », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 October 2003. The article mentions the existence of a terrorist camp belonging to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen at Bajajiano Mascar, in the Tangir valley, destroyed by the security forces. It asserts that the facility was used only for domestic terrorism.

² « The ball is in Pervez's court », Kuldip NAYAR in rubric « Opinion », « Dawn », internet edition, 26 April 2003.

³ « Crossings have come down : Pakistan », B. Muralidhar REDDY, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 9 November 2004.

⁴ « Islamic radicals once used by Pakistan now threaten it », Howard W. FRENCH in « International Herald Tribune », 28 May 2002.

« The chasm between rhetoric and reality », article of G. PARTHASARATHY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 July 2004.

⁵ « Politics ground teenage fighter », Zahid HUSSAIN in « The Times », 8 June 2002.

« Army fears spurt in violence », in « Hindustan Times », New Delhi, 24 May 2004.

⁶ « Photos of terrorist camps in Pak. available : army », in « The Hindu » internet edition, 18 September 2003.

« Kashmir fence nears completion », in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 July 2004.

« India completes 700 km fence along Kashmir LoC but security concerns remain », Arun RAJNATH in « South Asia Tribune », webnewspaper, 6 December 2004, available on website www.satribune.com.

⁷ « Beyond the roots : undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the question of ethnic Assamese identity », Pahi SAIKIA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 73 and 74. Reference is made to the article « ISI meddling in India's North-East, says US official », in « The Hindustan Times », 11 March 2000. In an other chapter of the same book, « Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its role in North-East insurgency », Krishan GOPAL writes that 2,500 Naga insurgents have been trained in East Pakistan from 1962 to 1968. See pages 181, 182, 183.

Naga nationalist leader took refuge in Pakistan before leaving for London. The covert activities of Pakistan stopped for a while after the birth of Bangladesh end of 1971 but resumed afterwards, with or without the complicity of the Bangladeshi authorities. Some training of insurgents was even done in the partitioned Pakistan, for the benefit of members of the United Liberation Front of Assam¹.

India-Sri Lanka

Support to the Tamil insurgency was provided by Tamil Nadu, a southern Indian State, and also by the Indian intelligence agencies². In the 1980s, most particularly after the ethnic riots of July 1983 in Sri Lanka, Tamil insurgents infiltrated among normal refugees to take shelter in Tamil Nadu, only 25 km away through the Palk Strait. India became a sanctuary for them³. In fact, the chief of the LTTE, PRABHAKARAN, had himself slipped into India in early 1979 and had been arrested with other Tamil extremists in Madras, in May 1982 but was not extradited to Sri Lanka where he was qualified as the most wanted man⁴. He was released on conditional bail on July 28 1983⁵. New Delhi even accepted the opening of training centres on the coast, mainly in Ramanathapuram district. Tamil ex-servicemen retired from the Indian army and navy as well as former members of the Border Security Force served as instructors with high salaries. The LTTE movement operated even training bases for women and children in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry⁶, with the help of friendly groups, possibly unknown to the Indian federal government but presumably known to the local governments, the intelligence agencies and tolerated. A Tamil Information Centre operated in Madras for the benefit of various militant groups, churning out publicity material to be distributed in India and throughout the world⁷. The town of Salem became a sanctuary for Tamil extremists and their families⁸.

Such an unfriendly attitude and apparent support to guerrillas who had already started to commit terrorist acts can be explained in two ways. First of all, it may mean a real approval of the political aim of the Tigers in the island, the independence of the Tamil inhabited areas but it may also convey the wish, and even the necessity, for internal political reasons, not to antagonize the government and population of Tamil Nadu, sympathetic towards the liberation struggle of the LTTE.

Later on, New Delhi had to behave with restraint because of a possible backlash on its own territory with nationalist feelings of the Tamil Nadu population. The LTTE movement struck back on the Indian territory, specially in Chennai (new name of Madras), where a bomb blasted in the international airport in 1984. Rajiv GANDHI was assassinated in 1991 by

¹ « ISI's Eastward operations. Old links in North-East India and new ones in South-East Asia », Anil BHATT, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 233 and 240.

² « Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 76.

³ « The aftermath », Chaitanya KALBAG in « India today », 15 September 1983.

⁴ « Taming the Tigers », Raj CHENGAPPA, in « India today », 30 June 1982.

⁵ « The Tamil tragedy », Chaitanya KALBAG in « India today », 31 August 1983.

⁶ « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 17 February 2003.

« Drogue et terrorisme », Alain LABROUSSE in « Contact », bulletin of the Association of former members and members of the Enseignement Militaire Supérieur, Scientifique et Technique, December 2002, pages 36 and 37.

⁷ « Ominous presence in Tamil Nadu », Shekhar GUPTA in « India today », 31 March 1984.

⁸ « The Indian connection », Mervyn de SILVA in « India today », 15 March 1983.

a female member of the LTTE at Sriperumbudur, in Tamil Nadu. In the 1990s, the LTTE had strong links with the political and administrative functionaries in Tamil Nadu¹. Nowadays, although the government of Tamil Nadu cooperates with New Delhi to help Colombo solve the Tamil issue, two provincial parties still support the Tamil separatist cause in the island : the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) and the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) which have representatives in the provincial assembly. The first one even takes part in the Congress led coalition in power in Delhi. Furthermore, the Dalit Panthers of India, a political movement created to defend the oppressed people, praises the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Some film directors are also campaigning for them². So, there is still sympathy in India, particularly in the Tamil Nadu for the separatist group of Sri Lanka.

Nowadays, Delhi favors a political dialogue between the Tamil insurgents and the Sri Lankan government to reach a solution in one undivided island.

State terrorism and non State terrorism

The Pakistani and Indian policies are examples of States' interventions, called sometimes State terrorism, in which could be included the presence of the Mukti Bahini from East Pakistan in the late 1960s and beginning 1970s in the Indian States of Assam and Meghalaya and the presence now in Bangladesh of militants belonging to outfits which operate in the North-East of India .

Independently of States, South Asian extremist organizations may cooperate together in many ways, to achieve particular aims. It is quite clear that some at least of the militant movements operate together, for intelligence purpose, for getting weapons and for financial reasons, if not for operational planning. Contacts are facilitated by the similarity of populations across the borders, the porosity and the absence of demarcating of frontiers, the bad relations or at least the insufficiency of official contacts between neighbouring countries, the bad governance of many frontier areas and the virtually non-existence of national identity systems.

Nepal-India-Bangladesh-Sri Lanka-Bhutan-Myanmar

There are links between the Maoist movement in Nepal with the Naxalite/Maoist movement operating in several Indian States³. Training camps exist for Nepalese Maoists in several Indian States, particularly in Bihar, the capital Patna being also used as a transit point for financing. In that State, security forces are unable to cope with⁴. Wounded Maoists are treated at hospitals in Uttar Pradesh⁵. Weapons are bought by the Maoists of Nepal in the

¹ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 337.

² « Bharatirajaa; DPI leader visit LTTE-held areas », V. S. SAMBANDAN in « The Hindu », 6 December 2004.

³ « Hit and run », Robert KARNIOL in « Jane's Defence Weekly », 27 March 2002.

⁴ « Nepal terrorist groups. Communist party of Nepal-Maoist », document of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, updated April 2004.

« PW – full coffers and a long reach », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », 29 April 2004.

« MCC and Maoists : expanding naval violence in Bihar » and « Naxal assault : growing vulnerability of Bihar police », Sanjay K. JHA, in bulletin « Naxalism », of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁵ « Maoist incursions across open borders », P. G. RAJMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

black market in Uttar Pradesh with the help of Indian left-wing extremists¹. The Naxalites/Maoists of India have joined other left-wing movements of South Asia in a Revolutionary Internationalist (or International) Movement². Links are established with Bangladeshi and even Sri Lankan organizations (like the Purba Bangla Sarbhahara Party, the Bangladesh Samajwadi Party and the Communist Party of Ceylon - Maoist)³. A Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCMPOSA) has been created in July 2002. A common strategy seems to have been elaborated. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist Party of India (Maoist) want to create jointly a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh, covering large chunks of the two countries⁴.

Furthermore, the Nepalese Maoists are also said to have links with the Kamtapur Liberation Organization of West Bengal⁵ and with some North-East insurgent movements, including the United Liberation Front of Assam and the All Tripura Tigers Force. The Kamtapur Liberation Organization and the United Liberation Front of Assam may even set up bases in Nepal. Already, militants from India have undergone some training together with the Nepalese Maoists in camps located in Nepal⁶.

The Maoist movement from Nepal tries to influence the people of Nepalese origin living in India, numbering about ten millions and located mainly in Uttaranchal, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Sikkim and Meghalaya. The aim is to make them assert their right of self-determination and may be to provide help for the creation of a Greater Nepal, claimed by some Nepalese political movements in India, like the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) whose secretary has perhaps established contacts with some Kashmiri militant groups, to get arms.

The Nepalese Maoists may have started to establish leftist groups in the Bhutanese kingdom too where, in the southern part, a significant Nepalese community is living⁷.

¹ « Failing State », article of P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

² « Nepal : back to the gun », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 22 October 2003, page 4.

« New Naxalite strategy may spell trouble for BJP », Sandeep DIKSHIT in « The Hindu », Bangalore, 30 April 2004.

« POTA may go, so states get homework on Naxals. Centre will step aside but help states tackle left wing extremists », Shishir GUPTA in « The Indian Express », New Delhi, 9 June 2004.

³ « An insidious campaign », K. Srinivas REDDY, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 October 2003.

⁴ « Lean to the Left, Maoism, India and Jihadi », study of Jaideep Saikia, to be consulted with jaideepsaikia@rediffmail.com.

« South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 10 March 2003.

« Andhra Pradesh : violence without end », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 October 2003.

« Emerging cooperation against Maoist subversion », P. G. RAJAMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 February 2004.

⁵ « The shadow of militancy lingers », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 March 2004.

⁶ « Militants trying to set up camps near India-Nepal border », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

⁷ « Hit and run », Robert KARNIOL in « Jane's Defence Weekly », 27 March 2002.

Actually, a Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) has been created on April 22, 2003 with the help of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and maybe the Kamtapur Liberation Organization. Seven camps have been established in the eastern part of Nepal to accommodate more than 105,000 Nepalese refugees forcibly evicted from southern Bhutan since the late 1980s. They have been infiltrated by Maoists. Repatriation has commenced in 1993 but on a very small scale due to Bhutanese restraints. Thimphu is afraid that the newly indoctrinated militants among the repatriates may spearhead Maoism in the kingdom and initiate a struggle against the monarchy like in Nepal. Possibly already 200 Bhutanese, from Nepalese origin, have joined the new Maoist army, likely to operate in Bhutan. The speaker of the Bhutan assembly has claimed that they were in fact 2,000. It has also been reported that the United Liberation Front of Assam has trained some youth from the Nepalese refugee camps¹.

Fears are sometimes expressed that Nepal is becoming a failed State and may serve as a den for any militant groups including Islamic ones on the run from Afghanistan and Pakistan². Maoist movements may have initiated contacts with the Islamist movements³ too, although they do not share at all the same ideology.

The Naxalites, now better called the Maoists, have established contacts with the Kamtapur Liberation Organization in north Bengal⁴ and with the United Liberation Front of Assam⁵. They receive help and encouragement from other Indian and more generally South Asian militant movements which do not necessarily have the same aims but have in common their hatred of India and its dispensation. For instance the Khalistan Affairs Centre, based in Washington, which works for an independent country in Punjab for the Sikhs, supports them through its own media, including on internet⁶.

The Kamtapur Liberation Organization and the United Liberation Front of Assam have established direct links. Actually the first movement may be considered as a surrogate of the second one⁷. The members of the former outfit have been imparted arms training from the second one, in southern Bhoutan where both had camps⁸. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah Group) is allegedly training the Gorkha Liberation Organization

« Maoist incursions across open borders », P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

« The shadow of militancy lingers », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 March 2004.

¹ « Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

« Terror and refuge », P. G. RAJAMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 November 2004.

² « Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

³ « Inde. Les mouvements terroristes maoïstes », in « Alertes », September 2003, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

⁴ « People's War leader arrested in West Bengal », Marcus DAM, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 7 December 2003.

⁵ « POTA may go, so states get homework on Naxals. Centre will step aside but help states tackle left wing extremists », Shishir GUPTA in « The Indian Express », New Delhi, 9 June 2004.

⁶ « India's Naxalite movement. What is it ? A tutorial. Andhra Pradesh Chief minister Naidu has lucky escape from a Naxalite landmine attack », Amarjit SINGH, Khalistan Affairs Centre, Washington, www.khalistan-affairs.org, 15 October 2003.

⁷ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 41.

⁸ « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, pages 111 and 112.

in West Bengal¹.

The Nepalese Maoists are said to have established links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, especially to get weapons². The nexus between them may have been facilitated by the People's War Group which has itself a record of close cooperation in arms procurement with the LTTE movement³. The Tigers are also said to train People's War Group militants in the Bastar area of Chhatisgarh⁴ and in Andhra Pradesh⁵, specially in the use of improvised explosive devices. They also have relations with the North-East insurgents particularly with the United Liberation Front of Assam⁶. The LTTE serves as intermediate between drug producers and consumers, using partners particularly in South India, in the Tamil inhabited State of Tamil Nadu. Furthermore, the Tigers earn a lot of money making forged documents for various South Asian militant organizations, including Al Qaeda⁷.

The militants operating in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland, in fact in all the Indian States of the North-East, entertain relations between themselves. The smaller groups generally share a proportion of their fund collection with the bigger ones in return for training of their cadres, arms and ammunition. The secondary groups provide also safe houses and transit facilities to the major insurgent movements. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM faction) is helping United Liberation Front of Assam. These two organizations are actually the most powerful militant outfits in the North-East. The Achik National Volunteer Council operating in the Garo hills of Meghalaya had and maintains operational contacts with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM). Furthermore, it keeps close relations with the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. In exchange of getting weapons, training and funds, it provides to these two Assamese outfits shelters and access into and from Bangladesh⁸.

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM) provides also support to the

¹ « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, pages 114.

² « Dawood Ibrahim living in Islamabad, undergoing cosmetic surgery, say Indians », Arun RAJNATH, on website « www.satribune », 3 April 2004.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 326.

⁴ « LTTE training PW cadres, says Swamy », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 December 2003.

⁵ « Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 76.

« More Naxalite attacks feared in Jharkhand », Bisheshwar MISHRA in « The Times of India », 12 April 2004.

⁶ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 136.

« Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 76.

« Understanding and combating terrorism in South Asia », Beenish HAFEEZ in « Regional studies », quarterly of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, spring 2004, page 100.

« ISI's Eastward operations. Old links in North-East India and new ones in South-East Asia », Anil BHATT, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 248 and 249.

⁷ Interviews in South Asia

⁸ « Meghalaya : shutting down the industry of terror », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 September 2003.

« Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

« Small wars of the Northeast », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 December 2004.

Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council, an insurgent outfit of Meghalaya¹. It has real surrogates like the Dima Halim Daogah and the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity in Assam, the Hmar Peoples Convention in Mizoram, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup and the People's United Liberation Front in Manipur².

These connections make a very complicated network centred on the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM faction) which covers all the North-East. It was called the National Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters (seven sisters meaning the seven States of the region) which in 1994 became the Self-Defence United Front of the South East Himalayan Region. Its objective is to oppose the Indianization of the indigenous people³.

The militant movements of Assam and West Bengal, which took refuge in Bhutan, may still maintain a certain presence, after the bulk has being dislodged end of 2003⁴. Insurgents of those movements, mainly the United Liberation Front of Assam, possibly as many as 2,000 may have taken refuge in Arunachal Pradesh, a neighbouring Indian State and/or migrated to Myanmar and Bangladesh⁵.

An Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) comprising of the United Liberation Front of Assam, the United National Liberation Front (from Manipur) and the People's Liberation Army (also from Manipur) has been created⁶. Other insurgent groups may have also join it⁷. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has its crack 28th battalion, also called Kashmir camp based in Myanmar⁸ operating in the upper Assam districts, with a cadre strength of about 500⁹. The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) has established camps as well. Myanmar may become a conduit for Chinese and other armament for many insurgent movements of the North-East¹⁰, even without the consent of China or even of the Myanmar government.

Myanmar is not the only shelter for Indian insurgents. The North-East militants

¹ « The Naga question. Violence and the peace process », Shantanu Nandan SHARMA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 92.

² « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 41.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 228.

« Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 37.

⁴ « Counter terror operations. Limitations to security forces », Mallika A. JOSEPH, research paper of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 2004.

« The shadow of militancy lingers », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 March 2004.

« South Asia : trajectories of terrorism and counter-terrorism », presentation of Ajai SAHNI, executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, at the Conference on South Asia : « what lies ahead in the next five years ? », Wye River Plantation, Queenstown, Maryland, 21-23 March 2004.

⁵ « Assam : ULFA's success or a counter-insurgency failure » Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 August 2004.

⁶ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 37.

⁷ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 136.

⁸ « Assam : spreading terror from the Kashmir camp » Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 June 2004.

⁹ « Seventy militants surrender in Assam », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « The Hindu » internet edition, 28 August 2004.

¹⁰ « Counter terror operations. Limitations to security forces », Mallika A. JOSEPH, research paper of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 2004.

« Salvaging a relationship » E. N. RAMMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 1st November 2004.

crossed in the past and still cross the international borders to Bangladesh, to avoid the pursuit of the security forces. They had and have their own facilities in those countries¹. The “central command headquarters” of the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland are based in Bangladesh. The Tripura insurgent movements have also camps in this country². Weapons coming from various countries in the world have been provided through Bangladesh to several extremist organizations operating in the North-East and also in West Bengal³. Due to its geographic situation and its political instability, Bangladesh may have become a major transit place for the smuggling of arms and ammunition to all insurgent groups in South Asia⁴. Cox’s Bazar has emerged as a major port for supply of illegal armament⁵. The ammunition and explosives seized in the Bogra district of Bangladesh in June-July 2003 were, possibly, to be smuggled to the Nepalese Maoists, with the All Tripura Tigers Force as a conduit⁶.

According to Indian sources, the Bangladeshi Directorate General of Forces Intelligence helps and nurtures, in collaboration with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, insurgent groups operating in the North-East of India whether they may be ethnically based or Islam-based. Anti-India Islamic groups are supposed to run training centres in Bangladesh. The Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) of Bangladesh is said to have extensive contacts with Muslim groups in the Indian States of West-Bengal and Assam. Funds are sent by Bangladeshi extremist organizations to Muslim outfits existing in the North-East. Members of Al Qaeda and Talibans have also found a safe haven in Bangladesh where almost all insurgent groups of the North-East of India have reportedly met them⁷.

¹ « United Liberation of Asom planning to regroup, indicates report » in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 March 2004.

² « Tripura : creating an unenviable record », Babhu Prasad ROUFRAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 20 October 2003.

« Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami », in « Times of India », 2 September 2004 and reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 September 2004.

³ « KLO got firearms from Bangladesh through ULFA », Marcus DAM in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 December 2003.

⁴ « Country is hub for arms smuggling syndicates in South Asia », in « One World South Asia », 15 December 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 December 2003.

⁵ « Role of Bangladesh in insurgency in the North-East », D. GOPAL, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 22.

⁶ « Maoist incursions across open borders », P. G. RAJMOHAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 December 2003.

⁷ « Fresh flare-up », Sumanta SEN in « India today », 15 November 1984.

« Time magazine », 15 October 2002.

« Cautious tango », Hiranmay KARIKHAR in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 May 2003.

« Asia frets over Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus », in « www.atimes.com » (Asia Times online), 5 March 2004.

« Beyond the roots : undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the question of ethnic Assamese identity », Pahi SAIKIA, « Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh : implications on India’s security », Nirmal JINDAL, and « ISI’s Eastward operations. Old links in North-East India and new ones in South-East Asia », Anil BHATT, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for

Foreign operatives and terrorists, Pakistani and Bangladeshi and from other countries, may also be infiltrated into India, particularly into West Bengal and Assam, at any time because of the porous border

Crossing from one country to another is easy because more than 60% of the 4095 km border (States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram), the longest land border that India shares with any of its neighbours, remain almost unguarded due to insufficient security personnel. End of 2004, in the North of the West Bengal State, 11 BSF battalions guard the India-Bangladesh frontier. Complete fencing of the portion which can be fenced may be finished in 2005¹. End of 2004, in the northern part of West Bengal, 547 km have been fenced out of 1,066 km-long frontier². Illegal immigration of Bangladeshi Muslims in Assam and other States of the North-East of India has taken place provoking demographic destabilization and the creation of Islamist terrorist groups³. Bangladeshis may be found even in remote States like Nagaland where 200,000 clandestine migrants have taken refuge⁴.

Even if the ethnically-based militant movements are opposed to the Muslim Bangladeshis coming in various States of the North-East and submerging the local populations, they cannot expressed their resentment and contribute to stop the illegal immigration because they need Bangladesh to establish and maintain rear bases and to get weapons. In fact, cooperation between Islamist movements and conventional militant organizations may even include arms supplies and training. For instance, Muslim militants have been provided arms and training by a Manipuri group, the People's Liberation Army⁵. The United Liberation Front of Assam is said to have joined the Muttahida Jihad Council (United Jihad Council), an umbrella organization of Islamist groups engaged in operations in Jammu and Kashmir⁶.

Bangladesh is also sometimes accused to give shelter to the Muslim Rohingya insurgents of Arakan, in Myanmar, who in fact have been active since 1948⁷.

the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 75, 201, 202 and 245.

¹ « Foreign infiltration in North-East India causing serious trouble », Mozaffar ISLAM, freelance Indian journalist, on website « www.satribune », 3 August 2003.

« Militants trying to set up camps near India-Nepal border », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

² « Militants trying to set up camps near India-Nepal border », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

³ « Extremist Islamist terror and subversion in South Asia », chapter written by K. P. S. GILL and Ajai SAHNI in the book « The threat of Islamic terrorism », published in 2001 by the Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tel Aviv.

« Beyond the roots : undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Assam and the question of ethnic Assamese identity », Pahi SAIKIA, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 74.

⁴ « The North-East : Islamist shadow », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 25 October 2004.

⁵ « India's North-East in the aftermath of Kargil », Sanjoy HAZARIKA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2000, pages 90, 91.

⁶ « The North-East : Islamist shadow », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », weekly review of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 25 October 2004.

⁷ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 44.

Pakistan-Afghanistan

Finally and not the least, many members of Al Qaeda movement and Taliban are widely believed to have taken shelter in Pakistan from Afghanistan. Islamabad does not deny it anymore. These militants still hide in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas geographically included in the North-West Frontier Province¹ and in Baluchistan, particularly in the area of Quetta². They have now scattered all over Pakistan, including in the big towns³. Some of them, according to UN sources, may have posed themselves as refugees⁴. A Pakistani source mentioned beginning of 2003 that the number of Al Qaeda members did not exceed 50 in the tribal areas of Western provinces⁵ but the real number as admitted or mentioned later is much bigger, up to about 5,000⁶. From their new locations in the border areas, the Taliban and members of Al Qaeda may strike back against American bases in Afghanistan. End of August 2003, a group of 18 Taliban (nationalities not mentioned), which had conducted attacks on the Pakistan-Afghan frontier areas, was arrested in Chaman, a town on the border between Baluchistan and Afghanistan⁷. Attacks in the Afghan Khost area are carried out from the Pakistani North-Waziristan tribal agency⁸. Al Qaeda members and the Taliban may share infrastructure with the terrorist groups operating in India⁹.

Pakistan-Sri Lanka

The Muslims from Sri Lanka are said to have established contact with the Pakistani extremist movements as well as with the Libyan leader KHADAFI. Suicide teams bearing the name of Osama are supposed to be created¹⁰.

¹ « Policy Analysis », n° 472, March 2003, Subodh ATAL, published by the Cato Institute, Washington.

² « Quetta a haven for Taliban, says report » in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 November 2003.

³ « Stalemate in Afghanistan », T. SREEDHAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 31 May 2003.

⁴ « Taliban cross into Pakistan as DPs, says UN body » Syed Irfan RAZA in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 December 2003.

⁵ « 50 Al Qaeda men still in tribal areas » Qudssia AKHLAQUE in « Dawn », internet edition, 15 February 2003.

⁶ « Musharraf warns against failure of Wana operation », Zulfikar ALI in « Dawn », internet edition, 16 March 2004.

« The Taliban strike back », B. RAMAN in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2003.

⁷ « 18 Taliban held in Chaman » in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 August 2003.

⁸ « Mixed signals », M. Ilyas KHAN in « Herald », monthly, Karachi, March 2004.

⁹ « Why was the terror intelligence withheld ? » Praveen SWAMI, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

¹⁰ Interviews in South Asia, 2004.

12. MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS BY INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

Apart from facts, mentioned just above, generally established and accepted as such by most unbiased analysts, India and Pakistan have always accused each other of being responsible for so-called State terrorism, that means terrorism sponsored by States and not by international organizations. The media are the vectors through which accusations are being known. Denials have regularly followed accusations. The truth is rather difficult to find out in what appears as a kind of psychological warfare between India and Pakistan, the two main South Asian countries and to a certain extent between India and Bangladesh, the third more important State in South Asia.

Accusations by Pakistan

In the 1980s after the taking over of General Zia-ul-HAQ, Pakistan accused India to allow the Al Zulfiqar movement to have training camps in India¹. That organization named after the former Zulfiqar Ali BHUTTO after his execution wanted to topple the military regime.

The Pakistan press, even now, indicates that camps still exist in India, specially in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir and West Bengal, to train Indian but also foreign terrorists, for action in neighbouring countries. They were allegedly run and financed by the Bharatiya Janata Party when it was ruling in New Delhi, and by the associated extremist Hindu organizations. Before, they were said to be managed by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian Intelligence Service. Israeli experts are providing assistance².

Time and again, Indians are arrested in Pakistan, accused to be terrorists and condemned³. Many terrorist acts committed in Pakistan and in India itself have been attributed to the RAW. For instance, when in July 1995 a little known militant group so-called Al Faran kidnapped in Kashmir three Europeans and one American and killed one of the Europeans, it was said in the Pakistani press that this organization might have been created by the RAW⁴. The killing on 20 March 2000 of 35 Sikhs in Kashmir, by Islamist militants was also credited to India⁵ which wanted to prove once more, just before the visit in India of the US President, the danger of Islamist terrorism. The attacks against the State Legislative Assembly building in Srinagar 1 October 2001 and against the Indian Federal

¹ « Pakistan not involved », interview with ZIA-UL-HAQ, in « India today », 15 July 1984.

² « Over 70 terrorist camps operating in India », Tariq SAEEDI in « Times.com.pk », 14 August 2003.

³ « Sialkot : life term for Indian terrorist », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 April 2003.

⁴ « India's secret army in Kashmir, new pattern of abuse emerge in the conflict », excerpts from the May 1996 report of Human Rights Watch/Asia, pages 14 and 15.

⁵ « Analysing reportage from theatres of conflict », Kanchan L., in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, April 2001.

Parliament in New Delhi 13 December 2001 have been attributed to India or at least serious suspicions have been raised. The argument is that these incidents could only benefit India which wanted to prove to the world and particularly the USA the responsibility of Pakistan in terrorist related blasts. The time was ripe to do so, just a few weeks after the World Trade Centre destruction in New York and the launching of the war against terrorism¹. Pakistan contested that Muslims set a train of Hindus on fire 27 February 2002 but said that the fire was lit from inside a compartment². The responsibilities of the bombings in Mumbai, in August 2003, are to be placed on Hindu fanatics according to some Pakistani sources. In so doing, they wanted to scare Hindus and to convince them into voting in the 2004 elections for hardliners of the Shiv Sena in the State of Maharashtra and for the Bharatiya Janata Party in India as a whole.

It has been said by Pakistani officials that India might have been behind the bomb attack which killed 11 French nationals in Karachi in May 2002. The reason given is that New Delhi wanted to undermine the project of building French designed submarines, for which the victims were working³. In the same way, India has been accused to be behind the Sui pipeline blast which happened in January 2003 in Baluchistan and disrupted the supply of gas to Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. Originally, it was said to be due to enduring Bugti-Mazari tribal feuds. According to the Pakistani press, India wanted to prove to Iran that making a gas pipeline through Baluchistan and Sindh to reach its territory would be useless and detrimental to their mutual interests⁴. Only an offshore pipeline, in deep sea, would be a solution. The Pakistani media, quoting the political authorities, frequently attribute the sectarian killings of Sunnis and Shias to India⁵. For instance, the involvement of India in the attack of a Shia mosque on 4 July 2003 in Quetta, the capital city of Baluchistan, has not been ruled out⁶. Indians have also been accused to be behind the troubles which happened in the same province in 2004. The Chief Minister of this province himself said that the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, was operating training camps in Iran and Afghanistan⁷.

The links between India and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, now participating in the government in Kabul, are denounced as dangerous because they aim to destabilize the western provinces of Pakistan, the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. It is for that precise purpose, that the Research Analysis Wing is supposed to control a few terrorist training centres in Afghanistan. It is also assumed that it coordinates the anti-Pakistani activities through the Indian consulates, particularly in those near the border, providing fake identity cards and fake currency to operatives who are sent into Pakistan⁸. There are now

¹ « Terrorism and religious extremism in South Asia », article of Dr Maqbool Ahmad BHATTY, a former Pakistan's ambassador to China, in "Regional Studies", Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, spring 2002.

² « Reward for massacre results », Major-General (rtd) Jamshed Ayaz KHAN, in « The Nation », Islamabad, 4 January 2003.

³ « Bomb attack may have been aimed at France », Jac LEWIS and Rifaat HUSSEIN, in « Jane's Defence Weekly », 15 May 2002, page 3.

⁴ « Indian hand possibly behind Sui gas pipeline blast », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 15 February 2003.

⁵ « Is the enemy within or without ? », Aileen QAISER in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 October 2003.

⁶ « Killings act of political sabotage : Jamali, foreign hand not ruled out », Razaqat ALI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 July 2003.

⁷ « RAW camps in Balochistan », in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 August 2004.

⁸ « Over 70 terrorist camps operating in India », Tariq SAEEDI in « Times.com.pk », 14 August 2003.

« Delhi running terror camps in Afghanistan : India involved in Quetta killing. Faisal », in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 October 2003.

Kabul has denied the existence of any Indian training centre in Afghanistan. See « Afghanistan refutes terror camps charge », in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 October 2003.

four Indian consulates in Afghanistan (Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jelalabad, this town, being relatively close to Pakistan) and two other ones are planned to be created. The idea to create a Pushtunistan reuniting the Pashtoons of Afghanistan and Afghanistan may even be revived¹. Pakistan sees the hand of India's RAW as well as of Israel's Mosaad and the US Central Intelligence Agency in the dissemination of Jihadi literature in South-Waziristan².

Pakistani charges include also the support allegedly given by India to the Maoist insurrection in Nepal, in order to destabilize the Hindu kingdom³.

Islamabad is also sensitive about cyber-terrorism. Mentions of Indian hackers, who operated on their own or not, attacking Pakistan official websites have been made public⁴.

Accusations by India

Accusations of Pakistan and Bangladesh to sponsor separately and sometimes in connivance many terrorist deeds appear as well in the Indian and foreign press and in Indian official reports (like the annual reports of the Ministry of home affairs and Ministry of defence). The latest report of the Ministry of defence, for the year 2003-2004, mentions that the main threat to peace and stability in South Asia remains fundamentalism and terrorism, blames the "ingrained adventurism of a section of the Pakistani military" responsible for infiltration of terrorists and denounces the presence in Bangladesh of militants from the North-East⁵.

Pakistan has been made responsible or at least accomplice of some plane hijackings, particularly in 1984⁶.

Islamabad has been accused to give shelters to terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir and to run training camps (photo evidence of those facilities is said to be available to the Indian army⁷). As many as 85 militant training camps are supposed to be existing in Pakistani territory, many of them being merged with those of the army⁸. Around 3,000

¹ This motivation has been expressed by the Pakistani General (rtd) Aslam BEG, former chief of army staff, during a seminar organized at the Brookings Institution, in New York, by the Pakistan-American League. See « Pushtunistan issue may be revived says Gen Beg : situation along Afghan border », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 August 2003.

« Indo-Pak. rivalry in Afghanistan », Aunohita MOJUMDAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 September 2003.

² « Power play in South Waziristan », Mohammad SHEHZAD in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 November 2004. The article mentions the following publications : Nawa-i-Waqt, Ummat, Jasarat, Friday Special, Takbeer, Nida-i-Millat and Islam.

³ « What has turned South-Asia into a cauldron ? », Khalid Mahmud ARIF, a former Pakistani general, in « Dawn », internet edition, 22 February 2003.

⁴ « IT body recommends plan to counter cyber-terrorism », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 11 May 2003.

⁵ « Terrorism, still the primary security concern : report », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 November 2004.

⁶ « The Dubai drama », Dilip BOBB and Raju SANTANAM, in « India today », 15 September 1984.

« The smoking gun », Dilip BOBB and Raju SANTANAM, in « India today », 30 September 1984.

« More sabre-rattling », Suman DUBEY in « India today », 15 November 1984.

⁷ « Photos of terrorist camps in Pak. available : army », in « The Hindu » internet edition, 18 September 2003. The origin of the photos is not mentioned. They may have been shot from the ground by operatives or from satellites (Indian or not).

⁸ « Al Qaeda active in Jammu and Kashmir, says army chief », in « Times of India », 12 October 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 October 2003.

militants are allegedly being trained in Azad Kashmir¹. According to Indian government sources, 60 to 80% of terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir are from outside, under the direct control of the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, the local militants "playing the role of porters and guides"². Pakistan has been accused to stoke tensions, especially through deliberate destruction of shrines, like what happened on May 11, 1995, at Charar-e-Sharif, about 35 km from where the shrine of the Sufi saint Nooruddin Noorani was burned down (the militants said that the Indian army committed the arson)³.

Recent official declarations mention that Pakistan is trying to rekindle the Sikh insurgency. Some militant leaders are believed to be in Pakistan⁴.

Islamabad has been made responsible of the riots which happened in Mumbai after the destruction in December 1992 of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya by Hindu extremists. Possibly up to 2000 Muslims had been killed in its aftermath. Terrorist acts regularly happening in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India like the attack on the national Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 are mostly credited to the western neighbouring arch enemy. The attack against the American Information Centre of Kolkata in January 2002 has been said to have been done by the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence⁵. The attack of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims back to Gujarat from Ayodhya in February 2002 has also been attributed to Pakistan. Pakistan was also made responsible for the explosion in a train in Mumbai in March 2003 and for the killing, on the same month, of Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir⁶. The bombings in Mumbai in August 2003 have been attributed to Lashkar-e-Toiba, an extremist movement based in Pakistan⁷.

It has also been reported that help in training and arming is being given by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Maoist movement in Nepal⁸ and the Naxalite/Maoist movements in India⁹. Circulation of fake Indian currency in the border areas of India and Nepal and in the North-East is attributed to the ISI¹⁰.

¹ Answers to questions in Indian Parliament by Defence Minister George FERNANDES, 30 July 2003, quoted in article « India conducts 20 missile tests in six months : Pakistan accused of reviving Punjab militancy », news item of AFP in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 July 2003.

² « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 May 2003, mentioning the annual report of the Union Home Ministry for the year 2002-2003.

³ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 142.

⁴ Annual report of the Ministry of home affairs 2003-2004.

Answers to questions in Indian Parliament by Defence Minister George FERNANDES, 30 July 2003, quoted in article « India conducts 20 missile tests in six months : Pakistan accused of reviving Punjab militancy », news item of AFP in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 July 2003.

« Terrorists' strike plan unearthed », Sarabjit PANDHER in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 February 2004.

⁵ « L'Inde blâme Islamabad pour l'attentat de Calcutta », article de Françoise CHIPAUX in « Le Monde », 24 January 2002, page 4.

⁶ « Implication of Indo-US nexus », M. H. ASKARI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 April 2003.

⁷ « Attentats : Delhi réclame des comptes au Pakistan », Marie-France CALLE in « Le Figaro », version électronique, 27 August 2003.

⁸ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 10 March 2003.

« Dawood Ibrahim living in Islamabad, undergoing cosmetic surgery, say Indians », Arun RAJNATH, on website « www.satribune », 3 April 2004.

⁹ « Naxals acting like terrorists : BJP », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 4 October 2003.

¹⁰ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 July 2003.

Accusations have been expressed against Pakistan and Bangladesh for the help assumed to have been provided and still being provided to the various insurgent movements of the North-East of India, which include Muslim extremist groups operating in several States of that region¹. The Pakistani connivance in the spate of terrorist acts in October 2004 in Assam and Nagaland has been pinpointed by the Indian Intelligence establishment². India asserts there are 90 training camps for Indian insurgents in Bangladesh³. The figures of 194 and 195 have even been mentioned⁴, which would include non training camps. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, while denying the presence of any camps of foreign insurgents on its territory, claims that India operates 39 terrorist camps for Bangladeshi insurgents⁵, which is also denied by New Delhi. Furthermore, New Delhi accuses Islamabad to help Bangladesh to settle training camps for members of Al Qaeda.

Some food for thought. Who has got the edge to carry out mischievous activities ?

According to information given by media and various open sources, there does not seem to be a parity between India and Pakistan. There is a difference in the magnitude of offence. India cannot be considered innocent of all wrongdoing but cases where Indians or Pakistani operatives working for India have been accused and convicted of committing terrorist acts in Pakistan are rare, even according to the Pakistani press. Furthermore, the very limited number of Indian or Pakistani nationals allegedly operating on behalf of India who are suspected to prepare terrorist acts in Pakistan cannot be compared with the assessed presence of many Pakistani militants in India, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. The claims and counter-claims are difficult to assess. However, there is ample independent evidence, including open source reports in the South Asian and the international media, that confirm the presence of training camps and safe havens in Pakistan and Bangladesh. On the other hand, there is no such independent confirmation of counter-accusation of camps in India. Some of these mutual accusations may be true but certainly not all. Many terrorist acts are being perpetrated by indigenous movements or individuals which may have no links with foreign countries.

Pakistan seems to be in a more favourable position, if we may say so, to harm its

« Dawood Ibrahim living in Islamabad, undergoing cosmetic surgery, say Indians », Arun RAJNATH, on website « [www.satribune](http://www.satribune.com) », 3 April 2004.

« Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

¹ « Tripura : in the rebels' firing line », Wasbir HUSSAIN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 August 2003.

Annual reports of the Ministry of home affairs, including the 2003-2004 report.

« Small wars of the Northeast », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 December 2004.

² « North-East attacks point to ISI involvement », Vijay KUMAR, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 October 2004.

³ « New Delhi completes fence along BD border », in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 November 2003.

⁴ « India asks Bangladesh to dismantle rebel camps », in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 January 2004.

« Rhetoric and denial », Saji CHERIAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 20 September 2004.

⁵ « India sheltering guerrillas : BD », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 January 2004.

« No terrorist camps exists in the country, claims BDR Director-General », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 January 2004.

« Army/jungle school a global hit », Rajat PANDIT in « The Times of India », 10 April 2004.

« NLFT peace with no strings », Chandan NANDY in « Hindustan Times », 8 May 2004.

neighbour in preparing and carrying out mischievous deeds than India. The reasons are manifold.

First of all, the democratic system is not working so well as in India, to say the least, even if it is far from being perfect in the "biggest democracy of the world". For more than half of the period since the partition of South Asia, Pakistan has been ruled by the army. When it was not the case, the military were never far from the political power. The army has always controlled the various intelligence services including the most important one, the Inter-Services Intelligence¹. On the contrary, in India the military have been kept out of the political decision-making circles². Furthermore, the civilian intelligence services are not all controlled by the armed forces. As a rule, dictatorships are more likely to make use of terrorism than democracies.

The existence of an important Muslim minority in India, numbering about the same as the population in Pakistan itself, makes possible the existence of militant and even terrorist networks. Bangladesh, just a little bit less populated than Pakistan, being mostly inhabited by Muslims may also hide terrorists manipulated by Pakistan.

It may be presumed, so say the Indians, that Pakistan looks favourably to any Tamil agitation in the deep South of India. That would be a diversion for Indian military and paramilitary forces which otherwise would be available on the Western areas. That would also be an other factor likely to destabilize India. To say the least, Islamabad followed the situation very carefully when the anti-Hindi riots took place in the 1960s and when Rajiv GANDHI was assassinated in May 1991 by a Tamil. However, Islamabad has to be careful while dealing with the Tamil problem. After all, the Tamils are mainly Hindu. Furthermore, situation in Sri Lanka has to be taken into account. The relations between the LTTE who want to promote independence for the Tamil Hindu populations of the Northern and Eastern provinces and the Muslim community, living mainly in the latter one, are tense despite the fact that all speak the same language, Tamil (the reason is that the Muslims are basically Tamils who have been converted). The forced displacement of Muslims from the Northern Province in 1990, by the Hindu insurgent movement, may be considered as a religious cleansing. A similar process may be on the way in the Eastern province where murders of Muslims are being perpetrated. In a way, the tension between Hindus and Muslims in the island should not be surprising ; it is a reproduction of communalism as it is happening in India and Bangladesh. The number of the Muslims in the Eastern province is not known with precision since the census scheduled for 2001 was not allowed by the Tigers to be carried out but their percentage is about one third. Most probably, the strategy of the separatist Tamil movement is to force the Muslims as well as the Buddhist Sinhalese to leave the Eastern province and settle in the Sinhalese inhabited provinces. Apparently, it has started to resort to terrorism to achieve its aim. So, the Northern and Eastern provinces would be homogeneously populated by Hindu Tamils. The Muslims complained not to have been represented in the peace talks between the LTTE and the government. To protect themselves, the Sri Lankan Muslims are said to have established contacts with co-religionists abroad, including in Pakistan ; that may be a dangerous drift³.

India has the possibility to organize networks in Bangladesh where a significant

¹ « Armée et politique au Pakistan », Alain LAMBALLE, article published in « Défense nationale », Paris, March 2000.

² « Armée et politique en Inde », Alain LAMBALLE, article published in « Défense nationale », Paris, May 2000.

³ The Muslims represent 8% of the island population. The last serious clashes between Hindus and Muslims happened in the Eastern town of Valaichchenai, in July 2002. See « No war, but little peace for Sri Lanka's east », Lindsay BECK, in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 July 2003.

« An equal place in the peace process », Jehan PERERA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 25 August 2003.

Hindu minority lives (about 12% of the population) and even more in Nepal, a Hindu kingdom. But it is rather difficult in Pakistan where the Hindu minority represents only about 2% of the population and is mostly concentrated in the south-east part of the country, bordering India. There are practically no Hindu minorities in Pakistani towns. Some Sikh communities exist near Islamabad and in Lahore, but being small, are easily controlled. India may of course use its own Muslim Urdu speaking nationals as operatives but not without difficulties. Infiltration of extremist movements remain a hard task. India may also capitalize on the traditional rivalries between the tribes of the two Western Pakistani provinces (North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan). This is more easy when the regime in Afghanistan is friendly. It was obviously not the case with the Talibans but it happens to be so now. Apart from its consulates in Afghanistan, India has now two consulates in Iran, at strategically located places, not far away from the Pakistani border, at Bandar Abbas and Zahedan. The Indian Intelligence Service, the Research and Analysis Wing, is certainly using this well developed network of consulates.

Of course, in theory, India may use commandos to carry out terrorist activities on the Pakistan territory. However, it is not an easy job, even using helicopters by day or night and it would not go undetected. No such attempts seem to have been done because it is too much risky. To be caught red-handed would ruin the image of the perpetrator for a very long time indeed. The same difficulties apply obviously too for Pakistan.

13. REGIONAL COOPERATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM

Mutual accusations and suspicions prevent the South Asian States to cooperate for countering the terrorist threats. However, perceived common dangers generated by extremist movements which want to topple the existing dispensations, bring together some countries of South Asia. That is becoming to be true for India, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka which have common threats and therefore share common interests.

Bilateral cooperation

Bilateral cooperation between South Asian States to fight terrorism remains largely marginal. This is due to generally strained political relations. Even when there is a will to cooperate, bad governance in border areas as well as poor and inadequate road networks are almost insuperable obstacles. Most of the time, roads cross frontiers and do not run all along (such are the situation for India on all its land borders with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and for Pakistan on its border with Iran and Afghanistan).

Till recently, India and Nepal cooperated in a moderate way to fight against the leftist insurgencies but situation is improving. Some technical assistance and training in counter-insurgency schools are being provided by New Delhi¹. A joint working group to manage the 1,800 km long porous frontier (including 780 km with Uttar Pradesh and 735 km with Bihar, the other bordering Indian States being Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Sikkim) meets every six months. It monitors and tries to curb the terrorist activities along the border areas, which is difficult because the frontier can be crossed at will without any administrative hindrance by citizens of both countries. Intelligence is now being shared. India is willing to increase cooperation for political reasons, to cut the influence of its own leftist militants and for economic reasons as well because the Maoists have started to plan attacks against dams² on tributaries to the Ganges which are beneficial to both countries. Some hydroelectric projects and mini hydro power stations have in fact already been attacked³.

¹ « Au Népal, l'armée se lance à l'assaut de la rébellion maoïste », Françoise CHIPAUX in « Le Monde », 9 May 2002.

« Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

² « Joint Working Group between India and Nepal on border management held in Kathmandu », in « Nepal News », 1 February 2004 and reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 2 February 2004.

« Emerging cooperation against Maoist subversion », P. G. RAJAMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 February 2004.

³ « How to fight an insurgency », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 December 2003.

Even cooperation between India and Bhutan (a closely associated country) to fight some insurgencies, especially the separatist movements in Assam and in West Bengal, has been unsuccessful for a very long time. Following major operations against them by the Indian army in 1990 and 1991, the insurgents of the United Liberation Front of Assam and of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland established rear bases (headquarters, training camps, arms and ammunition dumps) in the southern rugged and woody areas of Bhutan, without being disturbed. In fact, Bhutan had invited the United Liberation Front of Assam to come, in the hope that it would push out the undesired Nepalese settlers from the south of the country. But it did not happen so, on the contrary the Indian militants became friends with the Nepalese, using them as porters and guides. The United Liberation Front of Assam may have even given them weapons¹. Furthermore, it encouraged and helped the Kamtapur Liberation Organization of West Bengal to settle bases in Bhutan too.

For many years, the Bhutanese government was afraid to provoke a violent reaction of the Assamese separatists in the country where they could be seen roaming around in some villages and on Assamese roads extensively used by Southerners. A full-fledged military intervention against the foreign insurgents was delayed because of fear to bring chaos in the land-locked country, disruption in the road trade links with India and deterioration of all relations with the neighbouring Assam State (more than 28 millions inhabitants altogether, various minorities included, to be compared with 1,000,000 in Bhutan). Therefore, the Bhutanese government was playing a double game, reassuring New Delhi of its goodwill and at the same time helping the outfits in some ways, not only passive but also active, like assistance to get funds and travel documents in exchange of status quo and peace within the kingdom. Possibly, some Bhutanese ministers have been bought². The Bhutanese government remained undecided also because of doubts about the capacity of the recently created counter-insurgency force, together with the Royal Bhutan Guards and the Bhutanese army (with its small strength, about 10,000), not so well equipped, to push out well organized, well armed and seasoned guerrilla fighters numbering between 1,200 (estimate of the Indian army) and 3,000 (estimate of the Bhutan government)³ and then to monitor the 265 km long border with Assam and the 150 km long border with West Bengal. A combined operation with the Indian army appeared necessary, but that option was not favoured by Thimphu for sovereignty reasons. In the past some limited joint operations seem however to have been carried out, but without significant success.

The militants refused to quit Bhutan for fear, so they argued, of being caught at the border by Indian security forces⁴. Finally, failing to convince the militants to leave the country on their own, Bhutan took military action in December 2003. With the Indian army deployed on the border, in Assam, the Royal Bhutanese army moved in the southern jungles, destroyed around 30 camps and flushed out many militants out of the country, some of them being captured in Indian territory. A logistical help provided by helicopters of the Indian Air

¹ « Bhutan's tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, pages 37, 41.

² « Parops call for strong action to make the militants leave Bhutan » and « Punakha calls for nation to unite against the militant threat », in « Kuensel », Thimphu, 17-23 March 2001.

« Le Bhoutan : un royaume himalayen entre ciel et terre, entre Chine et Inde », Alain LAMBALLE, "Stratégique", 1/2001, Paris.

« Terrorism sans frontières », Jaideep SAIKIA, paper delivered at the international seminar on terrorism and low intensity conflicts in South Asia, 6-8 March 2002, Kolkata.

« Bhutan's tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, pages 38, 39, 40, 41, note 2 pages 54 and 55.

³ « Northeast militants' back broken, says army chief », Barun Das GUPTA, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 January 2004.

⁴ « King-size problem », Wasbir HUSSAIN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 September 2003.

Force and the Army aviation has also been given to the Bhutanese army but any direct fighting involvement of the Indian army has been denied. Some army instructors of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT), stationed in Bhutan, may have acted as advisers¹. 650 militants have been either killed or captured. The Indian army arrested 145 of them when they attempted to cross the border². Bilateral meetings are now organized, alternatively in New Delhi and Thimphu on border management and security issues³.

Delhi attempt to convince Dhaka to launch a crackdown on terrorist bases, just like the one decided by Thimphu, failed. Bangladesh does not even acknowledge the existence of Indian outfits on its territory. There is hardly any cooperation between the two countries. Dhaka has refused an Indian proposal for joint patrols on the border, to prevent smuggling, illegal immigration and movements of terrorists⁴. It has however accepted to coordinate patrols⁵ and has launched some drives against terrorists⁶ but does not send back to India those who are wanted⁷.

In the years 1987-1990, an Indian Peace-Keeping Force operated in Sri Lanka according to an agreement signed by Delhi and Colombo. At a time, it was 100,000 strong. However, the expedition ended in failure, for many reasons : absence of a clear mission, which appeared to change as the time went on, lack of coordination among the Indian civilian and military intelligence services and mistrust between India and Sri Lanka which grew up gradually. The Indian intervention has in fact been interpreted by Sinhalese not as a help to the Sri Lanka government but rather as a support to the Tamil separatist cause. But finally, it was perceived as unfriendly by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well.

Despite discrepancies, cooperation between the two governments never stopped and even increased after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991 in Tamil Nadu by a LTTE suicide cadre. However, an embargo of arm deliveries had been decided upon by India which was removed only in January 2003⁸, a significant time after the signature in February 2002 of a cease-fire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Some form of exchange of information between intelligence services of both countries on a bilateral level, concerning the Tamil problem, have almost always existed. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the

¹ « Bhutan army captures top militants », Barun Das GUPTA, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 December 2003.

« Flushing out ULFA », editorial in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 December 2003.

« Bhutan rejects ULFA's ceasefire call », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 December 2003.

« Over 100 militants killed in crackdown », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 December 2003.

« Bhutan's tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, pages 48, 49, note 35 pages 57, 58.

² « Northeast militants' back broken, says army chief », Barun Das GUPTA, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 January 2004.

³ « Bhutan and India hold bilateral meeting on border management and security matters », in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 March 2004.

⁴ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 4 August 2003.

⁵ « Rhetoric and denial », Saji CHERIAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 20 September 2004.

⁶ « Dhaka launches drive against terrorists », Haroon HABIB, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 March 2004.

⁷ « Bangladesh not to hand over ULFA activist to India », Haroon HABIB, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 April 2004.

⁸ « Tilting the balance », Saji CHERIAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 November 2004.

Indian intelligence agency, may even have played an active role in developing a rift within the Tamil secessionist movement which came to the limelight beginning of 2004¹. But if so, which is not sure at all, it is not known if it has been done in cooperation with the Sri Lanka intelligence agency. Nowadays, the Indian navy and the Sri Lankan navy have stepped up the already existing cooperation to prevent the LTTE smuggling arms by sea² and to deny any supply of weapons to the Naxalites/Maoists, supposed to be done off the coastline of Andhra Pradesh. In January 1993, the Indian navy had intercepted a ship of the LTTE's fleet, off the Tamil Nadu coast, which was blown up on the orders of LTTE. Naval joint patrols should re-establish and impose the sovereignty of the two countries which is defied by the Sea Tigers, particularly concerning the rights of Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen. A comprehensive defence cooperation agreement is under preparation. It will complete the existing relations which include the training of military personnel in Indian schools (1,200 of all ranks in 2003³) and the supply of weapons.

A limited Indian intervention in the Maldives from November 1988 till November 1989 ended successfully, putting an end to a tentative of coup d'Etat and consolidating the institutions.

On 13 September 2003, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have signed an agreement of bilateral cooperation in the fields of counter-terrorism, drug control and police training⁴. Pakistan already supplies small arms⁵ and trains some military personnel, but not as many as India. Pakistan and Maldives have decided to cooperate in areas of counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and anti-narcotics. Pakistan has offered help to train policemen and will increase the number of places for Maldivian defence personnel in military schools⁶.

Extradition treaties between the various South Asian States and with neighbouring countries simply do not exist or are not used. Although much needed, there is not even one between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So Pakistani people arrested on the Afghan side and the other way round are generally not extradited. Rumours did the rounds that Pakistan has refused to conclude an extradition treaty with India but Islamabad denied reports that an Indian proposal had been made⁷. However, India and Bangladesh have agreed to sign one⁸.

The counter-insurgency jungle warfare school at Vairengte trains soldiers from neighbouring countries, particularly Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan⁹.

¹ « Tamil Tigers : split benefits some », Feizal SAMATH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 March 2004.

² « Will LTTE give peace a chance ? », Cdr Vijay SAKHUJA, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

³ « Joint patrolling feasible : Sri Lanka army chief », V. JAYANTH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 12 December 2003.

« Tilting the balance », Saji CHERIAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 November 2004.

⁴ « Pakistan, Lanka to combat terrorism », in « Dawn », internet edition, 14 September 2003.

⁵ « Gen Aziz in Sri Lanka », in « Dawn », internet edition, 15 September 2003.

⁶ « Maldives to cooperate in anti-terror war », Q. A. in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 November 2004.

⁷ « No to treaty », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 August 2004.

« Reports on extradition treaty denied », B. Muralidhar REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 31 August 2004.

⁸ « India and Bangladesh to sign extradition treaty », Haroon HABIB in « The Hindu », internet edition, 12 March 2004.

⁹ « Army'jungle school a global hit », Rajat PANDIT in « The Times of India », 10 April 2004.

Multilateral cooperation

Bilateral cooperation is not satisfactory although it has improved recently between some countries. Multilateral diplomacy is even worse. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), consisting of the seven countries of South Asia, had in 1993 adopted a convention, known as Suppression of terrorism Act or Convention on Suppression of terrorism (it was first signed at Kathmandu on November 4, 1987) but it has no practical effects. However, an additional protocol to the Act has been adopted during the SAARC summit of January 2004 in Islamabad, mainly designed to interdict the financing of terrorist activities¹. Pakistan has ratified this protocol in November 2005². Hopefully, it will help at least to promote bilateral cooperation if not really in the whole of South Asia.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) in South Asia

South Asia does not possess sophisticated diplomatic tools to deal with mistrust. There is nothing equivalent to the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) existing within the scope of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Some measures however are used since a long time bilaterally. Each week, at a fixed day and time, the director generals of military operations of the Indian and Pakistani army headquarters talk to each other on the phone. Local commanders of paramilitary forces from both side of the India-Pakistan border have regular common meetings, except during periods of tension. A similar system works between India and Bangladesh border units. Coast guards of India and the Pakistan Maritime Agency are supposed to exchange information on matters of common interest which may include arms smuggling³. Foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan have also established a hot line.

Other important safeguards do exist which bind States and therefore extremist organizations, controlled directly or not by the governments, which are likely to resort to terrorism. But of course uncontrolled or so declared uncontrolled movements remain free of their actions. International constraints, like bilateral agreements, do not eliminate the threats of terrorism although they limit them. In December 1988, India and Pakistan signed an agreement forbidding attacks against nuclear facilities. In February 1999, they adopted measures to reduce nuclear risks due to accidental causes. Both countries also signed the Convention on the interdiction of biological weapons, adopted in 1972 and the Convention on the interdiction of chemical weapons, drafted in 1993. But none of them have accepted the Ottawa agreement of October 1997 on the interdiction of anti-personnel mines.

¹ « SAARC revitalized », Afzaal MAHMOOD, in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 January 2004.

« Momentous decisions », Najmuddin A. SHAIKH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 January 2004.

² « Pakistan ratifies Saarc protocol on terrorism », Qudssia AKHLAQUE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 November 2005.

³ « Coast guards of Pakistan, India to set up hotline », in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 January 2004.

14. SOUTH ASIA AND THE WORLD TERRORISM. THE WORLD AND SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM

In the past, some leaders of South Asian extremist movements took refuge abroad, particularly in the former colonizing country, the United Kingdom. PHIZO, a Naga secessionist leader since independence of India, had emigrated to the United Kingdom in 1957 and remained there till his death in 1990. It used also to be the case for the leader of a Mizo insurgent group¹ who had exiled in West-Germany and later on in UK and more recently for Sikh leaders (emigrated in UK and USA) and the chief of a Mohajir movement agitating in Karachi (in UK)².

The geographical position of Pakistan, contiguous to Afghanistan and close to Central Asia, formerly a part of Soviet Union, has always attracted the attention of the foreign powers, including and especially the bigger ones. The intelligence agencies have been very much present at all times, especially of course when the events made it even more necessary, for instance the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, recently the Taliban regime in Kabul and nowadays the existence of remnants of Talibans and of the Al Qaeda movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Now, Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute the hub of world terrorist activities, as it is commonly alleged by the international press³. South Asia and its surroundings, where half of the world Muslim population lives, are in the limelight. The Muslim extremist ideologies are originated from that conflict prone and volatile sub-continent, contemporary theoreticians of terrorism are from there, not from the Arab countries, nor from South-East Asia. Threats are actually multi faceted, including in the scientific field.

Potential attacks against Western interests in the data processing field

Many firms from the West have given part or all of their informatics, to Indians mainly, to Pakistanis to a much lesser extent, to be processed. So far, Western interests have not been attacked but could be. There is a risk that terrorists from any confession, Muslims as well as non Muslims, may infiltrate these companies in the aim of launching possibly devastating attacks against the West. India and Pakistan have engineers extremely well trained in data processing. The West is therefore vulnerable. Any eventuality has to be reckoned with⁴, which may threaten private and government websites and e-mails.

Documents seized in 2002 in Afghanistan have shown that Al Qaeda studied the

¹ « Conciliatory moves », S. Venkat NARAYAN in « India today », 31 October 1984.

² The Mohajirs are the immigrants who left India just after the departure of the British in 1947 to settle in Pakistan and their descendants.

³ See also the book « *Qui a tué Daniel Pearl ?* », Bernard-Henri LÉVY, Grasset, Paris, 2003.

⁴ « *L'espion des sciences : arcanes des arnaques* », Brigadier-General (rtd) Jean GUYAUX, edited by Flammarion, Paris, 2002.

feasibility of a cyber-terrorist attack. Some of its cadres have been trying since long to hack the American computer network¹. One information technology expert was arrested on 13 July 2004 in Lahore, capital of the Pakistani Punjab, a computer mastermind linked to Al Qaeda inner circle, who intended to hack into the American Federal Bureau of Investigation and a British official website².

Participation of South Asian and South Asia trained Muslims in the various world conflicts or involved in terrorist activities

South Asia may be considered as a hotbed of Islamist fanatics and therefore potential terrorists. Indoctrination, through religious schools, also widely attended by foreign students, and through mosques, is common.

Muslims from Pakistan have been identified in extremist foreign movements, operating in different countries in the past and still are. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 1992 to 1995, some Pakistanis and Pakistan-trained militants have fought with their Bosniak coreligionists against the orthodox Serbs and the catholic Croats. Those fighters were not acting as terrorists but rather as mercenaries for the Islamic cause. Some have stayed and are involved in unlawful activities like human trafficking and endangering persons. One Pakistani has been arrested on November 18, 2004 in Zenica, in central Bosnia for threats to international prosecutors dealing with organized crimes, for human trafficking and for contraband trade³.

Allegations have been expressed, mentioning that the suicide pilots on September 11 2001 who crashed planes on the World Trade Centre twin towers in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington had in fact been trained by the Pakistani air force⁴. Prior to 11 September 2001, Indian agencies estimated the number of Taliban and Al Qaeda members active in Afghanistan-Pakistan area to be about 55,000 including 15,000 Pakistani military personnel⁵. Since then, many Muslim volunteers trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan have dispersed around the world⁶.

Some of the terrorists or suspected terrorists arrested in the past few years and recently in Europe, Asia, Middle East and in the North America originated from Pakistan or were foreigners who had been trained there or in Afghanistan⁷. More and more Al Qaeda

¹ « War on terrorism : the state of flux », major general (retired) Afsir KARIM in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 5.

² « Minister confirms arrest of IT expert », in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 3 August 2004.

« Cooperating suspect's name revealed », in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 7 August 2004.

« Undercover Pakistani had messages from Qaeda n°3 », Reuters release in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 September 2004.

³ Review of the press office of the high representative, Sarajevo, 20 November 2004.

« Pakistani arrested in Bosnia », in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 November 2004.

⁴ « Les équations cachées du terrorisme », Alexandre ADLER in « Le Figaro », internet edition, 16 June 2004

⁵ « The Taliban-Al Qaeda after one year of war », SREEDHAR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 54.

⁶ « War on terrorism : the state of flux », major general (retired) Afsir KARIM in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 5.

⁷ « Le terroriste du vol Paris-Miami aurait des liens avec les réseaux islamistes », Eric LESER in « Le Monde », 27 December 2001, page 5.

« 3 sentenced in US for supporting Lashkar », in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 November 2003.

« Operation in Waziristan aided by US agencies », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

operatives are said to originate from Pakistan, according to American sources¹. Pakistani militants have been hunted out in France in December 2004².

Russia accuses Pakistan of harbouring Muslim extremists in humanitarian relief associations (like Al Rashid Trust Foundation), active in Chechnya and Kosovo³. Some terrorists operating in Dagestan have been trained in Pakistan⁴. In the beginning of March 2003, five men were arrested in Spain on suspicion of involvement in the attack against a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba in which twenty-one people died. Among the five one was a Pakistani⁵. Ten Pakistanis were also arrested in Spain in September 2004 for forged documents including credit cards, drug trafficking and links with terrorist organizations. They were transferring ill-gotten money to Pakistan for the Al Qaeda network⁶. An eleventh one Pakistani was arrested in November in the same country in November 2004⁷. In July 2004, ten Pakistanis were deported back to their country by Cyprus, on suspicion of belonging to the Al Qaeda network⁸. Ten Pakistanis have been detained in Latvia on 21 November 2003, being suspected to prepare an attack against a visiting Israeli basketball team⁹.

Terrorists responsible for the series of attacks during March 2004 in Tashkent and Bukhara had their base in Pakistan, according to the Uzbekistan President¹⁰. Two Pakistanis have been nabbed in Australia in April 2004, reportedly plotting terrorist acts¹¹. The suicide bombers who blasted two synagogues in Turkey in November 2003 had been trained in Pakistan in the 1990s, according to the Turkish police¹². Several other terrorists trained in

¹ « Al Qaeda seeking new recruits in Pakistan : report », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 October 2003.

² « Des réseaux islamistes pakistanais mis à jour en France », Jean CHICHIZOLA in « Le Figaro », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

³ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 17 February 2003.

⁴ « The global jihadi movement in Dagestan and Kashmir », major general (retired) Afsir KARIM in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 1999, page 8.

⁵ Mention of young people, in particular from France, trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan is made in the book « Le grand bazar », Bernard BRIGOULEIX and Bruno DELAMOTTE, éditions Michalon, janvier 2003, pages 152 and 153.

« Pakistanis held in Spain », in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 March 2003.

⁶ « 10 Pakistanis held in Spain », in « Dawn », internet edition, 16 September 2004.

« 10 Pakistanis held in Spain charged in fraud, drug », in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 September 2004.

« Pakistani suspects probe opens », in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 October 2004.

« Pakistanis held in Spain funded Al Qaeda », in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 November 2004.

⁷ « Pakistani held in Spain on terror charge », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

⁸ « Cyprus deports 10 Pakistani students for suspected terrorist activities », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 10 July 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 July 2004.

⁹ « Ten Pakistanis detained in Latvia for terrorist plot », in « Nation », Islamabad, 26 November 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 1 December 2003.

¹⁰ « Terrorists responsible for March 2004 attacks came from Pakistan, says President Karimov », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 30 April 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 3 May 2004.

¹¹ « Suspected Pakistani terrorist planned Sydney blackout bombing », in « Jang », 24 April 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 April 2004.

¹² « November 15 Turkish suicide bombers had trained in Pakistan », in « Rediff », 20 November 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 November 2003.

Pakistan were arrested in Turkey in spring 2004 while they prepared to launch an attack during the NATO summit planned for June 2004¹. One Pakistani suspect was detained end of August 2004 in Saudi Arabia².

In August 2003, 18 Pakistanis, mostly students, suspected to have links with Al Qaeda, have been arrested in Canada³. In the USA, one Pakistani was arrested on 20 July 2004, in possession of suspected documents⁴. An other Pakistani national was nabbed in the States end of August 2004⁵.

Links between the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a notorious Kashmiri outfit, and the Islamist groups fighting the Americans and their allies in Iraq have been proven⁶. The Lashkar-e-Toiba is said to have recruited up to 2,000 men for armed operations in that country⁷. Some of its Pakistani members have been arrested there⁸. Lashkar-e-Toiba affiliated members have not only operated in Iraq but also in the United Kingdom and the United States. Some terrorists involved in the London underground bombings on July 7, 2005 had visited some Lashkar facilities⁹.

In August 2003, eleven terror suspects from Bangladesh have been discovered and nabbed in Saudi Arabia¹⁰. In May and June 2004, five Bangladeshis, suspected to be members of Al Qaeda, have been arrested in Japan¹¹. In December 2003, sixteen Bangladeshis have been arrested in Bolivia, on suspicion of links to terrorism¹².

Till summer 2003, apparently, no Muslims from India, which has an Islamic community of almost 150 millions (as many and even more than Pakistan or Bangladesh), had ever been found involved in terrorist activities anywhere in the world. One Indian has been arrested in Canada, along with Pakistani, end of August 2003¹³. Two Indians were also taken into custody after the 11 March 2004 terrorist acts on trains in Madrid. Apparently, they are Hindus and thought to have provided, unwittingly as it seems, the terrorists with SIM cards which were used in the booby-trapped mobile telephones that triggered the

¹ « Suspected terrorists detained in Turkey were trained in Pakistan », in « Dawn », 5 May 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 10 May 2004.

² « Pakistani among 5 held in Saudi Arabia », in « Dawn », 30 August 2004.

³ « Diplomats seek release of Pakistanis in Canada », in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 August 2003.

⁴ « Pakistani held in US has videos », in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 August 2004.

⁵ « Pakistani, US nationals arrested », in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 August 2004.

⁶ « Riding the Jehadi tiger », Praveen SWAMI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, weekly published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 April 2004.

⁷ « Lashkar raising Islamist brigades for Iraq », Praveen SWAMI and Mohammad SHEHZAD in « The Hindu », internet edition, 13 June 2004.

⁸ « The Hindu », Chennai, 1 April 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 5 April 2004.

⁹ « The Lashkar-e-Taiba, in theory and practice », Praveen SWAMI, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 November 2005.

¹⁰ « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 August 2003.

¹¹ « Three Bangladeshi nationals arrested in Japan for suspected Al Qaeda links », « Daily Star », Dhaka, mentioned in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 31 May 2004.

« Japanese police arrest Bangladeshi national for suspected Al Qaeda links », « Daily Times », Lahore, mentioned in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 7 June 2004.

¹² « 16 Bangladeshis held in Bolivia over anti-US plot », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 December 2003.

¹³ « Pakistani held in Canada » in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 1 September 2003.

explosive devices¹. One UK Muslim from Indian origin, who received training in Pakistan and who was aware of the London bombings of summer 2005, has been arrested in Britain in October 2005².

Presence of foreign militants in South Asia

Muslim foreigners, mainly Arabs but also Chechens, Uzbeks, West Europeans (including British and French) as well as Americans participated in the fighting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, from 1979 till 1989. Some were trained ideologically in Pakistani madrassahs and militarily in Pakistani and Afghani camps, most of the time run by the Pakistani army. They had then the support of the United States. Quite a few remained in Afghanistan and in Pakistan after the departure of the Soviets and have been occasionally infiltrated in the Indian part of Kashmir to help the local militants. Arabs (Saudis, Emiratis, Egyptians, Yemenis, ...), Chechens, Uighurs, Uzbeks and other Central Asians are still active in Pakistan and Afghanistan along with Afghans and Pakistanis in the Taliban and Al Qaeda movements as shown by the killings and arrests in 2004 in the South-Waziristan tribal agency and in other agencies as well³. According to a statement made in October 2004 by the general commanding the army corps of Peshawar, the total number of foreign militants in the tribal areas could have been about one hundred, a figure which he estimated to have come down to 70-80 end of November 2004⁴.

Some Uighur militants had been located before in Pakistan. One of them, a leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, was killed on the Afghan border in October 2003⁵.

Recently, a significant number of foreign militants have been arrested in Pakistan. In September 2003, 13 Malaysian and 6 Indonesian students were taken into custody after being arrested in Karachi religious schools for suspected ties with extremist movements like Jamiah Islamia, active in South-East Asia. Checks have subsequently been done but apparently without any result in the International Islamic University of Islamabad where many foreigners are studying⁶. Among the terrorists arrested on 27 July 2004 in Pakistani Punjab, was one Tanzanian national, allegedly responsible for the bombings of the US

¹ « Madrid blasts : detention of Indians extended », Vaiju NARAVANE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 March 2004.

² « UK Muslim of Indian origin held for links with bombers », Arshad SHARIF in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 October 2005.

³ « Pakistan captures 100 foreign militants », B. Muralidhar REDDY in « The Hindu », internet edition, 21 March 2004.

« Militants be extradited », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

« Al Qaeda spy killed was a local operative, says ISPR », in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 March 2004.

« Fallout of the Wana operation », Khalid AZIZ in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

« Arab, two others arrested », in « Dawn », internet edition, 12 August 2004.

« Abductors killed in operation : one Chinese hostage rescued, other dead », Ismail KHAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 15 October 2004. This article mentions that among the abductors, three were Uzbeks affiliated to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

⁴ « Osama not in tribal area : Gen Safdar », Ismail KHAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 October 2004.

« Bases of terrorists along border busted : Safdar », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 November 2004.

⁵ « Chinese terrorist killed by Pakistan army », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 December 2003.

⁶ « Islamabad : IIU, agencies take foreigners record », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 September 2003. « Entering the ASEAN regional forum », Aileen QAISER in « Dawn », internet edition, 28 June 2004.

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania¹. On 16 August 2004, one citizen of Myanmar was arrested in Lahore². On 19 August 2004, an Iraqi national and an Algerian citizen, suspected to be Al Qaeda members, have been nabbed in Hayatabad, a posh suburb of Peshawar³. Two Egyptians said to be masterminds in a terrorist organization, presumably Al Qaeda, have been arrested at an unknown place in the second half of August 2004⁴. On 29 August 2004, one Egyptian citizen and one Saudi national were taken into custody in Quetta, for alleged links with Al Qaeda⁵. Close to Peshawar, a Saudi national was arrested, on 7 September⁶ and one Algerian on September 19, 2004⁷. In October 2004, two Arab members of Al Qaeda were apprehended ; one of them, a Yemeni caught in Lahore is supposed to be an important figure⁸. On November 2, 2004, two Al Qaeda suspects, including one Iraqi national, were rounded up in Quetta⁹. Two Tajik militating citizen have been arrested on November 23, 2004 in the Makin area of South-Waziristan¹⁰. One Chechen was caught in Quetta on November 29, 2004 after he had escaped from South-Waziristan with other compatriots¹¹. An other one was killed at Killi Paind Khan in Baluchistan on December 1, 2004¹².

Bangladesh may be harbouring Islamist extremists from South-East Asia¹³.

The ideologue of the movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has an Australian wife who, presumably, is an active militant herself.

Various international connections

Apart from Muslim ones, many South Asian militant groups had or have contacts with communities living in the European, American and Asian countries, more rarely with African countries. They are versed in using all the facilities offered in the Western countries for their own advantage, in all fields. Education is one of them. Collecting of funds is an other one. Granting of rehabilitation loans are discussed between governments but may involve some militant movements, directly or indirectly. The supplies of weapons are carried out from abroad. Mediation in negotiations is an other form of international involvement which includes governments as well as militant organizations.

Whatever the importance of the madrassahs as breeding-grounds of terrorists, the fact is that many leaders of the extremist organizations have been trained in Western higher

¹ « Al Qaeda terrorist wanted in 1998 US embassy bombings arrested in Gujarat », in « Daily News », Lahore, 30 July 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 2 August 2004.

² « Foreigner, Pakistani Al Qaeda suspects held », in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 August 2004.

³ « 2 Al Qaeda suspects held after car chase », Shafiq AHMAD in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

⁴ « Nine suspects being grilled : Rashid », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 August 2004.

⁵ « Two foreigners arrested for Al Qaeda links », Saleem SHAHID in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 September 2004.

⁶ « Saudi suspect held », in « Dawn », internet edition, 8 September 2004.

⁷ « Algerian among two held for Al Qaeda links », Shafiq AHMAD, in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 September 2004.

⁸ « Two Arabs Al Qaeda suspects arrested », in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 October 2004.

⁹ « Two Al Qaeda suspects held », in « Dawn », internet edition, 3 November 2004.

¹⁰ « Two Tajiks arrested in Waziristan », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 November 2004.

¹¹ « Chechen suspect held in Quetta », in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 November 2004.

¹² « Chechen suspect killed in encounter », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 December 2004.

¹³ « Top Jemaah Islamiyyah leader could be hiding in Bangladesh », in « Australian News », 27 September 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 September 2003.

study establishments, sometimes even in the most prestigious ones in the USA and UK¹.

Dubai is a financial hub for many extremist Islamist organizations. Most transactions go undetected because the hawala system, also called hundi, is commonly used instead of regular banking (it works as follows : a broker receives money in cash somewhere. An other broker, who is informed by the first one by any means, including carriers and couriers, and who is located close to the recipient, gives him the amount. The transaction is done on trust, without any record being done in bank). This traditional South Asian way is a paperless operation, leaving no trails, once the money has been delivered to the recipient. Kerala is one the most affected States in India for hawala transactions², probably because it has many Muslim as well as non-Muslim expatriates in the Middle East, specially in the United Arab Emirates. The Talibans and Al Qaeda use this system in Dubai³. Apart from Dubai, Nepal and even UK are also involved for transferring funds for Kashmiri organizations⁴.

The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has extended its support to revolutionary struggles in South Asia and beyond in the Philippines, Turkey and Peru⁵.

Several countries have been identified as weapons suppliers of South Asian insurgent movements. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union actively supported the Baluchi insurgents to weaken Pakistan, an ally of America⁶. Thereafter in the 1980s, when the Red Army invaded Afghanistan, it was also keen to support any militants within Pakistan but did not succeed. Among the supplying countries to the present South Asian insurgencies are to be found now Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and even Vietnam, belonging to South-East Asia⁷. For economic reasons without any political meaning, Thailand, through its arms market located around the Three Pagodas Pass, is a hub providing weapons to the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction), the United Liberation Front of Assam and to other South Asian insurgent groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam⁸.

Strangely enough, this country at the same time has the privilege to host various negotiations between South Asian governments and militants groups, particularly between the government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction) and between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Besides, Norway has been solicited to facilitate an agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil militants. Japan is also keen to become a mediator in the island conflict.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has surprisingly been asked by the African National Congress to assist it to get the vote of the Tamil community of South Africa but

¹ « *Qui a tué Daniel Pearl ?* », Bernard-Henri LÉVY, Grasset, Paris, 2003, pages 129 and 130. Information confirmed through discussions of the author of the present study with Pakistani politicians, generals and scholars.

² « Joint Task Force to track hawala transactions », G. ANAND, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 25 October 2004.

³ « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 10 February 2003.

« Inside Al Qaeda : global network of terror », Rohan GUNARATNA, Vanguard books, Lahore, 2003. Review of the book in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 July 2003.

⁴ « Govt looks to cut off terror funds », Bhavna VIJ-AURORA in « The Indian Express », 7 June 2004.

⁵ « Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

⁶ « Terrorism in South-Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 73.

⁷ « Thailand becomes less hospitable place for LTTE », Marwaan MACAN-MARKAR in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 11 November 2003.

⁸ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 44.

« Thailand becomes less hospitable place for LTTE », Marwaan MACAN-MARKAR in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 11 November 2003.

many criticisms have been expressed by South Asians living in the country¹.

So, State and non State actors happen to be present in international relations related to South Asian insurgencies and terrorism.

War against terrorism

At a time, when it suited their national interests, some foreign countries used the extremist organizations as proxies. The United States sponsored the Mujahideens, with the full understanding of the Pakistani government, and supported them in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet forces.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington had serious consequences in South Asia and its surroundings. The Americans identified Afghanistan as being the welcome territory of Bin Laden, the alleged conspirator of the attacks on United States. Moreover, apart from the possible but controversial involvement of the Pakistani air force in the training of the suicide pilots (see above), an other reason has also been made public : some Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, possibly even under instructions of the Inter-Services Intelligence, played a major role in financing the terrorist attacks on the American soil².

A full-fledged war against terrorism has been launched by the USA, followed by most of the countries and the international government organizations.

Bilateral cooperation between India and countries outside of South Asia

India immediately expressed its readiness to join the alliance against terrorism. It signed several extradition agreements, particularly with France in January 2003, with Poland in February 2003, with Tajikistan in November 2003³, with Philippines in March 2004 and with Kuwait in August 2004⁴. Although an agreement was concluded with the United Arab Emirates in 1999, it does not work well because of the reluctance of Dubai⁵. However, several Sikh and Islamic militants have been sent back to India from Dubai⁶. An extradition treaty

¹ « LTTE to assist ANC in campaign for Indians », release of PTI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 9 February 2004.

² « Funds traced to Pakistan, FBI, US landmarks », Anwar IQBAL in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 August 2003.

« U. S. covering up Pakistan's September 11 connection ? », Michael MEACHER in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 July 2004.

³ « India, Tajikistan to set up JWG on counter-terrorism », Amit BARUAH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 November 2003.

⁴ « India, Kuwait sign trade, extradition agreements », in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 August 2004.

⁵ « L'Inde exclut une reprise du dialogue avec le Pakistan », Erich INCIYAN and Bruno PHILIP in « Le Monde », 26-27 January 2003, page 4.

« Extradition treaty signed with Poland », « The Hindu », Chennai, 18 February 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 February 2003.

« India, Philippines sign extradition treaty », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 14 March 2004.

⁶ « The smoking gun », Dilip BOBB and Raju SANTHANAM, in « India today », 30 September 1984.

« Extraditions : flight to freedom ? », Saji CHERIAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

and a mutual legal assistance treaty in criminal matters is under discussion with Jordan¹. In October 2004, India and South Korea signed a treaty on extradition and agreed to exchange information in the security field including terrorism. The coast-guards and the navies of the two countries as well as the intelligence agencies will cooperate in areas like anti-piracy². India and USA have also signed an extradition agreement³. Portugal extradite India's wanted men, particularly those responsible for the March 1993 Mumbai blasts, even without any treaty⁴.

The intelligence services of India (Research and Analysis Wing) and Israel (Mossad) work together, especially in the struggle against Muslim extremist organizations. Following an Israeli tip-off, a mopping up operation was launched in the beginning of November 2004 by the Indian army in Laddakh to find out Osama Bin Laden supposed to have infiltrated there. Israelis are also said to give assistance in training Indian covert operatives for missions within the Pakistani territory. Israel is said to have its own covert agents intertwined with the US diplomatic mission in Pakistan⁵. India imports Israeli drones⁶ which may be used in conventional war but also to search for insurgents and terrorists.

A joint working group has been set up by India and Turkey to combat global terrorism⁷. Contacts are established with the almost neighbouring Central Asian States, particularly Kyrgyzstan⁸. A joint working group on counter-terrorism has been established with Tajikistan⁹.

Myanmar adjacent to South Asia is a most useful partner for India in the struggle against terrorism and insurgencies. Indian militants have links with the Chins and Kachins¹⁰ whose areas are not fully and permanently controlled by the Myanmar security forces. The last official joint operation by the Indian and Myanmar forces was carried out in April-May 1995 ; it was successful, resulting in recovery of a huge quantity of weapons and ammunition apart from killing militants¹¹. Media reports have mentioned a common attack against the Naga insurgents in the Konyak region of Myanmar, in 2001¹². Time and again, the Indian security forces have penetrated into uncontrolled areas of the neighbouring country in hot pursuit of militants and to destroy hideouts¹³, without any approval and possibly even

¹ « Extradition treaty », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 June 2004.

² « India, South Korea to study economic ties », Amit BARUAH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 October 2004.

³ « Extradition pact inked with US » in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 26 September 2003.

⁴ « Portugal to extradite Abu Salem to India » in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 6 February 2004.

⁵ « Japan and the sub-continent », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 August 2004.

« Over 70 terrorist camps operating in India », Tariq SAEEDI in « Times.com.pk », 14 August 2003.

« More Indian troops being rushed to track Osama in Laddakh region », Arun RAJNATH in « South Asia Tribune », webnewspaper, 5 November 2004, available on website www.satribune.com.

⁶ « India to get Israeli drones », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 November 2004.

⁷ « India, Turkey set up JWG on terrorism », Harish KHARE in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 September 2003.

⁸ « India offers defence help to Kyrgyzstan », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 November 2003.

⁹ « India, Tajikistan to set up JWG on counter-terrorism », Amit BARUAH in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 November 2003.

¹⁰ « India's welcome for Myanmar leader incenses dissidents », Surendra PHUYAL and Sonny INBARAJ, in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 October 2004.

¹¹ « Counter terror operations. Limitations to security forces », Mallika A. JOSEPH, research paper of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, January 2004.

¹² « The Shiliguri corridor. Question mark on security », Pinaki BHATTACHARYA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 114.

¹³ « Threat from within. India's internal security environment », lieutenant-general (retired) V. K. NAYAR, Lancer publishers, New Delhi, 1992, page 225.

knowledge of the Myanmar government. New Delhi wanted to cooperate again with Yangon (formerly called Rangoon) to flush out the militants from several States of the North-East, particularly now from Manipur, but was dissuaded to do so for fear of being accused of sympathy with the military regime, set up in 1988. A change of regime was welcome for that reason too¹. Despite these restraints a “memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues” was signed on October 25, 2004 during the controversial visit in New Delhi of the Chairman of the Myanmar State Peace and Development Council. It covers the struggle against terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, organized crime and even cyber-crime². Contacts never stopped between the two armies, even locally, but there was no current real cooperation nor any project of a common operation³. Normally, Myanmar’s army carries out a kind of annual jungle “bashing” in the Naga Hills to clear out the anti-India separatist camps⁴. A new cooperation is on as could be seen during a major strike of the Indian army in Manipur at the beginning of November 2004 to destroy camps of the United National Liberation Front, the People’s Liberation Army and other smaller groups. At the same time, the Myanmar army sealed the border to prevent any militants crossing over⁵. However, most probably, it could not totally deny the insurgents access across a 358 km long and porous frontier with Manipur⁶.

India cooperates also with Hungary directly and through the American Federal Bureau of Investigation which has funded an International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest.

A memorandum of understanding on terrorism has been signed with Australia in August 2003 ; it provides for the establishment of a joint working group⁷. India and Indonesia have agreed to exchange information and envisage joint patrols in the Andaman Sea, where they have a common maritime border, to combat arms smuggling, drug trafficking and terrorism and consolidate maritime security⁸. Singapore, although similarly committed to fight terrorism, considers for the moment that the Commonwealth framework is sufficient since it provides a mechanism for extradition but does not exclude however a bilateral extradition treaty⁹.

Anti-piracy exercises are being organized by India and Japan¹⁰. The fifth one was carried out in the Arabian Sea beginning of November 2004 in cooperation with the Piracy Reporting Centre at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and with the presence of Malaysian and

¹ « Manipur », article of Pradip PHANJOURBAM in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 June 2004.

² « Myanmar to act against anti-India groups », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 October 2004.

³ « Cross-border challenges », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « Frontline », Chennai, 3-16 July 2004.

⁴ « Bhutan’s tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 55.

⁵ « Army begins attacks on Manipur rebels », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 November 2004.

⁶ « Manipur : yet another “final” assault », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 8 November 2004.

⁷ « India, Australia sign MoU on terrorism », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 August 2003.

⁸ « India, Indonesia agree on anti-terror measures », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 September 2003.

« India-ASEAN relations taking on a new dimension : Manmohan », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 November 2004.

⁹ « Economic, defence cooperation between India, Singapore vital », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 January 2004. Reference is made to the Commonwealth Central Committee on Terrorism (see « Countering terror », Rajeev DHAVAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 September 2004).

¹⁰ « India-Japan coast guards exercises begin », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 September 2003.

Vietnamese observers. In a way, it was a replay of a real event in which the Indian coastguards and navy caught pirates who had hijacked a Japanese vessel in October 1999¹. A joint working group on counter-terrorism will be set up by the two countries².

India actively cooperates with Russia, both countries condemning Islamist terrorism³. India harboured resentment against the USA which through Pakistan helped the Mujahideens to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. In doing so, the Americans downplayed and even disregarded the Pakistani support to the Kashmiris militants operating in Jammu and Kashmir even after the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan⁴. Gone also is the time of the 1950s when the Americans supported the Naga insurgency with the aim of creating a large State in the whole North-East of South Asia which would have given a full autonomy to some minorities, like the Nagas and the Mizos⁵. Actually the British were also at that time sympathetic to the Nagas who during the second world war had collaborated with them to stop the Japanese forces near Kohima⁶. India has now become a necessary ally for the USA, at least in the long run, because it is a democracy and because both countries suffer from terrorism. A bilateral treaty has been signed in October 2002 to help in investigating international crime⁷. A joint working group to fight terrorism had been established as soon as 2000 and holds regular meetings. Sophisticated equipment like motion sensors, thermal imaging devices and alarms have been acquired from the United States and Israel to make the fence on the international border with Pakistan and on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir more efficient⁸. To avoid any piracy acts, India is providing naval escorts for some American ships sailing through the Straits of Malacca, under an agreement between New Delhi and Washington, with the approval of the three littoral States concerned, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia⁹.

Despite this cooperation, New Delhi has voiced concern over the withholding of terrorism-related information by the United States and UK. The Indian intelligence agencies believe that the American possess data about the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 from Kathmandu and but are reluctant to hand them over. They complain not to have received any material after the arrest on July 13, 2004 in Pakistan of a double agent working for the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence as well as for the United States Federal Bureau

¹ « India, Japan conduct anti-piracy exercise », Arunkumar BHATT in « The Hindu », internet edition, 5 November 2004.

² « Japan and the sub-continent », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 August 2004.

³ « India, Russia for greater effort against terrorism », Vladimir RADYUHIN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 September 2003.

« Russia and India sign joint declaration against terrorism », article in « The Hindu », 13 November 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 17 November 2003.

⁴ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, Harper Collins publishers, New Delhi, 1995, pages 165 and 166.

⁵ « Naga imbroglio », Manan DWIVEDI, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 111.

⁶ « Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, page 274.

⁷ « South Asia security : a US perspective », Mary Ann PETERS, Ambassador to Bangladesh, lecture in the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 1 July 2003.

⁸ « Kashmir fence buoys Indian army ; militants undeterred », Y. P. RAJESH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 July 2004.

⁹ « India to be sounded on Malacca Straits security », P. S. SURYANARAYANA, in « The Hindu », internet edition, Chennai, 29 August 2004.

of Investigation and the subsequent arrests of terrorists in London. The double agent is said to have established contact with operatives in several countries including Bangladesh and India. The American intelligence agencies operate officially in Pakistan and most probably pick up a lot of communications intelligence, including on the Jihadi groups active in Kashmir. One explanation is given for the silence of the US : they do not want to be suspected by the Pakistanis to give information to India. Discontent has been increased also by the defection of a RAW official to the US beginning of 2004¹.

The USA want to prevent any war between India and Pakistan, which would force Pakistan to decrease its forces on the Afghan border and therefore divert it from fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorisms. But they cannot convince India to accept an international monitoring of infiltrations of militants from the Pakistani side across the Line of Control in Kashmir.

New Delhi refuses any kind of internationalisation of the Kashmiri issue². Since 1972, it even prevents the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), operating since 1949, to monitor the incidents on the spots on its side of the Line of Control. The mission of UNMOGIP is limited to keep tabs on exchanges of fire across the Line of Control and in no way to register infiltrations and exfiltrations of militants.

Bilateral cooperation between Pakistan and countries outside of South Asia

In the short term and because of its geographical situation, Pakistan is more useful than India for the Americans, despite the fact that its responsibilities are allegedly established by the USA in the nuclear proliferation and the spread of terrorism in South Asia and even beyond, including possibly the preparation of the 11 September 2001 event. The first time Pakistan assumed a strategic importance was when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979. It kept its position till their departure in 1989. It has become, once again, a frontline country indispensable for the Americans to pursue their annihilation of the remaining Talibans and militants of Al Qaeda, who took refuge in the bordering areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Willy-nilly, President MUSHARRAF had to climb on the bandwagon. The military intervention of the United States in Afghanistan in October 2001 against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda movement, mainly through air strikes, necessitated the Pakistani active cooperation to check and arrest possible fugitives. The subsequent presence of American and other foreign troops in Afghanistan continues to make it a must.

A joint working group on counter terrorism (JWGCT) has been established in May 2002³. Ground and air bases (four airstrips altogether) were put at the disposal of American units⁴. Other outlying airfields temporarily come under the order of US forces if needs be, for

¹ « Why was the terror intelligence withheld ? » Praveen SWAMI, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 20 August 2004.

² « A chance to avert war over Kashmir », Arun A. SWAMY in « International Herald Tribune », 8-9 June 2002.

³ « Anti-terrorism fight ; Pakistan US talks next week », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 April 2003.

⁴ The four airbases are located at Khuzdar, Dalbandin and Zhob in Baluchistan and at Jacobabad, in Sindh, on the border with Baluchistan. The last one is called Shahbaz air base.

« Al Qaeda hunters' focus narrows », in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 March 2003.

A press release of AP/AFP, 3 October 2004 and the article « US spy drone crashes », in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 October 2004 mention that the Shahbaz air base at Jacobabad is used by unmanned spy planes.

« Fokker flight operations », letter of Doctor Mansoor Akbar KUNDI in « Dawn », internet edition, 9 October 2004.

instance in the North-West Frontier Province¹. The Pasni harbour, on the Makran coast of Baluchistan, was also used by the American units to land heavy equipment and units of the Marine Corps for the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. American special forces are posted in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan². Altogether, the strength of the US soldiers present in Pakistan in August 2004 was estimated at 619 by an American source³ but obviously it varies according to circumstances⁴. Furthermore, civilians working for military units and intelligence agencies have to be added to that number. According to the Asian Development Bank, 97 millions dollars are paid every month by the USA to Pakistan for logistical support⁵ to which should be added an unknown but important amount to finance operations in the tribal areas⁶.

A cooperation is going on between the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Pakistan intelligence agencies, army and police to search for hidden Al Qaeda terrorists who have escaped the bombings in Afghanistan and have fled to the bordering tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province and to Baluchistan and dispersed in the other provinces as well. FBI seems to have detention camps inside Pakistani military facilities, for instance in the Kohat air base, in the North-West Frontier Province, close to the tribal areas⁷. Americans have deployed electronic surveillance devices in the country, particularly in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. A technical help is provided to modernize the specialized agencies⁸ and create other ones like the Special Investigation Group (SIG) to track down terrorists and investigate acts of terrorism⁹.

US technical and financial aid is granted to set up a Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), to be operational in 2005. The Torkham frontier post in the Khyber agency has been equipped in November 2004. Thanks to iris scanning, finger printing and electronic recording of documents, this system will enhance the capability of the Federal Investigation Agency to prevent illegal crossings at the main twenty

¹ « Fallout of the Wana operation », Khalid AZIZ in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

² « India and Pakistan : u-turns and pitfalls », Ashok KAPUR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 27.

³ « US troops », letter of Bazlur SURVERY in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 October 2004. The author of the letter, living in Canada, refers to the US News and World Report (August 30, 2004).

⁴ « Most US troops leave Jacobabad », in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 November 2004. This article mentions that a few troops were now staying at the Shahbaz air base.

« US troops leave Jacobabad today », in « Dawn », internet edition, 20 November 2004. This article mentions that sensitive instruments stay at the Shahbaz air base.

⁵ « Pakistan will join 7-nation naval force : monitoring of Arabian Sea », Arshad SHARIF, in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

⁶ « Anti-terror war pushes defence spending up », in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 March 2004.

Information initially given in « The Washington Post », 6 August 2004 and reproduced in the article « Operation in Waziristan aided by US agencies », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

⁷ « Rocket hits building at Kohat PAF base », Abdul Sami PARACHA, in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 July 2004.

⁸ « Link US roadmap for Pakistan promises cut in Musharraf's power », Shaheen SEHBAI in « South Asia Tribune », webnewspaper, 25-31 May 2003, available on website www.satribune.com.

The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) receives technical help to monitor entries into the country. A new sophisticated system is being deployed with the assistance of USA. See « Hi-tech border monitoring system to be set up », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 September 2003.

« US to provide \$ 50m border security equipment », in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 May 2003.

« Descent into anarchy », M. Ilyas KHAN in « Herald », monthly, Karachi, March 2004.

⁹ « Raising new force to combat terror », in « Dawn », internet edition, rubric « Latest news », 20 August 2003.

« Pakistan to raise a new anti-terrorism force », in « Dawn », internet edition, rubric « Top stories », 21 August 2003.

air, sea, road and railway entry/exit points of the country (including the five major airports viz Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta)¹. The Transaction Tracking Server (TTS), installed in the international airports of Karachi and Islamabad, since December 2001, monitors all the international passengers. It is connected with the FBI databank².

The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is also involved in the search of extremists. American specialists are operating in Pakistan, including in the tribal areas particularly for satellite and drone surveillance and electronic eavesdropping. They gather and process electronic intercepts through computerized identification systems of the National Security Agency (NSA)³. A joint Document Exploitation Group checks internet traffic⁴. Simultaneously, efforts are being done to improve the identification of people in the country as a whole through the army-managed National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) which has acquired a French designed Automatic Finger Print Identification System (AFIS)⁵.

So far, more than 500 Al Qaeda men, Pakistanis but also foreigners of various nationalities, have been handed over to US, including some leaders.

More than 70,000 men of the army and paramilitary forces have been deployed along the Afghan border to check infiltration of Al Qaeda and also Taliban members⁶ who are supposed to hide and shelter on Pakistani side and strike American, allied and Afghan forces on the other side. Important operations to find out foreign militants (numbering 500 to 600) and local supporters and insurgents have been launched by military and paramilitary units (about 10,000 men for the former and 3,500 for the latter) beginning 2004 in the South-Waziristan agency⁷. Combined operations on the border areas have been carried out by Afghan and American troops on one side and Pakistani troops on the other side since end of 2001. Incidents happen like the unfortunate killing in August 2003 by US forces of two Pakistani soldiers in the North-Waziristan tribal area⁸. Direct clashes do also happen between the Afghan army and the Pakistani forces, without any American involvement⁹. Some intrusions of American helicopters have happened, deliberately or not, at least in

¹ « Hi-tech border monitoring system to be set up », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 September 2003.

« Pakistan-US project to monitor e-traffic », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 September 2004.

« New system at Torkham to curb terrorism », in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 November 2004.

² « Getting connected », Amir Mir in « Herald », monthly, internet edition, Karachi, 9 February 2004.

³ « Musharraf warns against failure of Wana operation », Zulfikar ALI in « Dawn », internet edition, 16 March 2004.

« American technology helping hunt for Al Qaeda men », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

Information initially given in « The Washington Post », 6 August 2004 and reproduced in the article « Operation in Waziristan aided by US agencies », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

⁴ « Pakistan-US project to monitor e-traffic », in « Dawn », internet edition, 6 September 2004.

⁵ « New system to check finger prints installed », in « Dawn », internet edition, 8 September 2004.

⁶ « Major Qaeda catch in Sept. 11 manhunt », Erik ECKHOLM in « The New York Times » and reproduced in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 3 March 2003.

« 480 Al Qaeda men handed over to US », Qudssia AKHLAQUE in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 March 2003.

⁷ « Musharraf warns against failure of Wana operation », Zulfikar ALI in « Dawn », internet edition, 16 March 2004.

« Amnesty offer to foreigners renewed : more troops sent to South Waziristan », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 April 2004.

⁸ « 2 Pakistani soldiers killed in US firing : strong protest lodged », Ismael KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 12 August 2003.

⁹ « Rockets fired into Mohmand Agency from Afghanistan », Shafiq AHMAD in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

North-Waziristan¹. Ground penetrations of allied forces also occur in the same agency². Small American units from Joint Task Force 121 operating in Afghanistan have been conducting cross-border operations³. Commandos from an other Task Force bearing the number 5 and including some members of the Central Intelligence Agency went also into action along the border at least in early 2002⁴.

Pakistan has joined a UK-led seven-nation naval force in the Arabian Sea to intercept possible Al Qaeda and Taliban members trying to escape through its territorial waters and open sea⁵. Arrests on 13 July 2004 of Al Qaeda members in Pakistan have led to further important arrests in UK, a pointer of improving relations between intelligence agencies⁶.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan like India, is keen to conclude various agreements, including extradition treaties, to show its determination to fight terrorism. Islamabad has accepted the assistance of the European Community to build counter terrorism capacities. Germany and Britain have offered financial and technical aid. France is collaborating with Pakistan to set up forensic laboratories. Cooperation between the two countries is increased to fight cyber crimes, drug trafficking and smuggling⁷. Pakistan cooperates with Indonesia⁸. On 20 January 2004, Pakistan and Turkey agreed to enhance cooperation on terrorism and organized crime⁹. Japan recognizes the role Pakistan now plays against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction but no joint working group seems to have been created¹⁰.

Extradition treaties have been signed with China in 2003¹¹, Algeria in March 2003¹², USA on 28 July 2003¹³ and the United Arab Emirates in March 2004¹⁴. Some Al Qaeda operatives, and particularly one linked with two assassination attempts on President MUSHARRAF, have been arrested in Dubai and handed over to Pakistan. No extradition treaty has seemingly been signed with Uzbekistan, despite the presence in the Pakistani tribal areas of Uzbek militants¹⁵ and with other Central Asian countries whose nationals are also to be found among the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province¹⁶. The extradition agreement

¹ « US helicopters bomb tribal area : 3 injured », in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 March 2004.

² « Allied troops intrude into Pakistani territory », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 September 2004.

³ « American technology helping hunt for Al Qaeda men », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

⁴ « CIA searching for Osama on western border : report », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 October 2004.

⁵ « Pakistan will join 7-nation naval force : monitoring of Arabian Sea », Arshad SHARIF, in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

⁶ « Al-Qaïda multiplie les menaces face à une lutte antiterroriste efficace », AFP release in « Le Figaro », internet edition, 7 July 2004.

⁷ « Four countries offer help to fight terrorism », Syed Irfan RAZA and Ihtashamul HAQ in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 September 2003.

« Pakistan, France agree on zestful cooperation in fighting terrorism », M. Ali KHAN, on « www.timespk.com », 7 September 2003.

« MoU to be signed with France », in « Dawn », internet edition, 8 September 2003.

⁸ « Entering the ASEAN regional forum », Aileen QAISER in « Dawn », internet edition, 28 June 2004.

⁹ « Anti-terrorism accord signed : Pakistan-Turkey talks focus on defence cooperation, trade », release of APP in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 January 2004.

¹⁰ « Japan and the sub-continent », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 August 2004.

¹¹ «Pakistan, China to hold talks on security issues », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 July 2004.

¹² « Extradition treaty inked with Algeria » in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 March 2003.

¹³ « Extradition pact inked with US » in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 September 2003.

¹⁴ « Extradition treaty with UAE inked », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 9 March 2004.

¹⁵ «Militants be extradited », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

¹⁶ « Fallout of the Wana operation », Khalid AZIZ in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

with USA allows the two countries to get out of the purview of the International Criminal Court, as the Americans wanted.

Internal difficulties in Pakistan to fight extremism

As a consequence of major army and air force operations in March 2004 and later on in the South-Waziristan agency, the local population which suffers heavily because of collateral damages has started to react. Some attacks of army and paramilitary posts and headquarters and ambushes of convoys have occurred in that tribal agency and in other agencies as well, particularly in North-Waziristan, Kurram and Khyber agencies but also in the Mohmand agency. Sabotage activities have been carried out¹. Paramilitary and military facilities are attacked also outside of the tribal areas, in settled areas of the North-West Frontier Province². Peshawar itself, the capital city of the province, has been hit by rockets³. Members of international organizations have even been kidnapped⁴.

In the South-Waziristan operations of beginning 2004, the most important ever launched in the tribal areas since independence, more than 60 terrorists have been killed and about 170 suspects arrested. Some foreigners are included in those numbers. But the toll in the security forces is heavy, 50 at least killed end of March 2004 and many more injured⁵. Fighting has not stopped in South-Waziristan and the toll of victims is increasing week after week. At the end of September 2004, the army death toll has crossed 100 mark in South-Waziristan alone. Other sources mention the number of 170 killed soldiers end of October 2004. The figure of losses is higher if paramilitary forces are included⁶. Number of casualties of security forces has been said to be 202 at the end of November 2004⁷. So the situation in

¹ « Fallout of the Wana operation », Khalid AZIZ in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

² « Rocket hits building at Kohat PAF base », Abdul Sami PARACHA, in « Dawn », internet edition, 10 July 2004.

³ « Landi Kotal : army man kidnapped », in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 March 2004.

« Rockets fired at military checkpoint : more troops sent to South-Waziristan », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 March 2004.

« 14 paramilitary troops among 38 killed in Wana : militants seek exchange of captives », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 March 2004.

« Descent into anarchy », M. Ilyas KHAN in « Herald », monthly, Karachi, March 2004.

« 12 troops die as army convoy is ambushed », in « Dawn », internet edition, 23 March 2004.

« Relatively quiet day at Wana : casualties in Kurram, Bannu. Four rockets hit Peshawar », Ismail KHAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 March 2004.

« Troops, tribesmen exchange fire : convoy attacked in North-Waziristan », Pazir GUL, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 April 2004.

« Three die in South-Waziristan action », Ismail KHAN and Dilawar KHAN WAZIR, in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 June 2004.

« Troops launch offensive against Al Qaeda hideout », in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 June 2004.

⁴ « UN agencies suspend work in South-Waziristan », in « Dawn », internet edition, 21 July 2004.

⁵ « Operation ends in Kaloosha : militants release 11 hostages », Zulfiqar ALLI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 March 2004.

« Al Qaeda chief spy among dead : 166 captured in operation - ISPR », Hasan AKHTAR, in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 March 2004.

⁶ « Army death toll crosses 100 mark : South Waziristan operation », Zulfiqar ALLI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 October 2004.

« 8 troops die in Wana landmine explosions », Dilawar KHAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 November 2004.

⁷ « Bases of terrorists along border busted : Safdar », Ismail KHAN in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 November 2004.

the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province is deteriorating.

In summer 2004, the participation of some American and British forces in the operations carried out in the tribal areas, particularly in South-Waziristan, has been claimed and condemned by the local Pashtoon militants, who, at the same time, deny the presence of any foreigners in their ranks although the government mentions that almost 150 foreign combatants have been killed. The tribal rebel leader in that agency asserts that they will continue their fighting against the security forces as long as Americans and British will be present¹. A civil war is brewing up in the tribal areas.

The fighting against the extremists is being somewhat hampered by the border dispute. Kabul claims that the so-called Durand Line, established during the British colonial era, in 1893, was valid only for 100 years and that therefore a new negotiation should start². This line defines a pure artificial and nebulous frontier, with the same tribes living on both sides and even with some villages divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The location of some madrassahs remains uncertain, in between the two countries, particularly in the area of Chaman, in Baluchistan³. Altogether the frontier between the two countries is about 2,500 km long (of which 1,200 km, a little bit less than half, with Baluchistan and 1,300 km, a little more than half with the North-West Frontier Province proper and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas).

Shops in the tribal areas are littered with jihadi material like video compact discs, audio tapes and pamphlets. Some sectarian organizations have even set up their own frequency module radio stations illegally which are used not only to impart religious education but also to fan sectarianism. To counter the militant propaganda, several government radio and even television broadcast stations have been constructed and activated to cover the tribal areas, up to the border, possibly with an American help, although it is denied by USAID⁴.

According to the collective responsibility which applies in their territory, the tribes are obliged to pay fines whenever posts are attacked⁵. More and more permanent army posts are established in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The tribals have no choice other than to accept the increasing grip of the federal institutions. To make this presence more acceptable to the local population, a politics of pacification is being applied. The army has launched a massive programme to build new roads, schools, dispensaries and hospitals. This comes in addition to civilian programmes, like a road project to directly connect the seven tribal areas from Wana in South-Waziristan till Khar in the Bajaur agency⁶. Obviously, apart from the social and economic advantages of such an axis, there would be political benefits in contributing to the integration of the tribal areas between themselves as well as with other parts of Pakistan. Furthermore, the strategic and tactical mobility of the security forces will

¹ « Attacks on forces will go on, warn militants », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

« Army death toll crosses 100 mark : South Waziristan operation », Zulfiqar ALI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 4 October 2004.

² « America feels entangled in Durand Line dispute », in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 29 August 2003. The Taliban regime in Kabul was the only one which recognized the Durand Line as a frontier.

³ « The Taliban rises again », Syed Saleem SHAHZAD in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 September 2003.

⁴ « Electronic media to see growth along border », Zulfiqar ALI in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 September 2004.

« Landi Kotal : five FM stations operating illegally in Khyber Agency », Ibrahim SHINWARI in « Dawn », 2 December 2004.

⁵ « Tribesmen allow army posts in Shakai », Dilawar KHAN WAZIR, in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

⁶ « Peshawar : FATA road project to cost Rs 4.79 bn », in « Dawn », internet edition, 2 July 2004.

be increased. They will more easily move from an agency to an other one to face any emergency. On the other side, the maliks, the traditional tribal chiefs, are generally reluctant because any step towards integration reduces their power.

So far, the Pashtoon tribes living in the North of Baluchistan, the other Western province of Pakistan, through which terrorists from South-Waziristan may escape, remain loyal and quiet¹. However the discovery in Pashtoon inhabited areas of Baluchistan of some dumps of rockets, mortar shells and hand grenades, smuggled from Afghanistan, are not good omens². In other parts of Baluchistan, where terrorist acts have happened like in Gwadar on the Makran coast, Turbat and Khuzdar, the operations carried out by the security forces, including the army, are strongly resented³. Operations were also underway in August 2004 in Kohlu and Dera Bugti. That may be portents of Baluchistan becoming a staging post for Islamist extremists, although the resistance in the province is so far explained by pure nationalistic Baluchi feelings. It may be directed not only against the federal power but also against the Americans, who are present in the province. Some Al Qaeda operatives may have relocated there due to the military operations in the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province. Anyway, a substantial number of Jihadis has been present in Baluchistan for quite a long time. The setting up of new cantonments like in Dera Bugti, Sui, Kohlu and Gwadar areas is resisted but still goes on⁴. Islamabad wants progressively to convert the so-called B areas of Baluchistan, which are controlled by tribal chiefs (receiving the entire income) and represent 95% of the province, into A areas placed under normal administration⁵. So, like in the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province, an integration process is on, taking advantage of the struggle against terrorism.

Other parts of Pakistan are likely to receive militants, including foreigners, after they are chased out of South-Waziristan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a whole. Malakand and the Swat valley, two regions of the North-West Frontier Province which are already known for their extremist postures, may be a future refuge for them⁶.

The pro-American stance taken by President MUSHARRAF, who banned the most extremist organizations, has antagonized a large part of the population which for the first time since independence has in the October 2002 elections given a large amount of votes to the extremist Islamist parties. They now constitute a force to be reckoned with at the national level in the Parliament. They are also ruling the North-West Frontier Province and participate in the coalition in power in Baluchistan. So the task of pursuing the extremist militants of both Al Qaeda and Taliban organizations has been complicated, even if the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are administered by the Federal government and not by the North-West Frontier Province. This is a perfect example of consequences of terrorism in the political field. In fact, several disbanded Islamic extremist organizations re-emerged under different names before being banned again. It remains to be seen if they have really stopped

¹ « Zhob tribal elders assure government of cooperation », in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 March 2004.

² « Ammunition seized in Zhob », in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 September 2004.

³ « Army operation criticized », in « Dawn », internet edition, 29 July 2004.

« 5 soldiers, civilian killed in Khuzdar », Azizullah KHAN, in « Daily Times », internet edition, 2 August 2004.

⁴ « Balochistan PA opposes setting up of cantonments », in « Dawn », internet edition, 24 September 2003.

« Balochistan : a rising insurgency », Kanchan LAKSHMAN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 9 August 2004.

⁵ Excerpts from President Pervez MUSHARRAF's opening remarks at his Dawn panel interview, in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 August 2004.

⁶ « Militants find new sanctuaries » Qudssia AKHLAQUE, in « Dawn », internet edition, 11 December 2004.

to operate. They seem to have just reduced their activities¹.

Many analysts say that in fact the President provides only partial support for anti-terrorism operations² because, according to Indian and American sources, he does not want and anyway is unable for domestic policy reasons to give up the struggle against India in Kashmir³. His determination appears strong only when he deals with domestic sectarian terrorism, that means against extremist Sunni and Shia organizations. The only chance for him not to antagonize too much the religious political parties is to grant the extremist movements operating beyond the border and Line of Control the outlet for free actions in the Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, the unresolved Kashmir issue allows the military to have an important budget and keep their control on the country. The army is also infiltrated by extremists⁴ and time and again some military are arrested for their links with militant organizations, including Al Qaeda⁵. According to Indian sources, militant training camps have been re-opened end of spring 2004 in Azad Kashmir and in the Northern Areas. The American press mentions the existence of training camps in Pakistan adding that some of the Pakistan-trained terrorists are sent to the US where they join dormant cells, waiting to be activated at any moment⁶. In the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, the solidarity between Pashtoons on both sides of the frontier, who very rarely betray each other, and the reluctance of some field intelligence staff to cooperate with the Americans explain how the Taliban and Al Qaeda members can move from one place to an other one without being arrested. They are actually free to move anywhere in Pakistan⁷. Furthermore, the government has not regulated the madrassahs to include secular subjects, mainly because it wants to remain on good terms with the extremist Islamist groups⁸. The banned organizations resurface in a way or another, their leaders may even be elected members of Parliament. Radical Islam and army need each other⁹. However, the various failed attempts to assassinate President MUSHARRAF may finally convince him that playing double game will not work.

The Americans are aware of this ambiguity but insist however that infiltrations of Mujahideens from Pakistan and from Pakistani Kashmir into Indian Kashmir should stop. They hardly believe President MUSHARRAF when he pretends, to reassure Washington, that

¹ « Kashmir : learning from the past », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 4 December 2003, pages 18, 19.

« Lashkar still has its way in Pakistan », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 April 2004.

² « Islamabad still helps Taliban : US senators », in « Dawn », internet edition, 15 February 2003.

« Policy Analysis », n° 472, 5 March 2003, Subodh ATAL, published by the Cato Institute, Washington.

³ « Unfulfilled promises : Pakistan's failure to tackle extremism », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels; 16 January 2004, page 13.

⁴ « Power struggle after Musharraf will be fierce : Ahmed Rashid », interview by Sharmeen OBAID, on the website « satribune.com », 3 April 2004.

⁵ « 20 army officers face probe : links with Al Qaeda » in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 September 2003.

« Restructuring Pakistan. A global imperative », major general (rtd) Vinod SAIGHAL, Manas publications, New Delhi, 2003, page 57.

⁶ « Pakistan-trained Islamic radicals being sneaked into US : report », Sridhar KHRISHNASWAMI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 11 February 2004, quoting an article from « The Washington Times ».

« Terrorist training camps in Pakistan re-opened, indicates report », in « Daily Excelsior », Srinagar, 21 June 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 June 2004.

⁷ « Stalemate in Afghanistan », T. SREEDHAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 31 May 2003.

⁸ « Unfulfilled promises : Pakistan's failure to tackle extremism », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 16 January 2004, pages 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11.

« Government not doing enough about madrassahs », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 14 June 2004.

⁹ « Writing on the wall », editorial of Najam SETHI in « The Friday Times », Lahore, 21 November 2003.

he tries and curbs infiltrations and dismantles the training centres in Azad Kashmir or elsewhere. At the same time, they recognize that he may have lost control of those organizations acting in Kashmir and likely to destroy him as well¹. Furthermore, Pakistan has refused to extradite the organizer of the murder of the American journalist Daniel PEARL in January 2002, condemned to death but who may be later on amnestied because of its alleged collusion with the Inter-Services Intelligence².

Bilateral relations of Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka with countries outside of South Asia

Bangladesh also joined the international fighting against terrorism, declaring outfit in February 2003 a most dangerous organization, Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma.

An agreement has been signed by Nepal and the USA to fight terrorism. An extradition treaty exists too between the two countries³. The Americans and the British provide more and more help to the security forces which includes export of arms and ammunition⁴. Common exercises with the Nepalese army have also been carried out by the Americans in Nepal⁵.

The British have contributed to create the anti-terrorist Special Task Force of the Sri Lankan police⁶. The Americans have provided a Beechcraft with a modern radar to conduct air patrols around the island⁷. An extradition treaty has been signed by Sri Lanka and the USA. A similar treaty exists also between USA and the Maldives⁸.

International actions against the extremist organizations

Three South Asian States, India since 1996, Pakistan and Bangladesh since July 2004 cooperate with the 10 ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) and other 13 ASEAN dialogue partners (European Union, USA, Australia, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea,

¹ « La DIA prévient le président Musharraf », in « Alertes », n°10, March 2003, page 4, bulletin of GEOS, 9 bis rue Delerue, 92 120 Montrouge.

« The ball is in Pervez's court », Kuldeep NAYAR in rubric « Opinion », « Dawn », internet edition, 26 April 2003.

² « Qui a tué Daniel Pearl ? », Bernard-Henri LÉVY, Grasset, Paris, 2003.

³ « Extradition pact inked with US » in « Dawn », internet edition, 26 September 2003.

⁴ « Au Népal, l'armée se lance à l'assaut de la rébellion maoïste », Françoise CHIPAUX in « Le Monde », 9 May 2002.

« Is another Vietnam in the making for US in Nepal », Conn HALLINAN in « South Asia tribune », 8 February 2004.

« India admits helping US against Maoists : 16 killed in Nepal strike », in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 September 2004.

« Aircraft with arms arrived only this morning », Amit BARUAH, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 30 September 2004.

⁵ « Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

⁶ « Karuna or Prabhakaran : who will survive ? », Bandulla JAYASEKARA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 March 2004.

⁷ « The LTTE and the KP factor », Iqbal ATHAS, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 15 October 2003.

⁸ « Extradition pact inked with US » in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 26 September 2003.

New Zealand, Russia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and East-Timor, the latter included in July 2004) on security issues, which include terrorism, within the frame of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994. Therefore, this not so much institutionalised organization includes 26 members. The new inclusions of Pakistan and Bangladesh have been justified by the links existing between the South-East Asian and South Asian Islamic terrorists. The first conference of military officials of ARF was held in Beijing at the beginning of November 2004. The struggle against terrorism was one of the topics along with cross-border crimes, drugs and small arms-trafficking. The role of the armed forces in assistance to the civilian institutions and agencies was emphasized¹. South-East Asia has three specialized institutions dealing with terrorism and associate crimes : the South-East Asia regional centre for counter-terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, the International law enforcement academy in Bangkok and the centre for law enforcement cooperation in Djakarta, the last one being an initiative of Australia and Indonesia². A partnership pact for peace, progress and shared prosperity has been signed on November 30, 2004 by India and the 10 ASEAN countries. Although it mainly deals with economic development and trade cooperation, it also mentions that the signatory States will jointly fight international terrorism, sea piracy and transnational crimes like arms smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering. India's help has been sought for training personnel from South-East Asia on anti-terrorism. Exchange of information will be developed³.

Five South Asian countries, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, are members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an association which includes also Myanmar and Thailand. BIMSTEC has decided in its summit meeting of July 2004 to expand cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. All the seven member States are concerned by terrorism in a way or another. A joint working group is being set up and an intelligence network will be established⁴.

In the future, contacts may be developed with other institutions, like the Pacific Islands Forum which is helping to implement counter-terrorism legal regimes in the micro States of the Pacific Ocean.

All the extremist Islamist and non-Islamist movements in South Asia are now targeted. Some of them have been listed as terrorist organizations and declared out of law (see *appendices 6, 7 and 8*). For instance, the Al Badr, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Jamaat-ul-Fuqrah, the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, which are operating in Indian Kashmir, the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (a Shia anti-Sunni movement), the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (a Sunni anti-Shia movement), the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (a Sunni anti-Shia Pakistani group) have been declared illegal by many countries, at the instigation of USA. Obviously, India has declared illegal, most of the times, much before other countries, many extremist organizations and outfits operating on its soil (one of the last put on the list of forbidden movements is the Students Islamic Movement of India - SIMI).

¹ « ARF agrees to strengthen anti-terror cooperation : Pakistan wants terrorism defined », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 November 2004.

² « Entering the ASEAN regional forum », Aileen QAISER in « Dawn », internet edition, 28 June 2004.
« Uniting to fight terrorism », Alexander DOWNER, Australian minister for foreign affairs, in « Dawn », internet edition, 31 August 2004.

³ « India, ASEAN to jointly fight terrorism », release of PTI and ANI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 December 2004.

⁴ « Delhi, 6 others to fight militancy », Reuters press release in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 August 2004.

« Militant camps issue to be raised with Dhaka », Sushanta TALUKDAR, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 12 September 2003.

The separatist movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, operating in Sri Lanka, has been forbidden in India, USA (since 1997), UK, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, ... Its international headquarters used to be in London, it is now relocated in Paris. The USA have also banned, in March 2003, the Nepalese Communist Party (Maoist) because of its involvement in the Maoist insurgency. Iran worries over attacks on Shias in Pakistan and expressed its approval of the ban of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

The international governmental organizations have adopted the same stance in banning militant movements. To avoid inconveniences of being declared illegal, some Muslim organizations, specially those operating in Kashmir have changed their names¹ (*see appendices 3 and 4*).

Official help provided in Pakistan earlier by Saudi Arabia to Sunni movements and by Iran to Shia organizations² may have stopped. Funds in national and foreign banks belonging to various extremist organizations have been frozen. In May 2003, the State Bank of Pakistan froze the accounts of the Al Akhtar Trust International (previously named Al Rashid), created in 2000 and believed to be linked to Al Qaeda and Jaish-e-Mohammad³. These measures came too late. The militant groups could withdraw their money before their accounts were frozen. Furthermore, normally accounts are not opened in the names of militant organizations⁴. Pakistan has not yet enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) to enforce action against illegal financial transactions which include terror funding. The work of the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) is not efficient enough⁵. The Bank of Bangladesh, through its anti-money laundering department, has asked to freeze some suspected accounts⁶ but the Bangladeshi anti-money laundering legislation remains deficient⁷. Everywhere in South Asia, parallel circuits, almost undetectable, are still functioning like the already mentioned hawala system.

International institutions specialized in the struggle against illegal financing (trafficking in drugs and arms, organized crimes, terrorism, ...), like the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF or, in French, Groupe d'Actions Financières sur le blanchiment des capitaux - GAFI), set up by the G-7, the seven most industrialized countries, in 1989 and attached to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), analyse the legal systems against laundering and polish up their own tools, including keeping up to date the listing of the most lenient countries (Myanmar, a

¹ « Outlawed Kashmiri militants resurface in Pakistan », latest news in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 March 2003.

Assessment on Pakistan in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 3 March 2003.

² « The sectarian menace », Iffat IDRIS, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 August 2003.

³ « Nailing a lie », Kanchan LAKSHMAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 20 October 2003.

⁴ « Accounts of three banned outfits frozen », in « Dawn », internet edition, 13 December 2003.

« Proscribed Jehadi groups did not maintain bank accounts », in « The Friday Times », Lahore, 19-25 December 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 22 December 2003.

⁵ « Hundi not going for good : even Americans know it », M. AFTAB in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 October 2004.

⁶ « Banks warned about Al Qaeda and Taliban accounts », in « New Age Bangladesh », 9 July 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 12 July 2004.

⁷ « South Asia security : a US perspective », Mary Ann PETERS, Ambassador to Bangladesh, lecture in the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 1 July 2003.

neighbouring country of South Asia being one of them)¹. The Vienna based Global Program against Money Laundering (GPML) is also active. However these institutions are of no value to track all transactions. In fact, the FATF has adopted a very narrow definition of money laundering, keeping the business of capital flight unaffected. It has also diluted its recommendation for limiting secrecy, under American pressure². Furthermore the two biggest countries of the world, China and India are not members of FATF. No South Asian States are included in its list of suspected countries but neighbouring Myanmar is³. There is no specialized regional institution in South Asia as it exists in the Asia-Pacific region, the Asia-Pacific Group on money laundering.

International Governmental Organizations may intervene as mediators to put an end to insurgencies. The United Nations Organization itself has proposed to facilitate the dialogue between the Nepalese government and the Maoists. In such cases, militant movements may receive some kind of legitimacy⁴.

Sometimes the Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are more or less biased in favour of extremist organizations. It may happen that some of them are in fact under the direct or indirect control of extremist outfits. The World Kashmir Freedom Movement, based in UK, falls in that category. The Netherlands-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization has turned its attention to India's North-East⁵. So has done the Bangkok-based Asia Indigenous Peoples' Pact⁶. The Amsterdam-based Nagaland International Support Centre, the UK-based Naga Vigil and Liberation, the Hong Kong-based Christian Conference of Asia, the Geneva-based World Council of Churches, the Naga People's Movement for Human Right (NPMHR) and other organizations declare openly their pride in associating with the insurgents and defend their stands⁷. Some organizations of expatriates may be occasionally sympathetic to extremist ideologies. It happened to be the case with the World Sikh Organization in the 1980s⁸. It is so for the Kashmir Freedom Council in Great Britain⁹.

The governments of the countries where these organizations are located have started

¹ « Le GAFI affûte les armes de la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme », Antoine JACOB, in « Le Monde », 5 October 2003.

² « Capital account convertibility in India and related issues », Kannan SRINIVASAN, paper delivered at the India International Centre, New Delhi, function arranged on 11 March 2004 by the Transform India Group, 7 A III Girdhar Apartments, 28 Feroze Shah road, New Delhi 110001. email : tigdelhi@yahoo.com.

³ « Le GAFI souhaite l'adhésion rapide de la Chine et de l'Inde » in « Le Figaro », Paris, 22 September 2004, page 7.

⁴ « Maoist rhetoric for United Nations mediation », P. G. RAJAMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 August 2004.

⁵ « The China-Taliban equation », Surya GANGADHARAN in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2000, pages 74-75, note 9.

⁶ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 44.
« Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its role in North-East insurgency », Krishan GOPAL, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, page 187.

⁷ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, pages 37 and 44.

« Centre urged to honour recognition given to Naga history », Sushanta TALUKDAR, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 June 2004.

« Nagaland : a frozen peace », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », published by the Institute for Conflict Management, internet edition, New Delhi, 2 August 2004.

⁸ « Tapes of wrath », Suresh JAIN, in « India today », 15 September 1984.

⁹ « India media wrongly projecting Kashmir : EU », in « Dawn », internet edition, 27 October 2003.

to react against some of them which are in fact acting as screen militant movements.

The use of child soldiers by some extremist organizations, officially forbidden by the UN General Assembly in May 2000, has been widely publicized and criticized since the 11 September 2001. The LTTE, which in the past had recruited children, as above indicated, is now under monitoring, especially by a Norwegian peace mission, but seemingly does not abide by the international law. In fact, the recruitment of underage soldiers has not abated in the island¹. It has been strongly condemned by the European Union and Non Governmental Organizations².

UN anti-terrorism conventions

The United Nations Organization could not reach a consensus to adopt a definition of terrorism. That did not prevent it from adopting a series of conventions to fight terrorism. However the absence of a commonly accepted definition constrained some countries, including in South Asia, to make reservations and to precise their own way of thinking.

India as well as Pakistan have signed most of the 12 UN anti-terrorism conventions (10 in the case of Pakistan – the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has not yet been accepted³). Bangladesh has signed the 12 United anti-terrorism conventions but 9 still have to be ratified⁴. Sri Lanka has ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism⁵.

Furthermore, the Indian and Sri Lankan navies are using the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) to board and inspect suspected ships, mainly belonging to the LTTE, and occasionally the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea⁶. India and Sri Lanka are signatories of the International Ship and Security Code which came into force in July 2004. It makes them mandatory to them to keep their ports and ships ready to tackle any act of maritime terrorism⁷.

The two international covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights are relevant to South Asia. When India ratified the second one, it made a reservation about right to self-determination to exclude from its scope sovereign independent States and sections of independent nations which would refer to it for separatist

¹ « No war, but little peace for Sri Lanka' east », Lindsay BECK, in « Dawn », internet edition, 30 July 2003.

« Sri Lanka peace process – with and without mediation (1994 – to date) », Maria Saifuddin EFFENDI, in « Regional studies », quarterly, Islamabad, winter 2003-2004.

« LTTE abducting child soldiers », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 June 2004.

² « E. U. concerned at human rights violations by LTTE », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 17 August 2004.

« LTTE still enlisting child soldiers », Randeep RAMESH, in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 November 2004.

³ « Unfulfilled promises : Pakistan's failure to tackle extremism », report of the International Crisis Group, Brussels, 16 January 2004, page ii.

⁴ « South Asia security : a US perspective », Mary Ann PETERS, Ambassador to Bangladesh, lecture in the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 1 July 2003.

⁵ « Sri Lanka knows about terrorism », Chandrika BANDARANAIKE KUMARATUNGA, in « International Herald Tribune », 8 November 2001.

⁶ « Will LTTE give peace a chance ? », Cdr Vijay SAKHUJA, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

⁷ « Sea Tigers : threat to Indian security », V. SURYANARAYAN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 July 2004.

purposes. Obviously, these sections include the Kashmiris and other people who claim independence from India.

Temporary lower profile of the extremist movements

The South Asian extremist movements keep now a lower profile, especially abroad, due to international pressure. The funds inflow; except for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has somewhat diminished, which may affect them. Their offices all over the world cannot operate so freely as before but they are waiting new opportunities to resume their activities.

On the ground, the extremist movements have adopted, at least for a while, a somewhat softer line too, as a consequence of international focus being applied to the struggle against terrorism. But they never really gave up their overt political activities and some of them went on with their covert deadly operations. Guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts are still being perpetrated in India (particularly in Kashmir, in the North East, in central parts as well as in Mumbai), in Pakistan, in Nepal and in Sri Lanka.

Most of the militant movements carry on their propaganda activities against governments and individuals. Many South Asian militant movements have created in South Asia itself but also around the world their own newspapers, reviews and radio networks. They have never stopped spreading their messages. In South-Waziristan, to mention just one of the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, publications portraying the militants as heroes are mushrooming¹. The main outfits of South Asia also operate websites (see bibliography at the end). For instance the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has got a very sophisticated world network.

Similarly, recruitments abroad and internally have never stopped. The movement of the LTTE recruits mainly among the Tamils originating from Sri Lanka and occasionally from those coming from India. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba continues to operate cells from Dubai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which recruits among Indian expatriates². The LTTE are still getting weapons from Thailand although the Bangkok government has taken strong measures to curb the freedom of action of arms buyers³.

In the past, in India, agreements halted insurgencies at least for a while and partially. So it happened in 1986 in Mizoram thanks to an agreement with the Mizo National Front and in 1988 in Tripura through an agreement with the Tribal National Volunteers. Several understandings have been concluded recently. Currently, several negotiations are on.

In Assam, a cease-fire was accepted by the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity, an insurgent movement of the Karbis, on August 1, 2002 but was refused by a dissident faction. A cease-fire was also signed with the Dima Halim Daogah on January 1, 2003 but dissident groups continued large-scale extortion activities⁴. In the same State, the creation of a Bodoland Territorial Council on 7 December 2003 has put to an end the terrorist activities of the Bodo Liberation Tigers, a movement which has disbanded. However, a rival militant

¹ « Power play in South Waziristan », Mohammad SHEHZAD in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 November 2004. The article mentions the following publications : Nawa-i-Waqt, Ummat, Jasarat, Friday Special, Takbeer, Nida-i-Millat and Islam.

² « Lashkar's new wave of recruits from Indian expatriates », Praveen SWAMI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 January 2004.

³ « Thailand becomes less hospitable place for LTTE », Marwaan MACAN-MARKAR in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 11 November 2003.

⁴ « Small wars of the Northeast », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 December 2004.

organization, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) which has been marginalized has continued fighting for a while in a very violent way for an independent Bodoland¹. In October 2004, it finally agreed to a cease-fire offered by the Assam government². After being pushed away from Bhutan, the United Liberation Front of Assam has resumed devastating and spectacular terrorist attacks and continues to spurn peace feelers.

A cease-fire is operating since August 1997 (it is in fact the seventh one since the beginning of the insurgency) with the main Naga militant movement, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction) whose leaders, Isak Chishi Swu and Thiungaleng Muivah, are Bangkok-based. The other branch of the movement, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) whose leader is based in Myanmar has regularly renewed a unilateral cease-fire, first declared in April 2001³. The national legislative elections for Lok Sabha in spring 2004 were not boycotted by any of the two factions. Talks have been held in June 2001, July 2003, December 2003 and March 2004 in Bangkok, in September 2003 and June 2004 in Amsterdam and in July 2004 in Chiang Mai, between the Indian government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction). Negotiations have been slightly delayed because this faction complains that the Indian central agencies encourage and even arm its rivals, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) and the Naga National Council, an accusation which has been denied by New Delhi⁴. The government of India has also been accused of holding secret talks with its rival, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction), which has been denied too. Conversely, New Delhi complains that the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction) does not observe fully the terms of the cease-fire because it still administers an extensive regime of fund extortions and because its armed cadres move outside their designated camps⁵. Actually, the Isak-Muivah faction wants to be the sole representative of the Nagas. The talks are always held without the participation of the local government, which complains about it but which is understandable considering its collusion with the militants. Despite the numerous negotiation meetings, the Naga question may remain unresolved till the time when a greater Nagaland or Nagalim is created, unifying the various territories inhabited by Nagas or related tribes which are now included in other States of the North-East (Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh). But these concerned provinces are obviously reluctant to give away areas and sometimes not without good reasons. For example, the claimed Assamese districts of Cachar, North Cachar and Karbi Anglong are mainly inhabited by non Nagas despite deliberate efforts being done by the Naga militants to settle Nagas. The Naga inhabited four districts of Manipur cover 70% of the State total area. So a greater Nagaland would mean the end of Manipur. Furthermore, non Nagas are living in those Manipuri districts in significant numbers, although an ethnic cleansing is carried on by the Naga militants to chase away the Kukis⁶. Furthermore, the

¹ « Assam : another uncertain accord », Bibhu Prasad ROUFRAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 8 December 2003.

² « India to hold talks with Assam rebels », in « Dawn », 23 October 2004.

³ « Delhi offers talks to northeast groups » in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 29 October 2003.

⁴ « Naga peace process faces a roadblock », Vinay KUMAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 29 November 2004.

« Seven-year hitch », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 2 December 2004.

⁵ « Naga peace overtures », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 December 2004.

⁶ « The Naga question. Violence and the peace process », Shantanu Nandan SHARMA, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 89.

« Naga peace overtures », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 13 December 2004.

claim of the Naga militants to include within Nagalim territories in Myanmar inhabited by related tribes internationalises the problem. Altogether the new State would cover 120,000 square kilometres to be compared with 16,527 square kilometres of present Nagaland¹. There is also a personal factor in the claim because Muivah belongs to the Tangkhul tribe, largely concentrated in the hill districts of Manipur. In fact, the forty or so Naga tribes are different from each other, they fought among themselves in the past and the existence of several militant organizations reminds of the absence of unity, which makes a solution more difficult to reach. The federal government remains unwilling to remodel the State frontiers in the North-East.

Notwithstanding the cease-fire and negotiations, Nagaland remains a disturbed area, officially recognized as such. The blasts, claimed by an Islamist outfit and not by any Naga militant group, which killed more than 30 people on October 2, 2004, in Dimapur, the main city and business centre of the State, are a reminder of the fragility and complexity of the situation as are some incidents which happen now and then in neighbouring Assam between police and Naga militants², particularly in the Karbi Anglong hill district where Nagas try to encroach on border land³. The contention with Assam is compounded by the discovery of petrol on the border between the two States⁴. In fact the first test wells were drilled in Nagaland itself in 1981 but production remained low before being stopped in 1994 for several reasons including lack of trust of the Nagas although the Indian constitution has given Nagaland in its article 371 A the exclusive control over its natural resources, a privileged status which does not apply to other States⁵.

In Mizoram, negotiations continue since September 2001 to find a solution for the Hindu or Buddhist Bru (also called Reang) 35,000 minority refugees living in six camps of North Tripura district⁶.

Two of the three factions of the National Liberation Front of Tripura signed a memorandum in April 2004 to cease hostilities. They are ready to enter into peace negotiations. The All Tripura Tigers Force is in the same mood⁷.

On 23 July 2004, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Indian government and the Achik National Volunteers' Council operating in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya but since then other outfits have suddenly mushroomed in the State⁸.

On June 16, 2004, the Andhra Pradesh government declared a three-month cease-fire

¹ « Ethnicity, identity and conflict », Pradip PHANJOURBAM, in « Faultlines », quarterly of the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, January 2002, page 73, note 2.

² « Nagaland : arresting the slide », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 28 June 2004.

« Troops in position along Assam-Nagaland border », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 3 July 2004.

³ « Police, NSCN militants exchange fire », Sushanta TALUKDAR in « The Hindu », internet edition, 1 July 2004.

⁴ « Assam-Naga border row stalls ONGC ops », in « Economic Times », 7 May 2004

⁵ « A land where roots run deeper than oil » Paul WATSON in « The Los Angeles Times », reproduced in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 23 September 2004.

⁶ « Small wars of the North-East », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 December 2004.

⁷ « Nayanbasi Jamatiya faction of the NLFT agrees to cease-fire in Tripura », in « Assam Tribune », 16 April 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 19 April 2004.

« Tripura : rebels on peace mode ? », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 April 2004.

⁸ « Meghalaya : truce on track », Wasbir HUSSAIN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 July 2004.

« Small wars of the North-East », Bibhu Prasad ROURAY in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 6 December 2004.

with the People's War Group which accepted it, because its own conditions have been met. The cease-fire has been extended. It is not the first time that a truce is concocted in that State. The State government had also allowed the ban of the organization to lapse in order to negotiate with it. A first round of negotiations was held in Hyderabad, the capital city of Andhra Pradesh, in October 2004, between the State government and the Communist Party of India (Maoist). As it happened before, the Maoists have taken advantage in the new cease-fire, to consolidate their strength, to recruit new members and to train them, to collect huge amounts of money, in Andhra Pradesh and in other neighbouring States as well. They also construct memorials for their martyrs¹. Finally, the cease-fire came to a halt and was not renewed. Terrorist acts have started again.

On June 19, 2004, the Jharkhand government proposed also a cease-fire to the People's War Group, but the conditions set by the outfit were considered as unacceptable. On 22 June 2004, in Orissa, the People's War Group has taken the initiative to propose talks if the provincial government accepts its conditions. Offers of negotiation have also been done to Chhattisgarh, Karnataka and West Bengal governments which have responded cautiously. In fact, a peaceful solution should be found at the federal level or at least coordinated because several States are concerned by this left-wing insurgency². Some meetings between various Chief Ministers of concerned States and the federal home Minister have already taken place to discuss the matter. Centrally sponsored Backward District Initiatives have also been launched to deal with the socio-economic and political inequities³.

The newly formed Communist Party of India (Maoist), made of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, seems ready to negotiate in several States but is dictating its condition. Therefore, the move appears more tactical than strategic. The party does not give up its political aims and its violent modus operandi to achieve them as shown by the killing on November 20, 2004, in Uttar Pradesh, of 17 policemen.

In Nepal, a cease-fire between the Maoists and the government had been enacted on 29 January 2003, allowing negotiations to start. Although fragile, with some rebel pinpoint and murderous attacks still going on. It operated till 27 August 2003 when the guerrillas broke it. Real fighting started again⁴ and continue in a very violent way. The Madhesi National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Kirant Workers Party (KWP), two organizations affiliated with the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), have ended their association on 27 July 2004. They played a major role in expanding the Maoist influence in the southern part (Terai) and the eastern part of the country. The breaking away of these factions, the first major dissension since the beginning of the insurgency, may in the long run, weaken the Maoist movement but at the same time make the government efforts to negotiate more complicated. Despite some desertions in the rank of the Maoists, they continue to strike everywhere in the country⁵ including in the capital city. In an unprecedented show of

¹ « Regrouping of naxalites in Telangana on », N. RAHUL in « The Hindu », internet edition, 6 October 2004.

² « Andhra Pradesh : another throw of the dice », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 21 June 2004.

« People's War ready for talks », release from PTI in « The Hindu », internet edition, 23 June 2004.

« Ready for talks with other States too : People's war », K. Srinivas REDDY, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 July 2004.

« Ban on People's War lapses », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 22 July 2004.

« Talks with naxalites in isolation will not help », S. Nagesh KUMAR, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 22 September 2004.

³ « Do it together », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 24 September 2004.

⁴ « 14 killed in Nepal fighting » in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 September 2003.

⁵ « Maoist affiliates sever ties », Keshab POUDEL in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 2 August 2004.

strength, they have in August 2004 imposed a blockade cutting off Kathmandu from the rest of the country for several days. They managed to ensure compliance out of fear of reprisals without even deploying force¹. A cease-fire was unilaterally declared by the Maoists on September 3, 2005 for three months².

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE also preferred to accept a truce on 22 February 2002 and to start negotiations with the government under a Norwegian mediation. Following former negotiations (like the one in Thimphu in 1985), rounds of talks have been organized abroad (September and October 2002 in Thailand, December 2002 in Oslo, December 2002/January 2003 in Thailand, February 2003 in Berlin, March 2003 in Tokyo) without any breakthrough. A Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, consisting of 53 monitors from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway, tried to keep the warring parties apart. Japan has also proposed its help. The so-called Tamil Tigers had accepted cease-fires before, taking each time advantage of peace to replenish their forces in personnel, weapons and ammunition and then resumed fighting. The LTTE have withdrawn from the peace talks in April 2003.

In a document submitted on 31 October 2003, the movement demands the implementation of an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA), as defined by its own terms, in fact a prelude to independence of the Northern and Eastern parts of the island. The powers that are proposed to be given to the Tamils to administer the Northern and Eastern provinces, that means two thirds of the land mass, include the administration of land, the imposition of taxes, the direct management of international and national funds for reconstruction, the possibility of borrowing internally and externally, the establishment of a judiciary and legal system, the control over the marine and offshore resources and coasts (which would give the Tamils three fifths of the island littoral with the natural harbour of Trincomalee, hence potential problem with India), the maintenance of law and order, and the withdrawal of government security forces, including the army (implicitly, it is to be understood that the Tamil movement will keep its own military ; so the country, if it remains united, would have two standing armies, as it used to be the case and still is in a way in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

If the government refuses the proposals, the LTTE warned of dire consequences, including a bloodbath³. Meanwhile, the Tigers carried on apparently illegal activities, on land and at sea, not without mishaps at the detriment of foreign countries. On 20 March 2003, Tamil Tigers sank a Chinese trawler, mistaking it for a Sri Lanka navy ship⁴. So, foreign countries may suffer from terrorism without being involved in the conflict.

The feud between the head of the LTTE, Velupillai PRABHAKARAN, and the local commander in the Eastern province, Vinayagamoorthis MURALITHARAN, better known by his nom de guerre, colonel KARUNA, came to be openly known on April 9, 2004 with the defection of the latter who, despite denials, apparently took some kind of refuge with the government forces. This new development explains the resumption of selected terrorist acts by the Tamil movement in July 2004 : assassination of anti-LTTE intelligence operatives, of Tamil political rivals like members of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and supporters of colonel KARUNA who is himself a prime target. Conversely, LTTE members are shot down, presumably by followers of the breakaway leader. An internecine Tamil war is

¹ « Maoists blockade affects Kathmandu », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 19 August 2004.

« Spiralling crisis », editorial in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 August 2004.

² « A tenuous calm », Yubaraj GHIMIRE in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 24 October 2005.

³ « Perilous stalemate », Ameen IZZADEEN in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 June 2004.

⁴ « 18 killed as Tigers sink trawler », in « Dawn », internet edition, 22 March 2003.

« Will LTTE give peace a chance ? », Cdr Vijay SAKHUJA, in « Peace process in Sri Lanka », bulletin of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 2003.

on.

However, the cease-fire between the LTTE and the government forces holds on. The balance of forces has tilted in favour of the militant outfit if hostilities resume. Apart from committing terrorist acts, the Tamil forces are, despite the recent split, more than ever able to win a conventional battle to consolidate and even increase their territorial gains in the Northern and Eastern provinces. During the current cease-fire, the LTTE has reinforced its positions establishing camps around strategic points, including the deep sea harbour of Trincomalee. In the Eastern province, unlike in the north, frontlines between government and insurgent forces are unclear¹. The KARUNA factor brings some further uncertainty and may dissuade the LTTE leaders to wage a conventional attack even if they rightly think they have superiority on the Sri Lanka army. Some successes obtained before the cease-fire by the Long Range Recce Patrols which attacked Tigers camps and killed several militant leaders including the chief of the Tamil "Air Force" and the deputy-chief of the Tamil "navy" may also partially explain the reluctance of PRABHAKARAN to resume hostilities².

The LTTE had been declared as illegal in 1977 but on September 2002 has ceased to be a proscribed group for the purpose of negotiations. However, the outfit is still considered as a terrorist group in many countries, including the USA and India. The LTTE are looking for legitimacy, not only in the island but also abroad. They behave as a full-fledged international actor. Foreigners are welcome in Kilinochchi, the Tamil « capital » and functionaries of Tamil Eelam travel abroad and meet as many officials as possible. The LTTE managed to create with UNICEF in Kilinochchi a transit centre of children previously enrolled in fighting units, in fact a rehabilitation centre, although it is accused at the same time to still recruit children³.

Despite recent openings to some international organizations and foreign countries and existence of renegades, the LTTE remains a secret organization. Infiltration of the militant outfit by sleuths is hardly possible because the Tigers are mostly not corrupt, may be an exception among the insurgent movements in South Asia.

The tsunami of December 26, 2004 devastated a part of the LTTE facilities. Since then, a quarrel developed with the government for the distribution of relief. Although the cease-fire has not been abolished, terrorist acts have started again. The Minister of foreign affairs, a moderate Tamil, was shot down on August 12, 2005.

The Chinese factor

China began to realize even more than before the vulnerability of its western territories, particularly the Xinjiang Autonomous Region populated with Muslim Uighurs (who now represent only about 50% of the population due to the internal migration of Hans). Terrorist activities, carried out by several extremist movements like the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the East Turkestan Information Centre (ETIC) and the World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC), increased significantly in that region since September 2001⁴. The Party of Allah

¹ « A violent cease-fire », Amantha PERERA in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 23 August 2004.

² Interviews in South Asia.

³ « Freed LTTE child soldiers placed in transit centre », V. S. SAMBANDAN, in « The Hindu », internet edition, 22 July 2004.

⁴ « Le Xinjiang, une région en développement de la Chine populaire », Alain LAMBALLE in « Défense Nationale », Paris, July 1997. Due to the emigration of Hans, the percentage of the indigenous Muslim Uighur population is regularly decreasing. It represents today a little bit less than 50%.

« Chinese terrorist killed by Pakistan army », P. S. SURYANARAYANA in « The Hindu », internet edition, 26 December 2003.

(Hezbollah) and the Xinjiang Liberation Front are also active. China warned the USA that the ETIM had ties with Al Qaeda¹.

In the past, China had helped the Taliban fighting against the Red Army in Afghanistan, providing weapons. It now faces a backlash. Pakistan played a double game, so it appeared to the Chinese, courting Beijing for armament and scientific cooperation and at the same time helping the Uighur liberation or, if not, letting its extremist movements do it or, at least, being unable to stop their activities. Drugs, weapons and subversive Islamic literature are entering Xinjiang. Furthermore religious books, including Corans, are largely distributed. The Karakoram highway linking the Northern Areas of Pakistan to Xinjiang may be used for such deliveries. Occasionally, smuggling of weapons to Xinjiang from the Pakistani Northern Areas through the same road has been reported². Uighur separatists are said to find safe havens in Pakistan and to be trained there, religiously and militarily. In 2003, China officially complains about the existence of training camps in Pakistan³. A small number of Uighur militants can be found in the rank and file of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen operating in Kashmir. Some were even captured by the Indians during the conflict between India and Pakistan in the Kargil area in 1999⁴. One most wanted Uighur terrorist was killed in Wana, the capital of the South-Waziristan tribal agency in 2003⁵. On May 28, 2004, the Chinese deputy director of public security declared in Urumqi that members of ETIM had mixed up with Chinese communities in the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi⁶. Three Chinese were killed by militants near Gwadar on the Makran coast in Baluchistan on May 3, 2004 and an other one in South-Waziristan tribal area, on October 14, 2004 during a rescue operation a few days after he had been snatched with a colleague. All these incidents happened despite the fact that a joint working group has been established to fight terrorism in 2001⁷. Anyway they incite the two countries to reinforce even further their cooperation. Several explanations may be given for these killings. The aggressive attitude of the Chinese

« Global terrorism », major-general (rtd) Afsir KARIM in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, pages 14.

¹ « Attacks on China embassy feared : New Delhi tightens security », Jawed NAQVI in « Dawn », internet edition, 1 October 2004.

² « Islamist separatists in China are trained in Pakistan, claims Communist Party secretary », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 12 September 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 15 September 2003.

« Joint Pakistan-China team to investigate arms smuggling from Northern Areas », in « Dawn », 22 April 2004, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 26 April 2004.

« China says terrorists from Xinjiang hiding in Pakistan », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 29 May 2004.

³ « India and Pakistan : u-turns and pitfalls », Ashok KAPUR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 33.

⁴ « The China-Taliban equation », Surya GANGADHARAN in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2000, pages 63, 64, 65.

« China's Xinjiang problem and the Taliban factor », SREEDHAR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2001 page 62.

« China-South Asia : issues, equations, policies », Swaran SINGH, Lancer's books, New Delhi, 2003, pages 344, 345.

⁵ « Port facility to China offered », in « Dawn », internet edition, 7 October 2004.

⁶ « China says terrorists from Xinjiang hiding in Pakistan », in « Daily Times », Lahore, 29 May 2004. This assessment looks strange for two reasons : firstly because the Chinese communities of Lahore and Rawalpindi are insignificant and secondly because the Uighurs are not supposed to mix up with Hans.

⁷ « Four countries offer help to fight terrorism », Syed Irfan RAZA and Ihtashamul HAQ in « Dawn », internet edition, 5 September 2003.

« Islamabad, Beijing will jointly fight terror », Qudssia AKHLAQUE in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 October 2004.

authorities towards the Uighur nationalists is the most common one but the Americans, worried about the increasing China-Pakistan relationship and particularly about the possibility allegedly offered to the Chinese to use the new harbour of Gwadar on the Makran coast, close to the Middle East, have also been accused more or less directly to be behind the terrorist acts¹.

China has now a common interest with New Delhi to fight against the Islamist terrorist organizations, wherever they may operate from, Pakistan or Bangladesh. A joint working group on countering terrorism has been set up in April 2002 and two meetings already happened, alternatively in New Delhi and Beijing. A security dialogue has started between the two countries and this is a direct consequence of the intensification of terrorism originating in South Asia, that means Pakistan, or on its vicinity, that means Afghanistan. Apparently, Beijing has put aside its resent against India, accused originally to play the American game. It remains fearful of the American involvement in Central Asia and South Asia, considered also as a policy of China containment. India and China together with Russia may try to map out a common approach to deal with terrorism, without opposing the global campaign led by the Americans and the Western world as a whole. The three countries, which assert not to have been given full consideration in their struggle against terrorism, appear to have taken such a stance during a meeting of their Ministers of foreign affairs on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, held in Kazakhstan in October 2004², an organization created in July 2002 which itself endeavours to foster security in Asia and which includes apart from India an other South Asian State, Pakistan. From 2005 on, the foreign affairs Ministers of Russia, India and China will meet each year in full-fledged meetings. This rapprochement between India and China may be further fostered by a possible membership of the former one to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an active forum dealing with terrorism and comprising of China, Russia and the five Central Asian States of former Soviet Union³ and which has created an anti-terrorism centre in Bishkek, the capital city of Kyrgyzstan⁴. Pakistan may also be interested to be a member. Both India and Pakistan actually may be wishing to join. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization extends to the East the Collective Security Organization (the Russian abbreviation is ODKB), which includes Russia, Armenia, Bielorussia and three Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and which deals with terrorism as well as drugs trafficking, organized crimes, illegal migrations, ...⁵.

The defeat of the Indian army by the Chinese in 1962 gave a boost to all insurgent movements in the North-East. From 1967 till 1987, China helped various militant movements of the North-East of India, particularly the Nagas, the Kukis, the Mizos and the Meiteis, giving them training in Yunnan and providing them with weapons. Many of those groups

¹ « Is someone sabotaging China-Pakistan relationship ? », Wajid Shamsul HASSAN, on website « www.satribune », 24 October 2004. The author is a former Pakistan High Commissioner to UK, now based in London.

² « A timely initiative », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 28 October 2004.

³ For further information on the cooperation on the struggle against terrorism between China and India, see « United States' war on terrorism and its impact on India-China ties », Swaran SINGH, conference in Shanghai, June 2002.

⁴ « China's Xinjiang problem and the Taliban factor », SREEDHAR in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, January 2001, page 65.

« Shanghai Group alarmed by Afghan violence », Vladimir RADYUHIN in « The Hindu », internet edition, 18 June 2004. According to that article, the regional anti-terrorist centre has been established in Tashkent.

⁵ « Tensions et sécurité collective en Asie centrale », Jean PERRIN, in « Vigie info », quarterly, Futuribles International, Paris, April-June 2003.

appeared openly as communist-oriented. So a more or less common ideology and political affinity facilitated the contacts especially as on the Myanmar side existed also left-oriented insurgencies. At a time, a guerrilla training centre was operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan with Chinese instructors to train them¹. Armament was also given to some militants of Assam². It was widely assumed that the aid had not resumed. However, some sources mention Beijing has from 1999-2000 started to provide support again, particularly to the United Liberation Front of Assam, despite the improvement of relations with India³. In April 1999, this movement received a consignment of weapons from Tibet⁴. In September 2000, a firm in Beijing encashed a cheque in payment of a consignment of small arms for the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction)⁵. If it happens to be true, this attitude would be in total contradiction with the official Chinese policy. The United Liberation Front of Assam has appealed to China to get a safe passage for its cadres pushed out from Bhutan in December 2003 but Beijing has denied to have received any such request⁶. There is no evidence that members of that outfit could flee through Tibet.

In the past, China gave vocal help to the Naxalites/Maoists⁷. But Beijing does not seem to give any help now to the Maoist movements in India and Nepal⁸. On the contrary, it gives moral support to the Nepalese policy against the insurgents⁹. It has even sentenced to death in Tibet two Nepalese Maoists for smuggling weapons in Nepal¹⁰. Beijing would prefer the end of the insurgency which gives Washington the opportunity to supply the kingdom security forces with arms and ammunition and to train their personnel. The American presence in the Himalayas, close to Tibet, is a discomfort for the Chinese. However, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) indirectly helps China in weakening its main southern neighbour.

¹ « The China syndrome », Shekhar GUPTA, in « India today », 30 September 1983.

« Uncivil wars. Pathology of terrorism in India », Ved MARWAH, published under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, by Indus, Harper Collins, 1995, pages 237 and 240.

« Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its role in North-East insurgency », Krishan GOPAL and « ISI's Eastward operations. Old links in North-East India and new ones in South-East Asia », Anil BHATT, in « Insurgency in North-East India. The role of Bangladesh », edited by Dipankar SENGUPTA and Sudhir Kumar SINGH, Authors press in association with Society for the Promotion of Activities for National Development and Nation Building (SPANDAN), 2004, pages 182, 183, 184, 234 and 235.

² « Terrorism sans frontières », Jaideep SAIKIA, paper delivered at the international seminar on terrorism and low intensity conflicts in South Asia, 6-8 March 2002, Kolkata.

³ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, pages 43, 44, note 16 page 50 and note 43 page 51.

« US-China : post 9/11 acrobatics » Swaran SINGH, in « World Focus », April-May 2003.

⁴ « Bhutan's tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 39.

⁵ « Insurgencies in North-East India » S. K. PILLAI, in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 38.

⁶ « ULFA urges China for safe passage », in « Assam Tribune », Guwahati, 29 December 2003, reproduced in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 29 December 2003.

« Bhutan's tryst with ULFA », Jaideep SAIKIA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, April 2004, page 45, note 34 page 57.

⁷ « Terrorism in South Asia », Ramtanu MAITRA in « Aakrosh », New Delhi, October 2002, page 73.

⁸ « Nepal's insurgency stokes unease in Washington », Sanjeev MIGLANI in « Dawn », internet edition, 19 August 2003.

⁹ « China - South Asia : issues, equations, policies », Swaran SINGH, Lancer's books, 2003, page 225 with note 41, page 230.

¹⁰ « China sentences two Maoists to death », Jawed NAQVI in « Dawn », internet edition, 25 September 2004.

Emigration due to terrorism

Terrorist acts carried out by extremist movements bring governmental retaliations. Populations are in between and suffer from both sides. These events spawn not only displacements of population within the countries concerned from terrorist-affected regions to quiet ones, as already mentioned. They also generate emigration in the neighbouring South Asian countries and beyond all over the world, mainly in North America and Europe.

In the 1980s, many Sikhs went abroad, mainly in the United States, Canada and United Kingdom. Nepalese are now leaving their country to find jobs in India. Many Tamils from Sri Lanka, about 150,000, settled in the southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu¹. They are still now 65,000 living in about 100 camps². Sri Lankan Tamil refugees may be up to 450,000 in the USA, about 500,000 in Canada mostly in Toronto, in Europe³, mainly UK, Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and France (where they are more than 50,000 to whom we may add Tamils coming from India, particularly from the former Pondicherry colony) and in Australia.

Many of the emigrants chose to seek political asylum. Some immigrants indulge in political activities as militants for their own cause in their new countries. Such has been and still is the case for Sikhs, Sri Lankan Tamils and Kashmiris. The Kashmiris abroad do not surprisingly originate from the conflict-torn Indian part of Kashmir but rather from the Pakistani part. Many left the area of Mirpur when it was flooded by the construction of the Mangla dam on the Jhelum river. Although they have not migrated because of terrorism and guerrilla activities, but for pure economical reasons, they have always been anti-Indian and very active to foster fighting in the Indian Kashmir.

The Afghans who had fled their country to take refuge in Pakistan are encouraged by the UN auspices to return. Those who had temporarily settled in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where military operations are going on against Islamic militants, are pushed away by the authorities and have no other choice than to go back home, without any help⁴.

¹ « Sri Lanka peace process - with and without mediation (1994 - to date) », Maria Saifuddin EFFENDI, in « Regional studies », quarterly, Islamabad, winter 2003-2004.

² « Sri Lanka for increased partnership in small units », in « The Hindu », internet edition, 16 November 2004.

³ « Sri Lanka : Jaffna craint une reprise des combats », Marie-France CALLE, in « Le Figaro », Paris, 14 November 2003.

⁴ « Returning Afghan refugees », in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 26 July 2004.

CONCLUSION

The difficulties of the USA in Afghanistan and in Iraq show the limits of the capabilities of the only remaining superpower. They will encourage extremist organizations to act freely worldwide against the Americans and more generally the Westerners. Region-wise, South Asia will be most affected. The hatred which has been generated by the attacks of US forces against Afghanistan and Iraq in the Muslim world and also in many other countries will most likely create more and more terrorists. The world has become even less safe.

It is to be feared that the American deterrence against terrorism will peter out. The pressures of Washington to bring some South Asian insurgent movements to the negotiation table with governments will become more and more ineffective, also due to the stubbornness and assertiveness of those extremist organizations.

In the foreseeable future, insurgencies and terrorism will remain a scourge in South Asia. Violence comes from non-State actors and it will remain so. State actors and non-State actors in fact interact. The security forces have acquired experience and expertise through decades of fighting militants. They have increased their efficiency also thanks to the foreign technical help, including in the field of intelligence. Technical intelligence is a plus but there is no substitute to human intelligence which remains a priority for all the agencies. Infiltrating the militant outfits remains a hard task but an essential one. No doubt, in the future as nowadays, the polices and paramilitary forces will have to face the insurgencies. The army itself will continue to play a big role to solve the internal security issues of each of the South Asian States, in support of paramilitary forces which remain insufficiently equipped compared to well-armed militants. Significant parts of the Indian, Pakistani, Nepalese and Sri Lankan armies are reluctantly bogged down in maintaining law and order and fighting internal insurgencies and terrorism. Military interventions must not be indiscriminate and vindictive.

Although necessary under present circumstances in all the South Asian countries, the operations of the security forces alone cannot tackle insurgencies and terrorisms. They must be accompanied by political and economic actions. Many endeavours remain to be done to redress injustice and inequalities and to reduce poorness. The strife torn North-East could serve as a bridge between India and South-East Asia at a time when New Delhi promotes a "look East" policy. The North-Eastern States could then take benefit out of it. A systematic psychological campaign must also be launched to win over the minds of the populations which have to be cut off from the militants. It is better said than done. Time is required. Meanwhile, terrorism will drain a lot of resources and hinder the economic development. Negotiations with the militant organizations should be encouraged, with or without international mediations. Faction-ridden insurgent movements are not uncommon. Clashes between factions of the original same movements are not infrequent as can be seen particularly in India (Jammu and Kashmir and North-East, including Nagaland) and in Sri Lanka. The splits of most extremist outfits makes negotiations more difficult because an

agreement reached with one faction does not mean a final solution. Furthermore, interferences from neighbouring countries which have not ceased compounds the situation.

Half of the whole world Muslim population lives in South Asia. Indoctrination goes on mainly in Pakistan and Bangladesh but also in India and Nepal in madrassahs and even in the first two countries in State schools as well as outside of the schooling system through a significant number of extremist maulvis (orthodox religious scholars). The Pakistani madrassahs still receive students from abroad, mainly from South-East Asia, but also from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Arab countries. The local Muslim terrorism will be as now closely associated with worldwide terrorism. The situation in South Asia, which remains a hotbed of Islamic terrorism, will have repercussions elsewhere. So, it will stay as a major preoccupation of the USA and European countries, the more so because Al Qaeda manages in a loose way to federate various extremist organizations, specially those operating in Kashmir, and infiltrates to a certain extent the armed forces of Pakistan and possibly Bangladesh. The deterioration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, made visible in the non demarcated border areas, particularly in the North-Waziristan and Mohmand tribal agencies, where sporadic clashes have happened¹, hinders the fight against remnants of Talibans and members of Al Qaeda.

The Islamist extremism, important as it is, does not explain all the forms of insurgencies and terrorisms which exist in South Asia. There is no single ideological source of terrorism in this part of the world. The extreme leftist ideology, historically belonging to China, the big neighbour in the north, and now spreading from Nepal with the Maoists up to Tamil Nadu through Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh and Andhra Pradesh with the Naxalites/Maoists in India, generates an other major challenge for the sub-continent. If this belt collapses to the strikes of the violent leftist militants, the North-East would be even more isolated from the main part of India.

Nationalistic terrorism in the North-East is still flourishing. It prevails also in Sri Lanka where the separatist movement of the Tamils wants to impose its own rule through intimidating terrorist acts.

In South Asia, terrorism is not dead. It goes on killing and will go on killing. It will not come to an end in the foreseeable future. It may even extend to new areas. Out of 602 districts (the highest administrative level below the province or State) in India, 212 are afflicted by terrorism and insurgency, that means more than a third². Out of these 212 districts, 125, located in 12 States, are torn by Maoists who are spreading their activities³. Wide areas of Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka are prone to terrorist acts. The terrorists, whoever they may be, Hindus, Muslims or Christians, have no qualms. Their imagination knows no limits. In the future, new devastating forms of attacks may appear like destruction of major dams⁴, chemical and pharmaceutical factories and nuclear plants, through which

¹ «Pak, Afghan border guards trade fire », Beroz KHAN, in « Dawn », internet edition, 17 April 2003.

« Border clash in Waziristan Agency. Islamabad, Kabul trade charges », Zulfiqar ALI, in « Dawn », internet edition, 18 April 2003.

² « Bad medicine for a red epidemic », Ajai SAHNI, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 4 October 2004.

³ « Naxalites : a compact of fire », Nihar NAYAK in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 18 October 2004.

⁴ A partly successful attempt to sabotage the Bhakra main line canal in the Indian Punjab has been made in June 1984 by Sikh terrorists. See « Serious blow », Gobind THUKRAL in « India today », 15 July 1984.

« Heavy security set off to avert perils to Warsak Dam », Tariq SAEED in « Times », Pakistani internet daily (times.com.pk), 16 July 2003. The Warsak dam on the Kabul river is located close to Peshawar, the capital city of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.

populations would suffer tremendously. Contamination of rivers and food items may be done. In seas surrounding South Asia, attacks against dangerous ships like supertankers could be carried out by terrorist organizations in the future, to cause huge human and environmental damages on the coasts.

Brigadier-General Alain Lamballe

On January 27, 2004, Nepalese Maoists had planted a bomb at the Tanakpur dam, on the Mahakali river, inside Indian territory. See « Emerging co-operation against Maoist subversion », P. G. RAJAMOHAN, in « South Asia Intelligence Review », internet edition, published by the Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, 16 February 2004.

Rockets have been fired at a dam site under construction in Baluchistan. See « 12 rockets fired at Mirani dam site », in « Dawn », internet edition, Karachi, 17 July 2004.

APPENDICES

LIST OF APPENDICES

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APPENDIX 1

HEADS OF STATE, PRIME MINISTERS, MINISTERS AND HIGH LEVEL POLITICIANS ASSASSINATED IN SOUTH ASIA SINCE 1947 (COUNTRY-WISE)

India

- 30 January 1948 : Mahatma GANDHI by a Hindu fanatic.
- 31 October 1984 : Indira GANDHI, Prime Minister, by two of her Sikh bodyguards.
- 21 May 1991 : Rajiv GANDHI, former Prime Minister, son of Indira GANDHI, killed by a female suicide-killer of the Sri Lankan Tamil separatist movement Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, at Sriperumbudur, in Tamil Nadu, during an electoral campaign which most probably would have brought him back to power.
- 7 March 2000 : A. Madhav REDDY, the Panchayat Raj Minister of Andhra Pradesh, killed by the People's War Group in a landmine blast at Ghatkesar, near Hyderabad.
- 2002 : Mushtaq Ahmed LONE, Jammu and Kashmir junior interior Minister, killed by militants during an election campaign for the State assembly.
- 18 October 2005 : Dr Ghulam Nabi LONE, Jammu and Kashmir Minister of State for Education, killed by a squad of terrorists belonging to the Islamic Front and Al Mansooran.

Pakistan

- 16 October 1951 : Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister.
- 17 August 1988 : Zia Ul Haq, President of the Republic (air crash never explained, probably due to a terrorist act).

Bangladesh

- 15 August 1975 : Sheikh Mujibur RAHMAN, President of the Republic.
- 30 May 1981 : Zia-Ur-RAHMAN, President of the Republic.

Bhutan

- 5 April 1964 : Jigmie DORJI, Prime Minister.

Sri Lanka

- 25 September 1959 : Salomon West Ridgeway Dias BANDARANAIKE, Prime Minister by an extremist Buddhist monk.
- 16 February 1988 : murder by Sinhalese extremists of Vijaya KUMARATUNGA, leader of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP), son in law of former Prime Minister Sirimavo BANDARANAIKE and husband of the present President of the Republic.
- 1st May 1993 : murder by Tamil extremists of PREMADASA, President of the Republic.
- 7 June 2000 : C. V. GOONERATNE, Minister for industrial development is assassinated by a male LTTE suicide bomber in Ratmalana, near Colombo.
- 12 August 2005 : assassination of Lakshman KADIRGAMAR, Minister of foreign affairs by the movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Remarks

The massacre on June 1, 2001 of the king of Nepal BIRENDRA and most of the royal family members by a prince cannot be considered as an act of terrorism. It has therefore not been included in the above list.

Important persons apart from heads of States, heads of governments and ministers have also been assassinated but have not been mentioned (for example in India the murder in 1986 of general - retired - Arun Shridhar VAIDYA, a former chief of staff of the Indian army by a Sikh, to avenge the army attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar).

APPENDIX 2

MAIN TERRORIST ACTS IN SOUTH ASIA (COUNTRY WISE)

Since the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 and of Sri Lanka in 1948, thousands of terrorist acts have been committed in these countries and in the other countries of South Asia. Obviously, they cannot be recorded all. Only the most significant ones have been mentioned in this annex which completes annex 1 listing the Chiefs of State, Prime Ministers, Ministers and high level politicians assassinated in South Asia. Terrorist deeds against properties without any victims have generally been omitted. For 2002, 2003 and 2004, some terrorist acts of a lesser importance but not all have been added to give an idea of the seriousness of the current security situation.

In India

1947

Beginning of the Naga insurgency, extensively resorting to terrorism.

1966

28 February : simultaneous attacks against public buildings in several localities of Mizoram, meaning the beginning of the insurgency.

1969

7 military personnel killed at Marpara, in Mizoram.

1970

2 July ; killing of non-tribals in border villages of Tripura by Mizo insurgents.

1971

30 January : hijacking of an Indian Airlines passenger plane flying from Srinagar to Jammu.

1973

28 February : partial destruction of the Aizawl power station by Mizo insurgents.

1975

13 January : killing in Aizawl of the inspector-general of police of Mizoram and 3 other senior police officers, in his office of the former.

1980

27 February : killing in an ambush of 6 soldiers of the Assam Rifles at Kawnpui in Mizoram.

26 April 1980 : killing of 3 members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in an ambush at Patsoi; about 15 km west of Imphal.

1981

9 September : murder by Sikh militants of Lala Jagat NARAIN, a leading public figure, the proprietor of the influential Samachar group of newspapers and a severe critic of communal policies. This assassination indicates the beginning of the Sikh insurgency.

27 September : hijacking to Pakistan (Lahore) of an Indian Airlines plane by Sikh militants.

1982

20 January : killing of an inspector of police in Aizawl, in Mizoram.

19 February : ambush near Ukhrul, 30 km east of Imphal, in Manipur. 21 army personnel killed.

1983

18 February : 1,700 people, mostly women and children of the Muslim community massacred at Nellie, in Assam. Rather than terrorism, this massacre is a pogrom. It fostered terrorism.

5 October : hijacking of a bus by Sikh militants in Amritsar. 6 Hindu passengers are shot dead.

1984

2 August : bomb blast at the arrival lounge of the Meenambakkam airport (Chennai), by the LTTE. 29 people dead, including 24 Sri Lankans.

24 August : hijacking by Sikh militants of an Indian aircraft bound for Jammu.

November : anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and in many other places in the country, after the assassination, 31 October, of the Prime Minister Indira GANDHI by two of her Sikh guards.

1985

23 June : Air India aircraft bombing midair, over the Atlantic Ocean, perpetrated by Sikhs (331 persons killed).

1986

25 April : attack by the Khalistan Commando Force of a police escort, in Jalandhar, killing 6 constables.

25 July : killing of 15 bus passengers near Muktsar in the Faridkot district of Punjab.

10 August : killing by two Sikhs in Pune of general (retired) Arun S. VAIDYA, former chief of the army staff at the time when the Operation Blue Star was launched in June 1984 to flush out terrorists from the Golden Temple in Amritsar.

Explosion in flight, near Ireland, of an Indian Aircraft Corporation plane. The Sikh militants have claimed the responsibility.

1987

9 July : attack by Naga militants of a security post at Oinam in Manipur, killing 9 soldiers of the Assam Rifles.

November : ambush by Naga militants of an army convoy near Talloi in Ukhrul district of Manipur, killing 13 soldiers.

1988

January : ambush by Naga militants at Salammi, in Manipur, near the border with Myanmar, killing 6 Assam Rifles soldiers.

9 April : ambush by Naga militants of a convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force, at Selunghpam, in Manipur, killing 10 policemen.

16 May : murder of 17 persons at Samana in the district of Patiala in Punjab.

17 May : murder of 30 labourers in Sutlej-Yamuna Link canal project, in Ropar district of Punjab.

30 May : killing by an explosion of 27 persons in Amritsar, Punjab.

21 June : killing of 23 persons in a bomb explosion in Amritsar, Punjab.

31 August : explosion of a bomb in a bus, in Anantnag, killing one person. This act may be considered as the beginning of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

13 September : murder of 18 persons in firing at Sirhind, in the district of Patiala in Punjab.

4 November : murder of 19 labourers at Dadhuwal in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

4 November : killing of 18 people at Batala, in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.

1989

6 January : murder of 10 persons at Badowal in the Sangrur district of Punjab.

15 February : an assistant manager of a tea estate is hacked to death in Assam by militants of the United Liberation Front of Assam.

25 June : killing of 18 Hindu workers in Moga City, in the Faridkot district of Punjab.

13 July : 2 policemen from the Central Reserve Police Force and 4 civilians killed in Kashmir in an ambush laid by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front.

9-10 November : murder of 19 boys in Patiala, Punjab.

1990

24 January : murder of 4 Indian Air Force officers in Kashmir.

13 February : killing of a journalist in Kashmir.

7 March : killing of 33 persons at Abohar, in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.

- 13 March : a tea estate employee is killed in Assam.
- 19 March : murder of 11 persons at Zira, in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 3 April : killing of 35 persons at Batala, in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 5 April : bomb explosion in a bus at Panipat, Punjab, killing 10 persons.
- 9 April : a managing director of a tea estate is killed by militants of the United Liberation Front of Assam.
- 19 April : bomb blast killing 16 persons at Baroli in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 3 May : murder of 7 persons at Surat Mallian in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 9 May : murder of 5 labourers at Pabba Rani in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 14 May : murder of 7 persons near Dharovali in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 27-28 May : murder of 14 labourers from Bihar at Maluke in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 30 May : murder of 8 persons in the area of Ganda Nala and Sahu Chow in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 4 June : killing of 5 people in two bomb blasts in Patiala, Punjab.
- 20 June : bomb blast killing 4 persons at Purana Shala in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 14 July : killing of 8 persons at Chalheri in the Patiala district of Punjab.
- 16 July : murder of 8 persons at Trinde in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 9 August : killing of 8 persons in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
- 15 August : killing of 7 persons in a bomb blast in a bus, near Dasuya in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 16 October : explosion and shootout on a train near Basti Bawa Singh in the Ferozepur district of Punjab, killing 4 soldiers.
- 4 November : murder of 17 villagers near the village of Pandori road in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 10 November : killing by the Naxalites of 10 members of the Central Reserve Police Force in Etapalli tehsil of Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra.
- 17 November : killing of 10 persons in the Faridkot district of Punjab.
- 20 November : killing of 12 persons in a shootout at Islamabad Railway Crossing Market area in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
- 22 November : murder of 13 bus passengers near Parol in the Ropar district of Punjab.
- 25 November : murder of 14 persons in various places of Jalandhar, Punjab.
- 23 December : murder of 7 persons at Brass in the Patiala district of Punjab.

1991

- 8 January : murder of 12 persons near Gill Wali Railway Station in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
- 28 January : murder of 11 persons at Bikhawal in the Hoshiarpur district of Punjab.
- 21 March : killing of 9 persons at Haddanwali in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 22 March : killing of 29 bus passengers between Palheri and Rani Mazra in the Ropar district of Punjab.
- 23 March : murder of 8 persons at Kjathuana in the Ferozepur district of Punjab.
- 3 April : killing of 5 persons in Amritsar, Punjab.
- 9 April : killing of 18 persons at Sabwal in the Faridkot district of Punjab.
- 17 April : killing of 8 persons at Samana in the Patiala district of Punjab.
- 10 May : killing of 6 Christian labourers at Doggar in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
- 15 May : murder of 11 persons at Chale in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
- 15 June : murder of 50 train passengers in a shootout near Baddowal in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
- 15 June : murder of 26 train passengers in a shootout near Kila Raipur in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

- 21 July : murder of 7 members of a Sikh family at Chachowal, near Jalandhar, Punjab.
 24 July : murder of 5 bus passengers near Manan in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 24 August : killing of 12 persons near Shingari Chowk in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 7-8 September : murder of 7 policemen at Bhuianwali in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 23 September : killing of 4 passengers during a hijacking of a bus near Aemo Nangali in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
 6 October : killing of 8 policemen after a bomb explosion on a train at Khalchain in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 9 October : killing of 10 persons in Amritsar, Punjab.
 26 October : murder of 7 persons near Mehtiana in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
 31 October : murder of 7 members of a Sikh family at Gohawar in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 15 November : killing of 4 persons in a bomb explosion in Amritsar, Punjab.
 27 November : murder of 7 persons at Naiwala in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 19 December : killing of 10 persons in a bomb blast in Ludhiana, Punjab.
 26 December : killing of 52 train passengers near Sohian in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

1992

- 8 January : killing of 10 labourers at Kupkalan in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 8 January : killing of 10 labourers near Kharar in the Ropar district of Punjab.
 23 January : killing of 4 persons near Mehtiana in the Kapurthala district of Punjab.
 27 January : killing of 8 policemen at Kurnama in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
 17 February : killing of 12 labourers at Barnala in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 10 March : killing of 15 non-Punjabi engineers and technicians of a factory at Harkishanpura in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 14 March : killing of 20 persons in Ludhiana, Punjab.
 18 March : killing of 18 persons in a shootout in Ludhiana, Punjab.
 21 March : killing of 14 persons at Gandhi Chowk in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 26 March : killing of 7 Hindus at Gehri Mandir in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 15-16 April : killing of 8 Hindus at Bhangali in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 28 April : killing of 12 Hindus at Pandori Waraich in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 3 May : killing of 9 persons at Qadradabad in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 9 May : killing of 9 persons in Amritsar, Punjab.
 10 May : killing of 8 members of a Hindu family at Bhai Rupa in the Bhatinda district of Punjab.
 10 June : killing of 11 persons at Kalia Wala in the Faridkot district of Punjab.
 25 June : killing of 9 persons near Qila Raipur in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
 13 July : killing of 8 persons at Bassian in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.
 5 August : killing by Naga militants of 7 men of the Border Security Force at Mahur in North Cachar Hills.
 9 August : killing of 21 relatives of police personnel at Bakhatgarh in the Sangrur district of Punjab.
 10 August : killing of 5 family members of police personnel at Bheparai Baz Singh and 5 others at Wadala Veeram in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 11 August : killing of 6 family members of police personnel at Khayala Kalan in the Amritsar district of Punjab and 5 others at Mann Khera in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.
 12 August : killing of 7 family members of police personnel at Tarsikka in the Amritsar district of Punjab.
 15 August : killing of 6 relatives of policemen at Tethunangal in the Amritsar district of Punjab.

27 August : killing of 7 Sikhs of families of policemen at Balowal in the Amritsar district of Punjab.

29 August : mine-blast by Naxalites kills 7 personnel of the Border Security Force near Karimabad, in Andhra Pradesh

5 September : killing by Naga militants of 7 personnel of the Assam Rifles in the Tamei area of Manipur.

24 September : mine-blast by Naxalites kills 13 personnel of the Border Security Force in the Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh.

28 September : killing of 4 Hindus in an explosion on a bus at Malikpur in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab.

8 October : killing of 5 members of a Sikh family at Gharyali in the Amritsar district of Punjab.

9 October : killing of 5 policemen at Gohir in the Jalandhar district of Punjab.

30 October : killing of 17 Hindus at Sionkalan in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

30 October : killing of 8 agricultural Bihari labourers at Doburji in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

30 October : killing of 17 labourers near Seelon Kalan in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

21 November : killing of 7 Hindu labourers near Mithewal in the Sangrur district of Punjab.

1 December : killing of 16 bus passengers near Sidhwan Khurd in the Ludhiana district of Punjab.

10 December : killing by Naga militants at Lokchao of 11 people in an ambush of a convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force, escorting cash funds.

December : anti-Muslim riots in Mumbai, following the destruction of a mosque by Hindus at Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh.

1993

12 March : series of simultaneous bomb blasts by Muslim militants, killing 257 people in Mumbai.

29 June : killing of 26 soldiers of the army and 8 civilians in an ambush on National Highway 39, in Manipur.

14 November : killing of 9 policemen by a land-mine blast carried out by the Naxalites in the Mehboobnagar district of Andhra Pradesh.

28 November : killing by the Naxalites of 10 members of the Central Reserve Police Force in Madhya Pradesh.

1994

July : attack of a refugee camp at Barpeta in Assam by the Bodo Security Force, killing 50 Muslim inmates who were migrants from Bangladesh.

October : kidnapping in Delhi, by Pakistani and Indian members of Islamist extremist groups, of 4 foreigners (3 British and 1 American).

December : killing of 4 Western tourists in Kashmir.

Killing of 23 soldiers of the Assam Rifles in an ambush laid out by the naga militants at Yangkhullen in Senapati district of Manipur.

1995

23 January : killing by the Bodo Security Force of 9 Muslim labourers during their sleep at Bachanpura in the Kokrajhar district of Assam.

5 March : killing of 2 members of the Border Security Force, by militants of the Harkat-ul-

Ansar, near the shrine of the Sufi saint Nooruddin Noorani at Charar-e-Sharif, in Badgam district of Jammu and Kashmir.

4 July : kidnapping by a group called Al Faran in Kashmir of 3 Europeans (including 1 Norwegian killed in August) and 3 other foreigners (including 1 American who managed to escape).

24 July : killing of 6 members of the Punjab police in an ambush laid out by naga militants in the North Cachar Hill district of Assam.

25 July : killing of 6 Naxalites by Ranbir Sena activists at Sarathna village in Bhojpur district of Bihar.

1 August : killing of 8 policemen by the United Liberation Front of Assam at Chhayagaon, about 55 km from Guwahati.

1996

November : killing of 28 Bengalis in Tripura.

1997

12 February : killing in Tripura of 17 non-tribals, mostly Bengalis.

March : 7 Pandits (upper caste Hindus) killed in Jammu and Kashmir (at Sangrama in Budgam district).

June : 3 Pandits killed in Jammu and Kashmir (at Gul in Udhampur district).

1998

January : killing in Kashmir (at Wandhama in Srinagar district) of 26 Pandits (descendants of Hindu priests).

14 February : 58 people killed by Muslim extremists in serial bomb blasts of the Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu.

18 April : killing in Kashmir (at Prankote in Udhampur district) of 26 Pandits.

1999

22 January : murder in Orissa of an Australian missionary and his two minor sons.

22 June : 10 persons including two soldiers killed by a bomb blast at the New Jalpaiguri station in north Bengal.

24 December : hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane, after take off from Kathmandu. No movement claimed responsibility but it is widely alleged that Islamic militants linked to the Talibans and Al Qaeda did it.

2000

20 March : killing of 35 Sikhs at Chattisinghpura, in Kashmir, by Islamist militants.

9 April : massacre of 11 Nepali by the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) in Karbi Anglong district of Assam.

19 April : raid against entrance of headquarters of XV corps, at Badami Bagh, at the outskirts of Srinagar.

June : massacre of 26 Bihari labourers in Anantnag, in Kashmir.

1 August : killing in Pahalgam of 33 persons, including many Amarnath pilgrims.

21 December : killing of 15 Bhutanese on an Assam road by Assamese militants.

22 December : 3 persons killed in Delhi Red Fort.

2001

9 August : various simultaneous attacks by Naxalites, in Orissa. 6 policemen killed and huge quantity of arms and ammunition taken away.

1 October : 36 people killed during an attack against the provincial legislative assembly in Srinagar (Kashmir).

13 December : attack against the Federal Parliament in New Delhi. 11 people killed including all the 5 terrorists.

2002

22 January : attack against the American Information Centre of Kolkata, possibly by terrorists coming from Bangladesh.

27 February – 4 March : attack of a train of Hindus by Muslims in Gujarat (58 people killed) and reprisal killings of Muslims (possibly 2,000) and riotings in Gujarat.

14 May : attack of a military settlement at Kaluchak, close to Jammu. 34 people killed mostly civilians (family members of soldiers).

11 August : killing of 7 security force personnel by Naxalites (landmine blast) in Orissa.

24 September : attack of the Akshardham Hindu temple at Gandhinagar in Gujarat (30 people killed).

20 December : killing of 18 policemen in an ambush laid out by Naxalites in Orissa.

December : series of terrorist acts in Mumbai

2003

26 January : killing of 11 Bengalis in Tripura.

7 March : attack in Assam of the Digboi oil refinery, resulting in a loss of Indian Rs 200 millions.

13 March : explosion of a train in Mumbai (12 people killed).

16 March : attack of a police station in Jammu and Kashmir, in Gool area of Udhampur district (9 policemen and 2 civilians killed, 4 policemen and 3 civilians abducted).

16 March : killing of 7 civilians in a bus attack by members of the United Liberation Front of Assam.

23 March : killing of 24 Kashmiri Pandits (upper caste Hindus), at Nadimarg, near Shopian in Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir.

15 April : killing of 8 policemen by militants of the Maoist Communist Centre.

25 April : killing of members of the Border Security Force at Madar, in Bandipore area of Baramulla district, Jammu and Kashmir.

2 May : massacre of 8 Hindus by Muslims in Marad, Kerala.

11 June : attack by Naxalites of a police station at Addanki in Prakasam district of Andhra Pradesh. Looting of weapons and ammunition.

28 June : attack against the Dogra Regiment Camp in Sunjwan, on the outskirts of Jammu (12 soldiers killed)

21 July : killing of 17 Hindu pilgrims in Jammu and Kashmir.

22 July : killing of 8 military personnel, including a Brigadier. 12 wounded, including two top Generals and two Colonels at village Bangti on the Tanda road in Akhnoor district, Jammu and Kashmir.

27 July : killing of 2 security force personnel in Manipur in an ambush (the Chief Minister of the State was targeted but was unhurt).

30 July : killing of 10 security personnel by Naxalites, in Orissa (landmine blast).

July : series of terrorist acts in Mumbai

August : killing of a tea estate owner in Tinsukia district of Assam by militants of the United Liberation Front of Assam.

14 August : massacre of 30 villagers of Bengali origin in Tripura. Blowing up of a bus in Manipur, killing 6 people.

25 August : bomb explosions by Islamist extremists in Mumbai, killing 52 people.

6 September : 7 civilians killed in a car bomb explosion in a fruit market in Parimpora, on the outskirts of Srinagar.

8 September : 12 policemen killed in a landmine blast triggered by Naxalites near Dabua Mod in Rohtas district of Bihar.

1 October : a land mine blast is triggered by Naxalites in Chittor district of Andhra Pradesh against the Chief Minister, who escapes with minor injuries.

29 November : 7 security force personnel killed by a landmine blast set up by Naxalites in the South Bastar district of Chhatisgarh.

2004

25 February : killing of 8 security personnel, including 5 from the Eastern Frontier Rifles, at Golabari, in Midnapore district in West Bengal.

night 7-8 April : ambush of Naxalite insurgents in the West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand, killing 26 policemen, including 10 from the Central Reserve Police Force.

8 April : attack during a rally of the People's Democratic Party at Uri, in Kashmir, killing 11 people.

18 April : a land mine blast is triggered by Naxalites against a politician and his assistants, near Singupuram in Andhra Pradesh.

17 May : 6 members of the Border Security Force killed in an ambush in Tripura's Dhalai district by insurgents of the National Liberation Front of Tripura.

23 May : an improvised explosive device destroys on the Srinagar-Jammu highway, close to Qazimund, a bus carrying members of the Border Security Force and their families, killing 30 persons. The Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen has claimed responsibility for the blast.

12 June : explosion of a grenade in a hotel at Pahalgam, in Kashmir, killing 4 Indian tourists.

24 June : 7 people killed when the United Liberation Front of Assam detonated a bomb inside a bus, at Majgaon, in Sibsagar district of Assam.

26 June : gunning down of 11 members of the Gujjar community in the Jammu region.

2 July : 7 policemen killed in a blast against a convoy in Kishtwar area of Doda district in Kashmir.

19 July : six persons killed during attack on Deputy Chief Minister and Congress Ministers in Jammu and Kashmir when terrorists carried out a grenade attack at Kapran village in the Anantnag district. Deputy Chief Minister and ministers unhurt.

28 July : 5 members of the Central Reserve Police Force killed during an attack of their camp, on the banks of Dal Lake, in Srinagar, made by a squad of Al Mansooran, a front outfit of Lashkar-e-Toiba.

5 August : 9 members of the Central Reserve Police Force killed during an attack of their camp at Rajbagh in Srinagar.

14 August : 1 person killed in a cinema hall at Garipur, in the western part of Assam. The ULFA is suspected.

15 August : 13 people killed out of which children in a blast on a parade ground at Dhemaji, a district headquarters in the eastern part of Assam. The UFLA is suspected.

2 October : more than 30 people killed in Dimapur, Nagaland, in two simultaneous attacks in the railway station and a nearby market (an unknown non-descript Islamist militant outfit,

Al Jihad-e-Islam, has claimed responsibility). 19 people killed in several places in Assam in coordinated attacks by the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. These terrorist acts occurred on the birth anniversary of Mahatma GANDHI.

3 October : 12 people killed in several incidents in Assam carried out by the United Liberation Front of Assam and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.

4 October : 6 persons killed in the Sonitpur district of Assam by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.

5 October : 10 persons gunned down in lower Assam's Dhubri district, by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.

6 October : 14 persons killed by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland at Makhijhora in Assam.

9 October : 12 persons killed in an attack by members of Jaish-e-Mohammad against a military convoy at Singhpora, on the Srinagar-Baramulla road.

14 October : 6 Eastern Frontier Rifles personnel blown up by a landmine, activated by the Naxalites/Maoists, in West Midnapore district of West Bengal.

19 November : killing by Naxalites/Maoists of 2 forest guards in the Chandauli district of Uttar Pradesh.

20 November : 17 policemen killed in an ambush by Naxalites/Maoists in the same Chandauli district of Uttar Pradesh.

3 December : killing of 5 members of the Central Reserve Police Force in Sopore in north Kashmir, by the Al Mansooreen outfit.

5 December : killing by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen of 11 soldiers of the Rashtriya Rifles and 1 civilian near Naina Batpora in Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir.

9 December : killing of 2 policemen during an attack of the Special Operations Group at Imam Sahib, near Shopian, 55 km from Srinagar.

10 December : killing of 4 policemen at Magani in the Kathua district of Jammu and Kashmir.

2005

28 May : killing of 3 people at Burda in Orissa by Maoists.

7 July : killing of 5 people in several villages of Orissa.

20 July : killing of 5 people in Srinagar.

15 August : killing of 8 people by maoists at Narayanpet in Andhra Pradesh.

3 September : killing of 22 paramilitary personnel by maoists near Paleda in Chhatisgarh.

8 October : killing of 13 security force personnel in a bomb blast triggered by members of the Communist Party of India - Maoist).

29 October : serial bombings in Delhi, killing 62 people. The Islami Inqilabi Mahaz, a Kashmiri group, has claimed responsibility.

2 November : car bombing in Srinagar killing 10 people. Jaish-e-Mohammad has claimed responsibility.

In Pakistan

1981

2 March : hijacking of a Pakistan International Airlines by the extremist movement Al Zulfikar.

1995

November : a truck loaded with explosives rammed into the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, killing 18 people.

1999

27 July : killing of 7 people in a bus in Azad Kashmir.

2001

October : killing of 16 Pakistani Roman Catholic Christians during a morning service in Bahawalpur.

2002

January : kidnapping and assassination of an American journalist, Daniel PEARL.

26 February : slaying of 11 Shias in a Rawalpindi mosque.

17 March : killing of 5 people (including 2 Americans) in a Protestant church in Islamabad.

25 April : killing of 12 Shia worshippers, all women and children, in a women's section of a mosque at Bukker, in Punjab.

8 May : murder of French naval engineers and technicians in Karachi (11 out of 14 people killed).

14 June : explosion of a car bomb in front of the US consulate in Karachi (12 Pakistani killed).

August-September : attacks against Christian institutions (school, hospital, non-governmental organizations).

5 December : stabbing of two men and one woman in the honorary consulate of Macedonia in Karachi.

2003

January : attack against the Sui gas pipeline in Baluchistan.

22 February : killing of 9 Shias in imambargah (Shia mosque) in Karachi.

6 May : bomb blast outside Christian hospital in Tank (North-West Frontier Province).

8 June : attack against Shias policemen (from the Hazara community) in Quetta, 13 killed.

5 July : attack against an imambargah in Quetta, 54 Shias (from the Hazara community) killed.

3 October : 6 Shias killed in Karachi, while going to an imambargah.

6 October : killing in Islamabad of the leader of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (also member of the national assembly) and four other people (driver and 3 security guards).

14 December : failed attempt in Rawalpindi to murder President MUSHARRAF. Several people killed.

25 December : new failed attempt in Rawalpindi to assassinate President MUSHARRAF kills 18 persons.

2004

2 March : 48 Shias killed in Quetta during an Ashura procession (to commemorate the martyrdom of the Imam HUSSEIN, assassinated in 680 at Kerbala in Iraq by the Sunnis).

4 April : 5 policemen killed during an attack against a police station in Karachi.

3 May : 3 Chinese engineers killed near Gwadar, in Baluchistan.
 7 May : 23 people killed in a Karachi Shia mosque.
 31 May : 24 people killed in a Karachi Shia mosque.
 6 June : 2 persons killed during a landmine explosion in Kohlu district of Baluchistan.
 10 June : 11 people killed in Karachi in an ambush against the army corps commander (who himself escaped).
 27 June : 5 persons killed during an encounter at Maiwand, in Baluchistan.
 30 July : killing in Attock, in Punjab, of 8 people during attack of a convoy in an attempt to assassinate the Minister of finance who happened to be the Prime Minister-designate.
 1 August : 5 army personnel and their civilian driver killed at Khuzdar, second major city of Baluchistan. Attack claimed by the Baluchistan Liberation Army.
 2 August : Baluchistan Chief Minister escapes unhurt during attack of his cavalcade near Surab, 180 km south-west of Quetta. 2 people who accompanied him are killed.
 5 August : 19 persons killed in South-Waziristan in various incidents.
 8 August : killing of 6 persons in Karachi, near the Binori mosque complex.
 1 October : 31 Shia Muslims killed in Sialkot, Punjab, during an attack against a Shia mosque.
 7 October : 40 Sunni Muslims killed in blasts during a meeting in Multan, Punjab.
 10 October : 5 people killed in one explosion at the entrance of a mosque in Lahore.
 14 October : one Chinese hostage killed during a rescue operation carried on by a commando of the Special Services Group in South-Waziristan tribal area. Two Chinese had been snatched by militants on 9 October. The second Chinese has been freed unharmed.
 4 November : 8 soldiers killed by landmine explosions on a road near Kanigoram in South-Waziristan.
 10 December : 11 people killed, including 2 army personnel, in a bomb explosion claimed by the Baluchistan Liberation Army on the Mezeen Chowk in Quetta.

2005

4 August : killing of 5 military personnel in the Ghalnamai area of North Waziristan Agency.
 22 September : killing of 9 persons in two separate bomb blasts in Lahore.
 7 October : killing of 8 persons by a bomb blast in an Ahmadiya place of worship, at Mong in Punjab.

In Bangladesh

2000

November : killing of a journalist by the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami.

2001

20 January : killing of 6 people in Dhaka during two bomb blasts.
 6 February : 7 persons killed in a clash between Islamic militants and the security forces at Brahanbaria.
 14 April : killing of 8 people in a bomb explosion set off by suspected Islamic fundamentalists at a Bengali cultural function in Dhaka.

2002

7 December : attack against cinema houses in Mymensingh (18 people killed).

2003

15 persons assassinated in Khulna during the full year.

2004

8 January : killing of 3 activists of the United People's Democratic Front in Rangamati district.

30 January 2004 : murder of a politician in Khulna.

21 May : blast kills 2 people in Sylhet (British High Commissioner was injured during the attack).

21 August : 19 Awami League supporters killed in Dhaka in an attempt to assassinate the leader of this party, then in opposition.

2005

17 August : blasts in various places in the country, killing 3 people and injuring over 150.

In Nepal (massive attacks comparable to conventional feats of arms not included)**1996**

13 February : armed uprising of the Maoist movement. This date marks the beginning of the civil war.

2002

17 February : attacks by the Maoist insurgents in western districts. 140 security people killed.

September : attack of a police station at Bhimad, a small town in the Sindhuli district east of Kathmandu (more than 50 policemen killed).

September : attack by Maoist insurgents of Sandhikharta, a town west of the country (30 policemen, 15 soldiers and 9 members of the local security force killed).

2003

28 August : two army colonels are shot in Kathmandu, one of them is killed.

31 August : 9 rebels and 5 security personnel killed in separate clashes.

2004

14 June : 21 policemen killed in an ambush at Khairikhola, in the West of the country (a guerrilla event more than a terrorist act).

5 July : 21 soldiers 23 Maoist insurgents killed in two separate incidents (a guerrilla event more than a terrorist act).

17 November : killing of 8 policemen ambushed in the western part of the country.

2005

7 August : killing by maoists of 43 security personnel at Pili in the Kalikot district.

In Bhutan

2001

31 July : killing at Dadgiri, on Indian territory, in a bomb blast of 6 Bhutan nationals, presumably by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland.

2004

5 September : two people killed, reported to be Indians, in a bomb blast in a market of Gelephu town.

In Sri Lanka (massive attacks comparable to conventional feats of arms not included)

1974

destruction of an Avro aircraft at an airport in Sri Lanka

1975

murder of the Jaffna mayor by Vellupillai PRABHAKARAN (now leader of the LTTE movement)

1978

7 April : ambush by members of the separatist movement Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of a police patrol, killing 4 men. This marks the beginning of the Tamil insurgency.

September : burning by the LTTE of a Air Ceylon plane at Jaffna airport.

1983

23 July : murder of 13 soldiers of the Sri Lankan army by the LTTE. This date marks the beginning of anti-Tamil riots.

1984

10 September : ambush by the LTTE of an army convoy, killing 15 soldiers.

20 November : attack by the LTTE against a police station, killing 40 policemen.

1987

5 July : killing by a LTTE suicide bomber of 30 soldiers billeted in the Nelliady Central College, in the Jaffna peninsula.

1990

10 July : attack by the LTTE of the Sri Lankan naval ship Edithara.
massacre of 130 Muslims by the LTTE in the Batticaloa district.

1991

4 May : the Sri Lankan command ship Abitha is sunk by the LTTE.

1994

25 October : assassination of a candidate to the Presidency of the Republic.

1995

April : two Avro aircraft are shot down by the LTTE, using surface to air missiles.
11 November : 15 persons killed in an LTTE attack on the army headquarters in Colombo.

1996

31 January : 91 persons killed during an attack by the LTTE of the Central Bank in Colombo.
February : various terrorists acts in Colombo.
24 July : 70 persons killed as the LTTE bombs a passenger train near the capital Colombo.

1997

October : destruction of a patrol ship of the navy.
15 October : 18 persons killed as LTTE suicide bombers drive a truck packed with a large quantity of explosives into the world trade centre building in Colombo.

1998

25 January : attack against the Temple of the Tooth Relic in Kandy, killing 20 people.
4 February : mortar bombing of Batticaloa killing more than 10 people.
6 February : suicide attack in Colombo, killing more than 20 civilian and military personnel.
22 February : suicide attack against two transportation ships from the navy off Point Pedro, killing more than 50 military people.

1999

18 December : attack against President of the Republic, Chandrika KUMARATUNGA. She is wounded and has lost one eye. 13 persons are killed in the blast.
11 August : attack against a police convoy, killing 11 police men, East of Colombo.
18 September : suspected LTTE cadres, many of them women, attack three villages killing 50 persons.

2000

5 January : 13 people killed in a bomb blast in Colombo.

1 Septembre : 15 air force personnel are killed in a LTTE attack on their vehicle in northern Sri Lanka.

23 October : attack of the naval complex in Trincomalee. A ship is sunk and several others damaged.

2001

22 May : 10 naval personnel are killed as LTTE carries out a claymore mine blast in the Thambalagamuwa general area, 40 km away from Trincomalee.

24 July : attack of the Sri Lankan Katunayake air base and the adjoining international airport of Colombo. 7 security personnel are killed. 8 military aircraft and 6 Airbus passengers aircraft, that means about half the national airline's fleet, are destroyed.

November : killing of 14 policemen.

2002

21 December : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).

2003

18 April : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

13 June : killing in Jaffna of a leader of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) by the LTTE.

2004

1 March : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the United National Party (UNP) and of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

30 March : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

5 July : the political head of the LTTE in Batticaloa is assassinated by renegade supporters of colonel Karuna.

7 July : a woman from the LTTE commits a suicide attack in Colombo (Kollupitiya police station) which killed 4 policemen.

21 July : assassination by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

25 July : 7 important supporters of colonel KARUNA, the Tiger renegade, shot dead at Kottawa, in the outskirts of Colombo by the LTTE.

31 July : killing in Colombo of one anti-LTTE intelligence operative and of a member of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).

10 August : assassination in Trincomalee by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

11 August : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

16 August : killing by the LTTE in Colombo of the spokesperson of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

20 August : two leaders of the LTTE killed in an ambush, allegedly laid by followers of the dissident colonel KARUNA, in the eastern Batticaloa district.

11 September : assassination in Jaffna by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

18 September : assassination in Colombo by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

22 September : killing in the Batticaloa district by the LTTE of the elder brother of colonel KARUNA and of two of his aides.

23 September : assassination in Colombo by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP).

27 September : killing in Jaffna by the LTTE of a Tamil politician belonging to the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF, Varathar faction).

5 October : killing of two Muslims at Welikanda, near Batticaloa in the Eastern province by the LTTE.

19 October : assassination in Batticaloa by the LTTE of a member of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

19 November : killing in Colombo of a judge who handed down strict sentences on offences including terrorism (he had condemned PRABHAKARAN to 200 year jail term).

25 November : killing in Colombo by the LTTE of a member of the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (a moderate political party and a rival of the LTTE).

2005

23 February : killing of one soldier by the LTTE at Killali, in the north.

30 October : killing in the outskirts of Colombo of an army intelligence officer.

APPENDIX 3

MAIN MILITANTS ORGANIZATIONS IN INDIA AND RELATED TO INDIA

The list below, in alphabetical order, is not comprehensive. It also includes organizations which may have disappeared or are dormant and does not include some new ones which may have appeared. The listed organizations may or may not resort to terrorism but most of them do.

Some organizations based in provinces may also be active in other parts of the country. This is true particularly for those based in Kashmir.

The Muslim militant organizations are to be found in all India but mainly in Jammu and Kashmir and in Assam (therefore in the list below, most are mentioned State-wise). They can generally be identified through their names. Some of them sharing the same name, may be found in several States. For instance, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) is to be found in Jammu and Kashmir and Assam. It may be the same organization operating through different branches or not.

Some organizations like the Jamaat-i-Islami exist also in Pakistan and Bangladesh but function independently.

All India organizations

Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES), also named Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj, recruiting Nepalese who live in India

All India Sikh Students Federation

Dalit Panthers of India

Deedar Anjuman

Jamaat-i-Islami (Jil) ou Jamaat-i-Islami Hind

Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)

In the North-East

Al Jihad-e-Islam, unknown till October 2004

North-East Students Organization (NESO)

Arunachal Pradesh

All Liberation Tigers of Arunachal Pradesh (ALTAP)

Arunachal Dragon Federation or Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF), or Arunachal Dragon Organization (ADO), a surrogate group of the United Liberation Front of Assam

Liberation Tigers of Arunachal (LTA)

National Liberation Front of Arunachal (NLFA)

Patriotic Revolutionary Army of Arunachal (PRAA)
 United Liberation Army of Arunachal (ULAA)
 United Liberation Movement of Arunachal Pradesh (ULMA)
 United Liberation Volunteers of Arunachal Pradesh (UJVA)
 United Peoples' Volunteers of Arunachal Pradesh (UPVA)

Assam

Al Jihad-e-Islam, unknown till October 2004
 Bengali Tiger Force (BTF)
 Black widows, a breakaway faction of the Dima Halim Daogah
 Bodo Liberation Army (BLA)
 Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), dissolved on 6 December 2003
 Bodo Regiment
 Bodo Security Force (BSF)
 Bodo Tigers Liberation Front (BRLF)
 Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF)
 Coordination Committee for Bodoland Movement (CCBM)
 Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), a surrogate group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction)
 Dima National Army
 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), created in 1999
 Hmar People's Convention (HPC)
 Hmar People's Convention - Democratic (HPC - D), created in 1995, a former faction of Hmar People's Convention
 Islamic Revolutionary Front, created in Manipur in 1989, has spread in Assam
 Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), a former and rechristened faction of the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
 Karbi National Volunteers (KNV), merged in March 1999 with the Karbi People's Front (KPF) to form the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
 Karbi People's Front (KPF), merged in March 1999 with the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) to form the United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
 Kuki National Army (KNA), primarily based in Manipur
 Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), primarily based in Manipur
 Muslim Liberation Army (MLA), created in June 1994
 Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), established on October 3, 1986
 United Bodo Nationalist Liberation Front (UBNLF)
 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) (the word Asom is also used instead of Assam), created on April 7, 1979
 United Peoples' Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), an insurgent movement of the Karbis, established in March 1999, a surrogate group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction), The movement has split beginning of 2002.

Manipur

Chin Revolutionary Army (CRA), operating also in Mizoram and even in Myanmar
 Islamic National Liberation Front (INLF)
 Islamic People's Front (IPF)
 Islamic National Front

Islamic Revolutionary Front, created in 1989
 Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC)
 Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), formed in 1980
 Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup ou Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), created in 1994, a surrogate group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction)
 Kuki Defence Force (KDF)
 Kuki Independent Army (KIA)
 Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)
 Kuki Liberation Front (KLF)
 Kuki National Army (KNA)
 Kuki National Front (KNF)
 Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), operating also in Assam (particularly in the Karbi area)
 Manipur People's Army (MPA)
 Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), established in 1999, regrouping the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF)
 Manipur Red Guard Army, infant sub-nationalist movement, now disappeared
 Meitei State Committee (MSC)
 North-Eastern Minority Front (NEMF)
 Northeast Minority People's Front (NEMPF)
 People's Liberation Army (PLA), a militant outfit composed of Meiteis, created in 1978
 People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), a communist militant outfit composed of Meiteis, created in 1977
 People's United Liberation Front (PULF), a surrogate group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction), gathering Muslim activists, created in 1994
 Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM)
 Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)
 United
 Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF)
 United National Liberation Front (UNLF), created in 1964
 Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)

Meghalaya

Achik Liberation Magrik Army (ALMA) laid down arms on October 25, 1994 but some militants resumed fighting, possibly within the Achik National Volunteers' Council
 Achik National Volunteers' Council (ANVC), created in December 1995
 Hajong United Liberation Army (HULA)
 Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), created in September 1989 and which split soon after into Achik Liberation Magrik Army (ALMA) and Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)
 Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)
 Hynniewtrep National Special Red Army (HNSRA), created in July 2004
 Hynniewtrep National Youth Front Tiger Force (HNYFTF)
 North-East Red Army (NERA), may have disappeared in 2001
 People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM)
 Pnar Liberation Army (PnLA)
 Retrieval Indigenous United Front (RIUF), created in June 2004
 United Achik National Front (UANF), created in 2004

Mizoram

Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram (BLFM), created in 2002

Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), representing the minority Hindu or Buddhist Bru, also called Reang ethnic Group

Chin Revolutionary Army (CRA), operating also in Manipur and even in Myanmar

Hmar People's Convention (HPC) or Hmar People's Convention-Democracy (HPC-D), a surrogate group of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction)

Mizo National Army (MNA)

Mizo National Front (MNF), created in 1960 under the name Mizo National Famine Front, the new name being given on 22 October 1961

Mizo Zirlal Pawl (MZP), organisation of students

Nagaland

Naga Federal Government (NFG)

Naga Home Guards (NHG)

Naga National Council (NNC), accepted the Indian constitution in 1975 but a breakaway group created the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980, which itself split into two factions in 1988

Naga National Council (Adino) (NCC - A)

Naga National Council (Khadao) (NCC - K)

Naga National Democratic Party (NNDP)

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah faction) (NSCM - IM). Isak and Muivah are the names of the two leaders of that faction, the first one being from Nagaland and the second one from the Ukhrul district of Manipur. Created on April 30, 1988.

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) (NSCN - K). Khaplang is the name of the leader of that faction ; he is originating from Myanmar. Created on April 30, 1988. This faction is also active in two districts of Arunachal Pradesh (Changlang and Tirap)

People's Militia of Nagaland (PMN)

Tripura

All Tripura People's Liberation Organization (ATPLO), created in 1982

All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF), established in May 1990

Amra Bangali, a private army of immigrated Bangladeshis

Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT)

National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), established in December 1989 but started to disintegrate in 2001. Now split into three factions (NLFT-N led by Nayanbashi JAMATIYA, NLFT-B led by Biswamohan DEBBARMA and a part of NLFT-B led by Montu KOLOI)

Tribal National Volunteers (TNV), created in 1980

Tribal Students Federation (TSF)

Tripura Liberation Organization Front (TLOF), created in 1992

Tripura People's Democratic Front (TPDF)

Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti (TUJS), created in 1967

United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF)

In Kashmir

Al Badr or Al Badr Mujahideen, established in 1998
 Al Faran
 Al Fateh
 Al Jihad
 Al Jung
 Al Mansooreen, or Al Mansoorian or Al Mansooran, a front outfit of Lashkar-e-Toiba
 Al Nasireen
 Allah Tigers
 All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
 Al Umar Commandos
 Al Umar-Mujahideen
 Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), a women's organization
 Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI)
 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), established in 1985, renamed Jamiat-ul Ansar or Harkat-ul-Ansar
 Hizbullah Islamia Jamhoria, came to light in 1989
 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) or Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Pir Panjal Regiment, established in 1989
 Hizb-i-Islami
 Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon
 Islamic Front
 Islamic Jamat-e-Tulba
 Islamic Students League
 Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (IIM), a front organization of the Lashkar-e-Toiba
 Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), established in 2000, renamed Al Furqan or Khuddam-ul Islam
 Jamaat-i-Islami (JiI, Kashmiri branch, separate from the Indian branch)
 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM), established in the 1990s
 Jamaat-ul-Tulba
 Jammu and Kashmir Freedom Force
 Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front
 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), established in UK in 1976-1977
 Janbaz Mujahideen
 Jihad Force
 Kashmir Freedom Forum (KFF)
 Kashmir Resistance Forum (KRF) which regroups several militant organizations
 Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ)
 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), established in 1989, renamed Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith or Markaz-ad
 Dawa-il-Irshad (a political wing in fact) or Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which has itself split, one of the
 new factions being called Khair-un-Naas
 Mahaz-e-Azadi
 Muslim Janbaz Force
 Muttahida Jihad Council (United Jihad Council), an umbrella organization of Islamist groups
 engaged in operations in Jammu and Kashmir
 Nassir-ul-Islam
 People's League
 Salvation Front
 Save Kashmir (may be a cover of a known movement)
 Student Liberation Front
 Tehreek-e-Jihad, created in 1997
 Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen

United Jihad Council, which regroups 13 militant groups
Zia Tigers

In north-central part

Brahamrishi Sena, comprising mainly Bhumihars.

Bhumi Sena, comprising mainly Kurmis.

Kuer Sena, comprising mainly Rajputs.

Lal Raksha Dal, armed wing of the Maoist Communist Centre.

Lorik Sena, comprising mainly Yadavs

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), established in 1969.

People's War Group (PWG), established on 22 April 1980. The group has created a pure military wing, the People's Guerrilla Army (PGA)

Communist Party of India (Maoist), created on September 21, 2004, with the merging of the Maoist Communist Centre and the People's War Group. In fact this new party wants to play a role in the whole of India.

Forest Protection Committee (Jungle Surakkhya Committee).

People's Liberation Army (Praja Bimukhti Sainya).

People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), created on December 2, 2004, by the merging of the two armed wings of the Maoist Communist Centre and the People's War Group.

People's Revolutionary Platform (Lok Sangram Manch)

Ranvir Sena (also called Ranbir Sena), created by landlords against Maoists.

Revolutionary Farmers' Committee (Krantikari Kisan Committee).

Shanti Sena (Peace army), created to fight the Maoists.

In or related to Punjab

All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)

Babbar Khalsa (BK)

Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)

Bhindrawala Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTFK), created in April 1987

Dal Khalsa International (DKI)

Dashmesh Regiment (DR)

International Council for Khalistan (ICK)

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)

Khalistan Armed Force (KAF)

Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), constituted in February 1986 and which includes several factions (including Panjwar faction)

Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) or Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) or Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)

Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF) or Khalistan Liberation Force

Khalistan Liberation Organization (KLO), created in January 1988

Khalistan National Army (KNA)

Khalsa Raj Party

In Tamil Nadu

Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA)

Tamil National Retrieval Troops (TNRT)

In West Bengal

Gorkha Liberation Organization (GLO)

Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), established in 1995, a surrogate group of the United Liberation Front of Assam

APPENDIX 4

MAIN MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN AND RELATED TO PAKISTAN

The list below, in alphabetical order, is not comprehensive. It also includes organizations which may have disappeared or are dormant and does not include some new ones which may have appeared. The listed organizations may or may not resort to terrorism but most of them do.

Some organizations like the Jamaat-i-Islami exist also in India and Bangladesh but function independently.

Al Zulfikar (created by the two sons of the former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO executed under the military regime of ZIA-UL-HAQ). Active in the 1980s. Does not exist any more.

Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, created in 1977.

Hizb-ul-Tahreer (Liberation Party). It is a non-violent movement with roots from England to Central Asia. It may in the future resort to violence.

Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami.

Islami-Tehreek-e-Pakistan.

Jamaat-i-Islami (Jil)

Jundullah (The army of Allah), affiliated to the International Islamic Front (IIF).

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), created in 1996, Sunni, anti-Shia

Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO), reportedly founded in January 2002 as a conglomerate of Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad

Markaz-ad-Dawa-il-Irshad (sponsoring Lashkar-i-Toiba), renamed Jamaat-ad-Dawa.

Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP, Shia group, anti-Sunni)

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, army of the Prophet followers), created in 1985, Sunni, anti-Shia. Since it was banned, has created a new movement, Millat-i-Islamia

Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP, Shia group, anti-Sunni), renamed Tehrik-e-Islami.

Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), militant Wahabi tribal group operating mainly in the North-West Frontier Province (Swat valley and adjoining areas)

In Sindh

Nadeem Commando, comprised largely of Mohajirs, linked to the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (previously named Mohajir Qaumi Movement)

In Baluchistan

Baluchistan Liberation Army or Baluch Liberation Army (BLA)

Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF)

Baluch National Army (BNA)
 National Liberation Movement
 People's Liberation Army (PLA)

In the Northern Areas

Balawaristan National Front
 Bolor Research Forum (see "Dawn", 2 December 2004)

In Azad Kashmir

Jamaat-i-Islami (JiI, Kashmiri branch, separate from the Pakistan branch)

Organizations active in Indian Kashmir

(with headquarters, offices and other facilities in various Pakistani provinces, in the Northern Areas and in Azad Kashmir)

Al Arifeen

Al Badr, or Al Badr Mujahideen, established in 1998

Harkat-i-Jehadi Islami (HJI)

Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI)

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), established in 1985, renamed Jamiat-ul-Ansar or Harkat-ul-Ansar

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al Alami (HuMaA)

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), established in 2000, renamed Al Furqan or Jamaat-ul-Furqan or Khuddam-ul-Islam

Jamaat-ul-Fuqra (JuF).

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JUM), established in the 1990s.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), established in UK in 1976-1977

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), established in 1989, renamed Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith or Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which has itself split, one of the new factions being called Khair-un-Naas

Muslim United Army (MUA)

Tehreek-ul-Mujahiddeen (TuM)

APPENDIX 5

MAIN MILITANT ORGANIZATION IN BANGLADESH

The list below, in alphabetical order, is not comprehensive. It also includes organizations which may have disappeared or are dormant and does not include some new ones which may have appeared. The listed organizations may or may not resort to terrorism but most of them do.

Some organizations like the Jamaat-i-Islami exist also in India and Pakistan but function independently.

Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO)
Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami (HuJI), established in 1992
Hizb-ul-Touhid
Hizb-ul-Tahrir
International Khatme Nabuwat Movement Bangladesh (IKNMB)
Islami Biplobi Parishad
Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), established in 1941, as the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami
Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ), a member of the ruling coalition in 2004
Islami Shashantantra Andolan (Islamic Constitutional Movement)
Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), established in 1998
Jamaat-i-Islami (Jil), a member of the ruling coalition in 2004
Jamiat-ul- Mujahideen (JuM)
Mujahideen al-Islam
Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP)
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO)
Shahadat-e-Al-Hikma (SeAH)
Shanti Bahini, created in 1976, disbanded in 1998 but remnants may still exist
Tamir-ul-Din
United People's Democratic Front (UPDF)

APPENDIX 6

MILITANT ORGANIZATION FORBIDDEN IN INDIA

The list may not be complete or accurate because it is reviewed periodically by the Indian federal government and States. In September 2004, there were 32 terrorist organizations banned under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) but some other ones may be banned under other acts. After the repeal of POTA, on September 17, 2004, those 32 organizations remain banned referring to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Among the 32 proscribed organizations, 18 are active in the North-East (see annual report 2003-2004 of the Union Ministry of home affairs).

Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj, also named Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj
Al Qaeda
Students Islamic Movement of India – SIMI.

Assam

Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF)
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), declared unlawful on November 27, 1990.

Manipur

Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lu (KYKL)
Kuki Liberation Front (KLF)
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)

Meghalaya

Achik National Volunteers' Council (ANVC), forbidden under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, on November 16, 2000
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), forbidden on November 16, 2000

Tripura

All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF)
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

Kashmir

Al Badr.

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) or Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Pir Panjal Regiment (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Islamic Jamat-e-Tulba (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Islamic Students League (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Jamaat-ul- Furqan.

Jamat-i-Islami (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), renamed Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith or Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

Mahaz-e-Azadi (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

People's League (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

Students Liberation Front (forbidden under the State Criminal Law enactment Act).

In north-central part

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), since December 2002.

People's War Group (PWG), since December 2002.

Communist Party of India-Maoist, since August 17, 2005 in Andhra Pradesh and September 5, 2005 in Chhatisgarh.

Tamil movement

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

APPENDIX 7

MILITANT ORGANIZATION FORBIDDEN IN PAKISTAN

The list may not be complete or accurate because it is reviewed periodically by the Pakistani government.

Al Qaeda, since 2003
Jamaat-ul-Furqan
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), since 12 January 2002
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
Hizb-ul-Tahreer (Liberation Party), since November 2003.
Islami-Tehreek-e-Pakistan
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) since 12 January 2002
Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP)
Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)

APPENDIX 8

MILITANT ORGANIZATION FORBIDDEN IN BANGLADESH

The list may not be complete or accurate because it is reviewed periodically by the Pakistani government.

Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI), since October 17, 2005
Jamiat-ul- Mujahideen (JuM)

APPENDIX 9

MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS DECLARED TERRORIST OR SUPPORTING TERRORISM BY THE USA

The list which includes political parties and charities may not be complete or accurate because it is reviewed periodically by the American government.

Organizations active in all South Asia

Al Qaeda

Organizations active in India or concerning India

Babbar Khalsa International

Communist Party of India (Maoist)

Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), renamed Jamiat-ul-Ansar or Harkat-ul-Ansar, declared a terrorist organization in 1994.

Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (HM)

International Sikh Youth Federation

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), renamed Al Furqan or Khuddam-ul Islam, established in 2000

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)

People's War Group (PWG)

Organizations active in Pakistan or concerning Pakistan

Afghan Support Committee

Aid Organization of the Ulema

Al Akhtar Trust International

Al Aqsa Foundation

Al Harmain Foundation

Al Rashid Trust

Rabita Trust

Revival of Islamic Heritage Society

Umma Tamer-i-Nau

Wafa Humanitarian Organization

Organizations active in Nepal

Maoist Communist Party of Nepal and several aliases for the organization (Communist Party of Nepal - Marxist, United Revolutionary People's Council, People's Liberation Army of Nepal)

Organizations active in Bangladesh or concerning Bangladesh

Al Harmain Foundation
Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami (HuJI)

Organizations active in Sri Lanka

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), since 9 October 1997

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Furthermore, a lot of information has been collected during various assignments of the author in South Asia from 1965 to 1995 (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives). Further data have been gathered during travels from 1995 onwards, including in the most recent years (the last one being in spring and summer 2004) in India, (particularly North-East and Jammu and Kashmir), in Pakistan (especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas located within the North-West Frontier Province, the Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas), through personal observations and interviews with authorities and specialists.

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